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Foreword 
This is one of the studies on the economic and social modern­
ization of Korea undertaken jointly by the Harvard Institute 
for 7nternational Development and the Korea Development 
Institute. The undertaking has twin objectives; to examine the 
elements underlying the remarkable growth of the Korean 
economy and ti,e distribution of the fruits of that growth, 
together with the associated changes in society and government; 
and to evaluate the importance of foreign economic assistance, 
particularly American assistance, in promoting these changes. 
The rapid rate of growth of the Korean economy, matched in 
the less developed world (apart from the oil exporters) only by 
similar rates of growth in the neighboring East Asian economies 
of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, has not escaped the 
notice of economists and other observers. Indeed there has been 
fairly extensive analysis of the Korean case. This analysis, has 
V 
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been mainly limited to macroeconomic phenomena; to the be­
havior of monetary, fiscal, and foreign-exchange magnitudes 
and to the underlying policies affecting these magnitudes. But 
thert are elements other than these that need to be taken into 
account to explain what has happened. The development of 
Korean entrepreneurship has been remarkable; Korea has an 
industrious and disciplined labor force; the contribution of 
agricultural development both to overall growth and to the dis­
tribution of income requires assessment; the level of literacy 
and the expansion of secondary and higher education have 
made their mark; and the combination and interdependence of 
government and private initiative and administration have been 
remarkably productive. These aspects together with the growth 
of urban areas, changes in the mortality and fertility of the 
population and in public health, are the primary objects of 
study. It is hoped that they will provide the building blocks 
from which an overall assessment of modernization in Korea 
can be constructed. 
Economic assistance from the United States and, to a lesser 
extent, from other countries, has made a sizable but as yet un­
evaluated contribution to Korean development. A desire to have 
an assessment undertaken of this contribution, with whatever 
successes or failures have accompanied the U.S. involvement, 
was one of the motives for these studies, which have been fi­
nanced in part by the U.S. Agency for International Develop­
ment and, in part, by the Korea Development Institute. From 
1945 to date, U.S. AID has contiibuted more than $6 billion to 
the Korean economy. There has also been a substantial fallout 
from the $7 billion of U.S. military assistance. Most of the 
economic assistance was contributed during the period before 
1965, and most of it was in the form of grants. In later years 
the amount of economic assistance has declined rapidly and 
most of it, though concessional, has been in the form of loans. 
Currently, except for a minor trickle, U.S. economic assistance 
has ceased. The period of rapid economic growth in Korea has 
been since 1963, and in Korea, as well as in other countries 
receiving foreign assistance, it is a commonplace that it is the 
receiving country that is overwhelmingly responsible for what 
vi 
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growth, or absence of growth, takes place. Nevertheless. eco­
nomic assistance to Korea was exceptionally large, and what­
ever contribution was in fact made by outsiders needs to be 
assessed. One of the studies, The Developmental Role of the 
Foreign Sector and Aid, deals with foreign assistance in macro­
economic terms. The contribution of economic assistance to 
particular sectors is considered in the other studies. 
All the studies in this series have involved American and 
Korean collaboration. For some studies the collaboration has 
been close; for others less so. All the American participants have 
spent some time in Korea in the course of their research, and a 
number of Korean participants have visited the United States. 
Only a fcw of the American participants have been able to read 
and speak Korean and, in consequence, the collaboration of their 
colleagues in making Korean materials available has been invalu­
able. This has truly been a joint enterprise. 
The printed volumes in this series will include studies on the 
growth and structural transformation of the Korean economy, 
the foreign sector and aid, urbanization, rural development, the 
role of entrepreneurship, population policy and demographic 
transition, and education. Studies focusing on several other 
topics-the financial system, the fiscal system, labor economics 
and industrial relations, health and social development-will 
eventually be available either in printed or mimeographed 
form. The project will culminate in a final summary volume on 
the econcmic and social development of Korea. 
Edward S. Mason 
Harvard institute 
for International Development 
Mahn Je Kim 
President, 
Korea Development Institute 
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A Note on Romanization 
In ronianizing Korean, we have used the McCune-Reischauer 
system and have generally followed the stylistic guidelines set 
forth by the Library of Congress. In romanizing the names of 
Koreans in the McCune-Reischauer system, we have put a hy­
phen between the two personal names, the second of which 
has not been capitalized. For the names of historical or political 
figures, well-known place names, and the trade names of com­
panies, we have tried to follow the most widely used romaniza­
tion. For works written in Korean, the author's name appears 
in McCune-Reischauer romanization, sometimes followed by 
the author's preferred romanization if he or she has published in 
English. For works by Korean authors in English, the author's 
name is written as it appears in the original publication, some­
times followed by the author's name in McCune-Reischauer 
romanization, especially if the author has published in Korean 
also. In ordering the elements of persons' names, we have 
adopted a Western sequence-family name first in all alphabet­
ized lists, but last elsewhere. This is a sequence used by some, 
but by no means all, Koreans who write in English. To avoid 
confusion, however, we have imposed an arbitrary consistency 
upon varying practices. Two notable exceptions occur in refer­
ences to President Park Chung Hee, and Chang Myon, for whom 
the use of the family name first seems to be established by cus­
tom and preference. Commonly recurring Korean words such as 
si (city) have not been italicized. Korean words in the plural are 
not followed by the letter "s." Finally, complete information 
on authors' names or companies' trade names was not always 
available; in these cases we have simply tried to be as accurate 
as possible. 
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Preface 
It is a matter of common observation that governments in less 
developed countries play a larger role in economic processes 
than was true in Western countries at similar stages of develop­
ment or, for that matter, than governments play in most Western 
countries today. This is evidenced not only by the impor­
tance of public enterprise in the industrial sector but also by 
the scope of government control over private economic activ­
ities. It follows that how the decisions of government relate to 
private decision-making in the allocation and use of resources 
has a good deal to do with the course of development. Yet 
these relationships are given short shrift in theories of develop­
ment, and it is easy to see why this is so. They are closely 
bound up with the political and cultural characteristics of 
particular societies and do not lend themselves to the broad 
gene-alizations and cross-country comparisons that are the 
xxvii 
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bread and meat of development literature. Yet government­
business relationships arc important in the development process. 
To understand these relationships, it is necessary to examine 
the political forces that have shaped the structure of govern­
ment and have determined its priorities: the way ill which 
economic policies are formulated: the characteristics of tile 
bureaucracy that implements these policies; the nature of 
busin ss firms and the sources of business leadership. There are 
not many studies of tile development process in the Third 
World that have undertaken this task, and this is one of the best. 
Tile beginning of rapid economic growth in South Korea is 
usually dated in 1963, which followed by two years the assunlp­
tion of power by military forces led by Park Chung Hee. 
Military leadership gave way to civilian government in 1962 
under a constitution that concentrated power ill tile executive 
branch of a highly centralized regime. This regime, though 
increasingly authoritarian, brought political stability to the 
Republic of Korea, and political stability is a necessary, though 
not sufficient, condition of economic growth in any country. 
This is not to say that events preceding tile military takeover 
had nothing to do with subsequent economic development. 
Two significant land-distribution programs had laid the basis 
for a relatively egalitarian and productive agricultural economy. 
The expansion of educational facilities had produced an un­
usually literate population with extensive training of upper 
ranks. And behind all this was the impact of the East Asian 
culture with its emphasis on education and individual and social 
discipline that has underlain recent rapid growth in all East 
Asian societies. Nevertheless, political stability in the hands of 
a government that gave tile highest priority to economic develop­
ment was the needed catalyst. 
Although all sectors of the economy have grown at a respect­
able rate, it has been an export-oriented industrial expansion 
that has led Korean growth. Since 1963, industrial output 
(manufactures and mining) has expanded at the remarkable 
rate of 18 percent per annun, and exports (mainly of manu-
Xx viii 
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factures) at the even more remarkable rate of 40 percent. It 
is in this area that the relations between government and private 
activity have been closest and most significant. if there is a 
"Korea, Inc.," as there is alleged to be a "Japan, Inc.," it is the 
government that is tie chairman of the board of the corpora­
tion. The absence of vigorous political life has not permitted 
business organizations, as in Japan, to compcte for political 
power, and ownership by goverment of financial intermediar­
ies and control of access to foreign capital have provided the 
principal instruments of government influence on business 
activities. 
Although South Korea is thought of and, in the main, ill fact 
is, a private-enterprise economy, government enterprise has 
played a remarkably large role, a role as large, in fact, as is 
commilion il developing countries following a "socialist pattern." 
Obviously this is not the product of ideology but of an essen­
tially pragmatic policy that supports public enterprise where 
private-market failures or the inability of private enterprise to 
do the job are thought to exist. Over the last decade some 30 
percent of total industrial investment has been directed to 
publicly owned enterprises, though these enterprises account 
for only 10 to 15 percent of total industrial employment. 
Although opinion in Korea considers public enterprise to be 
less efficient than private enterprise, the record indicates that 
it is highly efficient as compared with most public enterprises 
ill other developing countries. The reason for this appears to 
be a government oversight that is not only well informed but 
intolerant of failure. 
It is, however, iii the relationship of government to private 
enterprise that the Korean experience is most worthy of study. 
The government has, in the main, eschewed those detailed and 
largely qIuntitative controls such as industrial licensing, price 
control, rationing, and allocation of foreign exchange that have 
characterized economic policy in India arid many other develop­
ing countries. Nevertheless, the influence of public policy onl 
private investment and output has been real. Beginning in the 
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mid-1960s, a major orientation of this policy has been toward 
the promotion of exports. Domestic credit and foreign borrow­
ing under government guarantee have been made available to 
firms showing a capacity to export. Imports have been made 
available at close to world market prices, and the government 
has actively participated in searching out export opportunities. 
Export targets have been set by product and region of destina­
tion, and the Minister of Commerce and industry has kept close 
track of the performance of individual firms in meeting targets. 
As might be expected in a society in which government lead­
ership is evident, economic planning is taken seriously. The 
Economic Planning Board is under the direction of a Minister 
of Planning who is also Deputy Prime Minister. In addition to 
preparing five-year plans, the board is also charged with the 
preparation of annual Overall Resource Budgets and, since the 
expenditure side of the budget is in the hands of the Economic 
Planning Board rather than the Ministry of Finance, that 
board is the central focus of development strategy. Increasingly 
the Economic Planning Board, in conjunction with relevant 
ministries, is concerned with an examination of alternative 
courses of action. Planning in Korea is substantially more than 
indicative, since the public sector is large, and the private in­
dustrial sector is heavily influenced by government decision­
making, but the resulting mix of public-private relationships 
falls far short of a command economy. Economic policy-making 
in Korea can be briefly characterized as being in the hands of 
relatively few people (though business and other interest 
groups are extensively consulted); conducive to rapid decisions 
(with equally rapid reversal of mistakes); and reaching rather 
far down in productive processes. 
It is, however, in the area of policy implemtntation that the 
Korean economy differs most sharply from most developing 
economies. The manner in which individuals and firms are 
persuaded, cajoled, or compelled to follow government direc­
tion is a seriously neglected area of economic development 
research, and here the authors make an original and substantial 
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contribution. They distinguish inducement from com­
mand procedures and discretionary from non-discretionary 
administration of these procedures. Liberal ideology favors 
non-discretionary inducement as the preferred method of 
policy implementation on the grounds that inducements offer 
possibilities of adaptation that command procedures deny, 
and that withholding discretion from administrative officials 
guards against corruption. The Korean government has made 
extensive use of non-discretionary inducements, but it has 
also used discretionary command procedures to good effect. 
This is possible only to governments possessing a well-trained 
bureaucracy that is either impervious to corruption suf­or 
ficiently supervised to make corruption unprofitable. No one 
would or could say that corruption is absent from the ad­
ministration of Korean economic policies. Indeed. during the 
Rhee regime in the 1950s, it was endemic. But the absence 
of detailed government controls that characterize most Asian 
economies and the existence of a relatively well-trained 
bureaucracy in a government that is determined to produce 
results probably holds corruption down to modest propor­
tions. 
Despite the leading position of government in economic 
affairs, Korea is predominantly a private-enterprise economy. 
Over three-quarters of industrial output is produced in the 
private sector, and it is private enterprise, though acting within 
a policy environment designed by government, that is the 
operating mechanism responsible for rapid growth. Korean 
firms are universally individual-or family-owned-enterprises, 
and the general public is only beginning to participate in equity 
ownership. A great many of these firms, moreover, are still 
in the hands of the founding individuals or families. The rise 
of a large and active group of entrepreneurs is one of the 
striking aspects of Korean development. Jones and SaKong, 
using an extensive questionnaire and numerous personal inter­
views, have examined the regional, family, religious, and ed­
ucational backgrounds and affiliations of this group. It is rather 
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remarkable that, despite the fact that war and political convul­
sion had practically destroyed tlie basis of the old aristocracy 
and economic opportunities have been extensively broadened, 
the entrepreneurial class is, in the main, composed of descen­
dants of former elite groups. 
Public policy has tended to encourage the rise of large con­
glomerates, since domestic credit and access to foreign borrow­
ing have been provided to those entrepreneurs who have shown 
a capacity to produce and to export. Preferred access to credit 
plus the fact that Korean corporations are highly leveraged, 
with a relatively small percent of capital represented by equity, 
have produced a high average rate of profits. Since Korean 
business leaders, at least in the first generation, have pursued 
a relatively austere lifestyle, most of these profits have been 
reinvested. A high percent of the expansion of industrial output 
has come from existing rather than new firms, with the result 
that economic concentration has grown rapidly. These large 
multi-firn enterprises in Korea are called chaeb6l and bear 
some resemblance to old style Japanese zaibatsu. The chief 
difference is that they do not control banks, which means that, 
since Lhe distribution of credit is in the hands of the govern. 
meint, the Korean chaeb6l are unlikely to achieve that dominant 
position in the economy and in society attained by the old 
style zaibatsu. Nevertheless, the rapid increase in business 
concentration in Korea has become a public concern, and 
government is attempting to do something about it. How 
successful this will be is still to be determined. 
The rapid industrialization of Korea and its emergence on the 
world scene as a formidable competitor are remarkable events 
in recent economic history. The role of government and the 
role of business have both been large, and the interrelation­
ship of government and business has been at the heart of 
the development process. Jones and SaKong tell the story well 
and, in doing so, have made a significant contrib, tion to the 
literature of development economics. 
Edward S. Mason 
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Park Chung Hec was killed on October 26, 1979, while page 
proofs for this volume were being corrected. We considered 
revising the 1an uscript to reflect this momentous event, but 
decided to let the original vCrsion staid unchanged. 
This book will now appear at a time when there llay be 
increased public awareness of the processes and con seuences of 
eco nomic dccisioji-making under the Park regime. \Vhile this 
would undoubtedly be a healthy short-term corrective, we see 
no reason to alter the 'cner'il; iositive tone of outr volume. 
Internationally (and in the Ilnger run, in Korea itself), the dom­
iant story is how the regi tue was able to achieve a sustainled 
anllual real increase in income of roughly 10 percent both for 
the country and for the poorest 40 percent of tile population. 
The fact that in the process a relatively small number of in­
dividuals benefited disproportionately is important, but 
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secondary when viewing the 1961 to 1979 period as a whole. 
Our primary concern has been to explain how the decision­
making process achieved as much as it did, with somewhat less 
attention to how it might have done even better. 
Nonetheless, when looking to the future, the weaknesses 
of the systcn deserve to be re-emphasized as they might be 
expected to be the focus of reform efforts. While a historical 
volume such as this is not tile place for either prediction or 
prescription, it may be useful to underline those features of 
the existing system that are most likely to be altered in the 
future. 
While change in the sphere of economic decision-making is 
likely to be much less dramatic than in the politic ilarena, it 
is nonetheless liable to be significant. In the first place, exo­
genous political change will impact on the ecoinimic system; 
and in the second place, endogenous econo-mic trends may 
produce reactions. 
If the political changes emanating from the events of October 
1979 constitute a mo;e towards democracy and away from 
authoritarianism, then onc consequence will be greater plural­
ism in economic decision-making. Additional actors will be 
appended to the rather narrow hierarchical structure we have 
described. The influence Of legislators and politicians is likely 
to increase both in policy formation and in the critical day-rt­
day implementation decisions of civil servants. if democratic 
electoral success is in part dependent on availability of cam­
paign funds, and if the dominant source of such funds is 
business, then the power of the :-haeb~l may actually increase. 
Unions might well gain a signifi:ant role in the process. In 
short, tlere may be modificati,,is in such characteristics of the 
system as executive dominan,.e, speed of decision-making, and 
the use of discretionary command enforced by partial mutu­
ality. In addition, system goal are likely to shift to give less 
emphasis to growth, with great r attention to equity and 
stability. 
Turning to endogenous economic ta(LVs, it can be argued 
that, over time, there has been .1marked increase in tile cost/ 
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benefit ratio associated with the existing system. First, the more 
than fivefold expansion of the economy from 1961 to 1979, 
plus equally dramatic alterations in structure, make control 
techniques appropriate to the simple environment of the 1960s 
inappropriate for the 1980s. Decentralization of decision­
making, reduced reliance on command, increased use of field 
manipulation and the market, and reduced discretion of civil 
servants all become increasingly desirable in a more complicated 
environment where the infcrmation available to a small number 
of civil servants is a decreasing share of the total needed to run 
the economy. Second, demand for certain social goods may be 
highly income elastic: at $100 per capita the dominant concern 
may be simply to get jobs for people's hands and food for their 
bellies; with this accomplished at $1500 per capita, equity and 
social justice become far more important. Finally, while the 
level of business concentration was low in the 1 960s, its rapid 
rate of growth creates increasing potential for abuse. Forty­
odd chaebZ51 producing, say, 10 percent of non-agricultural 
GDP is quite a different matter from the same number being 
responsible for 20 percent or more. 
None of these changes occurred suddenly in 1979. Indeed, 
during the late 1970s, these sorts of concerns were being voiced 
with increasing frequency both within the government and 
outside it; and some policy changes were already taking place 
in the directions suggested above. What has changed discontin­
uously is the opportunity for actually implementing necessary 
changes in the decision-making process so as to fully reflect the 
realities of the 1980s as opposed to those of the 1960s. As 
always, the danger is that of overreaction, with the possibility 
that the very real strengths of the existing system will be under­
mined in the reform process. It is hoped that the present volume, 
in analyzing both the benefits and costs of the historical starting 
point, may contribute to a rational and balanced reform program. 
Leroy P. Jones 
I1SaKong 
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Introduction 
ISSUES IN KOREAN GROWTH 
A striking feature of post-war Korean history is the coincidence 
of economic and political turning points. On May 16, 1961, 
a military coup brought Park Chung Hee to power. Under pre­
vious regimnL the economy had grown at a real annual rate of 
slightly more than 4 percent; thereafter it averaged nearly 10 
percent.' The question naturally arises as to whether this 
relationship is accidental or causal. 
Korea in 1961 represented a stage of suppressed growth 
potential in that the level of social development was conducive 
to a standard of economic achievement far higher than that 
actually attained. This is crudely reflected in Adelman and 
Morris's finding that, of severity-four developing countries, 
Korea was sixtieth in 1961 per capita income but fourteenth 
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in a composite indicator of socio-cultural development.2 The 
question is why this gap developed and what happened in the 
early 1960s to allow tapping of the potential. 
The marked discontinuity in the growth rate may be ex­
plained in terms of: 1) some sort of "stage theory" of economic 
development in which "preconditions" established in the 
1950s allowed "take-off" in the 1960s; or, 2) differences in 
government actions. The truth is undoubtedly a mixture whose 
proportions we will not attempt to estimate here. Ours is the 
more modest goal of contributing to an answer by comparing 
selected aspects of the government's economic role under two 
political regimes. 
When an economist evaluates the government's role, he is 
prone to think in terms of policies. From this perspective, the 
difference between the Rhee and Park periods can be explained 
by the shift to a set of rational ecotiomic policies such as 
export promotion, and equilibrium exchange and interest 
rates. A generation of Western economists has been going 
around the world urging less-developed countries (LDCs) to 
adopt this strategy of "getting the prices right." The aim is to 
achieve growth by substituting the invisible hand of market 
forces for the visible hand of government intervention. There 
has been a notable absence of success in convincing countries to 
follow this advice for any extended period of time, but the 
Korean experience is often cited as vindicating the process. 
Gilbert Brown provides a particularly ebullient exposition of 
this view: 
The almost irresistible conclusion from Korean development ex­
perience is that with proper economic policies and a continuation of 
reasonable international aid levels most developing countries can 
achieve at least a 6 per cent annual growth rate, and many countries 
could sustain growth rates as high as 10 per cent.3 
Without denigrating the importance of "proper economic 
policies," we will argue that they are only a part of the causal 
2
 
Issues in Korean Growth 
mechanism and that similarly endowed nations could espouse 
equally appropriate policies with far less dramatic results. There 
is, after all, much to be done between a proclamation of export 
priority and the appearance of Korean shirts on Sears shelves 
or "Pony" automobiles on Riadh streets. Fixing an import 
substitution target for fertilizer does not automatically result 
in an adequate supply of domestic urea in three years rather 
than seven. Reasonable exchange and interest rate policies may 
be necessary for such results but they are far from sufficient in 
the context of a developing economy. 
The missing element is implementation-the translation of 
an administrative abstraction into concrete action by a pro­
duction unit. In Korea, this link has emphatically not been 
provided by sitting back and letting market forces reign. On the 
contrary, the Korean government under Park Chung Hee has 
been actively and pervasively interventionist. The "Korean 
miracle" is not a triumph of laissez faire, but of a pragmatic 
non-ideological mixture of market and non-market forces. 
Where the market works, fine; where it doesn't, the govern­
ment shows no hesitation in intervening by means that range 
from a friendly phone call to public ownership. Implementa­
tion via intervention will be a major theme throughout this 
book. 
A second major concern is the obverse of the first. To start 
again from the view that policies "explain" growth, how are 
these policies themselves to be explained? The basic elements 
of a rational growth-oriented strategy may not be particularly 
obscure to economists, but political leaders in LDCs have not 
proven enamored of the prescriptions of mere "academic 
scribblers." It is thus of interest to push the explanation of 
growth one step deeper and ask how basic strategic decisions 
came to be adopted. Even more important, how are the more 
difficult and more numerous tactical decisions arrived at and 
continually modified in light of changing conditions in an 
open economy? Korea's long-term planning process, reflected 
in a succession of five-year plans, is well known. We shall argue, 
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however, that its rapid and flexible shuct-run adjustments to 
changing economic conditions are even more important in 
explaining rapid growth. 
The concern of this volume, then, is not government policy 
itself, but the way in which it is formulated and implemented. 
This is a rather broad mandate, and it is necessary to narrow the 
focus somewhat. We therefore leave to companion papers the 
government's macroeconomic role in aggregate demand manage­
ment via monetary and fiscal policy and its microeconomic 
role in providin, and financing public and merit goods. The 
reader will be excused for momentarily wondering if anything 
remains, since we have explicity excluded virtually the entire 
content uf traditional Western courses on "Public Economics." 
The answer is an area of particular importance in developing 
mixed economies, namely the state's contribution to increasing 
production in the organized enterprise sector.4 This may be 
accomplished either through direct government participation in 
public enterprise or through guiding, stimulating, and control­
ling private entrepreneurial activity. 
In light of Korea's capitalistic ideological reputation, its 
reliance on public enterprise has been surprisingly heavy, and 
we shall devote a chapter to explaining this paradox. The bulk 
of industrial growth, however, has come in the private sector, 
so that the extraordinary growth of the 1960s is manifest in 
a concomitant blossoming of entrepreneurial activity. Our 
concern with implementation, broadly conceived, thus neces­
sitates substantial attention to the roles of private entrepreneurs 
and managers. Most of our earlier questions on the role of 
government thus can, indeed must, be reformulated in terms of 
the complementary role of the private sector. To what extent 
is this higher rate of business success attributable to identi­
fiable government action, as opposed to independent evolution 
of entrepreneurial talents or a situation in which some critical 
mass of success leads to mutually reinforcing self-perpetuation? 
No definitive answer is possible, but perspective will be pro­
vided by surveying the history of Korean industrial entrepre­
4
 
lheoreticalPerspectiv(es 
neviship, the social backgrounds of a large sample of entrepre­
neurs, and a limited number of case studies of individual busi­
nessmen. The results will suggest that Korean culture and 
hiistory have combined to produce a substantial stock of entre­
pre-neurial intent, but that only after 1961 were these energies 
charuneled into socially constructive outlets through govern­
ment intervention. 
in sum, this volume considers the interaction of government 
a id business in formulating and implementing policies aimed 
at e,;panding industry. The primary goal is to broaden our 
under:;tanding of the dynamics of Korean development by look­
ing 1'ehind the changes in empirical economic magnitudes. A 
secondary goal of this Korean case study is to contribute to an 
understanding of more general issues concerning the interaction 
of government and business in developing a mixed economy. 
We now briefly sketch the outlines of these broader theoreti­
cal questions. Readers interested only in the Korean case may 
proceed directly to the Overview below. 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
VISIBLE VERSUS INVISIBLE HANDS 
The debate over the appropriate role of government is hardly 
new. Indeed, modern economic theory is rooted in Adam 
Smith's exposition on the merits of the invisible hand of the 
market over the visible hand of government. Although the 
topic is currently out of favor on the frontiers of the pro­
fession, there is nonetheless a very substantial body of litera­
ture on what John Maynard Keynes termed "the chief task 
of economists at this hour, Inamelyl to distinguish afresh the 
.,-l'vid/a of Government from the Noti-Amila.''5 In the space 
available we must necessarily be highly selective.6 'he pur­
pose here is twofold. First, we wish to outline the theoretical 
framiework within which the study is conducted and thus ex­
pose our biases at the outset. Second, we hope to demonstrate 
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that the Korean interventionist path to growth, far from being 
an aberration, is actuafly to be expected on purely theoretical 
grounds. 
MEANS VERSUS ENDS 
To put the issue in perspective, it is useful to recall the terms 
of Smith's original response to mercantilist economic philos­
ophy. According to Eli Heckshcr, the foremost authority on 
mercantilism, the dispute was not primarily over basic values: 
"On principle, mercantilist authors and statesmen not only be­
lievcd in, but actually harped upon 'freedom' especially 'free­
dora of trade' . . . I Instead, there was I . . . one fundamental 
difference, nalely, in the mercantilists' disbelief and the lib­
erals' belief in the existence of a pre-established harmony." In 
the eyes of mercantilists the desired results were to be effected 
"by the dextrous management of a skilful politician; chey were 
not expected to follow from the untrammelled forces of eco­
noniic life.'' 
The visible and invisible hands may thus be seen as alterna­
tive means to desired ends. The choice then depends upon tile 
results expected under the two methods and this will vary, 
first, with the particular decision and, second, with historical 
circumstance. The task is to choose a judicious combination 
appropriate to a particular time and place. This pragmatic ap­
proach is in sharp distinction to the ideological one in which a 
particular public-private combination is codified into some sort 
of "ism" which then attains the stature of an end in itself. 
Even if such a combination represents a judicious choice in its 
original historical context, it is not directly transferable to 
another time or place. 
CLASSICAL MINIMALISM 
Classical laissez faire can be viewed as leading to a minimal 
role for the state as reflected in the often quoted passage from 
Keynes: 
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The most important Agenda of the State relate not to those activi­
ties which private individuals are already fu!filling, but to those 
functions which fall outside the sphere of the individual, to those 
decisions which are made by no one if the State does not make 
them. The important thing for Government is not to do things 
which individuals are already doing, and to do it a little better or a 
little worse, but to do those things which at present are not being 
done at all.' 
The minimalist scope originally included the "night watch­
man" functions of Lasalle and Smith's "certain public works 
and public institutions which can never be for the interest of 
any individual to erect or maintain."'9 In a more complex 
twentieth-century economy, Keynesian aggregate demand 
management has been added. 
An ideological minimalist (or a maximalist seeking a straw­
man) would confine the state to these functions in perpetuity. 
A pragmatist would observe that the Keynsian supplement to 
the minimal list was in itself a response to changing conditions 
and that Keynes is subject to a much broader interpretation if 
the emphasis is changed to "those things which at present are 
not being done at all." As the "present" changes, so do the 
problems left to government to solve: for example, pollution 
and control of multi-national corporations in the contemporary 
West. While the relevant external conditions are infinitely vari­
able, it is possible to suggest some general determinants of the 
public-private mix. 
EXOGENOUS DETERMINANTS
 
The determinants of an economic system may be broadly classi­
fied into two groups-economic and socio-historic. The prag­
natic approach emphasizes the role of economic factors and
 
views government intervention as a response to private market
 
failures. This is represented by William J. Baumol, who "at­
tempt(s) to determine which, if any, are the circumstances in
 
which people composing an economy will find that a particular
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extension of the authority of their government is requisite for 
the most efficient pursuit of their own economic interests."' 0 
General equilibrium theory establishes certain very stringent 
conditions under which a competitive equilibrium exists and is 
Pareto efficient; any deviation from these conditions then es­
tablishes a presumptive case for government intervention.1 1 
Such market failures being ubiquitous in the real world, a rigor­
ous presentation of the beauties of the invisible hand ultimately 
proves a brief for the visible. The pragmatic market failure 
approach thus does not reflect a pro-laissez-faire bias, but 
only provides an analytic frame of reference. 
If the normative market failure approach is coupled with an 
assumption of social rationality then it leads to descriptive 
propositions such as Kenneth J. Arrow's that "when the market 
fails to achieve an optimal state, society will, to some extent 
at least, recognize the gap, and non-market social institutions 
will arise attempting to bridge it."' 2 A natural corollary is that 
societies facing similar problems in a similar environment will 
evolve similar solutions. This is reflected in various conver­
gence theories which see the United States and the Soviet 
Union, or socialist and capitalist LDCs moving toward similar 
patterns of government-business interaction. 
In fact there are real limits to convergence due to socio­
historic factors. The first of these is ideological. In theory, one 
could start with a "government failure" model and, with a 
given set of constraints, arrive at the same public-private mix 
as by starting at the opposite market failure extreme. In prac­
tice, ideological taboos will constrain the search pattern to 
marginal changes, and commonality will be approached from 
one side or the other rather than by iterative bracketing. Given 
an inevitable range of real world indeterminancy, convergence 
will then stop at opposite sides of this often broad band. Fur­
tiler, as Albert 0. Hirschman argues, "New problems continu­
ally arise and they will presumably again result in initially 
quite different probing and search patterns (so that) conver­
gence in one area will be paralleled by renewed divergence in 
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another."' 3 From the point of view of the present study, the 
important point about ideology is that it can reduce tile speed 
of adjustment and the scope of search. In an LDC where both 
government and market failures are pervasive, the rate of 
growth may be a function, not of ideological orientation, but 
of ideological flexibility. 
The second non-economic system determinant might be 
termed sociological. Talcott Parsons identified four inter­
related functional needs of societies: maintenance of prevailing 
social and cultural patterns, integration of persons and groups 
within society, attainment of systemic (group) goals, and 
adaptation to environmental conditions.4 The relative im­
portance of these functions varies with the evolutionary stage 
of society, and Bert Hoselitz has suggested that the scope of 
government activity varies with the nature of the dominant 
problem."5 Thus a "new" state facing problems of integration 
and systemic goal attainment may be more likely to rely on 
collective action than a "mature" state facing primarily prob­
lems of individual needs and environmental adaptation. 
A third non-economic system determinant is cultural. Regard­
less of the economic and social problems faced by a nation, a 
particular cultural heritage may make government activity more 
or less efficacious as a tool. For example, it may be that the 
Confucian hierarchical heritage is conducive to a stronger gov­
ernment in East Asia than in the individualistic West, even 
with identical environment and goals. 
ENDOGENOUS SYSTEM DETERMINANTS 
While external factors affect the need for collective action, 
endogenous elements may limit its efficacy. Two of these are 
of primary importance-information and motivation. 
Rational economic decisions require extensive information 
on such things as consumer preferences, technology, domestic 
and foreign resource availability, and conditions in related out­
put markets. Moreover, future as well as present conditions 
must be considered. Since acquiring such information is a diffi­
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cult and expensive task at best, the well-known advantages of 
the invisible hand offer substantial rewards both in improving 
the speed and accuracy of results and in conserving resources 
devoted to it. The von Mises-Lange-Hayek controversy centered 
on the drawbacks of the visible hand in this respect and led to 
the theory of Market Socialism. 
With private decision-making, many of the consequences of 
action fall directly upon the decision-maker and, compaicd with 
a disinterested bureaucrat, this may spur greater energy and 
accuracy in seeking information and implementing decisions. 
Keynes provides a uniquely balanced presentation of the argu­
ment: 
Profit accrues, under laissez-faire, to the individual who, whether by 
skill or good fortune, is found with his productive resources in the 
right place at the right time. A system which alloy - the skillful or 
fortunate individual to reap the whole fruits of this conjuncture 
evidently offers an immense incentive to the pra.tice of the art of 
being in the right place at the right time. Thus one of the most 
powerful of human motives, namely, the love of money, is harnessed 
to the task of distributing economic resources in the way best cal­
culated to increase wealth. 6 
Use of the phrase "skillful or fortunate individual" is judicious 
for it points to the endogenous distributional drawback of lais­
sez faire. Keynes again provides an articulate summary: 
Many of the greatest economic evils of our time are the fruits of 
risk, uncertainty, and ignorance. It is because particular individuals, 
fortunate in situation or in abilities, are able to take advantage of 
uncertainty and ignorance, and also because for the same reason big 
business is often a lottery, that great inequaiiies of wealth come 
17 
about. 
Once the choice is made, explicit attention needs to be given to 
offsetting undesirable side effects. Reliance on government re­
quires bolstering information flows and motivation, while de­
pendence on private decisions suggests attention to limitation 
ofunproductive windfall gains. In sum, regrettably but inevitably, 
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the alternative to market imperfection is government imper­
fection and vice versa. 
SYSTEM DETERMINANTS IN LDCS 
Heterogenous though the set of LDCs may be, there is sufficient 
uniformity of circumstance to lead various authors to generali­
zations concerning the appropriate role of the state.' 8 Since 
most of these arguments are based on the various exogenous 
and endogenous determinants already enumerated, they may be 
dealt with rather briefly as four classes of illustrative propositions: 
1) 	The need for government intervention will tend to be 
greater the lower the absolute level of development, since 
market failurcs will be more widespread. In particular, 
fragmented capital markets and information scarcity will 
retard productive private entrepreneurship. Further, the 
ubiquity of disequilibrium markets will reward rent-seeking 
zero-sum entrepreneurial activity. 
2) 	 The demand for government action will increase with the 
relative degree of backwardness, because of the tensions 
created by expectation gaps. Rapidity of escape from the 
various vicious circles of poverty may be seen to require 
concerted collective action. 
3) 	 The capacity for government action will increase with 
relative backwardness, since follower nations relying on 
borrowed technology require a less innovative form of 
entrepreneurship. Also, information requirements are 
lower in a simpler economy, and centralized decision-mak­
ing can economize on the use of scarce trained manpower. 
4) 	The capacity for government action will be lower in 
poorer countr~es, since administrative and bureaucratic 
efficiency is lower.9 
While the need for intervention thus seems clearly greater in 
LDCs, the judgment on its efficacy is mixed (chat is, factors #3 
and #4 work in opposite directions). The scarcity of competent 
decision-makers affects public and private sectors alike. It might 
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be said that the problem is to allocate scarce administrative 
and managerial resources so as to equate the marginal products 
in each sector. It might also be said that the problem is to 
harness the "animal spirits" of private capitalists to the service 
of broader social goals. Neither formulation is particularly 
illuminating in an operational sense, and the problem remains 
of determining a reasonable distribution in a particular time and 
place. 
SYSTEM DIMENSIONS 
Thus far we have proceeded rather simplistically as though the 
choice between visible and invisible hands were one-dimension­
al. In order to broaden the discussion, it is first necessary to re­
strict it by eliminating collective consumption. The government 
must necessarily organize and finance consumption of public 
and merit goods. The expansion of this dimension of interven­
tion is largely explained by income levels and is, in any event, 
quite independent of decisions as to intervention in produc­
tion-witness Sweden's combination of high public consump­
tion and low government intervention in production. 
Even confining ourselves to the production side, a single­
dimensional continuum-say between capitalism and social­
ism-is quite meaningless. The two-dimensional comparison 
of market socialism, market capitalism, command socialism, 
and command capital;si makes a step in the right direction 
by distinguishing between the independent dimensions of 
ownership of capital and the locus of resource-allocating 
decisions. While the ownership dimension is fairly well 
defined, the command- iarket continuum is not. For one 
thing, there is the obvious problem of specifying and weighing 
interventions in various markets. Much moore important, 
within a given market there is seldom a ciear choice between 
a visible public hand and an invisible pr' tte one. On the one 
side, the prevalence of scale economies relative to the size of 
the market means that private decisions will often be taken 
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by one (or a few) individual(s) whose hands are just as visible 
(and arbitrary) as that of government. On the other side, 
government decisions commonly evolve through a process 
that may be just as "invisible" as the workings of the market. 
Many critical decisions are reached through a complex and 
subtle interaction between private and public actors, so that a 
decision formally announced in one sector is not necessarily 
functionally attributable to that sector. 
Other elements of multi-dimensionality abound. The inter­
vention of the government is not confined to "commands," 
but also includes marginal incentives, provision of information, 
and subtle persuasion. )ecisions in one market may be affected, 
intentionally or unintentionally, by actions in another. Inter­
vention may operate on price or quantity and may apply to the 
entire economy, an industry, or a particular company. The 
choice between these various methods of intervention is not a 
mere matter of detail but one of substance. Even where the 
same primary result can be achieved by various tools, the 
secondary effects-desirable and undesirable-will be quite 
different. This is so, not just because of the exogcinous inter­
dependence of markets, but also because the endogenous 
strengths and weaknesses of intervention vary in importance 
from tool to tool. 
These elements of interdependent multi-dinensionality will be 
elaborated on at length in 1.terchapters. Here we wish only to flag 
their importance, since they affect the methodology of the entire 
paper. 
METHODOLOGY AND OVERVIEW 
The foregoing surveys of Korean and theoretical issues should 
suffice to demonstrate that this study addresses subtle questions 
whose answers are inherently slippery. As Patrick and Rosovsky 
observe about the comparison of the Japanese with Western 
European systems, "We really do not know, both because we 
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do not know a great deal about the actual state of government­
business relations in any country, and because we do not have 
good techniques of comparison."" 
The theoretically ideal way of dealing with the problem is 
represented by Koopmans and Montias, who suggest a detailed 
morphology to deal with complexity, followed by econometric 
analysis to sort out correlation and causation.21 Outcomes 
(consumption, growth, , )wer, efficiency, equity, stability, and 
so on) are viewed as a function of environment (resources, 
technology, international markets, and so on), of the economic 
system (participants, organizations, interactions, orders, in­
formation flows, motivations, nature of organization, authority 
structure, and so on) and of policies. Economic and organiza­
tion theory suggest the functional forms of the interrelation­
ships, and norms can be expressed as a function of outcomes. 
Armed with time series and cross-section observations on the 
variables, one could ascertain the role of policy and systems in 
particular environments by estimating first and second deriva­
tives of outcomes with respect to the various independent 
variables. 
We hasten to reassure (dismay?) the reader by announcing 
that we have no intention of attempting anything nearly so 
rigorous. The Koopmans-Montias analysis represents the ulti­
mate extension of the pragmatic approach, while we shall be 
operating near the opposite pole of sophistication, close to what 
Ward has termed "intuitive groping." 22 Nonetheless, the same 
logical framework underlies our analysis. One need not be 
immediately striving for Nirvana to be called a Buddhist. While 
the relationships we shall be examining are similar to those 
which concern Koopmans and Montias, we rely on verbal 
description rather than parameterization and support our 
generalizations with anecdotes rather than correlation coeffi­
cients. The results are undeniably "soft." 
To some extent our approach is dictated by the virtual 
absence of prior work in this field in Korea. In dramatic con­
trast to the situation in neighboring Japan, Korean scholars 
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have virtually ignored the areas of government-business inter­
action and entrepreneurship. To bolster our intuition and build 
up our stock of anecdotes, it has therefore been necessary to 
undertake a fair amount of primary research. This primary 
material has been relegated to appendixes, since it interrupts 
the analytic flow of the main text. It, nonetheless, constitutes 
an integral part of the whole effort. It has two components­
a broad-based survey, and detailed case studies-as described 
below. 
To provide breadth, an entrepreneurship survey was con­
ducted among a one-sixth random sample of all Korean manu­
facturing firms employing more than fifty workers. Using 
trained college students, interviews were solicited with the 
chief executive and top manager of each firm, and a question­
naire was administered covering enterprise history, personal 
background, government-business relations, values and atti­
tudes. Appendix C gives a detailed description of the survey 
design, and comments on problems and limitations of the 
questionnaire method. An English version of the questionnaire 
is given as Appendix D. 
To provide depth, we conducted detailed case studies of 
small and medium enterprises (Appendix A) and of large 
chaeb'l (family-based industrial conglomerates),2" (Appendix 
B). In each case study, the goal was to reflect the relative roles 
of government and business in industrial entrepreneurship; the 
extent, vehicle, and impact of government intervention; and the 
sources of private entrepreneurs. Our conclusions were checked 
through a number of interviews with prominent government 
and business leaders (see "Acknowledgments" for a list). 
Our interpretation of the results, organized according to the 
theoretical issues given above, is presented in the main text. 
We begin with a historical survey of developments in the colon­
ial period (Chapter 2), and then deal with the process of policy 
formulation (Chapter 3), the importance and means of imple­
mentation (Chapter 4), the role of public enterprise (Chapter 
5), the sources of expansion of private entrepreneurship 
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(Chapter 6), the social environment producing the supply of 
private entrepreneurs (Chapter 7), and government efforts at 
controlling private economic power (Chapter 8). Conclusions 
are summarized in Chapter 9. 
In sum, "methodology" is perhaps an overly grandiose term 
for the approach followed here. It would be more accurate to 
say that we simply intend to tell a story about how things 
work in Korea. The test of the story is that it be consistent 
with facts available to knowledgeable Koreans and that causal 
interactions be explained logically in light of economic theory 
and international experience. Alternative explanations are 
possible, and our preliminary generalizations will undoubtedly 
be modified following further work in this underdeveloped 
area of inquiry. 
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Past is not always prologue, but the possibility must be con­
sidered. We, therefore, begin with a survey of the industrial 
base upon which post-war growth was built. The rapid rise of 
a Korean entrepreneurial class is impressive in any case, but it 
would become positively epical if it could be shown to have 
emerged spontaneously v.wilh little or no prior history. Such a 
tale can be built on three not implausible premises: first, under 
the Yi dynasty there was no industrial entrepreneurship and 
only a very weak mercantile class; second, under the colonial­
ists, modern economic activity was overwhelmingly dominated 
by the Japanese; and third, such limited indigenous entrepre­
neurs as emerged under the Japanese lost their physical capital, 
if not their lives, during the chaos of the Korean War. 
While these premises will be shown to be broadly accurate, 
we shall, nonetheless, reject the pure hypothesis of immaculate 
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conception. Rather, we shall point out that the colonial era 
did leave behind a substantial growth potential consisting of 
impressive stocks of both physical and human capital. The 
putative bureaucrats, entrprecneurs, and managers had largely 
"learned by watching" rather than by "doing," but had, none­
theless, learned a great deal. This experience could have been 
translated into fairly rapid growth when combined with the 
inherited stock of Japanese factories. Instead, this heritage was 
dissipated through years of political and military conflict, tile 
former being no less destructive of the industrial potential than 
the latter. 
Throughout this chapter, we shall be concerned solely with 
the industrial sphere. Parallel developments in social structure, 
education, and the like, while critical to explaining overall 
post-war growth, will be largely ignored given our focus on 
manufacturing entrepreneurship and government. We now pro­
ceed chronologically, beginning with tile traditional economy 
of the Yi dynasty. 
YI DYNASTY ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Tile study of Yi dynasty economic history is far less developed 
than its political and cultural counterparts, so this section will 
necessarily be perfunctory and tentative.' We shall describe 
the Yi economy as "traditional dualistic." It was "traditional" 
in relying on small-scale, labor-intensive "handicraft" production 
techniques. It was "dualistic" in being segmented into royal­
aristocratic and commoner segments. The more sophisticated 
needs of the former were supplied by government handicrafts 
factories and Chinese imports, while the cruder needs came 
from levies on the population. The commoner economy was 
characterized by household prodt',ition and limited exchange. 
The link between the two economies was an extractive system 
based on land taxes and commodity tribute. 
Private sector activities were strictly controlled in theory. 
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Manufacturing outside the government monopolies was origi­
nally prohibited except in strictly limited areas. Trade was con­
fined to tribute contractors and government-licensed merchants. 
The degree to which these prohibitions were effective is subject 
to interpretation, but there can be no question that the Con­
fucian heritage restricted the Yi economy to a particularly 
limited form of traditional dualism. 
Following the Hideyoshi invasions (1590s), the general de­
cline of the dynasty was reflected in a deterioration of the 
aristocratic sector of the economy. As a result, the govern­
ment factory system was weakened and private artisanship 
grew. Whether the commoner economy benefited more from 
the reduced constraints and increased trade, or suffered more 
under increased extractions and general societal malaise, is not 
altogether clear. What is apparent is that the degenerate tradi­
tional dualistic economy of tile late Yi dynasty extremelywas 
weak, and undifferentiated and is not to be compared to its late 
Tokugawa counterpart. 
THE TRANSITION PERIOD, 1876-1910 
The opening of the ports beginning in 1876 introduced a transi­
tion period lasting until formal Japanese annexation in 1910. 
The competition of foreign powers for influence, and the in­
creasing role of tile Japanese, combined to introduce dynamic 
elements into the static traditional economy. By the end of the 
period, Russians had established a match factory and were in­
volved in lumbering and mining; Americans owned a gold mine 
and a power station and were active in rail and tramway con­
struction; French, German, and British interests operated in 
mining and rail construction.' Primary impetus, however, came 
from an influx of Japanese. According to official statistics, in 
1908 there were 79 incorporated Japanese manufacturing firms 
employing all ,'erage of 41 workers, compared with 6 owned 
by Koreans employing a total of 92 people. 3 
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TABLE 1 Industrial Occupation of Household Heads,
 
1910
 
Industry Japanese Korean Total 
Agriculture 2,210 2,433,450 2,435,660 
Fishing 1,423 33,646 35,069 
Mining - 1,429 1,429 
Manufacturing 5,619 22,943 28,562 
Commerce 14,568 178,780 193,348 
Civil Service 8,724 15,758 24,582 
Other 16,730 177,647 194,500 
Unemployed 1,718 31,123 32,841 
TOTAL 50,992 2,894,776 2,945,991a 
Source: Ch5sen Satokufu, Chiis,',, Sc5tokufu tk5ei ',ne.zp51909, 1910. pp. 63-79, 
81-87. Reported in: Sang-Chul Suh, Growth anad Structural Chan..s in the Korean, 
:comomy, 1910-1941) (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), pp. 34, 36. 
Note: aThese figures reflect a slight discrepancy arising from the original source. 
To sUpplcnient these selective observations, it is useful to con­
sider the single set of comprehensive data available. This is the 
1910 household survey reported ill Table 1. It shows that at the 
end of the transition period, there were 5,619 Japanese fanmilies 
active in manufacturing (11 percent of the immigrant group) 
compared with 22,943 Korcan households. Regrcttably, the 
survey does not distinguish occupations, so that owners, tech­
nicians, and laborers are lumped together. Nonetheless, the 
data are consistent with a pattern of Japanese dominance of 
"factory" manufacturing, with Koreans confined to household 
industry and the role of unskilled labor in Japanese-run firms. 
The role of Korean aristocrats in the early period is part c­
ularly interesting. Banking apparently had a great appeal to this 
group, and six Korean banks were founded during the transi­
tion, three of which quickly failed." Of the surviving banks, one 
was founded by the royal family with a crown prince as presi­
dent, a second by Korean aristrocrats, and a third by "business­
men." The three failed banks all were founded by aristocrats, 
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and members of the upper class were found in managerial 
positions throughout the sector. In addition, several rail lines 
were formed by former government officials.' 
Ki-Zun Zo argues that these early aristocratic efforts must 
be seen as part of the nationalistic effort to thwart foreign 
domination.6 His argument is in many ways similar to the once­
popular characterization of early Mciji entrepreneurs as patri­
otic and community-centered and is subject to many of the 
same criticisms. 7 When profit and social goals coincide, there is 
always room for skepticism as to the prime mover, but the 
intensity of anti-Japanese feeling in some Korean circles may 
give Ki-Zu,n Zo somewhat stronger grounds for stressing busi­
ness as one weapon in the nationalists' arsenal. In any event, 
the longer-run impact of these early efforts was minimal, but 
it is clear that the aristocrats were by no means aloof from 
economic activity. 
At the other end of the social hierarchy, the role of merchants 
must be mentioned, since their accumulated mercantile capital 
and experience with calculations of profit and loss make them, 
itpriori, a potential source of industrial entrepreneurship. The 
opening of the ports led to an expansion of foreign trade from 
a near zero base to 20 percent of domestic commodity-product 
plus import in 1911-1915.8 To what extent did domestic 
merchants profit from this expansion? Daniel S. Juhn argues 
that while domestic merchants, particularly innkeepers, were 
active in the early years, they were ultimately unable to 
compete with the foreigners, particularly after the abolition of 
monopoly trading rights in 1895.' He concludes that "Japanese 
merchants completely dominated foreign trade by the early 
part of the twentieth century."'" A similar story is told by 
Ki-Zun Zo, who asserts: 
The Japanese merchants came to Korea together with their goods 
and had Japanese retailers to sell their goods in towns and even in 
rural villages. The Japanese also purchased farm products directly 
from farmers for export to their country. At the beginning, the 
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Japanese merchants hired Korean brokers for collection of farm 
products, but gradually removed such brokers and dealt directly 
by themselves as Japanese came in large numbers. The indigenous 
merchants of Korea were therefore excluded from trade with11
 
Japan.
 
The positions taken by these two leading experts on early 
Korean entrepreneurship history are not inconsistent with the 
limited household survey data given in Table 1. There were 
nearly 15,000 Japanese families active in "commerce" (some 
30 percent of the immigrant group) versus about 180,000 
Korean households. It is thus possible that the japanese-who 
represented 7.5 percent of "commerce" households- domin­
ated foreign trade and its feeder chain, while the 92.5 percent 
Korean component was confined to small domestic trading 
activities and unskilled employees of Japanese. The evidence 
of foreign dominance, however, is weaker for commerce than 
manufacturing. 
In sum, at the end of the transition period, we have less than 
1 percent of Korean households active in manufacturing and 6 
percent in commercc. in both sectors, available evidence sug­
gests foreign dominance of the larger and more important 
enterprises. Limited though they were in numbers, these early 
Korean businessmen, nonetheless, made a significant contribu­
tion to modern growth by spawning modern entrepreneurs. 
COLONIAL PERIOD, 1910-1945 
The Japanese occupation brought rapid industrialization and a 
high rate of economic growth, as shown by the net commodity­
product (NCP) series in Table 2. Over three decades, real 
manufacturing NCP grew at an annual compound rate of 10 
percent and increased seventeenfold, while total NCP tripled. 
The share of manufactures in NCP grew from less than 4 per­
cent to over 20 percent. Impressive though this record is, 
Korean observers stress that its contribution to post-war growth 
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TABLE 2 Net Value of Commodity-Product, 1910-1940 
(in million KY) 
Share of 
Manufacturing
aPeriod 	 Value of Net Coninodity-Product in NCP
 
Total Manufacturing
 
1910 645 	 21 3.3 
1914 864 25 2.9
 
1919 814 
 69 8.5
 
1924 970 
 80 8.3
 
1929 1,141 137 12.0
 
1936 1,478 290 19.6
 
1940 1,661 364 21.9
 
Source: Sang-Chul Sub, pp. 170-171. 
Note: aln 1936 constant prices. 
was limited by three factors: the "colonial enclave" industrial 
structure; the dominant role of Japanese owners, managers, and 
technicians; and the North-South split. These will be discussed 
in turn. 
The structural pattern of the Korean economy followed from 
the role assigned to Korea within the Japanese Empire. During 
the first two decades, the emphasis was on Korea as a supplier 
of foodstuffs, and the result was an "agriculture first" policy. 
From 1910 to 1920 manufacturing activity was actively dis­
couraged by the Company Regulations that made formation of 
new corporations subject to government approval, and this was 
granted selectively.' 2 After repeal of the regulations in 1920, 
large numbers of small factories were established, but it was not 
until the late 1920s that the rate of growth of factory outpu;" 
outstripped that of household industry.1 3 The period may then 
be summarized as a rather typical colonial dualism with the 
periphery providing raw materials to the center. The expansion 
of manufacturing during the period was substantial, but dom­
inated by small-scale agricultural processing and household 
industries supplying consumer goods. 
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As shown in Table 3, the rate of expansion of Korean entre­
preneurship was high, with the number of wholly Korean­
owned companies increasing from 27 in 1911 to 362 in 1929. 
The Japanese were also expanding rapidly, but a comparison 
is made difficult by the existence of jointly owned companies 
about which little is known. If the latter were Japanese-donin­
ated, then the Korean share of paid-in-capital declined steadily 
from 17 percent in 1911 to 6 percent in 1929. Even so, the 
Korean partners in jointly owned firms undoubtedly played a 
major role in the critical learning process of the period. 
Today's Sam Yang and Whashin, the two most important and 
prosperous business groups throughout the colonial period, 
originated in this period. The Sam Yang Group began when a 
Japanese-educated son of an aristocratic landlord took over a 
small financially troubled textile company and built it into the 
well-known Kyungbang Limited Spinning Company. He also 
established today's )ou-in-A l1bo (Dong-A daily newspaper) 
around this time and later took over a private school that even­
tually became today's Korea University.14 
The 1930s brought a new element as a consequence of Japan­
ese war preparations, and the encouragement of Japanese 
zaibatsu investment in the colonies. The result was a substantial 
expansion of heavy industries from 23 percent of factory pro­
duct in 1930 to 50 percent in 1940." s Most of this relative 
growth was in the chemical industry, taking advantage of 
abundant cheap hydroelectric power in the north. The output 
of these producer goods went to supply Japanese industry, 
and the share of exports in total manufacturing increased from 
roughly a third in 1930 to two-thirds in 1940.6 With the out­
put of modern industries largely exported, forward linkages 
were few. Backward linkages were necessarily low in chemicals 
and mineral processing. Even in textiles, the Japanese built 
integrated modern weaving and spinning plants instead of 
relying on small-scale weavers supplied by large-scale spinning. 7 
The common agricultural dualism of the earlier period was 
thus complemented by a rather unique manufacturing dualism 
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TABLE 3 Enterprise Expansion, 1911-1929 
Number of Conpanies 
Korean Japanese Joint Foreign Total 
1911 27 109 16 0 152 
(17.8) (71.7) (10.5) (0.0) (100.0)
 
1919 63 280 22 1 366
 
(17.2) (76.5) (6.0) (0.3) (100.0)
 
1929 362 1,237 165 4 1,768
 
(20.5) (70.0) (9.3) (0.2) (100.0) 
Paid-iti Capital 
(w&n) 
1911 2,742,355 5,063,020 8,104,450 0 15,909,825 
(17.2) (31.8) (50.9) (0.0) (100.0) 
1919 11,403,615 83,375,962 10,982,000 2,000,000 107,761,577 
(10.6) (77.4) (10.2) (1.9) (100.0) 
1929 19,877,512 193,736,669 95,785,106 1,221,500 310,620,787 
(6.4) (62.4) (30.8) (0.4) (100.0) 
Source: Ch5sen S5tokufu, Chsoni SJt,,. ju tok'i ,' upJi, 1931, pp. 190-193. In­
cludes all partnerships, limited partnerships, and joint-stock comnpanies whose main 
offices are in Korea. l.ater editiois do not distinguish ownership in a manner con­
sistent with that presented here. 
in the 1930s. In both sectors, the "colonl enclave" structure 
minimized the spread effects of the rapid economic growth. 
The impact was further reduced by the dominant role of 
foreign owners, managers, and technicians. Japanese owned 
virtually all large-scale establishments and more or less split 
with Koreans in small-scale factories. The result was that, 
by 1941, Japanese owned 59 percent of the manulicturing 
firms representing 91 percent of paid-in capital.'" For all in­
dustry in the same year, Juhn reports that the Korean share 
drops to 2 percent, as shown in Table 4. Even with allowance for 
substantial under-reporting of the smaller-scale Korean estab­
lishments, it is apparent that foreign ownership of the modern 
sector was virtually complete. 
Further exacerbating the enclave structure, Japanese were 
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TABLE 4 Sources of Industrial Capital, 1941 
(%) 
Japan-based corporations 
Japanese residents in "orea 
Government corporations 
Korean; 
74 
12 
12 
2 
TOTAL 100 
Source: Daniel Sungil Juhn, "Enterpreneurship in an Underdeveloped Economy:
The Case of Korea, 1890-1940," Ph.D. dissertation (George Washingtoa University,
1965), pp. 176-177. 
TABLE 5 Occupations of Active Male Population, 1944 
(1,000s)
 
Japanese Koreans 
Managerial 3.4 7.2 
Professional and technical 14.5 27.9 
Clerks and other white collar 53.4 172.4 
Civil servants and small businessmen 38.2 122.1 
Laborers 74.6 6,292.3 
TOTAL 184.1 6,622.3 
Source: George M. McCune, Korea Today (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), pp. 330-331. 
recruited to fill many of the managerial, technical, and even 
laboring positions. Throughout the colonial period, Japanese 
constituted roughly one-fifth of total manufacturing employ­
ment.' 9 In skilled categories, the dominance was even greater: 
in 1943, Japanese held 81 percent of the "technician and 
engineer" positions in manufacturing.2" For the w-onomy as 
a whole, in 1944, Koreans outnumbered Japanese in white­
collar positions by only two or three to one (see Table 5). 
This is again consistent with foreign dominance of the large-scale 
sector and substantial participation in smaller-scale activities. 
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TABLE 6 Regional Shares of Net Commodity-Product, 
1939-1940 
(%) 
South North 
A. By Industry 
Agriculture 60 40 
Forestry 53 47 
Fishery 63 37 
Mining 24 76 
Manufacturing 46 54 
TOTAL 54 46 
B. Manufacturing Breakdown 
Chemicals 17 83 
Metals 11 89 
Ceramics 27 73 
Textiles 83 17 
Machines and Tools 72 28 
Wood Products 56 44 
Printing 86 14 
Foodstuffs 64 36 
Others 72 28 
Source: Sang-Chul Suh, pp. 137, 141. 
The colonial contribution to post-war growth is further 
limited by the north-south industrial distribution. Northern 
Korea produced 90 percent o,"the nation's electricity and led in 
manufacturing and mining while the south held the larger shares 
of agriculture, forestry, and fishing. (See Table 6, Part A). 
THE LEGACY EVALUATED 
We have seen that thz impressive industrialization of the colo­
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nial period had several "enclave" features which circumscribed 
its potential contribution to the growth of an independent 
South Korean entrepreneurial class. Nonetheless, a substantial 
legacy was left in several areas. Foremost among these was the 
inheritance of the entire Japanese productive machinery, in­
cluding an impressive infrastructure of communications and 
transportation. Tile results and implications of this physical 
heritage will be elaborated in the next section. Here we only 
identify the components of the legacy and note that the op­
portunity presented thereby is most significant. 
in terms of manpower, Japanese dominance should not be 
allowed to obscure the fact that many Koreans did gain sub­
stantial exposure to the world of industry. Korean employment 
in manufacturing increased from 23,000 household heads in 
1910 to 440,000 males in 1940.1 By 1944, there were nearly 
1,900 Korean engineers and technicians employed in mailu­
facturing, another 1,300 in mining, and 2,600 in service indus­
tries outside government." Overall, there were more than 
7,000 Korean managers and 28,000 professional and technical 
workers.- As early as 1937, there we re 2,400 Korean-owned 
manufactmring factories, and 1.60 of these employed more than 
50 wox:ers.14 Chapter 7 shows that few of these early indus­
trialists participated directly in the modern growth of the 
1960s, 'out their offspring played a major role. 
In terms of the North-South split, the northern dominance of 
manufacturing was confined to chemicals, metals, and ceramics, 
with the south having a substantial advantage in all other 
secto's, most notably in textiles and machinery (see Table 6, 
Part B). If a few giant chemical plants in the north are ex­
cluded, then the south actually produced manufacturing pro­
duct 50 percent reater than tile north.2" it thus seems highly 
probable that the south had a substantial advantage over the 
north in the number of indigenous entrepreneurs. Overall 
statistics are not available, but this hypothesis is to some 
extent substantiated by the fact that by 1939, Seoul produced 
nearly one-fifth of total manufacturing output, and two­
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fifths of this was in Korean-owned establishments. 6 The north­
ern manufacturing advantage is thus overrated in terms of its 
implications for post-war growth. 
Less quantifiable, but no less important than the foregoing, 
was the "demonstration effect" of exposure to modern tech­
nology and organization. The traditional economic structure 
was exposed to modernity not in the form of fancy goods 
mysteriously arriving on ships, but from factories down the 
street. Further, these establishments were run not by strange 
looking foreigners, but by people not unlike the indigenous 
colonials. Thus it is at least possible that the demonstration 
effect of the colonial period may have had a more effective and 
personal impact in Korea than in the typical European enclave. 
There might also have been "reaction" effect. Gregory Hendcr­
soil argues: 
These things-perhaps especially those which were most unforgive­
able-created in Koreans a fierce desire to modernize and to equal, 
if not overtake, those who had enslaved them. .. Contemplating th. 
results of the ruthless Japanese hand one wonders whether alien 
colonial regimes, if developmental, are successful modernizers in 
proportion to their intensity, especially when what is intense is 
cruelly disciplinarian, creative of the maximum in outrage. 27 
One further modern reflection of the colonial heritage de­
serves special mention-export orientation. The open economy 
strategy of the 1960s did not achieve the relative "foreign" 
trade share of the colonial period until 1973.8 There are, of 
course, substantial differences in that the early period was 
foreign-dominated and based on resource extraction and ex­
ploitative taxation, while the latter was indigenous and manu­
facturing-oriented. Further, the trade was not strictly "foreign" 
in terms of the geographic boundaries of the day. Nonetheless, 
Koreans in general became aware of the existence of external 
demand for their produce, and some actively participated in 
these markets: for example, Kyungbang Limited had a branch 
in Osaka and was extremely active in Manchuria (see Appendix 
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B); Whashin, one of the most successful Korean ventures, also 
turned outward, opening offices in Bangkok and Saigon, (with 
plans for a department store in Manila) and hired an American 
advisor to assist in plans for expansion in the United States and 
elsewhere. 29 In addition, after the war, some 2.5 million 
Koreans returned to the south after working abroad. While most 
of these had served in menial occupations, the stock of ex­
perience thus accumulated must have helped reduce the diffi­
culty of entering unknown foreign markets. To be sure, neither 
the government's role nor the export orientation was passed 
directly to the Park regime, but the reintroduc:ion of these 
critical patterns in the 196 0s must have been substantially 
eased by familiarity with similar patterns two decades earlier. 
None of this should be taken in any way as a defense of the 
colonial period. One can conceive of indigenous processes of 
development which could have produced equal or superior 
results at lower costs. The point made here is simply that Korea 
gained independence with a very significant base on which 
domestic industry could have been built. The colonial industrial 
heritage was far from negligible. We now consider the im­
mediate use to which that patrimony was put. 
HERITAGE DENIED, 1945-1951 
The Japanese left behind physical facilities constituting one of 
the largest "turnkey" projects in history. The Republic of 
Korea inherited over 2,500 operating industrial and business 
enterprises, as well as ii,frastructure, inventories, real estate, and 
15 percent of the nation's land; the official count was 166,301 
items of such so-called "vested property." 3 The legacy of land 
was distributed constructively and contributed greatly to both 
the substance and process of land reform and rural develop­
ment.3" The industrial heritage, in marked contrast, dis­was 
sipated and contributed remarkably little to independent indus­
trial growth. The process of deterioration will now be described. 
During the U.S. Military Government (September 1945 to 
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August 1948), industrial output plummeted. Consistent data are 
not available, but Kim and Roemer estimate that, even in 1948 
after recovery was underway, industrial output was still only 
14 percent of the 1938 level.3 2 The explanation must be sought 
largely in the vested-property sector which, in late 1947, ac­
counted for about 30 percent of operating plants and 55 
percent of employment.3" 
A few of the largest enterprises taken over from the Japanese 
were turned over for management to the nascent government 
departments (for example, electricity, railroads, communica­
tions, tobacco, coal mining).34 Some were also leased to Korean 
businessmen, but the bulk were entrusted to the American 
Office of the Property Custodian who delegated operating respon­
sibility to selected Korean managers. The failure of the process is 
reflected in the following official report issued in January 1948: 
Clarification of the status of Vested Property, its maintenance and 
preparation for eventual disposition moved ahead in a uniform and 
relatively uneventful way during January as procedures and programs 
previously set up were continued and their functions expanded to in­
include measures for the revival of a consistently increasing segment of 
the national economy. The end of January saw more than 20 percent 
of vested or formerly vested industrial properties in partial or full 
3 5 
operation.s 
How was it that two and a third years after Liberation, only 
20 percent of vested industry was in operation? There are two 
sets of explanations-economic and political. The economic 
argument follows from three features of the enclave structure 
previously discussed-the absence of trained manpower, the 
closing of markets in Japan and Manchuria, and the separation 
from output and input markets in the north (most notably, the 
electricity supply). 
Important though these economic factors were, the political 
and administrative elements may have been even more critical. 
On the American side, there was little or no preparation for 
occupation, and continual and conflicting policy changes.36 On 
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the Korean side, the sudden opening of a political vacuum 
generated intense conflict between myriad groups and sub­
groups of diverse political persuasion. morality, and ability.37 
This combination of well-intentioned ignorance and political 
anarchy created a chaotic situation oil all fronts. In the indus­
trial sphere, the absence of policy and the shortage and rotation 
of occupation manpower were such that the Office of the 
Property Custodian was unable even to make a comprehensive 
survey of its assets for more than two years.38 
The flavor of what went on is illustrated by E. Grant Meade's 
detailed description of the process in South Chflla province.39 
The civil affairs officers did not arrive there until more than two 
months after the Japanese surrender. They found 42 of the 
province's 50 factories in operation. Most of these had been 
Japanese owned, and the foreign managers and executives 
had already departed. The enterprises were being .Fu..rated 
either by the Korean workers on a profit-sharing basis or by 
the local People's Committee.4" The Americans then took 
control, designated Korean trustees, and actually got additional 
factories running. It not late 1946 thatwas until industrial 
activity slowed to a standstill as a result of politically induced 
labor strife and nationwide shortages of demand and inputs. 
In South Ch~lla province, at least, the departure of Japanese 
technicians does not seem have beento a critical factor. Years 
of "learning by watching" seem to have allowed many Koreans 
to step up to supervisory and technical jobs when the situation 
demanded. It is, of course, impossible to generalize from a 
single description of one province's experience, but we must at 
least suggest the possibility that the Japanese departure was 
less significant than the political chaos and market disruptien. 
The presence of large stocks of "liberated" property created 
a further problem in that anyone could perceive himself as 
legitimate heir to at least a portion. As a result, "The property 
custodians were subject to all sorts of jressures from high­
ranking military officers, representatives of national agencies, 
their civil affairs colleagues, and Korean friends. ' Efforts 
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at reliberating from American coitrol what had already been 
liberated from the Japanese took every form from outright 
theft, to padded payrolls, to Byzantine legal efforts to prove 
prior title. Given American naivetle, the task was not a diffi­
cult one. Success in such efforts provided a stake for not a 
few budding entrepreneurs. 
At Independence in August 1948. title to virtually all of the 
vested properties (except land, which had largely been sod) 
was passed to the new government (See Table 7). The im­
mediate benefits of the inheritance were marginal, since a good 
deal of stripping had already occurred, many of the plants 
were not operating, and the remainder were highly inefficient. 
In George M. McCune's words: 
Instances of misappropriation, one may suppose, were much more 
common than the official record indicated. There was also an 
important problem as to the efficiency of enterprises ostensibly 
not operated for the direct profit of their managers but at the same 
time held only very loosely responsible to the Property Custodian. 
Cases where numbers of employees greatly exceeding reasonable 
need were noted in a number of enterprises under government 
operation .... The fact that the nanagenlent of a "vested" enter­
prise may not have felt any particular incentive to maximize profits, 
may have made management indifferent to achieving the most 
efficient level of employment. 42 
In short, all the infamous characteristics of public enterprises 
were exacerbated by chaos and ignorance on the part of the 
foreign controllers. 
The new government was in no position to improve the situa­
tion for, in Joungwon Kim's words: 
South Korea at the end of the American occupation was in chaos 
and on the brink of civil war ... Inflation had gotten completely out 
of hand. People were pouring into cities where mobs of unemployed 
were attracted into "youth corps" of opposing political tendencies. 
These groups, together with the hated police force, survived in part 
by extorting "voluntary" contributions from an intimidated popu­
lace. Enthusiasm in South Korea had been replaced by fear, bitter­
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TABLE 7 Vested Enterprises, 31 December 1948 
Sezoul Kv'Thqgiprovince Kagiguvoiprovince 
fIi 'ungch 'c"n 
province 
Kvngsang
province 
Chlia 
provipice 
North 
Korea Japan Total 
Banks 
Chemicals 
Commerce 
Electricity 
Entertainment 
Farm 
Fibre 
Fish 
Food & brewing 
Fuel 
Furniture 
Insurance 
Leather 
Machinery 
Metal 
Mill 
Mining 
Nitrogen 
Oil 
Painting 
Paper 
Pharmacy 
Printing 
Contracting 
Rubber 
Ship operation
Transportation 
Carpentry 
Other 
22 
24 
56 
24 
16 
23 
64 
6 
56 
11 
2 
2 
14 
129 
25 
11 
38 
7 
17 
17 
13 
35 
43 
65 
19 
0 
19 
21 
37 
1 
11 
5 
2 
0 
4 
16 
0 
29 
3 
2 
0 
2 
25 
15 
11 
8 
14 
3 
3 
3 
4 
5 
7 
5 
0 
9 
11 
14 
0 
0 
1 
3 
0 
6 
18 
5 
16 
2 
2 
0 
0 
2 
1 
3 
3 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
2 
2 
1 
0 
5 
14 
3 
7 
16 
3 
1 
10 
20 
0 
56 
2 
0 
3 
1 
17 
8 
23 
8 
7 
2 
0 
4 
3 
8 
1 
0 
0 
12 
12 
10 
9 
15 
32 
9 
4 
18 
90 
13 
222 
12 
13 
1 
4 
109 
32 
21 
10 
28 
8 
5 
5 
11 
27 
12 
12 
3 
19 
31 
12 
2 
5 
17 
1 
2 
24 
19 
6 
85 
12 
3 
1 
0 
29 
2 
25 
2 
5 
3 
0 
3 
3 
16 
9 
1 
2 
10 
11 
9 
0 
1 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
a 
0 
1 
1 
0 
2 
4 
9 
7 
0 
4 
21 
0 
8 
0 
0 
20 
0 
10 
1 
2 
5 
0 
1 
1 
2 
4 
1 
15 
0 
0 
0 
1 
43 
60 
136 
51 
23 
89 
248 
31 
472 
42 
22 
27 
21 
322 
84 
96 
74 
61 
35 
26 
32 
60 
102 
111 
38 
5 
75 
102 
88 
" 
Z 
. 
" 
TOTAL 816 212 91 234 787 307 8 121 2,576 
Source: United States Armed Forces in Korea-National Economic Board, South Korean Interim Government Activities, November-December 
1948, p. 7 . 
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ness, ant' antagonisms which would be perpetuated for decades to
4 3
 
come.
 
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the new 
government was unable to utilize effectively the vested proper­
ties. Tile) were as poorly run under the government as under 
the Americans. NaivCt6 may have been replaced by sophisti­
cated profit sharing, and random distribution of benefits con­
solidated in a political and bureaucratic patronage system, but 
operational inefficiency and deterioration continued. 
A further shock to the already debilitated industrial system 
was given by the Korean War. Physical damage in the first 
year of the war has been officially estimated at 1.8-2.0 billion 
dollars or more than the entire gross national product in the 
year prior to the war. 4 Some 45 percent of industrial units 
nationwide suffered "substantial" damage.4 1 In Seoul "over 
eighty percent of industry, public utilities and transport, three­
quarters of the offices, and more than half of the dwellings were 
in ruins."46 The dissipation of the physical Japanese inheritance 
was thus nigh complete. 
The unsatisfactory operation of the government-run factories 
did not go unnoticed, and even before the war a major attempt 
at divestiture was made in conjunction with the land reform 
of 1949. Landowners were paid with land bonds which could 
be used in purchasing vested properties. Little progress was 
made before the war, however, and even in 1953, only two­
thirds of the enterprises (in value) had been sold.47 
The effort at converting landlords into capitalists is generally 
held to have been a failure. A typical description runs as 
follows: 
[The land bonds were] sold to the public at rates between 30 and 70 
percent of the actual value . . . . Korea's land reform forced land­
owners to make a sacrifice and contribute only to the formation of 
capital by newly-rising capitalists. 48 
In addition, it is widely believed that favoritism in sales led to 
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illicit gains for the fortunate few, with a low sales price financed 
by long-term low interest loans and a variety of government 
privileges. This accusation is somewhat anomalous: on the one 
hand the lack of industrial initiative is deplored, on the other, 
those who took advantage of the opportunity are deprecated. 
Given the deterioration, destruction, and uncertainty, it is not 
surprising the plants brought itlow price. Given the political 
context, it is also probable that the plants were actually sold at 
a still lower price.4 9 Still, it must be recognized that those who 
did take over the properties performed a positive social service 
by returning debilitated establishments to productive use. Sev­
eral moderni industrial groups originated in this way: the OB 
(Oriental Brewery) beer company was taken over by a Korean 
minority shareholder in the parent Japanese Kirin company; a 
technician in itJapanese textile firm became acting manager un­
der the Americans, later bought the plant, and built it into the 
Sunkyung Group: a similar sequence was followed by the only 
Korean employee of a Japanese explosives firm, and it grew into 
today's Korea Explosives. At least a small portion of the Japanese 
physical inheritance was thus rescued for the post-war period. 
We have told this story of "heritage denied" emphasizing the 
causality of political nialadininistration and deemphasizing the 
role of manpower shortages."0 We take this position because 
there is some evidence that the enterprises ran quite well for 
more than a year after the departure of the Japanese, and 
because of the degree to which we have been impressed with 
the abilities of Korean entrepreneurs. These qualities were 
demonstrated both under the constraints of the Japanese 
period and in the supportive environment of the Park regime. 
It is, of course, impossible to accurately assign responsibility 
between political and economic factors until far more research 
has been done. Causality may be in doubt, but the fact remains 
that the period 1945-1951 witnessed the destruction of the 
impressive industrial structure built by the Japanese. 
The implications of this period for post-war growth are not 
merely physical. In Chapter 8, we shall argue that a major 
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characteristic of Korean entrepreneurship in the 1950s was 
that it was far easier to make money from government-derived 
favors than from productive competitive activity, and entre­
preneurs naturally followed their pocket books. In Chapters 
3 and 4 we shall argue that in the 1950s there was neither an 
effective leadership commitment to growth nor a "hard" 
administrative structure and that as a result the government 
failed to channel private entrepreneurial energies into construc­
tive outlets. All of these elements of government-business 
relations that characterized the low-growth years of the 1950s 
are but a continuation of the pattern of the 1945-51 period. 
Those negative interactions did not wither away, but were cut 
back with the imposition of a -hard," growth-oriented regime 
in 1961. 
In sum, the colonial period left a heritage which was both 
physical and human. The physical structure was largely dissi­
pated by a combination of maladministration and war. The 
human capital was not destroyed, but was diverted into largely 
non-productive activities by chaotic government economic 
management. 
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Government Economic Decision-MakingProcess 
PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Any goal-directed activity involves an explicit or implicit hier­
archy of means and ends. This hierarchy begins with a primary 
end that is valued in and of itself, then branches to various 
means for attaining the primary end, branches again to incor­
porate means for attaining the various secondary ends, and so 
on. For example, one branch emanating from the primary end 
of economic growth' might run through export promotion, 
and ultimately down to the stitching of shirts, loading them on 
ships, selling them abroad, and repatriation of earnings. No 
path in the hierarchy is unique: for example, exports can be 
promoted through equilibruim exchange rates, bonus vouchers, 
or simple commands. Neither are the chains independent; for 
instance, while both export bonus vouchers and equilibrium 
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exchange rates may have identical primary effects on exports, 
the associated secondary impact on import substitution and 
capital transactions will be quite different. 
"Planning," in the broadest sense, is the working out of 
reasonably consistent means-ends hierarchies, taking into 
account the various possible chains and the interdependence of 
those actually chosen. Planning is "ccreplete" to the extent 
that it carries the chain down to the lowet ievel of requisite 
human actions, such as the order in which buttons are sewn on. 
Planning is "vertically consistent" to the extent that the "ends" 
at one level are achieved by the "means" of the next lower 
level. Planning is "horizontally consistent" to the extent that 
the various chains do not provoke behavior offsetting that 
required in another chain. 
"Implementation," in the broadest sense, is the conversion 
of an idea into action, or the means by which ends are attained. 
That is, one tier of the means-ends hierarchy is "implemented" 
by all the tiers below it. if planning is complete and consistent, 
then implementation is taken care of by definition. In practice, 
however, no government planning is ever complete, and some 
part of the planning is left to production units, even if it is only 
the order in which to sew buttons on shirts. In a mixed econ­
omy, of course, the gap is at a much higher level, at, say, the 
point where a decision is made to build and operate a plant to 
produce the shirts. There is thus a crucial discontinuity in the 
means-ends hierarchy at the point where government's direct 
control stops and private planning begins. The implementation 
issue becomes critical at this point. It is essential that this gap 
be crossed, and that mechanisms be provided whereby private 
compliance is assured. "Implementation," in the narrow sense 
used in the remainder of this volume, then refers to the manner 
in which decision-makers in production units are induced to 
act in accord with the preferences of government planners. 
The lowest tier of government action then becomes a set of 
compliance mechanisms whereby the interface between govern­
ment and private decision-makers is breached. 
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In sum, economic planning begins at the highest level of the 
means-ends hierarchy with the formulation of national priorities 
and determination of the relative importance to be attached to 
economic growth. Moving down the hierarchy, we reach a criti­
cal discontinuity where decisions on means-ends relationships 
pass from government to private hands. We call the crossing of 
this critical interface "iriplementation" (in the narrow sense). 
Everything above this poi t is government decision-making, and 
is the subject of this chapter; the crucial implementation phase 
is discussed in Chapter 4; and private decision-making at the 
lower end of the hierarchy is considered under the heading of 
entrepreneurship in Chapters 6 and 7. 
This chapter begins with the highest level of government 
decision-making, namely, the priority attached to economic 
growth. We then discuss the formal planning process and its 
contribution and short-term policy formulation. In both cases, 
the emphasis is not on the policies pursued, but the processes 
by which decisions are reached and the relative influence of 
various participants. The influence of the business community 
is a particularly important question and this is given separate 
treatment. We conclude by cons, ering business's evaluation of 
the government's role. 
LEADERSHIP COMMITMENT TO GROWTH 
The highest tier of the means-ends hierarchy is the establish­
ment of national priorities. The importance assigned to growth, 
relative to other goals, detcrmines the allocation of scarce 
government decision-making talent. If government attention 
has a positive marginal proiuct (MPG), then the tautological 
result .s that leadership commitment produces a higher rate of 
growth. Adelmnan and Morris's factor analysis of seventy-four 
developing countries suggests that the MPG is near zero at the 
lowest levels of socio-economic development, but strongly 
positive at the upper level (including Korea), once certain 
minimum social standards are achieved. At this level: "The 
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extent to which economic change can take place is significantly 
conditioned .. .by a single political characteristic, the extent 
of leadership commitment to economic development. . . . It 
is . . . the absence of notional mobilization for development 
which in general constitutes the prime political obstacle to 
development." '2 If social and political variables are considered 
alone, leadership corr.n,,-itmnnt itself accounts for 60 percent of 
cross-country difterences in growth rates.' It also correlates 
highly with various economic variables, 4 which suggests that if 
the top leadership really cares about growth, finding talent to 
formulate and execute the necessary policies is not an insuper­
able obsta-le. 
This sort of analysis provides a plausible partial explanation 
for the discontinuity in the Korean growth rate in the early 
1960s. Syngman Rhee was preoccupied with political and in­
tegrative tasks, while Park Chung Hee has enshrined growth 
near the top ol" the regime's value hierarchy. These differences 
will be apparent throughout our discussion of planning and 
implementation, but we here present an overview. 
The orientation of Syngman Rhee can be put in perspective 
by viewing him as one of the generation of Third World politi­
cal leaders who were active in independence movements and led 
their newly sovereign nations into the post-colonial era. Rhee 
was prominent in the anti-Japanese movement in the first 
decade of the century, served time in jail, spent thirty-three 
years in actively oppositionist exile, returned to the political 
chaos of the interwar period, and led the country through the 
devastation of the Korean War and its aftermath. Success in 
this environment required charisma and expertise at political 
*-rigue rather than administrative and managerial talent. Like 
o~iet- with similar careers, such as Sukarno, he was far better 
iited to the creation and integration of a new nation than to 
.ie developtrznt of an existing one. This is not to belittle his 
actual contributions to his cou:ntry, but only to argue that he 
remained in power too long. Cole and Lyman describe the 
situation in the late 1950s as follows: 
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At least on the part of the regime in power, politics moved more 
to resist than to accommodate to the social changes taking place. 
Neither Rhee nor his lieutenants were oblivious of the changes 
wrought by the war. Indeed, perhaps earlier than many Rhee saw the 
new attitudes of economic and military power that South Korea 
would need to survive in the post Korean War period. But in com­
mon with many of his goals, he saw these attributes in grand terms, 
in broad strokes. He never faced the technical and administrative 
complexity that they demanded for the society. Part of the problem 
was Rhee's age and his preoccupation with the past and with reuni­
fication. His goal was a very different Korea from the one he had in­
herited. In addition, his jealousy of his associates as potential rivals 
and his reliance on personal charismatic authority made it impossible 
for him to build the political, bureaucratic and private institutions 
that could absorb and channel the new energies and resources in the 
country for purposes of modernization . . . Thus the tasks of re­
construction and development in the South, in Rhee's time, on 
which a new natrnal identity might have been built never gained 
the priority and attention they demanded.' 
Rhee thus devoted energy to political action rather than admin­
istrative development and subsumed economic goals to inte­
grative ones. For example, his anti-Japanese measures retarded 
trade with a natural and tradirion.-I partner, and his faith in 
reunification was carried to an extreme: 
There was an unwillingness to build up the South as an independent 
and integrated economy. The possibility that unification would 
again give access to the electric power and heavier industries of the 
North was giveti as a reason for holding down the growth of such 
facilities in the South.6 
Even within the economic sphere, Rhee's concerns were not 
with growth, but with short-term objectives of reconstruction 
and maintenance of minimum consumption standards, both of 
which were to be achieved by aid maxim;zation rather than 
investment and production.7 
Park's value hierarchy could not have been more different. In 
the first place, economics took priority over politics. In his own 
words from 1962: 
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In human life, economics precedes politics or culture.8 
In order to ensure efforts to improve the living conditions of the 
people in Asia, even undemocratic emergency measures may be 
necessary. . . . It is also an undeniable fact that the people in Asia 
today fear starvation and poverty more than the oppressive duties 
thrust upon them by totalitarianism. . . . In other words, the Asian 
peoples want to obtain economic equality first and build a more 
equitable political machinery afterward. . . . The gem without luster 
called democracy was meaningless to people suffering from starva­
tion and despair. 
Second, higher ends such as reunification and national defense 
(as well as deferred objectives such as democracy) were seen 
as being furthered by, rather than in conflict with, economic 
growth. In 1964 he asserted: 
A sound development of democracy and national power accumula­
tion for the unification of the nation by winning over Communists 
are ultimately dependent on the success or failure of economic0 
construction.' 
Third, lie is scathing in his denunciation of the consumption­
oriented aid strategy of the Rhee period: 
American aid during this period (1955-1959) was extremely tight 
fisted towards the productive facilities which we desired and gen­
erous with regard to consumer goods which we did not require." 
Words are of course cheap, but in this case the professed leader­
ship commitment to growth has been translated into action. 
There are two aspects to this commitment. The first is the 
share of the chief executive's time devoted to economic 
matters. The second is the degree of support given to growth­
oriented bureaucrats, technocrats, and entrepreneurs. Both 
elements will, it is hoped, be amply illustrated in the remainder 
of this volume. 
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FORMAL PLANNING
 
PLANNING IN THE RHEE REGIME, 1948-1960 
At the beginning of the Republic in 1948, the Office of Plan­
ning was established under the Prime Minister with responsibil­
ity for budgeting, economic planning, resource mobi'.ization, 
pricing policy, and research activities. The head of the office, 
however, ranked below ministers and lacked power. The Office 
of Planning did prepare a five-year plan during the Korean 
War and issued it in revised form in 1953. It was essentially 
a "collection of individual projects recommended by the 
various Ministers rather than an integrated comprehensive 
program."' 2 Of course, the plan was never implemented, and the 
office dealt primarily with short-term stabilization policies 
until it was merged into the Ministry of Reconstruction in 
1955. 
Another five-year plan was prepared, not by the office, but 
by foreigners. In 1952, the United Nations Korea Reconstruc­
tion Agency (UNKRA) hired Robert R. Nathan and Associates 
to prepare a post-war reconstruction program. The resulting 
five-year "Nathan Plan," delivered in 1954, never really affected 
Korean decision-making. This was partly due to the Nathan 
group's poor relationships with the Rhee regime. These in turn 
stemmed in part from Nathan's appointment by UNKRA with­
out prior consultation with the Korean government. and per­
haps partly from Rhee's reading of American domestic poli­
tics.13 
Political conflict alone, however, is hardly the whole explana­
tion for the failure of the Nnthan Plan. There is a real question 
as to whetler or not Rhee's value hierarchy was compatible 
with the Nathan type of planning. Cole and Nam argue that 
the 1950s leaders: 
rejected the idea of overall planning and were not interested in 
trying to define the longer-run economic objectives or an integrated 
set of policies. This probably reflected a belief on their part that 
they could retain more flexibility and achieve better results in 
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negotiations with aid donors by proceeding on an ad hoc basis and 
avoiding tile overall commitments and constraints of a plan. Clearly 
the Nathan Plan called for very forceful policy action by the Korean 
government and set ambitious targets of self-support which the 
Koreans were not prepared to accept. To have agreed to the plan 
would have exposed the government to serious political risks. 
14 
In 1955, the Rhee regime did show some interest in improving 
the national planning apparatus when it established the Ministry 
of Reconstruction with responsibility for "overseeing aid coor­
dinating overall planning regarding the rehabilitation of indus­
trial economy."'" This institutional change was made with 
full realization that "if he Ithe Minister who is responsible for 
planning] is just one among many, he is not likely to have the 
necessary authority."' 6 Accordingly, the Minister of Recon­
struction was made chairman of the Reconstruction Committee 
of Economic Ministers. This gave him a theoretical position of 
seniority which was not replicated in fact.'" 
Another step forward in economic organization came in 
April 1958 when the Economic Development Council was 
established within the Ministry of Reconstruction. The council 
was able to attract a capable staff including a number of young, 
foreign-educated Koreans. In Hahn-Been Lee's words: 
In order to season the work of these academically oriented experts 
with the benefits of practical experience, senior civil servants and 
industrial experts were invited to frequent and active discussions 
with the members and staff of the Council. Thus, many conditions 
auspiciously converged to make the EDC a valuable forum for the 
formulation of a plan that would reflect the consensus of the dif­
fused thinking for the future which had been fermenting in many 
"innovational enclaves" of the period.'" 
Within a year of its founding the council prepared a Three-
Year Economic Development Plan for the period 1960-1962."' 
The Three-Year Plan was submitted to a cabinet meeting in 
the spring of 1959 but was shelved for a year "by the Liberal 
cabinet, whose prior concern at the time of its submission was 
the expediency of retaining political power."2 ° Ironically, the 
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Three-Year Plan did finally get approval a fcw days before the 
Rhee regime fell to the Student Revolution of 1960. 
In sum, the Rhee period saw an evolution of economic deci­
sion-making machinery, and tile Three-Year Plan can be seen as 
"a lystematic crystalization of tile future-oriented thinking in 
the Korean society."' Nonetheless, the planners were inexperi­
enced and isolated from the operational levels of government so 
their impact was minimal.22 More important, the political
leadership commitment to development was missing, so that "a 
potentially useful forinstrument deelopment was thus rele­
gated to the status of merely a document for later reference. ' ' 23 
PLANNING IN THE CHANG MYON REGIME, 1960-1961 
From its inception, the short-lived Chang Myon regime expressed
its foremost interest in tie nation's economic development. 
As soon as it took power, the regime directed the Economic 
Development Council to prepare a five-year economic plan and 
invited a Rand Corporation expert to advise in its formulation. 
In addition, Novemberin 1960, the regime organized public
hearings in the areas of administrative reform, public finance 
and banking, industrial structure, public enterprises, interna­
tional balance of payments, employment and standard of living, 
and regional development. 
The government also established a Committee on Government 
Organizational Reform, one of whose tasks was to devise a new 
administrative structure to efficiently execute economic devel­
opment plans. In its 1961 report, the committee recommended 
the establishment of an independent ministry of economic plan­
ning and an economic development research institute, both 
along the lines actually implemented under Park (see below).
The Economic Development Council also prepared a Five-Year 
Economic Development Plan, which was approved by the Park 
cabinet in May 1961. 
The later economic orientation of the Park regime was thus in 
no sense a sudden innovation. The actions of the interim Chang
Myon regime suggest that there was widespread recognition of a 
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need for a change from the Rhee period. It is an open question 
how successful the Chang Myon government might have been in 
translating these aspirations into reality. 
ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING IN THE 
PARK REGIME, 1961-1979 
Immediately after the Military Revolution (May 16, 1961), Park 
Chung Hee unofficially directed one of his ten revolutionary as­
sociates to draft a five-year economic plan. 4 At the same time, 
the Military regime wasted no time in officially announcing its 
intention to launch a five-year plan beginning in 1962. The Park 
Military Government also introduced various institutional 
changes necessary for effective economic decision-making. 
These administrative changes form a second major distinction 
between the Rhee and Park periods. Effective planning requires 
not only that growth be emphasized at the top of the means­
ends hierarchy but also that consistent chains emanate down­
ward to insure implementation. Limits on top leadership time 
and technical specialization require that there be an effective 
apparatus for intermediate-level economic decision-making. Im­
provements in this respect took two forms: first, obvious struc­
tural changes; and second, a fundamental shift in administrative 
philosophy. 
Several Korean writers stress the importance of the change in 
organizational approach. Halin-Been Lee asserts: 
The most general contribution of the military to the development of 
administration in Korea was its introduction and vigorous application 
of a "managerial approach." This approach took many concrete 
forms, including the adoption of a long-range development plan, 
institution of a comprehen,:ve planning and control system, and re­
vamping of many sluggish government corporations.
2 5 
In a similar vein, Sok-chun Cho characterizes the Military Gov­
ernment's administrative philosophy as consisting of three 
elements: first, a strong goal orientation and a high regard for 
institutions as a means for carrying out those goals; second, a 
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willingness to replace inappropriate means with alternative 
means; and third, a willingness to expand institutions as neces­
sary to achieve its goals.26 The change in attitude is rather natu­
ral, in view of the backgrounds of Rhec and Park. iee was a 
politician and often a loner; Park was a military man who knew 
how to use a staff. Rhee consequently used political parties,
youth groups, and cronies to a much greater extent than Park 
who increasingly relied on the government bureaucracy as his 
chosen instrument of control. 
This reliance was not misplaced. The Confucian cultural heri­
tage inculcates a value system based on "correct" superior­
subordinate relationships of the sort conducive to a smoothly
operating hierarchy. Further, the prestige attached to govern­
ment work, the stress on education, and the competitive merit­
based selection procedure insure civil service quality. Collectively, 
these features give the Korean bureaucracy the potential for 
highly effective decision-making, once they are given clear lead­
ership guidance and support. if one gives credence to Max 
Weber's theories on the superiority of bureaucracy as an organi­
zational form, then it is possible to argue that a part of the eco­
nomic success of Korea (and East Asia in general) is attributable 
to a cultural compatibility with effective hierarchical organiza­
tion." In any event, in moving from Rhee to Park, the bureau­
cracy was not simply reoriented and somewhat reorganized but
 
shifted 
to the forefront of the economic decisinn-making effort. 
Structurally, a major institutional innovation was introduced 
in June 1961 when the government organized powerful plan­a 
ning agency, the Economic Planning Board (EPB). 8 it took 
over planning responsibility from the recently established Minis­
try of Construction2" and absorbed the Bureau of Budget from 
the Ministry of Finance and the Bureau of Statistics from the 
Ministry of Home Affairs. The head of the board was given the 
title of Dept-y Prime Minister (DPM). This elevated position for 
the chief of the national planning agency signified the serious­
ness of the regime's planning effort and was necessary to coordi­
nate and control conflicts among the various economic ministries. 
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The Military Government also established the Central Economic 
Committee, consisting of the Prime Minister as chairman, the 
DPM as -ice chairman, all ministers concerned with economic 
affairs, and a few outside experts. Other structural changes will 
be described below in the context of plan and policy formulation. 
FIRST FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC
 
DEVELOPMENT PLAN, 1962-1966
 
The First Five-Year Plan was officially adopted in December
 
1961. The formulation of this Plan was strongly influenced by a
 
group of four civilian advisers to the Supreme Council, who pre­
pared directives for plan formulation.3" Directives were quite
 
specific, and so the EPB planning staff's primary responsibility
 
was to fill in details in cooperation with a 20-member working
 
committe, including government officials, businessmen, and
 
scholars, ii, addition to the above-niention'_d advisers. This First
 
Five-Year Plan was, however, rather hurriedly prepared in a
 
short period of time without good statistical data or a sophisti­
cated planning apparatus.' When the Plan was publicly an­
nounced, the general feeling was that the real growth target of
 
7.1 percent was over-ambitious, given historic Korean growth 
performance. At the same time, academics and professionals 
were skeptical because of the crudeness of the plan and doubted 
its consistency. 
This Plan had a bad start due to a poor harvest and the fiasco 
of the monetary reform in 1962. It was revised in 1964, but 
even the new version was more or less ignored for several rea­
sons: the government's preoccupation with stabilization, the 
lack of confidence engendered by "expert" criticism, ar.d the 
continued pressure to scale down a plan which eventually proved 
to be too pessimistic rather than too optimistic.32 
The First Five-Year Plan was, however, significant in various 
ways. It zhowed the people that the government was seriously 
commited to the nation's development. At the same time, 
rather inexperienced political leaders and government officials 
began to appreciate the complexity of the planning process and 
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gained useful experience for the future. The overachievement of 
growth targets during the later period also started building self­
confidence on the part of both the people and the economic 
policy-makers. 
SECOND FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT PLAN, 1967-1971 
The First Five-Year Plan was prepared under constraints of 
time, data availability, and inadequate planning techniques and 
experience. In -ontrast, Second Five-Year Plan preparation 
started long before tile actual plan period. 3 The Second Five-
Year Plan utilized a reasonably accurate input-output matrix 
and a rather sophisticated dynamic projection model for testing 
the consistency of the overall plan as well as estimating sectoral 
investment and import requirements. 
The Plan put much emphasis on 'strengthening planning ma­
chinery," 
-strengthening implementation machinery," and 
"translating the plan into an Action Program." -4 With regard to 
tile first point, the Plan proposed the establishment of an eco­
nomic research institute to provide basic research.3" Because 
the First-Plan formulation had suffered from the lack of reliable 
statistics, the Plan stressed data collection and processing. At 
the same time, the Plan foresaw the necessity of wider participa­
tion and support by various government bodies and civilians. 
Unlike the First Five-Year Plan, the preparation of the Second 
Five-Year Plan began with some general guidelines. Within tnese
 
broad terms of reference, EPB and various working commit­
tees 6 formulated plan proposals which wcie in turn 
 cross­
checked and coordinated by 
 Tile Second Plan Deliberation 
Joint Meeting and The Second Plan Consultative Council Meet­
ing. The Joint Meeting included ministers of concerned minis­
tries, menebers of the Economic and Scientific Council,3 7 and 
representatives from foreign-aid missions. The Consultative 
Council Meeting consisted of vice ministers of concerned min­
istries, vice presidents of national banking institutions, repre­
sentatives of economic research institutes, scholars, journalists, 
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other professionals, and representatives of various business asso­
ciations. Although the meetings were not open to the public, 
primary content was often made available to the news media. 
As a result of the improved formulation process, the final 
Second-Plan document had wide credibility both abroad and in 
Korea. 3H Further, as the official planning document of the 
Third Five-Year Plan states: "The successful completion of the 
first two plans has instilled new hope in the minds of the people 
whose attitude has been plagued by negativism and pessimism 
. . . It has given them self-confidence and courage to say, 'We, 
too, can be rich and strong.'"'' ' In addition, "The planning 
function and the planners became an integral part of the govern­
ment's decision-making process."4 Despite these positive 
achievements, the Second Five-Year Plan was, nonetheless, 
rapidly outstripped by events with the result that "the Plan was 
put on the proverbial shelf, to be brought down o,!y infre­
quently to point proudly at the fantastic overachievement of 
most targets." 41 
THIRD FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT PLAN, 1972-1976 
Preparation of the Third Five-Year Plan started in February 
1969. The initial work was primarily macro analysis to provide 
overall structure. Guidelines were prepared in about ten months, 
and, based on them, a tentative macro plan was drafted in April 
1970. At this stage of planning, various foreign as well as do­
mestic scholars were invited to participate. These guidelines 
were examined by the Working Committee on Economic Plan­
ning 2 and the Review Committee of the Third Five-Year 
Plan. 3 Ministries and concerned institutions were -o make con­
crete plans and develop necessary policy measures in close coop­
eration with the planning authorities. These detailed plans were 
then discussed, integrated, and adjusted by the Coordinating 
Committee. 4 As pointed out by Westphal and Adelman, how­
ever, "Planning closer to the ministerial level of the organization 
chart tended to be more window dressing than anything else."4 " 
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Most details of planning were carried out by the young, energetic, 
and competent lower-echelon bureaucrats. This rather decen­
tralized aspect of Third-Plan formulation contrasts with that of 
the Second Five-Year Plan, when "the EPB did not rely in a sys­
tematic way upon any other institutions within the economy 
for assistance in formulating the plan.''46 
A second change involved a shift from modeling and macro 
consistency emphasis to "policy planning." The focus was now 
on how "to formulate policies .vhich will lead to the 'desired' 
allocation of resources within the framework of private decision­
making in response to price incentives. Analytical work focuses 
on the system of incentives and the government's role as an eco­
nomic catalyst.""' 
A major reason for these changes in planning technique was 
that the economy had become far more complex. In addition, 
ministries other than EPB had gained confidence in their capa­
bilities in planning and were vying for the prestige and influence 
of participation. 
FOURTH FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT PLAN, 1977-1981 
This Plan is very similar to the Third Five-Year Plan in terms of 
its methodology and formulation processes. It also adopted de­
centralized "policy planning" procedures. There were twenty­
two working groups, each headed by ihigh government official 
from a concerned ministry. Each group consisted of government 
officials of concerned ministries, and experts from research in­
stitutes (such as the Korea Development Institute-KDI), banks, 
industries, business associations, and universities. EPB officials 
acted as secretaries to each team. 
These working groups were to develop detailed plans follow­
ing guidelines prepared by EPB. Plans prepared by these groups 
were to be coordinated by the Economic Plan Coordination 
Committee chaired by the vice minister of EPB with members 
from concerned iniiiistries and various public and private orga­
nizations. Finally, these plans were to be examined by the 
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Economic Plan Deliberation Committee chaired by the Prime 
Minister. As in the case of earlier plans, these c,, muittees were, 
in fact, a sort of formality, but did ensure that plan technicians 
were exposed to a wide variety of opinion. 
Actual plans were prepared by young bureaucrats in close co­
operation with KIDI staff. The Fourth Five-Year Plan again uti­
lized foreign consultants in twelve specific areas. They were 
hired independently using United Nations Development Pro­
gram money under the auspices of the World Bank. Their opin­
ions were evaluated by the Korean technicians and incorporated 
as appropriate. Tie aforementioned committees then debated 
and ppruved the drafts with relatively minor adjustments. In 
addition, KDI sponsored ten Economic Policy Con ferences in 
important policy areas. At these conferences, related working 
committees' plans were presented and commented on by partici­
pants from all walks of life. Nearly 250 people, in addition to 
concerned government officials, were invited to participate in 
these conferences. 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF FORMAL PLANNING 
Korean planning has been only partially successful in charting a 
detailed path for the economy to follow. More important, it has 
functioned as a sort of economic topographic survey which edu­
cated officials and allowed them to make the "*ntelligent short­
run policy decisions that really drive the economy. It has also 
had a major "announcement effect" in articulating leadership 
commitment and giving the general guidelines and implicit 
promises of support that facilitate private planning. 
Table 8 compares plan targets with actual achievements. Two 
features are noteworthy. First, actual growth always exceeded 
planned growth, particularly in mninimg and Manufacturing. Sec­
ond, during the first two plans, the actual ex post sectoral re­
source allocation shares diverge substantially from those planned 
t ante (social overhead taking more than expected and mining 
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TABLE 8 Plan Targets and Actual Performance 
(%)
 
GNP Growth Rate (annual average) 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries 
Mining and manufacturing 
Sociai overhead capital and other services 
Industrialstructure (terminal year)
Agriculture. forestry and fisheries 
Mining and manufacturing 
Social overhead capital and other services 
Investment as share of GNP (annual average) 
Domestic savings as share of GNP 
Foreign savings as share of GNP 
Allocation of resourcesby industrialsectora 
Agriculture. forestry and fisheries 
Mining and manufacturing 
Social overhead capital and other services 
FirstFive-Year Plan 
S(1962-1966) 

Planned 
7.1 
5.7 

15.1 
5.4 
34.8 
20.6 
44.5 

22.6 
9.3 
13.3 
17.4 
33.2 
49.4 
Actual 
8.3 
5.5 
14.8 
8.9 
37.9 
19.8 
42.3 
16.9 

6.7 

10.2 

15.4 

26.2 

58.4 
Second Five-Year Plan 
(1967-1971) 
Planned 
7.0 
5.0 

10.7 
6.6 
34.0 

26.8 

39.2 
19.0 

11.6 
7.4 
16.3 

30.7 
53.0 
Actual 
11.4 

2.0 
20.9 

13.2 
24.2 

29.9 

45.9 
30.6 
15.5 
15.1 
9.5 
23.8 

66.7 
Third Five-Year Plan 
(1972-1976)
 
Planned Actual 
8.6 11.2 
4.5 5.8 
13.0 20.1 -, 
8.5 8.5 
22.4 20.3 
27.9 36.0 "
 
49.7 33.7 
24.9 27.0 "
 
19.5 17.0 
5.4 11.8 
11.8 11.5
 
25.8 25.8 
62.4 62.7 
TABLE 8 (continued) 
Source-:: Kyo'ngje Kihoegwi'n (Economic Planning Board), Ky igjc kaeks (Economic white paper), 1972, 1976, 1977.
 
Kv8'ngje Kihoegwo'n Economic Planning Board), Che samch'a yotido ciz'opzgjawois ycsan, 1977 (Overall resources budget for 1977).
 
Bank of Korea, Motly Ecozornic Statistics, January 1977.
 
Note: alnventory changes are included in the plan estimates, but the "actual" na-ional income accounts dta do not provide this on a sectoral 
basis. These data were therefore estimated from 10 tables to provide consistent sectoral allocations inclusive of inventory adjustments. 
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and manufacturing less). These facts may be interpreted as fol­
lows. The government put primary emphasis on rapid growth of 
the mining and manufacturing sector and devoted its implemen­
tation efforts towards achieving that goal. The extraordinary 
response of private businessmen to these measures resulted in 
more rapid than planned growth in manufacturing. This then 
created bottlenecks in the social-overhead-capital sector (which 
the government controls directly), and required larger-than­
planned formal allocations 
Another noteworthy feature of Table 8 is that investment was 
not underestimated as heavily as growth, implying that actual 
incremental capital-output ratios were lower than anticipated. 
This is particularly noticeable in the First Five-Year Plan period
when actual investment was substantially lower than the planned
level, but annual growth rates were substantially higher. Similar­
ly, during the Third Five-Year Plan the achieved investment 
share was quite close to that planned, but actual growth 
was 11.2 percent rather than the planned 8.6 percent. The First 
Five-Year Plan result is, in part, due to increased capacity utili­
zation, but overall we would suggest there was an increase in 
"X-efficiency." In Chapter 6 shallwe argue that this is due to
 
the rapidity 
 of the learning being done by entrepreneurs and 
other economic actors. 
For present purposes, however, the major point is that the 
actual behavior was substantially different from plans. rhis is 
hardly unusual by international standards; what is unique is that 
the deviations were generally positive. We take this as evidence 
of superior short-term policy-making and implementation. This 
conclusion is not inconsistent with the expectations of Korean 
planners themselves. As early as the Second Five-Year Plan, 
there was official recognition that 
The value of a development plan lies not in tile plan itself but in how 
much the plan contributes to the development of the economy by
implementing the plan properly. It is preferable to have a poorly­
designed plan implemented appropriately rather than a good plan 
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implemented inappropriately if the poor plan so implemented con­
tributes to the rapid economic development of the nation."8 
This view was manifest in the change in emphasis of the Third 
and Fourth Five-Year Plans away from modeling and consisten­
cy and towards "policy-planning." It was institutionalized from 
1967 onwards in the form of annual Overall Resource Budgets 
(ORBs). The ORBs provided a framework for consistent short­
run policy-making. They reviewed past performance, set short­
term targets and allocations, and formulated appropriate 
implementation policies. 
More important than the actual results of the plans may have 
been the economic education provided to officials. Under Rhee, 
planning was isolated and educated no one save a very small 
band of domestic and foreign technocrats. Thereafter, there was 
a steady expansion of participation and education. There was 
both a vertical extension of planning concerns from the top to 
the bottom of the hierarchy, and a horizontal extension to 
other agencies within the government. There was also formal 
involvement of a broader spectrum of lay 3ociety. This was 
somewhat illusory, but did facilitate information flow. Planning 
thus played a major role in educating officials as to the com­
plexities and interactions of the economy. 
The learning by Koreans is reflected in the diminishing role of 
foreigners. The preparation of the Second Five-Year Plan was 
heavily influenced, not to say dominated, by foreign advisors, 
but by the Fourth Five-Year Plan, foreign consultants were in­
vited in only on a case-by-case basis to comment on particular 
topics. The process was controlled by Koreans, and the vast 
bulk of the analysis done by them. 
In sum, formal planning has not been as important in charting 
a particular course for tile economy as it has in mapping the 
economic terrain, providing a focus for dialogue, training bu­
reaucrats, and announcing government commitment to business­
men. We now consider the resulting short-term policies. Growth 
is the objective, and the Koreans do not generally confuse 
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means and ends. The formal Five-Year Plans were merely the 
first iteration in the process leading to the short-run procedures 
that actually drive the economy. 
POLICY FORMULATION 
Policy formulation is a much more diffuse effort than planning 
and cannot be summarized in the samc fashion. In this section, 
we therefore attempt only to specify the most important 
participants and identify the major distinguishing features of 
the process. Our discussion will regrettably be largely confined 
to the Park period. 
EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE 
A major characteristic of Korean policy formulation is that the 
executive branch is the overwhelmingly dominant government 
partner. This will come as no surprise to most readers, as the 
story of the emasculation of the legislature is well known to 
the most casual observer of the Korean scene. The point, how­
ever, is much more fundamental and goes well beyond the 
short-term decline in democratic formalities. In Japan, the 
executive branch dominates the legislature despite Formal 
legal provisions to tile contrary.49 One quantitative comparison 
involves the share of legislation initiated by the government as 
opposed to members of the legislature: in Japan, the figure is 
more than 90 percent; 0 in Korea, it has averaged 84 percent 
in the 1970s.5 The similarity is in part due to the common 
cultural background and a similar historical tradition. On the 
economic side, it may also have something to do with the in­
creasing technicality required to compete internationally and 
the necessity of speedy decisions to respond to a rapidly chang­
ing international environment.5 2 Whatever the reason, it is clear 
that the executive branch overwhelmingly dominates not only 
execution but policy formulation as well. 
Within the executive branch, the ultimate power is of course 
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the President, and major decisions and disputes are ultimately 
decided by him. Given Park's personal preoccupation with 
growth, this is no rubber-stamp formality. Within the Blue 
House (the executive mansion), there is a small but extremely 
powerful economic secretariat. Prior to August 1973, the First 
Economic Secretary held the rank of minister; from then until 
1974 he was a vice minister; and since then lie has been at the 
assistant-minister level. This reduced status may reflect a long­
term policy of power decentralization, but it is just as likely to 
be an adjustment to the President's confidence in incumbent 
ministers (as of the mid-1970s, the DPM had a United States 
PhD in economics and was formerly Minister of Finance; the 
Minister of Finance was previously First Economic Secretary 
of the Blue House). 
The formal mechanism for conflict resolution is the Economic 
Ministers' Meeting, begun in 1964. The meeting is chaired by 
the DPM and consists of all economic ministers and tile Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. The meeting is currently held twice a -ieek. 
More informal interaction takes place every Saturday morning 
at the Economic Ministers' Round-Table. Economic policy 
proposals agreed to at this formal meeting are sent to the 
cabinet meeting which is largely a rubber stamp. 
Despite these mechanisms, disagreement arises. Chitoshi 
Yanaga's description of interministerial conflict in Japan also 
serves for Korea: 
To a bureaucrat, possession of power is the goal. To maintain power 
and, if possible, increase it is his primary concern. Efforts to increase 
power inevitably result in sectionalism and jurisdictional conflicts, 
which have been exploited on occasion by both business and poli­
tical parties. Power struggles are common not only within the minis­
tries and agencies themselves but also between ministries over 
jurisdictional and budgetary matters . . . Jurisdictional conflicts 
arise because of the complexity of the problems handled by ad­
ministrative agencies whose jurisdictions overlap. 5 3 
Even though the expression "power struggle" seems to be a 
bit strong for the Korean situation, there exists a keen com­
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petitiveness among economic ministries. For example, setting 
an annual export target can be a subject of heated discussion 
between the EPB on the one hand and the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry (MCI) on the other. Grain price policy 
is another example of difficult coordination. EPB, concerned 
with price stability, would like to keep the price paid to farmers 
at a relatively lower level, while the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries (concerned with output incentives) may want to see 
the price increased as much as possible. Such disagreements are 
ultimately resolved either through interministerial bargaining 
or through the arbitration of the Blue House. 
Interniinisterial conflict is hardly unique to Korea. What is 
somewhat rarer is that the disputes ar( predominately settled 
on the basis of who is most convincing on econoinic grounds. 
Given the dominant leadership commitment to growth, minis­
ters prove themselves by the novelty and success of their eco­
nomic ideas. Similarly, subordinates prove their worth within 
their ministries by conducting the staff work necessary to 
generate and support their ministers' prograals. The incentive 
system flowing from leadership commitment to growth thus 
permeates the hierarchy and insures long bureaucratic hours 
devoted to making executive supremacy work in the economic 
sphere. 
SPEED AND FLEXIBILITY 
When the checks and balances of a multi-polar political system 
are rejected in favor of the tightly focused hierarchical structure 
already described, there are potential benefits in the speed and 
coherence of policy-making in a rapidly changing environment 
There are also pote ntial costs in that inadequate scrutiny may 
lead to errors that might otherwise have been avoided. 
In Korea, journalists regularly deplore the hastiness of such 
measures as the 1971 Law on Restraining Real Estate Invest­
ment, which is claimed to have resulted from a twenty-four 
hour "study," and the 1973 Law on Price Stability, which is 
said to have taken a comparatively leisurely three days of 
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s4preparation. While there is undoubtedly exaggeration in these 
examples, there can be no doubt that speed and flexibility are 
fundamental characteristics of the government economic 
decision-making process. Businessmen often complain about the 
sudden shifts in policy direction, and (at a decidedly lower 
level of importance) academics are regularly frustrated when 
their critiques of policy become outdated before reaching print. 
We can illustrate the process by giving one version of the 
response to the 1973 oil crisis."5 While the oil price increase 
was initiated in October, the permanent dimensions of the 
problem were not apparent for more than a month. In late 
December, the Blue House economic secretariat began an in­
tensive effort to produce a policy response. Their work was 
closely guarded, involving only a few technocrats from KDI and 
selected government bureaucrats. At tie ministerial level, it 
is said that only the Minister of Finance was aware of the 
project. Though the Offices of National Tax Administration 
and Customs Duties were to be heavily affected by the out­
come, these offices were not deeply involved (though senior 
officials were called upon to provide data). In situations such as 
this, the custom is to operate out of a suite of hotel rooms in 
order to avoid interruptions, preserve secrecy, and allow 
around-the-clock efforts. In this case, Presidential Emergencya 
Decree was issued on January 14, 1974, some three weeks 
after the study had begun. It was a quite sophisticated docu­
ment, combining a respect for allocative efficiency (increase i'i 
price of petroleum products to more or less world levels) with
 
a concern 
for equity (taxes were widely realigned to reduce the 
net burden on the middle class and increase it on the rich). 
There was also a recognition of the dangers of adi -:.iiant wind­
falls (petroleum product price increases and allowable pass­
throughs by users were to be allowed only after scrutiny of 
profit and loss accounts). 
This example is quite typical in reflecting exe . rtive domin­
ance, speed of action, and relative sophistication ir outcome. 
The secrecy of the process is less typical and may, in part, be 
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explained by a desire to minimize the excess profits which 
could have accrued to anyone with foreknowledge. Perhaps 
more important, it was desired to avoid popular debate on an 
issue that boiled down to one of just how to redistribute in­
come from Koreans to Arabs. In such a negative-sum game, 
debate is likely to produce deadlock (as in the United States) 
rather than illumination. The sudden flat approach allows 
a quick absorption of the necessary deadweight loss and permits 
the country to get on with operating under the new reality. In 
any event, action was quick and decisive. 
The costs of swift decision are also real. Better policy alter­
natives, or ill effects, or both are often found after a new policy 
has been quickly announced. 
As one example, consider the government's approach to 
adopting the Japanese structure of general trading companies 
(GTCs). The justification for GTCs is that there are economies 
of scale in exploiting overseas markets and that these impose 
excessive transaction costs on many small volume products. The 
GTC reaps these economies by being horizontally integrated 
across products. It facilitates export expansion by playing an 
active entrepreneurial role in seeking out foreign markets for 
virtually any commodity and then finding someone to produce 
it. It thus contributes to the process of functional differentia­
tion of entrepreneurship. While this pattern of corporate 
activity had been evolving informally for some years, the 
government decided to formalize it in 1975. While no explicit 
financial advantages are given to GTCs, the implicit administra­
tive support makes such status highly desirable. Initially, firms 
qualified for GTC status by meeting such objective criteria as 
export volume, product diversity, number of countries exported 
to, corporate size, and so on. This led to an overabundance of 
GTCs negating the scale economies and, in August 1977, it 
was decided to limit the number of GTCs to ten to be effective 
January 1978.6 This in turn led to artificial efforts (such as 
dumping some products in some markets) in attempts to qualify 
for one of the ten coveted spots. Accordingly, policy was again 
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reversed in December 1977, before the old policy even became 
effective. As a result, firms who at some cost had altered their 
behavior to comply with the earlier regulations, were unable to 
reap any benefits. Their dissatisfaction was articulately summed 
up by one journalist: 
The Korean bureaucrats of economic affairs are undoubtedly 
geniuses of extemporization. They come up with new measures, 
institutions and regulations in a dizzying speed only to change 
them almost daily afterwards. Korean bureaucrats deserve to be 
called actors of thinking while running. To be recognized as a 
capable bureaucrat, they have to continuously conic up with new 
ideas and new proposals for revisions. It is not unusual for them to 
formulate policies without thorough evaluation and preparation. 
Consequently, trial-and-error processes are repeated under the 
name of measures of modification of original ideas and sometimes 
basic directions are repeatedly changed only to confuse concerned 
parties. This is the reason why the economic bureaucrats can domi­
nate the business world.5 7 
The general indictment is, of course, applicable to the whole 
process of short-term policy formulation. 
While the costs of "thinking while running" are certainly 
real, it is necessary to recall the benefits. There is great uncer­
tainty in answering such questions as: "Should we have GTCs, 
and if so, what is the optimum number to exploit economies of 
scale?" Rather than studying the problem to death, the govern­
ment moves quickly to achieve the perceived benefits imme­
diately and then modifies its position quickly as deleterious 
side effects become apparent. Flexibility thus substantially 
reduces the costs of speedy decision-making. 
In short, there are two polar approaches to short-term policy 
formulation. One is to study problems in depth, making certain 
that all factors are taken into consideration before taking 
action. The second is to react quickly, monitor the results, and 
continuously adjust policy as necessary to achieve the desired 
outcome. The Korean method is far the second polenearer 
than the first. The costs of inaction are deemed greater than 
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those of adjustment. This may be inevitable in an open econ­
or y growing at such a high rate. Rapid structural change and 
unpredictable exogenous shocks continually produce new 
imbalances which outdate earlier policies and require quick 
adjustments if growth is to be sustained. Speed and flexibility 
of government decision-making may thus (in part) be both 
cause and conIsequence of the sustained 10 percent growth 
rate. 
PRAGMATISM, PARTICULARISM, CENTRALIZATION, 
AND OPENNESS
 
Other characteristics of the policy-fornulation process include
 
pragmatism, particularism, centralization, and openness. These
 
are best illustrated by examples given elsewhere in this volume,
 
and we here provide only a sumnary. 
By "pragmatism" we mean the willingness to experiment 
with any available tool for achieving a desired end. This is to 
be contrasted with an ideological approach that attempts to 
apply some received formula focusing on means rather than 
ends: for example, centralization and public ownership on the 
one hand, or laissez faire and private capitalism on the other. 
Preconceived notions as to the appropriateness of particular 
tools are present in Korea, as elsewhere, but provide only a 
starting point for the search. The outcome is a balance between 
market forces (for example, in the foreign exchange market) 
and direct government intervention: and coupling extensive 
government ownership with heavy reliance oin private entre­
preneurship. Where the market works, fi.,. , where it does not, 
the government is quick to intervene. This pragmatic absence 
of ideological predilection substantially expands the oppor­
tunity set of government tools and helps explain the sustained 
high growth rate. 
"Particularism" refers to the practice of making policy de­
cisions with a low level of generality: for example, with appli­
cation to only a single firm at a particular time (see Chapter 4, 
esiocially the section on Discretion and Command: A Case 
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Study. The decisions may be codified in a "measure," 
"directive," "order," or other legal form, but are so often 
highly specific that tle outcome may be characterized as more 
of a "rule of men" than a "rule of law." The advantage of the 
system is that it allows fine tuning of decisions in a rapidly 
changing environment where once-and-for-all general regulations 
inevitably conflict with a changing environment. The disadvan­
tage is that it is often extremely difficult for medium to large 
businesses to know what is permitted without personal consul­
tation at the concerned ministry. The accumulation of parti­
cularistic law emanating from various ministries is often impen­
etrable as to precedent. This difficUILNv being particularly acute 
with regard to foreign business, a unified foreign-investment 
code was promulgated in 1966. A similar effort by EPB to 
promote a Uniform domestic Investment Promotion Law has 
thus fir met with strong resistance friom concerned ministries 
protecting tneir turf. The resulting particularism gives great 
scope for individtual discretion (and attendant corruption) 
among bureaucrats. This aspect of the topic is considered ill 
greater detail in Chapter 4. 
Virtually all economic decisions of any importance are made 
in Seoul. This "centralization" is in no sense confined to the 
economic sphere and is hardly of recent origin. The historical 
causes and contemporary consequences of the broader phe­
nomenon are detailed in Henderson's Korea: 1The Politicsof the 
I ortex." For present purposes, we need only note that central­
ism reinforces executive dominance and facilitates speed and 
flexibility. 
The final notewo thy characteristic of Korean economic 
policy formtIlation is "openness." We mean this in the some­
what restricted sense of being open to a wide range of opinion 
inputs, even though the final decision process itself is usually 
closed. This openness is a somewhat surprising characteristic 
in an authoritarian regime and, even in Korea, can hardly be 
said to extend to the political arena. Nonetheless, within the 
strictly limited realm of economic affairs, there is virtually 
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unlimited freedom of expression and dissent Critics may have 
to be careful to attribute existing shortcomings to concerned 
ministers rather than the President or the regime as a whole. 
These, however, are minor restrictions and a variety of eco­
nomic opinion is not only tolerated but often heeded. One mani­
festation of this process is the Fourth Five-Year Plan's shift 
in emphasis towards "social" development in the form of in­
creased attention on health, education, and regional and urban 
problems. if implemented, this would soothe many earlier 
academic critics. 
It is important to note the absence of organized labor as a 
significant participant in the economic decision-making pro­
cess. While labor unions exist, they are so weak that not only do 
they not provide much opinion input, but their potential re­
action is seldom considered as a constraint. While it is arguable 
that workers' interests are to some extent protected by the 
government's implicit value system and by the explicit criti­
cisms of the journalistic and academic communities, it is clear 
that labor's direct contribution is minimal. Given the minor 
contribution of labor and the major role of the business com­
munity, it is worth examining the latter in greater detail. 
THE INFLUENCE OF BUSINESS 
IS THERE A "KOREA, INC."?
 
The nature and extent of business influence on government is a
 
profound issue with ramifications well beyond the economic 
reahn. Here we attempt only to present in overview. One 
relevant paradigm of government-business it. eraction is repre­
sented by the notion of "Japan, Inc.", that is, "the proposition 
that economic growth policies have been jointly decided and 
jointly executed by politicians and appointed officials together 
with representatives of private business."" There is some 
difference of opinion as to where dominance lies: some would 
have government dominating business, others the reverse, and 
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a third group would say it makes no difference, because they 
6 ° are one and the same. The journalistic popularity of this 
desciiption notwithstanding, the concept's academic repute is 
not particularly high.' However, since the parallel notion of 
"Korea, Inc." has begun to appear in print,6" a brief compari­
son of the Japanese and Korean "corporate" structures provides 
a convenient heuristic device for focusing our discussion. 
Given the Korean government's dedication to growth and its 
substantial (though by no means exclusive) reliance on private­
sector activity, the success of government requires the success 
of business. Indeed, the very survival of Park Chung Hee rests 
on economic performance and thus on the achievement of 
private business. This mutuality of interest implies a partner­
ship and, to this extent, there is indeed a "Korea, Inc." parallel 
to "Japan, Inc." 
This partnership is reflected in exter.sive interaction between 
government and business in the process of policy formulation. 
These relationships are facilitated by a network of personal ties 
between businessmen and bureaucrats, and by interchange of 
personnel between the two sectors (though the latter is decid­
edly less extensive in Korea). In these respects, there is again a 
similarity between Japan and Korea, in large part due to the 
common cultural heritage. 
There is, however, one decisive difference between the two 
countries. In Korea, the dominant partner is unequivocally the 
government, whereas, in Japan. the reverse may be closer to the 
truth. A major study of the Japanese scene concludes that 
"big business (ik) pr-dominant and unrivaled as an influence 
in Japanese politics. Its wishes are tantamount to commands, 
and the government does not dare take them lightly.'' 6 A 
similarly bald description of the situation in Korea would be 
provided by rotating the subjects in the last sentence: the 
govemmhut's wishes are tantamount to commands, and business 
does not dare take themi lightly. 
This reversal of dominance follows from differences in politi­
cal structure. In Japan, ascension to the top of both executive 
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and legislative branclies requires success in electoral politics, 
and this in turn depends heavily upon the financing and support 
of business. In Korea, Park's original power base was the 
military, and his current base is a broader mix of the military 
and other executive agencies, supported by broad-based (though 
by no means total) popularity derived heavily from econoin ic 
success. Real private consuni ption expenditure rou"lHlv,., tripled 
in fifteen years ulnd'. -r Park, and that buys a lot of votes. Whe,, 
elections have been held, they have, of course, been financed 
by levies on the business community. This has taken, however, 
the form of ;a unavoidable political tax levid by ,. powerful 
incumbent, rather than a discretionary cc ntribution that 
imposes obligations on the recipient. 
Another way of describing this difference would be to say 
that in Japan the business coinmu nity Call dismiss most poli­
ticians by withholding support in an election. In Korea, the 
business community could dismiss Park only by shutting down 
operations and ruining themselves in the process. Conversely, 
the Korean government can ensure tile failure of any business­
man, should it care to do so. 
Eugene Kaplan argues that "business as well as government 
sits on the board of directors of 'Japan, Incorporated,' "64 
and it "should not be thought of as an organization with the 
sbureauracy in conimand.'' if the same corporate analogy 
were applied to Korea, it would be far closer to the truth to say 
that the President chairs a policy board composed of ministers, 
with businessmen as operationally independent ianagers or 
production units. The success of the conglomerate depends on 
the performance of the managers whose counsel is valued (and 
the more important are quite influential), but they are einpha­
tically not members of the board. 
In sum, in Korea the government is dependent upon the 
success of business, but not upon its political support. It there­
fore must listen to the business community and frame policies 
that are in the long-run best interests of entrepreneurs in 
general. At the same time, however, it is in a position to take 
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actions that are inimical to certain short-run interests. In 
Chapter 8 we will describe thcse latter elements as: first, con­
straining tle license-seeking en-repreneurship of the Rhee 
period and forcing businessmen into generally socially produc­
tive activities; and second, constraining private wealth utiliza
tioi while allowing virtually unlimited wealth ,ccuuilatiol. 
For present purposes, however, :lw critical point is that in 
Korea there is indeed a harmony of interest between govern­
ment and business, and this is reflected in close working rela­
tionships between the two in a manner which could be crudely 
described as "Korea, Inc." The term is, however, misleading 
n implying an eual partnership as in Japan. Rather, govern­
ment is clearly the sen~ior partner in Korea. These propositions 
should not be t,:rribly surprising. Intimate government-business 
interaction may be contrary to the American ideal of counter­
vailing power but represents the actuality in many WeEtern 
nations such as France. in Korea, government dominance 
follows from the authoritarian government and the relatively 
weak business power base in 1961. Granted that the actual 
intcraction is far more complicated than that implied by the 
corporate analogy, the idea of "Korea, Inc." does not provide 
a bad starting point for understanding the relation ship. 
THE PATFERN OF i3USINESS INFLUENCE 
The pattern of government-business interaction under Park was 
set in the first months of the regime. One of the first acts of 
the new government was the passage of a Law fur Dealing with 
Illicit Wealth Accumulation. The law itseif is described in 
greater detail in Chapter 8. Here we only note that, under 
its provisions, most of the country's leading businessmen were 
arrested and threatened with confiscation of their assets. 
Soon thereafter, ten of the leaders were summoned to a meeting 
with Parkl, then Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Council.6 6 
A deal was struck whereby: 
1) The government would exempt most businessmen from 
criminal prosecution. 
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2) 	 With the notable exception of commercial bank shares, 
existing assets would not be confiscated. 
3) 	 Businessmen would instead pay off their assessed obliga­
tions by establishing new basic industrial firms and do­
nating the shares to the government. 
In 	 other words, from the beginning Park tried to channel 
entrepreneurial energies into growth-producing activity. In the 
end, only a few plants were established under the program (on 
the argument that foreign loans were unattainable), and even 
those were not turned over to the government. Instead the fines 
were paid in cash. Nonetheless, the basic pattern was set, with 
buinessmen in a decidedly subordinate role. 
THE MEANS OF BUSINESS INFLUENCE 
A 	second outcome of the foregoing episode was the initiation 
of 	business input into government economic policy-making. 
The thirteen businessmen with the largest fines to pay received 
governmental permission to go abroad and solicit foreign 
capital. Upon their return, they made a variety of policy recom­
mendations, including the establishment of an industrial port 
at 	 Ulsan, a proposal that was immediately implemented. In 
addition, they formed an association that evolved into the 
Federation of Korean Industries (FKI). In addition to FKI, 
the most important Korean business associations are the older 
Chamber of Commerce and the newer Korean Traders Associa­
tion (KTA) which is financed by a government mandated levy 
of 0.55 percent on all imports. In addition, there is the Cooper­
ative Association of Small and Medium Firms and a plethora 
of "industrial associations" representing particular industries. 
The role of business associations has been shown to be central 
to government-business interaction in Japan. Indeed, one 
observer asserts that "zaikai [loosely, big business] literally 
presided over Japanese society."67 In Korea, their power 
is far less, for reasons already explained, but they do pro­
vide a major vehicle for the transmittal of business ideas on 
economic policy. For example, in 1974 KTA made 167 formal 
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recommendations to the government and 76 percent were 
adopted, at least in part.6" 
In addition to such formal submissions, important Korean 
businessmen have regular opportunities to discuss economic pol­
icy with top government officials. Most notable is the Monthly 
Export Promotion Meeting and the more select luncheon that 
follows, both attended religiously by President Park. 
Personal contacts with government officials are a traditional 
means of influence in East Asia, and Korea is no exception.69 
Many such contacts evolve from the close ties generated by 
school, region, or family, and by the recruitment of ex-civil 
servants for government positions. Since officials exercise great 
discretion in policy-making, there are obvious dangers in these 
relationships, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. Here we note 
only that, in addition to providing opportunities for transmittal 
of individual needs, they also serve to inform officials of busi­
ness concerns in general. 
It is, of course, impossible to quantify the importance of 
these various means of influence, but we did ask our sample 
survey respondents how important they thought various con­
duits were. Their responses, reported in Table 9, must be liber­
ally discounted for response bias, but tile following points seem 
worthy of note. First, direct appeals to the government7" are 
used most often, with indirect appeals through politicians or 
political parties virtually never used by anyone. Second, indirect 
appeals through business associations are "soml-ti,,es used" 
by many of the respondents, with small in..ustry-specific asso­
ciations (for example, for cement or fertilizer) being far more 
influential than the larger broad-based groups. Third, there is 
extremely high variance in the responses (for example, for 
direct formal appeals, 30 percent respond with #1 or #2, 30 
percent with #3 and 40 percent with #4 or #5, for a 3.38 mean). 
Surprisingly, decompositi n into "exporters" versus "non­
exporters" and "large" versus "small" firms does little to explain 
the variance. T-tcsts show only four cases of significant differ­
ences in means (at 5 percent): two of these are tautological, (ex­
porters are more likely to use the Korean Traders Association, 
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TABLE 9 	 Methods of Busincss Influence on Government 
Question: 	 "If you have sonic influence on government economic policy, 
how frequently are the following methods vsed ?" 
Respoirse Categories: 
Used very Sometimes 
often used Never used 
1 2 3 4 5 
Mean Responses: 	 All Snmalla Largeb 
Direct formal impersonal appeal to 
government 3.38 3.51 c 2.82 
Direct informal personal appeal to 
government officials 4.05 4.20 c 3.55 
Indirect appeal through business 
association 
Industrial Trade Association 3.19 3.17 3.29 
Chamber of Commerce 4.28 4.27 4.32 
Small and Medium Industrial 
Association 4.41 4.28 c 4.91 
Federation of Korean Industries 4.60 4.65 4.43 
Korean Traders Association 4.19 4.11 4.47 
Indirect personal appeal through 
politician 4.73 4.76 4.60 
Indirect impersonal appeal though 
political party 4.90 4.90 4.91 
Indirect impersonal appeal though 
newspaper 4.78 4.78 4.79 
n= 109 86 23 
Source: Entrepreneurship Survey, see Appendix C. 
Notes: "Large 	 firms are those in top quintile of respondents by value added.b*"Exporters" and "non-exporters" are not presented since the differences are sig­
nificant at the 5%level only for use of the Korean Traders Association.
cindicates difference significant at 5% level. 
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and small firms are more likely to use the Small and Medium In­
dustrial Association): and two are reasonable-large firms make 
greater use of both direct personal and direct impersonal appeals. 
Still, the relatively small difference between "large" and "small" 
and between "exporters" and "non-exporters" is puzzling. 
Part of this is undoubtedly due to the inherent weakness of 
the qucstion and to response bias, and part is probably due to 
tle fact that, though small firms exert less influence, they use 
similar methods when they do so. In addition, however, we 
must consider the possibility that in some respects the govern­
ment's treatment of different groups is somewhat more even­
handed than commonly thought. This will be elaborated on in 
the next section. 
THE DEGREE OF BUSINESS INFLUENCE 
Respondents were asked, "To what extent can you (or your 
company) influence government policies affecting your busi­
ness?" Answers (detailed in Table 10) included: "frequently," 
27 percent; "sometimes," 43 percent: and "seldom," 23 per­
cent. These results are not surprising, given the foregoing 
argument that, while government is quitc responsive to busi­
ness needs, it is also clearly in the driver's seat. 
What is surprising is that, while large firms feel themselves to 
be more influential than smaller firms by a small but statisti­
cally significant amount, exporters and non-exporters respond 
in a virtually identical fashion. This may seem to conflict both 
with the popular p' rception of export bias and with evidence 
we present elsewhere that shows that exporters see themselves 
as receiving significantly ,reater benefits from tax and tariff 
privileges (Table 36), and also view the government as being 
more "helpful'' in establishing, operating, and expanding their 
businesses (Table 11 ). This is at least consistemt with the follow­
ing hypothesis: the government initiates policies favoring par­
ticular sectors, but is then roughly neutral in responding to 
complaints across sectors (for example, an exporter appealing 
for additional privileges may get short shrift given tile general 
privileges already accorded). 
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TABLE 10 Degrees of Business Influence on Government 
Question: "To what extent can you (or your company) influence govern­
ment policies affecting your business?" 
Response Scaling: 
Can Get Can Frequent- Can Some- Seldom Affect 
Anything ly Affect times Affect Affect Not at All 
1 2 3 4 5 
Responses: 
% Distributionof Responsesc
1 2 3 4 5 n - t 
All 1.6 26.7 43.0 22.8 5.9 182 3.05 -
Larg e 2.8 33.3 45.9 18.0 0.0 37 2.79 1.96 
Smalla 1.3 25.0 42.3 24.0 7.4 145 3.11 
Exportb 2.5 25.7 43.9 20.4 7.5 79 3.05 
0 .0 0Non-exportb 0.9 27.5 42.3 24.6 4.7 103 3.05 
Source: Entrepreneurship Survey, see Appendix C. 
Notes: '"Large" companies arc thosc in the top quintile of respondents when
ranked by value added. b"Exporters" are those who derive more than 50% of revenue from exports. 
C11 n mtber of observations
 
x mean response
 
t t values
 
BUSINESS'S EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENT 
This chapter has been concerned with government economic 
decision-making, and we conclude by presenting businessmen's 
evaluation of the outcomes cf that process. Our respondents 
were asked to evaluate the role of government as positive,
neutral, or negative in a number of different areas. Results are 
summarized in Table 11, with the following points worthy of 
note: 
1) The Park Government is ranked as superior to the Rhee 
Government in every respect (all differences are signifi­
cant at the 5 percent level). The differences are greatest for 
"foreign finance," "foreign marketing," and "long-range 
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TABLE 11 	 Businessmen's Perceptions of Government
 
Helpfulness
 
Question: 	 "The government affects your operations in many ways. In 
each of the following areas, would you rate their involvement 
as having a positive, negative, or neutral effect upon your 
business. Ifyou were hi business under the Rhee Government, 
please rate them on the same items. 
Response Scaling: 
Very Positive Neutral Very Negative
 
1 2 3 4 5
 
Mean Responses:
 
Non- Ex-

Now Rhee Small Large' Exporter porterb 
Establishing business 2.28 *c2.82 236 1.95 2.40 * 2.12 
Operating business 2.19 2.80 2.23 2.02 2.34 * 2.00 
Expanding business 2.25 2.90 2.31 2.00 2.36 * 2.10 
Foreign marketing 2.26 3.26 2.29 2.16 2.38 2.12 
Domestic marketing 2.66 3.08 2.63 2.78 2.52 * 2.85 
Foreign financing 2.33 3.23 2.45 1.87 2.36 2.31 
Domestic financing 2.22 * 2.90 2.24 2.16 2.44 * 1.94 
Stimulating general 
level of economy 2.22 * 2.91 2.22 2.25 2.27 2.15 
Controlling prices 2.68 * 3.00 2.59 3.04 2.7'0 2.65 
Long-range planning 2.20 * 3.14 2.24 2.05 2.20 2.20 
Controlling unfair 
competition 2.63 * 3.04 2.56 * 2.92 2.62 2.66 
Controlling labor 
unrest 2.40 * 3.11 2.46 2.21 2.45 2.34 
SOC provision 2.18 * 2.98 2.29 1.79 2.14 2.23 
number 172 73 138 34 95 77 
So,,rce: Entrepreneurship Survey, see Appendix C. Some response categories are ab­
breviated here. 
Notes: a"Large" companies are in the top quintile of respondents when ranked by 
value added. 
b",Exporters" are those who derive more than 50 percent of revenues from exports. 
C, indicates significant difference at 5% level. 
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planning": and least for "controlling prices" and "con­
trolling unfair competition.' 
2) 	Overall, the evaluation of the current government is mildly 
positive, but hardly wildly enthusiastic (mean responses 
are on the neutral side of positive). The only items on 
which the government was ranked closer to "neutral" 
than to "positive" were "controlling prices," "controlling 
competition," and "domestic marketing." 
3) 	 Large firms generally give the present government a higher 
rating than do smaller firms, 71 though the differences are 
often not significant. Even where statistically significant, 
the differences are not strikingly large (that is, mean 
responses of both groups are generally closer to "positive" 
than to either "very positive" or "neutral"). 
4) Exporters generally rate the government more favorably 
than do domestic producers. 7 The absolute differences 
remain small, however, though they are more often signifi­
cant than with the "small" versus "large" distinction. 
The relatively low explanatory power of the "'small" versus 
"large" and "export" versus "non-export" distinctions requires 
attention. One hypothesis runs as follows: because of informa­
tion imperfections and uncertainty, exporting is much more 
difficult than import substitution, and the government there­
fore must intervene in favor of exports to reduce the gap 
between expected private and social gains. The question then is 
not the qualitative one of whether or not the goveonment 
should favor exports, but the quantitative one of how much is 
necessarv to roughly equate returns from export and domestic 
sales. Has the government gone overboard and induced entre­
preneurs to ignore domestic opportunities in favor of exports 
which, at tihe margin, are socially less advantageous? Or, have 
exporters received proportionally greater policy attention only, 
to the extent necessary to offset the market imperfection? 
The relatively small differences in our empirical results provide 
some weak support for the view that in practice the government 
has largely intervened to redress an existing imbalance and has 
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generally not gone so far as to create a new onc. This is, of 
course, a testable hypothesis (in terms of average rates of re­
turn on domestic sales and exports), but we are unable to find 
any relevant data and so leave the exercise to others. In any 
event, the possibility must at least be considered that the 
government is reasonably even-handed in dealing with different 
sectors, with exporters having greater problems and thus merit­
ing, and receiving, greater attention. 
The judgments of businessmen presented above are, of course, 
only partly due to the government economic decision-making 
process-the top tier of the planning heirarchy. They are even 
more closely related to the cutting edge of planning where 
government decisions are transmitted so as to actually alter the 
behavior of production units. It is to this "iIplementation" 
level of planning that we now direct our attention. 
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FOUR 
Implementation of Government Policy 
IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
 
MECHANISMS
 
Government planning, if it is to alter the path of a mixed 
economy, must ultimately be reflected in the actions of indivi­
duals and enterprises. This link is by no means automatic. In 
the words of Eli Hecksher: "Even in large countries ruled by 
strong governments, economic statutes and laws have ever so 
often remained pious wishes exerting little or no effect on the 
course of economic development."' This has been particularly 
true in post-World War 11LDCs. "Development planning" has 
run the gamut from simple lists of "goods" to the most sophis­
ticated programming models without conspicuously influenc­
ing grassroots behavior. Nehru's judgement on India, "The real 
question is not planning but implementing the Plan-I fear we 
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are not quite so expert at implementation as at planning," 2 is 
reflected in a growing emphasis in the planning literature on 
the cruciality of implementation and its inadequacy in most 
LDCs.' We believe that Korea is a notable exception, and that, 
in contrast to the Indian situation, Koreans are even better at 
implementation than at planning. Our argument will be struc­
tured according to four organizing principles. 
We have broadly defined planning as the working out of an 
ends-means hierarchy in which "implementation" refers to the 
means whereby a given end is achieved; that is, any one tier 
in the hierarchy is implemented by all the tiers below it. In this 
scheme, there is a crucial discontinuity between government 
and private planning, and crossing of this interface is the critical 
bottleneck in implementation. The lowest tier of government 
planning is a set of mechanisms whcreby individual and enter­
prise compliance is stimulated, forced, or cajoled. A discussion 
of implementation can usefully concentrate on these means 
whereby the crucial interface is crossed. Our first organizing 
principle is thus to focus on intervention mechanisms. 
Intervention mechanisms may be classified in two ways: 
first, in terms of the instruments of intervention (taxes. ex­
change rates, rationing, subsidies, and so on); and second, in 
terms of the kinds of pressures brought to bear on individual 
behavior in order to insure compliance. Our second organizing 
principle is that we are primarily concerned with behavioral 
compliance mechanisms. 
Behavior may be modified by field manipulation or by 
command. The former expands an individual's opportunity set, 
leaving him free to alter his behavior or not, while the latter 
constricts it. Since government's efforts at field manipulation 
are well known, a major concern of this chapter will be to 
describe and explain the command elements. The command 
versus field manipulation distinction is thus a third major 
organizing principle. 
Both field manipulations and commands may be discretionary 
or non-discretionary, depending on the degree to which admin­
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istrators are free to alter their applicability. A related distinc­
tion is the degree of particularism with which mechanisms are 
applied to individual or larger groupings of enterprises. The 
choice between discretionary and non-discretionary interven­
tion is a fourth organizing principle. 
These principles are elaborated ol in theoretical terms in the 
next section (which may be skipped by those interested only in 
the Korean case). Pages 85-127 then detail Korean usages of non­
discretionary and discretionary variants of field manipulation 
and command. The section, Discretion and Command: A Case 
Study, demonstrates how the various mechanisms interact to 
alter the behavior of a particular enterprise. We conclude by 
characterizing the Korean implementation system as a 
Myrdalian "hard" state and evaluate the costs and benefits of 
this status (pages 132-140). 
THEORETICAL DIMENSIONS OF
 
INTERVENTION
 
Our discussion of compliance mechanisms is hobbled by a lack 
of previous work on the subject, both in Korea and elsewhere. 
One notable exception is Gunnar Myrdal's discussion of what he 
terms "operational controls," but as he observes: 
In no other major field of South Asian economic policy is there 
such a lack not only of scientific analysis but of systematic and 
specific knowledge of the empirical facts. The operational controls 
are not planned, they arc clearly not coordinated, and the manner 
of their application is usually not disclosed in any detail.4 
This neglect is not confined to South Asia, and a natural conse­
quence is the absence of an accepted paradigm, model, or frame­
work for dealing with this complicated set of interrelationships. 
Our purpose here is not to present a detailed morphology, but to 
suggest its more important dimensions and thus provide a struc­
ture for our discussion of implementation as practiced in Korea. 
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INSTRUMENTALISM VERSUS BEHAVIORALISM 
Two broad structuring principles of compliance mechanisms 
are possible-instrumental and behavioral. The instrumental 
approach is most completely developed in the work of E.S. 
Kirschen et al. They define instruments as "something which the 
Government itself can change in order to produce an economic 
effect," and classify them into five groups-public finance, 
moncy and credit, exchange rate, direct control, and changes 
in the institutional framework.' The behavioral approach is 
reflected in the work of Dahl and Lindbloom, Koopmans 
and Montias." Here the focus is on the nature of the inter­
action which alters behavior, and this cuts across instrumental 
categories. For example, Kirsclien's tax, credit, and exchange 
rate instruments are basically similar in altering resource alloca­
tion by acting on enterprise profits and self-interest. From the 
behavioral point of view, the crucial microeconomic question 
is not so much which particuiar element of the profit function 
is being manipulated, but lou, it is manipulated. That is, how 
much administrative discretion is there in application? How 
are underpriced resources allocated to competitors? How easy 
is it to avoid compliance, and so forth? Such questions are of 
interest for a wide range of instruments, and their answers 
have much to do with whether or not the policies remain mere 
"pious wishes." The process of control dominates the tool of 
control as a determinant of efficacy. 
The behavioral and instrumental approaches are, of course, 
not mutually contradictory but two dimensions of the same 
issue. Nonetheless, we choose to organize our presentation 
along behavioral lines because it seems more suited to under­
standing the microeconomic problems LDCs face in making 
policies work. In addition, the instrumental approach is re­
flected in companion papers. We now elaborate somewhat on 
the behavioral categories. 
Dahli and Lindbloom distinguish four broad socio-political 
techniques through which one social organism can produce a 
response in another.7 Briefly, these are: 
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1) Spontaneous field control: pursuit of one's own interests 
affects another's behavior without conscious intent. 
2) Manipulated field control: intentional alteration of an­
o.her's opportunity set so as to stimulate a desired re­
sponge. 
3) Command: hierarchical direction enforced by expectations 
of penalties for non-compliance. 
4) Reciprocity: bilateral or multilateral interaction employing 
combinations of the other three techniques. 
In the present context, spontaneous field control is represented 
by the invisible hand of the market, government intervention 
is accomplished via manipulated field control or command, 
and reciprocity is the linkage between compliance mechanisms 
and business influence on government. Spontaneous field con­
trol is not itself an intervention mechanism so that it appears 
in this chapter only in specifying the opportunity costs of 
command and field manipulation. Interactive reciprocity is 
discussed in explaining how command is enforced by field 
manipulation. 
COMMAND VERSUS FIELD MANIPULATION 
The distincton between command and field manipulation can 
be clarified by ccsidering the motivation behind compliance.8 
Both ultimately act on the controllee's self-interest by altering 
his perceived opportunity set. hi field manipulation, compliance 
or non-compliance is up to the controllee's decision and is its 
own reward. With command, on the other hand, compliance is 
not perceived by the controllee as being advantageous in and of 
itself, so that it must be accompanied by an explicit or implicit 
threat for non-compliance. 
Command thus implies compulsion, which may either be a 
penalty for non-compliance, or the removal of an existing (or 
potential) privilege. The latter method we shall refer to as 
"partial mutuality." In the words of Koopmans and Montias, 
this occurs 
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when an individual undertaking an effective ,ction incurs some, pos­
sibly temporary, disutility in order (a) to forestall an action by one 
or r jore participants which would inflict on him an even greater loss 
in utility or (b) to accumulate credits for future benefits. 9 
No better description of the Korean method of enforcing com­
mand. could be found, as we shall see. 
As an example of our behavioral morpholory, consider the 
fiscal instrument of taxation. An income t;,x is imposed by 
command, conferring no advantage in and c.t itself, and it must 
therefore be enforced by threat of penIl y. 0 Tax variances, ex­
emptions, holidays, and other loopholes, on the other hand, 
consist of offers of advantage in return for particular actions. 
They are, therefore, field manipulations. Finally, the threat to 
withdraw exemptions (or to enforce inoperable tax commands) 
in the absence of a specified action represents partial mutuality 
in operation. 
Field manipulation may, in turn, take two forms, which we 
shall call parameter manipulation and field augmentation. The 
former signals desired reallocations by marginal adjustments of 
prices, taxes, interest rates, exchange rates, and -he like. Field 
augmentation, on the other hand, operates through expanding 
information about existing opportunities. The controllee con­
siders his perceived opportunity set that includes only a finite 
number of feasible alternatives due to limited information. The 
controller can expand the decision-maker's perceived opportu­
nity set by filling this information gap and thus lead him to re­
evaluate alternative courses of action and the expected outcomes 
associated with those alternatives. 
In sum, field manipulation either expands the perceived op­
portunity set (field augmentation), or alters expected payoffs 
from particular courses of action (parameter manipulation). 
Command, on the other hand, reduces the feasible opportunity 
set, assuming there is sufficient compulsion to make it operable. 
The main point is that a given instrument can be used to alter 
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behavior in a variety of ways, and the process chosen is often as 
important as the instrument in determining the outcome. Where 
intervention is deemed necessary, field manipulation would 
seem preferable to command on several theoretical grounds: it 
increases liberty; it takes maximum advantage of the market 
forces of self-motivation and private knowledge and flexibility; 
and it conserves on administrative costs of enforcement and in­
formation acquisition. As we shall show, however, the Korean 
government has relied heavily on command, often with good ef­
fect. A major task of our discussion of implementation will be 
to explain this paradox. 
DISCRETIONARY VERSUS
 
NON-DISCRETIONARY INTERVENTION
 
The second dimension must now be added to our behavioral 
typology. Myrdal's discussion of operational controls utilizes 
such a two-dimensional classification scheme. One of these dis­
tinguishes "positive" from "negative" controls in a manner 
compatible with, but far from identical to, our command versus 
field manipulation categorization.'" His second dimension de­
fines a "non-discretionary" control as one in which 'application 
follows automatically from the laying down of a definite rule, 
or from induced changes in prices, the imposition of tariff du­
ties or excise duties, or the giving of subsidies to a particular 
branch of industry without the possibility of discrimination in 
2favor of particular firms.' On the other hand, the application 
of discretionary controls "involves an individual decision by an 
administrative authority with power to act at its own discre­
tion.''13 
Myrdal describes the heavy reliance of LDCs on discretionary 
controls and classes them as "illiberal states" on this count, in 
distinction to the use of non-discretionary controls in the "lib­
eral" West.' 4 He argues forcibly for liberalization on the ground 
that "the scarcity in South Asia of administritive personnel 
with both competence and integrity should make discretionary 
policies all the more difficult to execute with reasonable effect­
84
 
Non-DiscretionaryField Manipulation 
iveness and reliance on them more hazardous, even morally. 
With this consideration in mind, ... it would be desirable if 
non-discretionary controls were used to the maximum extent 
possible."'" 
This argument is similar to Hirschman's hypothesis that "an 
untrained labor force will perform better in machine-paced op­
erations" than in "operator-paced operations.''"6 In both cases 
one conserves on scarce decision-making powers by relying on 
automaticity. 
The formulation of well-designed generalized controls is, how­
ever, not a sufficient condition for non-discretionary applica­
tion. Myrdal admits this by saying: 
In regard to all controls except those non-discretionary ones that 
work through induced changes in prices, there are wide differences in 
the degree of administrative discretion, depending on how firm and 
specific the governing directives and how literally they are observed.'" 
For example, under the law, tax holidays might be allowed to 
a wide class of investors, but in practice there may be substan­
tial room for administrative discretion. 
Again, examination of the Korean case will yield a paradox. 
Myrdal argues for non-discretionary controls, but the Koreans 
have successfully relied heavily on discretionary methods. We 
now describe the application of control mechanisms in Korea 
and return to an explanation of the double paradox at the end 
of the chapter. 
NON-DISCRETIONARY FIELD
 
MANIPULATION IN PRACTICE
 
In theory, non-discretionary field manipulation is the preferred 
form of intervention, since it achieves a desired deviation from 
pure market behavior while taking maximum advantage of the 
motivational and informational advantages of the invisible hand. 
In Korean practice, it is not so pervasive as one would gather 
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from the writings of some economists, but, nonetheless, it plays 
an important role. The single most important realm of applica­
tion of non-discretionary field manipulation is the market for 
foreign exchange. Other forms of intervention are also used in 
this market, and to maintain continuity we shall also consider 
them here, After the detailed examination of the foreign ex­
change market, we shall make more limited references to other 
uses of non-discretionary field manipulation. 
The foreign exchange market is particularly important be­
cause of Korea's "export-led" growth. In 1962, exports were 
roughly fifty million dollars but, under the Park Government, 
they rose at a nominal average annual rate of 42 percent to a 
level of eight billion dollars in 1976.18 This represented an in­
crease from 6 percent of GNP to 38 percent.' 9 More important, 
this was not cheap and easy natural resource-based growth: in 
1976, 90 percent of the exports were manufactured products.2" 
It is, therefore, of interest to ask what role government inter­
vention played in the process. The traditional answer is that the 
change was wrought by a move to an equilibrium exchange rate 
and the addition of export incentives: namely, by parameter 
manipulation. We find little evidence to sustain this view and 
instead argue for the importance of field augmentation. We shall 
first examine the setting of the foreign exchange rate and de­
mand side interventions in the form of tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions. We then consider supply side interventions through 
export promotion schemes. 
THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE 
AND ALLOCATION MECHANISMS 
The basic change in the exchange rate regimes between the 
Rhee and Park periods is generally characterized as a move from 
a disequilibrium to an equilibrium system. This is suggested by 
Table 12 that calculates the demand for foreign exchange as the 
sum of the official rate, tariffs, and estimated distortion premia 
accruing to importers." Under Rhee, foreign exchange was 
heavily undervalued with the demand price for dollars roughly 
three times the official rate. Under Chang Myon, devaluation re­
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suited in the demand price falling to twice the official price. 
Following the 1964 exchange rate reform, the demand price 
was only 15 percent above the official rate and this declined 
steadily to some 7 percent in 1975. 
Some of the gap between demand and official prices is taken 
up by tariffs, but in the I 950s the remaining distortion premia 
were still such that an importer who obtained foreign exchange 
at the official rate could earn a profit ranging from 100 to 175 
percent if he brought in a tariff exempt commodity (compare 
columns A and B of Table 12) and in the 90 percent range if he 
paid an average tariff (compare columns A+ C with B). 
The resulting excess demand for foreign exchange at the 
official rate was allocated by a complicated system including a 
variety of privileged acccss categories for some products from 
some sources, and a serics of competitive auction and bidding 
procedures for other uses and sources, notably including export 
earnings. 22 Estimates of activity in privileged and (relatively) 
competitive markets are given separately in Table 13. It appears 
that in 1958 something like 80 percent of imports came in via 
privileged access and this dropped to about 50 percent in 1959 
and 1960. 
The rates within the non-privileged sector varied substantially 
(Table 13). Exporters sold freely to importers at a competitive 
rate while International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and 
Korean Foreign Exchange (KFX) auctions yielded prices be­
tween the export and official rates. There were two reasons for 
this. First, ICA and KFX dollars were more restricted in use 
than were export dollars. Second, the auctions suffered from 
imperfections of information, collusion among bidders, and 
accusations that allocations were not always made to the 
highest bidders. Regrettably, we are unable to quantify these 
two factors, although their respective magnitudes are criti­
cal in assessing the restrictiveness of the system. In any event, 
the weighted average import rate ranged from 10 percent 
above the official rate in 1958 to 40 percent above in 1959 
and 1960. 
Three important conclusions emerge from this discussion. 
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TABLE 12 	Foreign Exchange Market Distortions,
 
1955-1975
 
(current wn per dollai) 
A B C D EOfficial 	 Distortion Tariffs and Demand Distortion 
Year Ratea Premium Taxesc Price Factor 
1955 31.3 48.1 5.9 85.3 2.72
 
1956 50.0 52.9 7.0 109.9 2.20
 
1957 50.0 58.9 9.4 118.3 2.37
 
1958 50.0 64.0 20.3 134.3 2.69
 
1959 
 50.0 84.7 47.8 182.5 3.65
 
1960 63.8 52.0
83.9 199.7 3.13
 
1961 127.5 N.T. 30.8 1.74
2 2 2 .5 d 

1962 130.0 N.T. 28.8 2 4 5 .2 d 1.89
 
1963 130.0 39.8 21.0 2 6 8 .0 d 2.06
 
1964 214.3 39.7 36.8 290.8 1.36
 
1965 266.5 0.0 41.0 307.5 1.15
 
1966 272.2 0.0 37.2 309.4 1.14
 
1967 272.5 0.0 39.0 311.5 1.14
 
1968 276.8 0.0 46.9 323.7 1.17
 
1969 286.8 0.0 38.7 325.5 1.13
 
1970 310.1 0.0 40.6 350.7 1.13 
1971 346.1 0.0 34.4 380.5 1.10 
1972 391.8 0.0 37.0 428.8 1.09 
1973 398.4 0.0 29.1 427.5 1.07 
1974 406.0 0.0 27.7 433.7 1.07 
1975 484.0 0.0 34.8 518.8 1.07 
Notes: aTwelve month average from Wontack Hong, FactorSupply and Factor In­
tensity ofTrade in Korea (Seoul, 1976), p. 140. 
bEstimate of windfall profit accruing to importer 	with privileged access to foreign 
exchange at official rate. 
I) 	 From 1955 through mid-1 961, and again in 1963 and 1964 there was a com­
petitive market for foreign exchange earned by exporters. The resulting exchangepremia are taken from: C. R. Frank, K. S. Kim, and L. E. Westphal, ForeignTrade Regimes and Economic Development: South Korea (New York, 1975), pp.
70-71. 
2) Frurm mid-1964 on, a series of devaluations maintained a reasonable approxi.
matie,:: to an equilibrium rate. Parity rates calculated by Frank, Kim, and West­phal (p. 235) and Wontack Hong (p. 141)' show, if anything, undervaluation 
rather than overvaluation. A 	 has existed withthin black market a very stable 
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TABLE 12 (continued) 
premium of about 30 wn per dollar from 1965 through 1975 with the excep­
tion of the post-Vietnam psychological scare. The stability of this premium at an 
absolute rather than a relative rate, as well as its small size, suggests that it is 
largely a risk premium in an illegal nacket. We conclude that disequilibria premia 
after 1964 are virtually zero. 
Estimates of tariffs (including foreign ex.hange tax prior to 1962) per dollar of final 
consumption imports. Average rates per iollar were first calculated from the BOK 
Economic Statistics Yearbook and multiplied by an estimate of the ratio of actual 
consumer goods rates to the average. For the 1964 to 1967 and 1967 to 1972 tariff 
regimes the estimates are derived from Frank, Kim, and Wcstphal (p. 61 '. For early 
years the estimates are based on highly subjective examinations of legal rates and for 
later years on collections by SITC codes which do not distinguish endusers. The re­
sulting estimates are indicative only of broad orders-of-magnitude. 
dclonfusion accompanying a plethora of reforms in the early years of the Park Mili­
tar), Government made the data for these years unreliable. Accordingly, we substi­
tuted a linear extrapolation. 
eDemand price over official rate. 
First, the degree of effective undervaluation of foreign exchange 
was substantially less thain appears from looking at the official 
rate alone. Second, exporters in particular received close to a 
competitive rate. Third, there remained substantial room for ex­
cess profits from privileged access (In tile KFX and ICA auc­
tions as well as at the official rate). Together with the benefits 
from discretionary credit allocations, these economic rents con­
stituted tile prime movers of entrepreneurial activity in the 
1950s and lead us to describe the Rhee period loosely as one of 
"zero-sum ientrepreneurship- (see Chapter 8). These excess 
profits were allocated by a system of quantitative restrictions 
which will be considered in the section on discretionary corl­
mand. Here we only note the shift in the behavioral foreign ex­
change allocation mechanism from one which relied in part on 
discretionary command (quotas and licenses) under Rhee to one 
which is virtually wholly non-discretionary field manipulation 
(official rate plus tariff) under Park. 
Thc second intervention on the denand side is via tariffs. 
These are aiso field manipulations in altering allocation by af­
fecting the access price. We now compare the use of tariffs un­
der Rhee and Park. Under both regines, they were administered 
in a largely non-discretionary fashion, though there was an in­
portant shift towards greater particularism under Park. In addi­
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TABLE 13 Import Markets, 1958-1960 
1958 1959 1960 
Imports (US S million) 378.2 291.7 325.2 
Source of importdollars (US S million) 
Exports 16.5 19.2 31.8 
ICA auction 50.9 124.9 128.2 
KFX auction 13.0 24.4 11.3 
Othera 297.8 123.2 153.9 
Sources of import dollars (%) 
Cmpe t i t i ve b 21.3 57.8 52.7 
Official rate 78.7 42.2 47.3 
Acquisition rate (w-6n per dollar) 
Exportsc 114.0 134.7 146.4 
ICA. auction 74.2 79.1 99.8 
KFX auction 79.8 104.2 105.9 
Other 50.0 50.0 62.5 
Weighted average 56.9 72.6 86.9 
Source, except as noted: EPB, Korea Statistica;Yearbook, 1961 (Seoul, 1962). 
Notes: aCalculated as a residual, but basically consisting of foreign aid allocations. 
bAt least somewhat so. 
cFrank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 70. 
tion, the level of effective manipulation declined between the 
two periods. The following summary draws heavily on Frank, 
Kim, and Westphal.23 
In 1946, a uniform tariff rate of 10 percent was imposed on 
all imports except those financed by foreign assistance. In 1950, 
there was a move toward greater particularism and increased 
nominal levels. According to the new customs law, more than a 
thousand distinct import items were specified with an average 
nominal tariff of 40 percent. The many exemptions reduced 
average collections to less than 20 percent. In 1952, exemptions 
were extended for some capital goods and intermediate input 
users. In 1957, there was a minor restructuring which added 4 
percent to the average rate and in 1958 a uniform foreign ex­
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change tax was added. The first major reform came under the 
Park Military Government in July 1961 when a Temporary 
Special Customs Law was enacted "to capture the windfall prof­
its that would otherwise accrue to importers receiving import 
licenses for restricted items." 24 A similar system of special tar­
iffs was superimposed following the May 1964 devaluation. 
Adjustments in tile regular tariff classification were made peri­
odically. In 19(7, there was a major shift from positive to nega­
tive list systems. The tariff law became even more flexible 
administratively in 1968 when it was provided that "under 
certain conditions, emergency duties, countervailing duties, and 
so-called beneficial duties could be levied. The government had 
the authority to change statutory rates by as much as 50 per­
cent by administrative decree." 2 A further increase in flexibili­
ty accompanied the tariff reform of 1973 that allowed the 
government to adjust the tariff rates within 100 percent of the 
legal rate. The government subsequently used this authority to 
reduce the cost-push pressure from increases in world prices of 
major industrial raw materials. 
Two trends should be emphasized in the foregoing summary. 
First, there was a steady decline in the level of tariffs as a percent 
of the demand price (compare columns C and A of Table 12). 
Second, and much more important, there was a dramatic in­
crease in particularism and flexibility between the Rhee and 
Park periods. Under Rhee, the tariff system was relatively 
stable, and intervention in the structure of the national import 
bundle was achieved through discretion;'ry application of quan­
titative restrictions. Under Park, allocation was increasingly 
accomplished by shifting relative tariffs on particular commodi­
ties in a non-discretionary fashion, and these changes came with 
great frequency. 
In sum, the instrument for intervention in the allocation of 
foreign exchange under Rhee was a mixture of discretionary 
command and non-discretionary parameter manipulation. Un­
der Park, the system became wholly non-discretionary, though 
highly particularistic, parameter manipulation.2 6 
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THE GENERATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
 
Under Rhee, the dominant source of foreign exchange was for­
eign aid, and this was maximized by maintaining an overvalued
 
domestic currency on the assumption of price inelasticity of
 
donor supply. The wisdom of this policy may be questioned, 
but it emphatically did not have the effect of discouraging ex­
ports as is widely asserted. Recall that export earnings were con­
verted by a variety of special means at well above the official 
rate, beginning with the export-import link system in 1951. By 
the late 1950s these premia were substantially greater than the 
official yield and produced an effective direct return to ex­
porters that was as high (or higher) in the 1950s as in the I960s 
and 1970s (see Table 14, columns A, D, and F). 27 
What then produced the export boom? The usual, though 
incorrect, answer is a variety of export subsidy schemes which 
increased the net profit from a given w~n yield per dollar. 
Wontack Hong has prepared an extensive survey of export­
promotion schemes and these are summarized in Table 15. 
Readers interested in the details of the schemes may refer to 
Wontack Hong's paper.28 Here we only identify the trends. The 
first thing to note from Table 15 is that under Rhee export 
promotion subsidies were by no means absent. In addition to 
the premia already described, there were a variety of tax, 
tariff, and credit exemptions. Under Park such subsidies multi­
plied and diversified, but the crucial question is what the total 
effect was on net export earnings.
 
Calculating effective subsidies 
 is a difficult task that has
 
been attempted by Frank, Kim, and Westphal. Their estimates
 
were given in Table 14, and the results are surprising. In con­
stant 1965 w~n per dollar the effective exchange rate on 
exports, inclusive of subsidies, has remained remarkably stable 
(in the vicinity of 300 from 1958 through 1970). If anything, 
there was a net decline between the late 1950s and the early 
1960s. 
Now these figures are subject to argument, particularly the 
credit subsidy estimation, and do not incorporate all of the 
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TABLE 14 Foreign Exchange Market, 1958-1970 
EffectivC Effectite Percentaqe Componen)ts of lcc- PercentageComponentsof Effec-Exchange ExclanevRate oii tive Exchange Rate on ExportsRaft, ott tire Exchange Rate on Imports 
Exportsa Inportsb Official1965 j1965 Ratio Ta riffaPd Official Exchangu' of/dollar) won/dollar) TariJf Exchange(A/B) Premia Subsidies Rate Elqtivalents Rate(A) (B) z(C) (D) (E) (F) ((;) (H) 
1958 288.7 160.4 1.80 55.5 1.0 43.5 22.51959 77.5333.3 202.9 1.64 62.2 1.0 36.8 39.6 60.41960 326.5 221.6 1.47 56.7 0.8 42.5 37.61961 62.4294.1 287.1 1.02 9.7 
1962 5.6 84.7 13.2. 86.8270.5 261.4 1.03 0.0 14.1 85.9 11.21963 88.8280.6 219.4 1.28 21.3 68.7 12.2 87.81964 309.6 271.7 1.14 
10.3 
14.1 9.7 76.2 13.2 86.81965 304.6 293.1 1.04 0.0 12.8 87.2 9.4 90.61966 296.8 272.4 1.09 0.0 15.9 84.1 8.4 91.61967 287.6 255.8 ;-z1.12 0.0 18.2 81.81968 8.6 91.4283.0 241.6 1.17 0.0 21.9 78.1 8.5 91.51969 271.7 233.4 z1.16 0.0 20.6 79.41970 7.8 92.2272.3 230.6 1.18 0.0 21.8 78.2 7.6 92.4 
Source: Frank, Kim, and Westphal, pp. 70-75. 
Notes: aReturn to exporter deflated by wholesale price index. Includes official exchange rate, export premia, direct subsidies, tax and tariffexemptions, and interest rate subsidies.
bprice to importer 4 :flatcd by wholesale price index. Includes official exchange rate, tariff and FX tax collections and export premia.
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TABLE 15 Major Export-Promotion 
Types of Incentives 
Tax Incentives 
Commodity tax exemption 

Business tax exemption 

Reduction of corporation and in­
come tax by 50% on earnings 
from exports 
Accelerated depreciation on allow­
ance for fixed capital directly 
used for export production in 
mining, fishing and manufacturing 
Tax credit for foreign market de­
velopment expenditures 

Tax credit for losses due to opera­
tions in foreign markets 

Tariff Incentives 
Tariff exemptions on capital equip­
ment for export production 
Tariff payments on an installment
 
basis for capital equipment used
 
in export production 

Tariff exemptions on raw material 
imports for export production 
Tariff drawback on imported raw 
material used for export production 
Wastage allowance 
FinancialIncentives 
Financing for export sales 
Export shipment financing 
Export promotion fund financed 
by counterpart fund 
Financing imports of materials 
to be used in export production 
Schemes 
Duration 
April 1950-

January 1962-

January 1961-December 1972 
January 1961-

August 1969-

March 1973-

March 1964-December 1973 
January 1974-

April 1961-June 1975
 
July 1975-

July 1965-
February 1948-July 1955 
June 1950-July 1955 
November 1959-January 1964 
October 1961-February 1972 
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TABLE 15 (continued) 
Export credits (trade credit before 
1961) 
Financing suppliers of U.S. off­
shore military procurement 
Fund to promote the export 
industry 
Fund to convert small and medium 
size firms into export industries 
Fund to prepare exports of agricul­
tural and fishery products 

Foreign currency loans 

Financing exports on credit 

Other Promotion Schemes 
Foreign exchange deposit system 
Trading license based on export 
performance 
An export bonus with preferential 
foreign exchange 
Payment of export subsidy 
Discount on railroad freight rates 
Monopoly rights on exports of 
specific items to specific areas 
Creation of exporters associations 
on various export products 
Financing KOTRA 
Export-import link system 
Discount on electricity rates 
Waiver issuance for shipping 
Local L/C system 
Differential treatment of traders 
based on export performance 

Export insurance 

General trading company 

Export-import bank 

June 1950-
September 1962-
July 1964-September 1969 
February 1964-
September 1969-
May 1967-
October 1969-
June 1949-January 1961 
January 1953­
? 1951-May 1961 
? 1954- ? 1955 and 
? 1960- ? 1965 
? 1958-
April 1960-
September 1961­
? 1962-
November 1962­
? 1965- ? 1976
 
? 1965- ?
 
March 1965-
February 1967-

January 1969-

May 1975-

June 1976-

Source: Wontack Hong, "Trade, Distortions and Employment Growth in Korea," 
pp. 82-83. 
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subsidies listed in Table 15.29 Nonetheless, the results are strik­
ing and suggest that export growth was not primarily a result 
of direct financial incentives, since the sum of exchange premia, 
exchange rate, and export subsidies were at least similar in 
periods of stagnation and rapid growth. What then made the 
dlifference? We suggest five contributing factors: reduction in 
opportunity costs, simpler input acquisition, lower variance in 
export return, field augmentation, and non-pecuniary parameter 
manipulation. 
The most important cause of the change was probably the 
reduction of alt -rnative higher-yielding sources of entrepre­
neurial income. If you can make 100 percent in a few months 
with little risk, through privileged access to foreign exchange, 
there is little point in devoting effort to the difficult and 
complicated task of exploring export markets and putting 
together internationally competitive productive combinations. 
The exchange rate reforms closed out the zero-sum sources of 
rent, reduced opportunity costs, and drove rent-seekers into 
productive positive-sum activity." 
A second factor also stemmed from the import side. The shift 
from discretionary field manipulation in allocating foreign 
exchange made it easier and cheaper for exporters to obtain 
imported raw materials, spares, and capital equipment. This, 
however, would be equally applicable to domestic production 
and does not serve to explain the increased share of exports. 
While the mean value of the price received by e*porters did 
not change appreciably from the 1950s to the 1960s, the 
variance was substantially reduced, thus removing an element 
of uncertainty in the expected yield. Prior to reform, premia 
constituted over 50 percent of the total return (see Table 14), 
but this value depended on an auction system in a thin market 
and fluctuated widely. Further, access to the market (and its 
variants) did involve some transaction costs, and there may 
have been further uncertainty as to whether the special rates 
would be maintained in the future. For these reasons, the 
reforms may have induced greater exports by increasing the 
expected return even though the mean yield was unchanged.' 
Field augmentation was particularly important. At the highest 
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level, this followed from the introduction of political stability 
by a regime which gave top priority to growth and cnsured a 
"favorable business climate." This lengthened time horizons 
and made manu facturing a much more feasible alternative to 
commerce as a field of entrepreneurial activity. In the e.zport 
field itself, the Monthly Export Promotion Meeting chaired 
by the President was a forum of multi-faceted information 
exchange. In 1962, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
began setting annual export targets classified by commodity, 
region, and country of destination. This had an announcemcnt 
effect in suggesting profitable markets and in implicitly prom­
ising non-cquantifiable government support in pursuit of those 
targets. In addition to such indirect field augmentation, the 
government established, or expanded, a variety of special 
purpose entrepreneurial support institutions. Best known of 
the, is the Korean Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) 
which is financed through a government-mandated contribu­
tion of 0.55 percent of the c.i.f. value of imports and channeled 
through the Korean Traders Association. Other support institu­
tions include a variety of special purpose banks and financial 
internediaries. 
Also in the realm of field augmentation are diplomatic efforts. 
Indirect augmlentation is provided by the mere fact of represen­
tation and interaction. Rhee's periodic embargoes of trade with 
Japan sorely hurt exports to the major traditional market"2 
and were in marked contrast to Park's normalization of rela­
tions with Japan in 1964. More recent efforts include drives 
to establish relations in the LDCs and iastern Europe and 
expand them in Western Europe. Direc'. action on the dip­
lonatic front includes commercial attrch6s who actually per­
formed marketing functions in the eally years and who, more 
recently, have made a significant contritution to the construc­
tion industry's expansion in the Middi, East. Removal of 
restrictions on foreign travel by businessmen has also improved 
in formation flows. 
Non-pecuniary parameter manipulation also played a role. As 
Chapter 7 will show, entrepreneurs are not motivated by profit 
alone, and it is arguable that a rise in non-pecuniary incentives 
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may increase their total return and thus the level of activity. 
In contrast to Rhee, Park has placed primary emphasis on 
industrialization, and this has led to government recognition 
and approval of successful entrepreneurs. November 30 is 
"Export Day" and the highest ranking exporters are, with 
great fanfare, awarded "industrial merit-medals" of gold, silver, 
and bronze pagoda rank.33 In addition, special awards are given 
to those exporting over U.S. $100 million worth of goods." 
These medals are presented personally by the President, and the 
competition is taken seriously. The competitors sometimes 
get carried away as Export Day nears. In 1976, SamsYng Mulsan 
arranged prepayments amounting to U.S. $68 million and 
Daewoo managed !s2 million. The referees managed to keep 
on top of the game, however, and since 1977 prepayments no 
longer count. 
With due attention to income distribution, non-pecuniary 
incentives are not confined to the first decile. At an interna­
tional Youth-Skills contest in the mid-1970s, a Korean delega­
tion won top honors. They were met at the airport by the 
Deputy Prime Minister and several ministers, given a ticker 
tape parade through a carefully marshaled crowd estimated at 
300,000, and were personally received by President Park. 
Jaded skeptics may chortle, but to the hairdressers, pipe-fitters, 
and welders it may well provide a non-pecuniary incentive to 
excell. 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET: SUMMARY 
Korea's export spurt is generally attributed to devaluation and 
export incentives; that is, to getting the price right. We find 
surprisingly little evidence for this position. Available calcula­
tions suggest that the total w6n return to exporters was similar 
ir periods of stagnation and of rapid growth. Both regimes 
intervened via non-discretionary parameter manipulation to 
a similar degree. Exchange rate reform was, nonetheless, im­
portant, though not in the fashion usually described. The move 
from discretionary command to non-discretionary parameter 
manipulation on the import side drove entrepreneurs out of 
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zero-sum arbitrage activity, and into positive-sum production. 
Field augmentation and non-pecuniary parameter manipulation 
provided further support. We conclude that, even in the foreign 
exchange mai'- where non-discretionary parameter manipula­
tion is dominant, it is essential to look at non-price interven­
tions to comprehend the dynamics of Korean development. 
TAX COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES 
Non-discretionary field manipulation is not used only to pro­
mote growth; it is also used in efforts to control business 
behavior. These attempts have not been notably successful, but 
are considered here to suggest the limitations of the mechanism. 
The Corporate Tax Law defines "green-return corporations," 3 
as: publicly held corporations, corporations listed on the 
Korean Stock Exchange, public (that is, government) corpora­
tions established by special laws, and joint-stock companies 
in which the government's equity share is over 50 percent. 
In addition, any company may become a "green-return corpor­
ation" if it convinces the government that its reported taxable 
income is substantially correct over a period of years. Once a cor­
poration attains this status, it enjoys various privileges including: 
1) Assessment of tax based on tax reports alone. 
2) Generous treatment in calculating expenses. 
3) Tax installment payment privileges. 
4) Special depreciation allowances. 
As of 1975, there were only 282 "green-return corporations" 
out of 12,532 corporations. 36 This included 142 corporations 
in the automatic status, so enterprises with an acceptable tax 
return record are very few indeed. 
A related incentive is the Office of National Tax Administra­
tion's "sincere-return corporations." These corporations are ex­
empted from various tax investigations, and tax calculations are 
basedon theirreportsalone. InJuly 1976,therewere 59 "sincere-re­
turn corporations" and 857 "semi-sincere-return corporations. ,
3 1 
The effort at inducing firms to go public included similar 
incentive mechanisms, but largely failed, and discretionary 
command was resorted to as will be described below. In all 
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of these cases the magnitude of the parameter manipulation was 
too small to be effective. 
OTHER NON-DISCRETIONARY FIELD 
MANIPULATIONS 
Price controls represent field manipulations from the point of 
view of the buyer, but commands from the viewpoint of the 
seller. They are genes'ally highly discretionary in Korea. Excep­
tions involve the provision of subsidized goods and services 
by public enterprises. Worldwide, there is a temptation for 
government to generate political favor by such policies, and 
they can generally be justified (rationalized) in the name of 
consumption or production externalities. Korea under Rhee 
was no exception; a combination of inefficiency and populist 
pricing resulted in large deficits which were repudiated by the 
Park Military Government. In contrast, Brown's study of the 
pricing policies of six of the largest enterprises leads him to 
conclude that under tile Park Military Government "pricing 
changes were consistently in the direction of moving toward 
and approximating opportunity cost prices." 38 While this is 
a fair assessment, it should be emphasized that the trend is more 
reflective of a concern for cost efficiency than of a basic aver­
sion to subsidies. The government's willingness to use parameter 
manipulation in setting prices for publicly produced (or traded) 
goods and services is reflected in the continuing massive defi­
cits arising from sales of fertilizer, grain, and electricity. 39 The 
overall level of this form of parameter manipulation may have 
been reduced between the Rhee and Park periods, and its 
incidence more easily justified, but intervention remains. 
Together with the forign exchange and wage rates, tile 
interest rate is one of the fundamental factor prices. In Korea, 
with the exception of at most a few brief years, interest rates 
have not been determined by market forces. Instead, there 
has been government intervention on both the supply and 
demand sides. On the supply side, deposit rates have been set 
by the government, but administered in a largely non-discre­
tionary fashion. There has been some particularism in that 
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certain classes of small savers have been allowed higher rates 
than others, but parameter manipulation has by no means 
been eschewed. On the allocation side, intervention has been 
both particularistic and discretionary. 
DISCRETIONARY FIELD MANIPULATION 
IN PRACTICE 
CREDIT VULNERABILITY OF KOREAN FIR(MS 
Under the Park regime, allocation of under-priced credit has 
been by far the most important single instrument of government 
microeconoinic control. Under Rhec, it was also important 
but shared top billing with foreign exchange allocation. In 
behavioral terms, it is a form of parameter manipulation which 
has been non-discretionary in theory, but generally highly 
discretionary in practice. 
Credit is the life-blood of business enterprises everywhere, 
but it is particularly critical in Korea where debt-equity ratios 
in manufacturing have been in the three to four range in the 
first half of the I970s.4" This high level of credit dependence 
has been largely a product of the Park period since the ratio 
rose steadily from 1.2 in 1966 to a peak of 3.9 in 1971. a" The 
sources of the change are shown in Table 16 which gives real 
flow-ot-funds sources for private corporations from 1963-1974. 
Over the entire period, only 14 percent of the cash flow came 
from new equity. Another 20 percent was generated internally, 
but two-thirds came from borrowing. Of the borrowing, 53 
percent came from domestic banks and financial institutions, 
29 percent from foreign sources, and 19 percent from miscella­
neous sources including the curb market.42 
There are many consequences of leveraging of this magnitude, 
but two are germane here. First, businessmen have been able to 
prosper with relatively small infusions of their own funds, 
thus pyramiding the growth power of the limited stock of 
effective entrepreneurs (see Chapter 7). Second, businessmen 
have paid a price in the form of increased government control 
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TABLE 16 	 Real Private Corporate Sources _f Funds,
 
1963-1974
 
Source 	 1963-1969 1970-1974 1963-1974 
Internal savingsa 	 18.6 20.8 19.9 
New equity 	 7.2 18.2 13.7 
Debt 	 74.2 61.0 66.4 
Commercial banks 13.1 23.4 19.2 
Special banks and finan­
cial institutions 13.3 17.4 15.7 
Foreign loans 	 26.4 18.0 19.0 
Oth e rb 	 27.4 2.2 12.6 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Current flows from: BOK, Flon, oj Fnuds Accoults it Korea: 1963-1975 (Seoul, 1976). Converted to constant 1970 prices by implicit GIDP deflation from: 
BOK, Ecopiomic Statistics Yearbook: 1976 (Seoul, 1977).
a .. 
b Notes: Depreciation allowance plus retained earnings.bTrade credit, "miscellaneous " and adjustments. 
over their activities. With massive debt shares, firms are totally 
dependent upon credit, not only for expansion, but for survival. 
In Korea's institutional framework, this translates into depen­
dence on government. As shown in Table 16, over half of the 
total fund flows come from domestic financial institutions and 
foreign sources, and both of these sources have been subject 
to effective discretionary government intervention. 
Government intervention in the credit market is not confined 
to the power to set interest rates and provide allocation guide­
lines. Much more important is the power for direct discretion­
ary intervention in the allocation process. This follows from 
two institutional factors. First, both special-purpose and com­
mercial banks have been public enterprises in the sense that 
government controlled internal decision-making through the 
power to appoint top management. Second, all foreign loans 
(save short-term suppliers' credits) must be subjected to govern­
ment approval and guarantee. 
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SOURCES OF CONTROL
 
In 1945, all commercial banks were Japanese-owned and were 
transferred to the government at Liberation. Initial government 
direct and indirect shareholding amounted to some 70 percent, 
and this was reduced by a series of six public offerings between 
1954 and 1957. Dilution of control was minimal, however, 
since single-bidder sales and resales were forbidden in an effort 
to prevent decisive accumulation by any single private gioup. 
In 1957, this policy was reversed, and controlling interests 
were sold to various chaeb6l groups. Their control was short­
lived, however, and in 1961 the Park Military Government 
confiscated the banks as part of the "illicit wealth accumula­
tion" purge (see Chapter Eight). Since then, shares have again 
been sold publicly until the government's direct and indirect 
share in 1973 ranged from 30 to 65 percent.43 This, however, 
was sufficient to ensure government control since the Tem­
porary Law on Financial Institutions of June 1961 precluded 
anyone (save the government) from voting more than 10 
percent of the outstanding shares. Government control over 
the banks was further strengthened by the 1962 revision of 
the Bank of Korea Law that shifted final responsibility for 
monetary policy to the executive branch. In sum, the govern­
ment is able to affect domestic credit allocations at all levels 
from monetary policy to final bank decisions on individual 
end-users. 
Three mechanisms of foreign credit allocation may be dis­
tinguished. Public loans (namely, those to the government or 
from international agencies or foreign governments) have since 
1974 been covered by the Public Loan Inducement and Manage­
ment Law which specifies the process for government guaran­
tee. The previous procedures are unknown to us but, under 
both Park and Rhee, all public loans were subject to govern­
ment approval and guarantee. The second category is private 
long-term loans (over three years' maturity). These are now 
covered by the Foreign Capital Inducement Law which allows 
guarantee by the government, the Korea Exchange Bank 
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(formerly part of the Bank of Korea), or the commercial banks. 
In practice, the first procedure dominated up through about 
1968, and the second has been preeminent since that time. 
Commercial bank guarantees have been increasing, but are still 
relatively small. The third category is private short-term credit 
which comes under the Foreign Exchange Management Law. 
In contrast to the first two forms, transactions under this law 
are relatively automatic and non-discretionary so long as the 
terms correspond to international banking practice. In sum, in 
both the Rliee and Park periods, the government has had the 
power to exercise discretionary control over foreign loans for 
capital goods (largely long-term), through the guarantee require­
ment. Financing of short-term intermediate inputs and exports, 
in contrast, has been largely non-discretionary, at leastunderPark. 
EXERCISE OF CONTROL: 
I)ISEQUILIBRIUM INTEREST RATES 
Governments everywhere regulate loan rates, and Korea is no 
exception. Throughout the post-war period, interest rates on 
domestic loans have been regul ated, generally at levels well 
below their equilibrium values. Precise estimates are impossible 
since there have been a variety of loan rates, and the risk-free 
opportunity cost of capital is ephemeral. The general picture, 
however, is apparent from Table 17 which shows that: first, 
the general bank rate has typically been half of the curb-narket 
rate; and second, the real bank rate has often been negative and 
generally below even the most conservative estimates of the 
opportunity cost of capital. The result has been excess demand 
followed by the necessity of non-price rationing devices. 
DISCRETIONARY ALLOCATION THEIN RHEE REGIME 
Under Rhee, rationing was accomplished by a variety of selec­
tive control schemes including BOK determined loan ceilings 
for various end-uses and financial institutions and priority end­
use specification. In principle, these mechanisms could be used 
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TABLE 17 Real and Nominal Interest Rates and Opportunity 
Cost of Capital, 1954-1976 
Nominal Curb Mar-
Loan ket Loan 
Year Ratea Rateb 
1954 18.3 -
1955 18.3 -
1956 18.3 -
1957 18.3 -
1958 18.3 -
1959 17.9 -
1960 17.5 -
1961 17.5 -
1962 15.7 -
1963 15.7 52.6 
1964 16.0 61.8 
1965 26.0 58.9 
1966 26.0 58.7 
1967 26.0 56.5 
1968 25.8 56.0 
1969 24.5 51.4 
1970 24.0 49.8 
1971 23.0 46.4 
1972 17.7 39.0 
1973 15.5 33.4 
1974 15.5 40.6 
1975 15.5 41.3 
1976 17.5 n.a. 
Real 
Inflation Loan 
Rate' Rate 
31.6 -13.3 
65.3 -47.0 
30.7 -12.4 
20.4 - 2.1 
- 0.5 18.8 
2.6 15.3 
9.6 7.9 
15.1 2.4 
13.9 1.8 
28.7 -13.0 
32.1 -16.1 
8.2 17.8 
14.3 11.7 
14.0 12.0 
11.8 14.0 
10.1 14.4 
13.2 10.8 
11.5 11.5 
14.5 3.2 
9.4 6.1 
26.7 -11.2 
24.1 - 8.6 
15.7 1.8 
Notes: alnterest rate on general bills up to one year. 
Y'earbok, various issues. 
Real Rate of 
Return on Capita { 
in Manufacturing 
9-18
 
"
 
"
 
9-26
 
" 
" 
16-38 
17-40 
BOK, Economic Statistics 
bBOK, Suri'y of Iusiness ilia lcipil aml t iiorgaii ldMlocy Mlarkets, various quar­
terly issues.
 
CAnnual rate of change in the GNP 
 deflator. BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 
various issues and Natiounal Income in Korea, 1975. 
dRange of estimates reported in: Wontack Hong, Trade, Distortions and Employment 
(Seoul, 1977). 
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to allocate subsidized credit to socially profitable end-users. 
In practice, there can be no question that the actual alloca­
tions were highly discretionary in pursuit of non-economic 
ends. As one observer typically laments: "How one could ex­
pect a desirable development of financing under such a socio­
political environment where loans were arranged not according 
to the importance of projects or ability to repay, but based on 
political decisions, private favoritism, or under-the-table 
dealings." 44 Such assertions are fairly easily documented since 
a good deal of data was made available after the Student Revo­
lution of 1960 and the subsequent Special Law for Dealing With 
Illicit Wealth Accumulation. 5 The act actually defined "illicit 
wealth accumulators" as those with more than U.S. $200 
thousand in foreign loans or more than 100 million hwan 
(10 million wan) in domestic bank loans, 46 thus reflecting 
popular belief in the corruption involved in credit allocation. 
Of particular interest was tile dominant role of politics in 
distributing foreign-aid credits in the early period. According 
to Joungwon Kim, the Liberal Party "was believed to have had 
a substantial interest in at least 50 percent of all the private 
projects receiving American aid."47 The government was also 
able to put pressure on the banks, and this seems to have been 
heavily used especially at election time. For example, according 
to a report based on statistics provided by the BOK and the 
prosecutor's office, prior to the March 1960 election, loans 
amounting to more than 10.7 billion hwan (equivalent to U.S. 
$21 million in 1960) were kicked back to Rhee's Liberal Party as 
8campaign contributions. 4 On a company by company basis, 
tile kickbacks varied from 10 percent to 100 percent. 
DISCRETIONARY ALLOCATION IN THE
 
PARK REGIME
 
In the Park period, the domestic loan ceiling system was aban­
doned.49 Specification of desirable end-uses, however, was
 
retained and intensified. Differential rates and target industry
 
allocations are set with great particularity and flexibility.
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Though the pressure points changed somewhat, the potential 
for discretion remained. The system could have been non-dis­
cretionary had the priority system been highly specific so that 
anyone fitting a particular description automatically received an 
allocation. In practice, someone must ultimately decide whether 
or not even highly specific criteria are met, and this decision 
remained in government hands. 
A fairly recent illustration is provided by the "industrial 
rationalization" component of the August 3rd Emergency 
Measures of 1972. The stated objective was to make Korean 
industries more productive so that they would contribute 
toward stabilizing the domestic price level and become more 
competitive in the world market. Criteria were established 
under which chosen firms would get long-term loans with 
relatively lower interest charges, preferential tax treatment, and 
various administrative privileges. Applications were to be exam­
ined by the Industrial Rationalization Council (established 
under the Prime Minister's office), with the President having 
final approval."0 
There were two sets of screening criteria. The first step was to 
select companies in: 
"1) 	Industries which produce goods or services indispensable 
for stabilization of the nation's livelihood and, further, 
whose rationalization and development will reduce signifi­
cantly the burden of the people. 
2) 	Key industries which will widely promote related indus­
tries and substantially benefit the overall national economy. 
3) 	Machine and raw material manufacturing industries whose 
productivity will rise significantly through their rationaliza­
tion and development. 
4) Export industries, tourist business and other foreign ex­
change earning industries whose rationalization and devel­
opment will improve the balance of payments. 
5) Farmer's subsidiary business or agricultural-fishery process­
ing industries, which can increase farmers' and fishermen's 
s 
income significantly."'1
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Enterprises in such industries may then be given special status 
if they aim at: 
"1) Specialization and vertical affiliation of production. 
2) Optimum scale and method of production and other goals 
through consolidation of enterprises. 
3) Liquidation or transformation of business. 
4) Optimization of equipment investments (including rep!ace 
ment or expansion of equipment). 
5) Increase of capital and other improvements in financial 
structure. 
6) Development of technology and innovation. 
7) Other necessary matters not specified above." 2
 
In addition, "When 
 small and medium industries or enterprises 
are designated, the criteria for rationalization, may be deter­
mined separately taking into consideration the spiecial charac­
teristics of those industries." 5 3 
It is apparent that this specification leaves virtually complete 
discretion to the Industrial Rationalization Council. It would be 
difficult to imagine an enterprise which could not construct an 
argument for privileges under some provision of the law. Dis­
cretion is thus inevitable, and the question becomes whether it 
is exercised in the spirit of the allocation criteria or in pursuit of 
individual interests. 
It is rather difficult to document the manner in which discre­
tion is actually exercised under the current regime so we shall 
simply tell the story as we see it. Discretion undeniably remains 
and, given excess demand at an artifically low rate, there is 
substantial room for the recipient to share his b2nefits with the 
grantee. In this, there is no difference from the Rhee period, 
though the profit to be shared nay be somewhat smaller. Under 
the current government, however, allocations are generally 
made in the spirit of the priority system. A genuine effort is 
made to ascertain whethic the applicant fits the economic 
eligibility criteria. Gratitude, if shown by the borrower, is in the 
nature of a uniform transaction tax. This is distinct from the 
Rhee period when the payment was not only necessary, but 
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often sufficient to obtain a loan. Under the Rhce regime, dis­
cretion was exercised in a manner which resulted in resource 
misallocation, whereas under Park, a portion of the profit may 
be reallocated, but resources gencrally get to qualified users. 
This is a direct result of the bureaucratic hierarchy's response to 
leadership commitment to growth. Personal bias may be, and is, 
exercised at the margin, but egregious deviations from sensible 
allocations are precluded by the self-interest of the hierarchy. 
CREDIT: THE FULCRUM OF PARTIAL MUTUALITY 
If the foregoin g is ,orrcct, then can we conclude that discre­
tionary allocation of industrial credit under Park is unimportant 
beyond diverting resources from low to high priority uses? The 
answer is emphatically no. There is a second function of the 
credit mechanism which is subtle, but critical. This is its role as 
the major meians whereby command is enforced, and this fol­
lows from its discretionary potential. 
We have already pointed out that, in Korea, command is 
generally backed up by piartial mutuality rather than police 
action. Partial mutuality is effective in proportion to the im­
portance of the advantage which might be witlhd. Since 
credit is the lifeblood of any enterprise, it provides the most 
powerful basis for partial mutuality. If credit were unavoidably 
allocated in a non-discretionary fashion, then either command 
would have to be abandoned or police action would have to be 
stepped up. The knowledge that the government can cut off the 
credit tap at any time is sufficient for the operation of partial 
mutuality. The threat need only be carried out occasionally. 
Recognizing the importance of this mechanism is central to 
understanding how business-government relations work in 
Korea. In Chapter 8 we shall argue that private concentrations 
of economic power are in a decidedly weaker position vis-a-vis 
government than in many other Asian nations at similar stages 
of development. A major reason for this is government control 
of credit. In pre-war Japan, banks were the central pillar of each 
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zaibatsu group. Banks played a similar role in maintaining the 
power of India's industrial houses and Pakistan's twenty-two 
families.5 4 With their own internal sources of finance, these 
groups were dramatically less dependent on government favor 
and proportionally less responsive to government control. In 
Korea, the chaebl groups are young, rapidly growing, and 
heavily leveraged so credit is not only for expansion but for 
survival. Government discretionary manipulation of the credit 
instrument is therefore the fulcrum whichon partial mutuality 
pivots. 
NON-DISCRETIONARY COMMAND
 
IN PRACTICE
 
All nations utilize command to impose obligations which 
would not be met voluntarily. For example, taxes must be 
levied by command, as no one has yet developed a field aug­
mentation technique that will convince citizens to voluntarily 
contribute substantial amounts to collective consumption. The 
first operational question with command, then, is not whether 
or not it is to be used, but whether or not it can be enforced. 
A major characteristic of intervention in Korea is that com­
mands are not only used widely, but used effectively. 
The second operational issue with command is whether it is 
applied in a discretionary or a non-discretionary fashion. This 
distinction requires some ilarification since enforcement of 
command (almost) necessarily involves discretion, whether or 
not the command itself is discretionary. For example, the 
personal income tax in the United States is non-discretionary, 
even though it is enforced by selective examination with some 
individual tax bills being set at the discretion of the tax ex­
aminer. This is to be sharply distinguished from the discretion­
ary procedure in some LDC's where the original tax bill is set 
by negotiation between two tax assessors and the individual. 
Not uncommonly, the "bad-guy" assessor sets the full legal rate; 
110
 
Non-Discretionary Command 
the "good-guy" partner then comes along and sets a lower rate, 
and the difference is split among the actors. This is discretion­
ary administration. 
In Korea, taxes are administered in a largely (though not 
wholly) non-discretionary fashion even though enforcement is 
selective. This is discussed below. A second example of non-dis­
cretionary command is tile prohibition of certain forms of con­
suniption. 
TAXES 
Consider the first operational question of enforcement. Table 
18 gives the historic shares of central government tax collec­
tions as a percent of GNP. The trend is upwards, roughly dou­
bling from a 7.5 percent average in the 1953-1960 period to 15.5 
percent in 1972-1976. This incre ase is of course partly duc to 
rising income which in turn facilitates tax extraction. To correct 
for this, we rely on Lotz and Morss who have estimated the rate 
at which tax collections vary with income for a sample of fifty­
tw LDCs in the mid-1960s (we have added an observation for 
Ko:ea in the mid-1 970s)."s Results are summarized in '?ible 19 
which shows a dramatic increase in the relative ranking of the 
Republic of Korea from 1.962-1964 to 1974-1976; for example, 
from forty-eighth to eighteenth in the equation relating tax 
burden to per capita GNP. Even granting the many ambiguities 
in international comparisons of this sorc,56 we take this as clear 
evidence that tax collections in Korea have increased far more 
rapidly than can be explained by the rise in per capita income 
alone. The tax burden in Korea started at a low lvel by inter­
national standards (due largely to the substitution of AID 
revenues in the 1950s), but has risen rapidly under Park, parti­
cularly in the 1970s. 
Enforcement is reflected not only in the level of tax collec­
tions, but (perhaps more important) in the composition of the 
tax burden. A widely held tenet of public finance is that direct 
taxes are superior to indirect taxes since they are less regressive 
and do not distort marginal incentives for the production of 
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TABLE 18 Tax Burden Trend, 1953-1976 
()
 
Year TaxIGNP 
 Year Tax/GNP 
1953 4.8 1965 8.6 
1954 6.8 1966 10.8 
1955 6.1 1967 12.0 
1956 5.9 1968 14.4 
1957 7.5 1969 15.1 
1958 8.5 1970 15.4 
1959 10.1 1971 15.6 
1960 10.2 1972 13.5 
1961 9.5 1973 13.2 
1962 10.8 1974 15.1 
1963 8.9 1975 17.1 
1964 7.3 1976 18.3 
1953-1961 Average 7.71 
1962-1966 Average 9.28 
1967-1971 Average 14.50 
1972-1976 Average 15.44 
Source: Central Government Taxes as percent of GNP from BOK, National Income in 
Korea, 1976 (Seoul, 1976). 
various goods and services. Nonetheless, LDCs around the world 
rely heavily on indirect taxes, most notably in the particularly 
pernicious form of import duties. This has less to do with LDC 
disagreement with economic precepts than with simple adminis­
trative expediency-it is a relatively simple miatter to assess and 
tax goods at the dock; it is extremely difficult to assess and tax 
income and wealth. Reliance on import duties is thus a matter 
of necessity, not choice. 
Korea is something of an exception to this rule. This is 
suggested by Table 20 which gives direct taxes as a share of 
total taxes for Korea as compared with that projected at Ko­
rea's level of income (based on Raja J. Chelliah's regression 
coefficients for fifty LDCs in 1966-1968)." 7 Korea is seen 
to have had a substantially higher than average reliance on 
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TABLE 19 	 Korea's Tax Effort Ranking
 
(among 52 LDCs)
 
Koreac Koread 
hIdicatorb 1962-1964 1973-1976 
A. T/Y 	 50 
B. a TIY=a 1 -b 1'/P 48 	 18 
C.a T/Y = al + b2 Y/P+c X+M 46 	 26 
Notes: dRa1 nking based on percentage deviation from trend lines estimated in source 
as: 
B. T/Y = 12.98 + 0.0080 Y/P
C. T/Y = 10.21 + 0.0085 Y/P + 0.0712 X+AYJorgen Lotz 	and Elliot Morss, "Measuring 'Tax Effort' in Developing Countries."I..F.StaffPaprs,November 1967, pp. 478-499.	 In 
b7, total central and local tax receipts
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P- Populationi
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M!- Imports

Clbid., pp. 488-489. 
dKorean data from IOK, Ecoigoic Statistics Yearbook, 1976 (Seoul, 1977), Con­
stant dollar conversions frotm constant wsvn made at rate usedseries originally by 
Lotz and Morss. 
direct taxes even in the Rhee period, but the gap widened 
markedly under Park. 
Both of the foregoing tests (on relative size and composition 
of taxation) are low-order and hardly definitive. At minimum, 
however, they do not conflict with our hypothesis that tax 
collection is more rigorously enforced in Korea (particularly 
under Park) than in other LDCs at similar levels of income. A 
major reason for this is the Park Government's ability to collect 
corporate and personal income taxes, inheritance taxes, and the 
like. Again, this is a highly relativistic statement. In a dynamic 
society where the information gap is large and personal connec­
tions are traditionally strong, tax "irregularities" remain wide­
spread. Nonetheless, the trend of collections is upwards and 
the level of compliance, while low by United States standards, 
is perhaps not dissimilar from that in France and decidely 
above that in most LDCs. 
The second issue in the use of command is whether it is 
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TABLE 20 Direct Taxes as Percent of Total Taxes 
Period Projecteda Actual Actual/Projected 
1953-1955 25 34 1.36
 
1966-1968 28 
 42 1.50
 
1973-1976 33 
 50 1.50 
Note: aBased on share expected at Korea's income level from: Raja J. Chelliah.
"Trends in Taxation in Developing Countries," LIM.F. Staff Papers, July 1971, pp.
278, ?83. 
discretionary or non-discretionary. Worldwide, indirect taxes 
are predominantly administered in a non-discretionary fashion. 
This is because, with few exceptions, (for example, antiques 
exported by tourists), quantity or value or both are readily 
ascertainable and a per-unit or percent-of-value tax is easily 
and objectively calculated. This clarity of assessment is re­
flected both in the well-known preference of LDCs for indirect 
taxes and in the non-discretionary application of the command 
to pay. Korea is no exception to the latter rule, with indirect 
taxes administered in a largely non-discretionary fashion. 
For administration of direct taxes, the story is more compli­
cated. The Office of National Tax Administration was estab­
lished in 1966 to increase tax revenue and to make the tax 
administration as non-discretionary as possible by elimination 
of corruption, tax evasion, and arbitrary tax assessment proce­
dures. Enforcement is generally via the selective application of 
police action. This is reflected in the recent announcement of 
a tax investigation of 27 corporations based on The Law for 
F-nishment of Tax Criminals. 8 If tax evasion is discovered 
through the investigation, the corporation will not only have to 
pay the additional taxes due plus a penalty of twice the addi­
tional tax, but the management will also be subject to criminal 
prosecution. The latter is not a laughing matter in Korea, and 
corporations consequently dread a tax investigation. The 
selection of the 27 corporations was based on the "degree of 
sincerity" in filing tax documents. Out of a total of 14,864 
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corporations filing tax returns, 916 corporations are classified 
as either "sincere-return corporations" or "semi-sincere-return 
corporations." The remaining 13,948 firms were eligible for 
audit, but only 27 were chosen in the first round. Substantial 
selectivity is apparent. A somewhat broader approach to the 
problem is represented by a recent announcement of the 
National Taxation Office that all cases of delinquency exceed­
ing one million w~n will be publicly announced. 9 
Despite such broad-based efforts, the essence of tile enforce­
ment mechanism remains highly selective police action. Selec­
tion is not based solely on the perceived possibility of non­
compliance with tax laws. A firm is just as likely to be audited 
for non-compliance with various discretionary commands. Sup­
pose the government has made a company aware of its patriotic 
duty to contribute a little extra to national defense in a time of 
national crisis. Suppose further that the company ignores its 
duty. It is then imaginable that the company may appear on 
the select list of those to be investigated. Good and sufficient 
grounds wll undoubtedly be found for penalizing the firm for 
non-compliance with non-discretionary tax laws, but the 
managers will be excused for believing that they are really being 
penalized for ignoring a command. More important, other 
owners may have their patriotic conscience raised by the example. 
In sum, selective enforcement of non-discretionary tax laws 
has two effects. First, it serves as a means of backing up partial 
mutuality, though it is decidely secondary to credit in this 
role. Second, it encourages firrn to reduce their liability by 
filing increasingly accurate tax returns. Much remains to be 
done in this respect, but as the tax figures cited above show, 
Korea already does a highly creditable job of enforcing non­
discretionary command. 
CONSUMPTION BANS 
One readily observable use of command is the prohibition of 
certain forms of consumption seen as immoral or contrary to 
specific economic interests. As examples, we consider non­
tariff barriers to trade and the ban on foreign cigalettes. 
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Under both Rhee and Park, the government has endeavored 
to control imports, in part through non-tariff barriers. In bnth 
periods these controls have been administered with a mixture 
of discretion and non-discretion. However, two trends have 
been apparent. First, the mi.,:urc has shifted increasingly away 
from discretion. Second, enforcement of prohibitions has been 
stiffened. 
Conceptually, one may think of three classes of imports: 
1) Unrestricted items which may be imported in any quantity; 
2) Restricted items which may be imported in limited 
quantity; and 
3) Prohibited items which may not be imported at all. 
Unrestricted items do not require intervention (except in the 
allocation of foreign exchange, considered above). Restricted 
items necessarily require discretion in allocation (assuming the 
quota is binding in that there is excess demand). Absolute 
prohibition is, by definition, non-discretionary command. 
From 1946 to 1949, there was a permit system which simply 
distinguished between prohibited and permitted items. 60 There 
were no quantitative restrictions within the permitted list, so 
the only constraint was access to foreign exchange. The system 
was thus non-discretionary since there were no restricted 
items. 
In 1949 a quota system was introduced, placing quantitative 
restrictions on catagories of permitted items, end-use, and 
source. The restricted category was thus added and discretion 
introduced. This led to much of the corruption and excess 
profits from imports already noted. 
Following the 1955 devaluation, a more flexible system was 
introduced with the addition of a "positive" list of items whose 
import was unrestricted. Some items were thus removed from 
the discretionary realm. 
Thereafter, there was a general m:,vement of items out of the 
restricted category and into the unrestricted group, where 
tariffs were used to control quantity. A major change came in 
1961 with the introduction of a "negative list" system under 
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which items not othcrwise specified were automatically placed 
in the unrestricted category. Nonetheless, the restricted cate­
gory remained substantial. In 1970, out of 1,312 "basic" 
items, 73 were prohibited, 524 were restricted, and 715 were 
unrestricted.' In addition, special approval was required for 
imports from countries with whom Korea showed a trade 
deficit. 
While ample room for discretion thus remains in the system, 
it does not seem to be particularly problematic. Unlike the 
Rhee period, there are few, if any, complaints of favoritism and 
bribery in allocation of quotas. This is due to some combination 
of three factors. First, the equilibrium exchange rate reduces 
the excess profit to be gained from privileged access. Second, 
some of the restrictions may be non-binding. Third, the bureau­
cracy seems to use reasonable economic criteria in allocating 
permission to qualified end-users (that is, to producers needing 
particular intermediates). While the discretionary realm was 
thus reduced between the Rliee and Park periods, a more im­
portant difference was the manner in which discretion was 
exercised. 
A second issue involves the degree to which prohibited items 
(and over-quota restricted items) are effectively banned. No 
hard information is available, but the incentives tor under­
invoicing and smuggling were greater under Rhee and enforce­
ment almost certainly more lax. Under Park, enforcement has 
been serious, if not fooiproof. The best known case involved 
the excessive import of saccharine (legitimately needed in small 
quantities as a catalyst) for the Korean Fertilizer Co., Ltd.'s 
plant in 1966, and resulted in the bulk of the plant's equity 
being forfeited to the government. 62 
The effectiveness with which non-discretionary comnmand is 
enforced under Park may be illustrated with regard to foreign 
cigarette manufacture. The government enjoys a monopoly of 
domestic cigarette production, so that it not unsurprisingly bans 
imports. This was true under Rhee as well as Park, the differ­
ence being the level of enforcement. Under Rhee, the situation 
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was similar to many countries (such as the pre-martial-law 
Philippines) with the ban ignored by all concerned. Today, 
foreign cigarettes are still sometimes smoked in private, but 
seldom, if ever, in public. This is not primarily due to reduced 
PX supply, since this would result in a much higher mark-up 
(not observed) unless demand also shifted. Part of the reduction 
in demand is due to a change in the popular attitude towards 
foreign cigarette smoking, which is now considered to be "un-
Korean." There has also been a marked step-up in enforcement. 
The Cigarette Monopoly Law of December 1972 provides 
explicit and severe penalities for buying, selling, or using foreign 
cigarettes. In the case of selling and buying for resale, the fine 
ranges from 50,000 up to 1,000,000 w~n depending on the 
quantity of cigarettes involved. In the case of giving, receiving, 
or possession of cigarettes worth more than 1,600 w6n, tile fine 
ranges from 30,000 won up to 500,000 won depending on the 
quantity involved. In both cases, both buyer and seller are 
subject to punishment and inay also be sent to jail (for up to 
ten years in the case of buying for resale). Further, rewards are 
provided to those who inform on illegal smokers and to those 
who arrest them. These rewards are large enough that small 
boys are sometimes found where passenger cars wai- for traffic 
signal changes and report observed smoking violations to 
inspectors with whom they share the bounty. The Park Govern­
ment is obviously serious about the ban. 
Other luxury imports are also banned under the 1961 Law 
Prohibiting Sales of Special Foreign Products. Again, offenders 
are severely punished, being subjected to up to ten years' im­
prisonment and/or a fine of five to twenty times the price of the 
commodity. The government rewards informers with an amount 
equivalent to 30 percent of the price of the commodity at the 
time of the confiscation. This is not mere formalism. In 1974, 
a diamond smuggling scandal among wives led to the resignation 
of two ministers and other high government officials and public 
enterprise executives.6 
In sum, non-discretionary command is widely used in Korea. 
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The unique thing is not its level, but the fact that it is generally 
enforced. 
DISCRETIONARY COMMAND IN PRACTICE 
Discretionary command is, in principle, the least desirable form 
of intervention because it combines compulsion with the poten­
tial for administrative abuse. It has, nonetheless, been exten­
sively used in Korea, often to good effect. We consider three 
variants: informal guidance, formal directives, and price con­
trols. 
INFORMAL GUIDANCE 
The first type of discretionary command occurs when someone 
in the government decides that a particular action should be 
taken by a particular firm and communicates this desire with 
more or less subtlety. This may have the objective of collecting 
contributions for some quasi-public purpose, but it may also 
take the form of a quick and expedient solution of a problem 
which is not generalizable. Use of this mechanism is difficult 
to document, but a few stories serve to illustrate the phe­
noinenon. 
One widely told tale along this line concerns a Seoul sky­
scraper which remained unfinished for an extended period due 
to a variety of administrative and financial difficulties. It is 
said that President Park was driving by one day, noted the 
lack of progress and the blight on the skyline, and instructed 
an aide to make the problem go away. The building quickly 
changed ownership and was completed in record time. Another 
example is President Park's alleged response to the news that 
no international finance could be found for the Hyundai 
shipyard, and the project would have to be abandoned. His 
initial angry response was a thinly veiled threat of the form­
"If you only want to do what's easy, then you'll get no more 
help from us." This was followed, after an interval, by an 
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inpassioned patriotic plea for the national interest. The result 
was a renewed effort by Hyundai and the successful comple­
tion of a project which would not have gone forward without 
the personal "urging" of the President." 
A third example occurred in late 1975 when large trade 
deficit; raised international doubts about the nation's ability 
to service further foreign debt. This was particularly trouble­
suijle, since at the time a major effort was being made to in­
crease foreign borrowing. To convince foreigners that long­
term export prospects were as good as the government felt 
they were, it was obviously desirable that 1975 export figures 
be as high as possible. Accordingly, it is said that exporters 
were given a strong suggestion to speed deliveries and to make 
whatever paper adjustments they could to enhance December 
performance figures. 
Stories such as these may be apocryphal in any given instance, 
but occur so frequently, and arc given such currency, that they 
clearly represent a common phenomenon. Informal guidance 
is ubiquitous, but its quantitative importance is impossible to 
assess. 
FORMAL COMMAND: 
FORCING FIRMS TO GO PUBLIC 
Discretionary command is more readily documented when the 
instructions are formalized. One major variant occurs when 
field manipulations fail to achieve a given end with sufficient 
rapidity, and certain firms are chosen to volunteer for the 
privileges being conferred. A reveali!,g example of the use of 
command to supplement inadequate field manipulation involves 
the series of measures designed to "encourage" closely held 
private companies to make public offerings of their shares. We 
outline a series of four measures aimed at this end between 
1968 and 1975. These show a clear trend towards increasing 
use of discretionary command to replace (or supplement) 
non-discretionary field manipulation. 
The 1968 Law for the Promotion of the Capital Market had 
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as its objective "The development of the capital market by 
inducing privately-held firms to go public and creating a favor­
able investment environment in which people's participation 
in business affairs and domestic resource mobilization are to 
be facilitated." ' As the law provided for various6s incentives, 
tax privileges for firms that "went public," but these proved 
ineffective. A new and stronger law was legislated in December 
1972-the Law for Inducing Business Corporations to go Public. 
Field manipulation incentives were expanded but, more in­
portant, command provisions were added. 'unitive measures 
could now be taken against certain corporations that failed to 
"go public." Provision was made for unfavorable tax treatment 
including a 20 percent penalty on the company's corporate 
income tax and a similar levy on the personal income tax of 
majority shareholders. Perhaps more important, the Minister 
of Finance was allowed to direct financial institutions to re­
strict credit to these firms. Further, targets were to be selected 
in a discretionary fashion. According to the law, the Minister 
of Finance shall select "appropriate corporations" based on the 
total paid-in capital, financial situation, ability to pay dividends, 
stock trading prospects, the general securities market trend, and 
so on, from among "eligible corporations." 
The impact of the law was positive. In 1973, firms listed on 
the Korean Stock Exchange increased by 41, roughly equivalent 
to the 42 firms added during the entire 1968-1972 period. This 
was largely due to field manipulation as the command powers 
of 1972 law were not used. 
Nonetheless, few of the chaeb&1 group firms participated in 
the program, the in favor ofrejecting benefits traditional 
closely held management pattern. Concern over the chaebSl 
problem led to the May 29 Presidential Special Directives of 
1974. These placed rather extraordinary restraints on chaebol 
behavior (for example, certain groups were prohibited fron 
receiving further foreign loan guarantees, establishing or acquir­
ing new companies, investing in stock, or acquiring non-oper­
ating real estate). These measures are described in detail in 
121
 
Policy Implementation 
Chapter 8 in the specific context of the problem of business 
concentration. Here we only note that the command elements 
of the 1972 law were now brought into play and applied to 
particular groups and firms selected in a discretionary fashion. 
In the year following the special directives, 48 additional 
firms went public, but again with less than desired response 
from major chaeb6l. Accordingly, the August 8 Measure of 
1975 extended coverage to the main holding companies (only 
subsidiaries had previously been included), and established 
a specific time schedule for compliance. 
This example has illustrated the way in which formal 
discretionary command is used to supplement supposedly non­
discretionary field manipulation. It also suggests the persever­
ance of the bureaucracy in pursuing an objective established at 
the top, and the flexibility of the search for a tool to achieve 
that end. To date, the effort can hardly be termed a success, 
though the number of firms listed in the stock exchange has 
increased from 66 at the end of 1972 to 251 as of October 
1976. Nonetheless, a learning process has been taking place and 
the trend is clear. 
PRICE CONTROLS 
Price controls are the final variant of discretionary command 
that we consider. These are field manipulations from the point 
of view of the buyer, but commands from the perspective of 
the seller. The former element dominates when the primary 
goal is to subsidize consumers through low public enterprise 
prices, as discussed above. The command element dominates 
when there is a broad-based effort to control private prices as 
part of an anti-inflationary effort. It is this latter use which is 
considered here. 
Price stabilization policies include: 
1) Aggregate demand management via fiscal and monetary 
policy, 
2) Aggregate supply management through foreign-aid financed 
imports, 
3) Indirect price controls via wage-good price policies (for 
122
 
DiscretionaryCommand 
example, through Public Law 480 imports and domestic 
grain price manipulation), and 
4) Direct administrative price controls. 
Briefly, in Korea the second and third (AID related) methods 
predominated in the post-Korean War Rhee period and were 
gradually supplanted by more conventional aggregate demand 
management policies. Administrative price controls were heavily 
used during the inter-war and Korean War years, withered under 
Rhee, and were reimposed under Park, though with varying 
degrees of intensity.66 It is these efforts to stabilize prices 
administratively (microeconomic intervention) which will 
concern us in the remainder of this section. 
Before detailing the rise and fall of administrative price 
control efforts, it is useful to distinguish three distinct sets of 
circumstances in which they might be used: 
1) Sustained across-the-board efforts as a substitute for 
aggregate demand management, 
2) Short-term, across-the-board efforts aimed at controlling 
excess profits in the disequilibrium wake of a shock such 
as devaluation, revolution, tax reform, or the oil price 
explosion, and 
3) Selective efforts designed to achieve competitive price 
levels in monopolistic or oligopolistic markets. 
The first method is typically, though not necessarily, adminis­
tered in a non-discretionary fashion. The latter two, if rational, 
are necessarily non-discretionary. The first takes the form: "Thou 
shalt not raise prices more than X percent" and is thus non-dis­
cretionary. The others take the form: "Thou shalt raise prices 
only to the extent justified by real increases in costs." Ascetain­
ing "real increases in costs," of course, requires case-by-case dis­
cretionary examination, whether in United States regulatory 
practice or in determining legitimate pass-throughs of oil-price 
increases. 
Sustained across-the-board price control (#1 above), although 
beloved of politicians, is probably doomed to failure for the 
traditional "squeezing a balloon" set of reasons. Selective short­
term controls (in circumstances #2 and #3 above) are certainly 
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justifiable government interventions, though their efficacy 
varies with the wisdom of their administrators. 
Under Park, with one notable exception, price controls have 
geirerally been either selective or short-term, and in pursuit of 
defensible economic goals. They have therefore been largely and 
ne:essarily discretionary. The exception is the 1972 to 1973 
period -"hen controls were used in a sustained broad-based 
effort to control prices, with predictable deleterious results. 
The first instance of short-term price controls under Park 
occurred in May 1961 when the new Military Government 
announced a temporary freeze on prices at their pre-revolution­
ary levels. The goal was to prevent profiteering in an unsettled 
environment when uncertainty gives sellers a temporary dis­
equilibrium advantage over buyers. Two months later, tile 
freeze was replaced by the Temporary Law on Price Control 
which placed price ceilings on "critical" commodities such 
as rice, barley, coal, and fertilizer. These were largely under the 
control of public enterprises in any event. More items were 
added later, but the system withered away following the re­
emphasis on aggregated demand management with the financial 
stabilization program of 1963. 
The balance of the 196 0s saw what Soon Chough calls an "in­
formal price supervision" system. 67 That is, there were no 
formal control procedures, but the government exercised 
"persuasion" on producers'various associations to forestall 
"undesirable" price increases. Enforcement of these discre­
tionary commands was through partial mutuality-implicit 
threats of credit restraint, tax investigation, stricter applications 
of sanitary standards, and so on. As Chough puts it: "There 
is no legal basis for the working of this system, but the govern­
ment influence goes beyond what laws or regulations stip­
'68  ulate." Application of these methods was discontilluous, 
with efforts intensified during the big spending sprees preceding 
Ch'us6k (Autumn Moon Festival) and S61 (Lunar New Year). 
A major change in tile price control system followed the 
August 3, 1972 Emergency Measure Regarding Economic 
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Stability and Growth. One announced goal of the measure was 
to keep annual price increases below 3 percent. This ambitious 
target was to be achieved, in part, by a series of administrative 
controls which were broad-based and across-the-board rather 
than selective. 
The policy was similar to, and clearly influenced by, the 
Nixon freeze of one year earlier, but was pursued with a unique­
ly Korean vengeance. A freez2e on prices of all commodities 
was announced. if unbearable cost-push pressures deve!'p0ed 
in any one industry, they were to be offset not by ;i cost­
pass-through price increase but by offsetting indirect subsidies. 
The Office of National Tax Administration set up 460 "mobile 
price control patrols" and 80 "price assurance forces" to check 
for price increases. Where "gouging" was found, violators were 
subjected to an imnr diate tax investigation, i special excess 
profits tax, and curtailment of credit. Moral suasion was also 
attempted through a major meeting between government and 
business leaders. 
Results of these efforts were predictable. Producers resorted 
to under-the-table payments, product-mix realignments and 
other devices to avoid the controls. The government responded 
with quantitative restrictions (production quotas) and daily 
checks on shipments of major producers. In March 1973, a 
Law on Price Stability was passed prohibiting sales at greater­
than-ceiling prices and prohibiting restricted shipments. In 
December 1073, the freeze was lifted, but prior approval was 
required for price increases. Fixty-three major commodities 
were controlled by EPB, and the remainder by concerned 
ministries. For EPB-controlled commodities, there was pro­
vision for special tariff reductions, import financing, and 
capital equipment and operating loans as an alternative to 
price increases. The usual partial mut;iality penalties for non­
compliance were also listed. 
The pressures that built up under the system were exacer­
bated by the 1973 oil shock and led to a return to the old 
philosophy of selective controls on February 5, 1974. The DPM 
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described the change by announcing that, "unlike the past 
price stability measure relying primarily on the administrative 
direct control power the new measure will be operated accord­
ing to the natural price mechanism supplemented by some 
administrative control."69 Prior restraint was abolished on all 
but 32 items, and for these products, price increases of 9.1 
percent over February 5 prices were allowed (21.5 percent 
over November 15, 1973 base prices). 
A new chapter in the price control story was added with the 
Law on Price Stability and Fair Trade of December 1975. 
This shifted the focus of selective control from temporary 
disequilibria (motive #2) to controlling oligopoli-ic and 
monopolistic markets (n-otive #3). Reflec.ing the government's 
increased concern with the problem of industrial concen:ration, 
this law was applicable to firms which: 
1) Captured more than 30 percent of sales in any industry. 
2) Captured more than 20 percent of sales in a concentrated 
industry (defined as having a three-firm concentration 
ratio of 60 percent). 
3) "Practically dominate those industries which supply 
critically important goods and services for the national 
economy."70 
Temporary disequilibria controls were of coure not abandoned. 
In July 1977, the government introduced a value-added tax and 
accrompanied it with intensive chccks on 850 commodities to 
preclude pass-throughs in excess of those justified by the tax 
increases. 7 ' 
In sum, the Park Government has throughout its tenure used 
administrative price controls in short-term across-the-board 
efforts aimed at controlling excess profits in disequilibrium 
situations such as revolution, devaluation, oil shock, tax reform, 
or holidays. More recently, it has used them in an effort to 
achieve competitive price levels in monopolistic or oligopolistic 
markets. Both irotivations are completely rational from the 
standpoint of market-failure analysis-the unregulated market 
fails so the government can usefully intervene. In both cases, 
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the behavioral intervention mechanism is necessarily discretion­
ary command. 
The major exception to the foregoing generalization is the 
brief one-and-one-half year period from August 1972 to Febru­
ary 1974. Here the government attempted sustained across-the­
board controls. The predictable failure, and consequent reversal, 
of this effort should not be interpreted as illustrating the ulti­
mate triumph of any underlying laissez-faire government phi­
losophy. If anything, the reverse may be true. The government's 
readiness to intervene was overcome only by blaLcntly unsatis­
factory economic consequences. Certain forms of intervention 
simply do not work, and sustained across-the-board price con­
trols is one of them. This having been demonstrated, the govern­
ment's dominant concern for efficiency and growth asserted 
itself at the expense of an interventionist proclivity in February 
1974. The one-and-a-half year attempt at broad-based price 
controls was thus a brief aberration. Nonetheless, it illustrates 
several features of' intervention in Korea: first, a willingness to 
intervene directly and pervasively via command; second, the 
capacity to enforce the command (insofar as price controls are 
ever enforceable); third, the willingness to try out a new control 
system (stimulated here by United States price control efforts); 
and fourth, flexibility in reversing direction once a conflict with 
growth and efficiency became apparent. 
DISCRETION AND COMMAND: 
A CASE STUDY 
We have argued that the Korean government actively uses its 
discretionary powe~rs to intervene in the operation of individual 
business enterprises. We now illustrate the process in detail 
through a case study of the Korean Machinery Manufacturing 
Corporation (henceforth, "Han'gi"-a contraction of its Korean 
name). 
The origin of the company dates back to June 1937 when it 
started under Japanese ownership as the Chosun Machinery 
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Manufacturing Company. After Liberation, the company 
became a departmental enterprise operated directly by the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Control was transfcrred 
to the Ministry of National Defense in 1950 and then back 
to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in 1961. In May 
1963, however, it became an autonomous public corpora­
tion, established according to a special law. These earlier status 
alternations represented typcial bureaucratic conflicts over 
control of a major public ente:prise, while the 1963 shift 
was an attempt at moving towards more autonomy and rational 
management. 
The paid-in capital was officially 214 million wo'n in 1964, 
but this was a paper transaction in the sense that the govern­
ment converted a KDB (Korea Development Bank) loan into 
equity. No cash was paid in. In 1964, the government again 
increased its capital base to 627 million wo'n simply by the re­
valuation of existing assets. The first actual government cash 
input came in 1965 when 73 million w-n was provided to 
finance the plant and equipment and increase the company's 
capital base to 700 million w6n. Given this equity base, the 
company had no choice but to rely on external debt for financ­
ing both operations and investment. In addition, the company 
had never experienced an operating surplus. The result was a 
continuing financial burden on the government, and a state in 
which Han'gi's very existence wa. in danger. 
In 1968, the government initiated a policy of divestiture 
under which a number of public enterprises were to be sold to 
the private sector. As t_..rt of this process, Han~gi was sold to 
Shinjin Automobile Manufacturing Company. Some of the 
shares were to be sold publicly, but as with other divestitures at 
the same time, these were heavily undersubscribed. As a result, 
the government assigned roughly one-third of the equity shares 
to various of its commercial banks in lieu of paid-in capital. In 
addition, because of the large loans made or guaranteed by KDB, 
and the shaky financial position, the company was placed under 
the supervision of KDB's Special Administration Division. This 
128
 
A Case Study 
meant that KDB appointed one director and followed the 
company's affairs closely. 
Nonethcless, the company was under private operational 
control, the stated objective of the divestiture having been to 
improve the company's efficiency and financial performance by 
rationalizing managenieint. Deficits, nonetheless, continued and 
the company eventually filed a petition to the governmcnt for 
its rescue in August 1971. The petition argued that the com­
pany was the "backbone" of the machinery industry which in 
turn was strategic for the nation's development. 
Upon getting the petition, the concerned economic ministers 
adopted Measures for the Korean Machinery Manufacturing 
Corporation Account Improvement in December 1971 in view 
of "the comn pany's position in the machinery industry." 
These measures were reported to the President in a meeting on 
the promotion of machinery. heavy, and chemical industries in 
January 1972. Then, actual measures were taken in April 1972 
according to the Prime Minister's directive on Measures for 
Korean Machinery Manu facturing Corporation. 
The major thliIst of these measures was to relieve the coni­
pany from its immediate debt service burden by replacing high­
interest loans with low-interest loans, extending loan repayment 
schedules, making provisions for installment payments, and 
converting some KDB loans into equity. Cheapcr KDB funds, 
tagged for promoting the machine industry, were used to re­
place a large portion of more expensive commercial bank and 
curb-market loans. Repayment of some outstanding KDB loans 
was postponed with an installment provision. At the saine time, 
some interest charges ill arrears on KDB loans were written off. 
In addition, the government promiserd tariff protection on 
diesel engines Han'gi planned to produce. 
In returni for all these favors, Shimjin was asked to increase 
substantially its equity base in Han'gi. Even more important, a 
substantial portion of the newly-planned diesel engine plant was 
to be financed by Shinjin itself. 
These measures were effective in the short run, but continuing 
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operating deficits and requirements for expansion forced the 
firm back to debt funding, including high-interest curb-market 
loans. By 1974 the company was in evcn worse condition than 
at the time of thc 1972 rescue operation. 
While the company's financial picture got grimmer and grim­
mer, the government issued its so-called May 29 Presidential 
Special Directives and the follow-up Measures on Bank Credit 
and Business Concentration issued by the Ministry of Finance. 
These required cliaeb6l groups with high debt/e,.1uity ratios to 
correct their financial structure by selling off some firms and 
divesting themselves of noll-operating assets. Han'gi, as a mem­
ber of the Shinjin Group, was subject to these regulations. 
In July 1974, the Council on Correcting the Financial Struc­
ture of Business Corporations, presided over by the Prime 
Minister, adopted specific measures for the Shinjin Grrrup in 
general and Han'gi in particular. The council was worried that 
Han'gi's diesel engine and railway passenger car projects were 
underfinanced, might not be completed rapidly, and might face 
operational problems if completed. This wVas unacceptable 
because: both diesel engines and railway passenger cars were 
deemed critical products: and tile government had arranged and 
guaranteed a West ;erman loan for the diesel engine plant. 
The council, therefore, ordered tile Shinjin Group to sell off 
all its firms except Han'gi itself and Shinjin's joint ventures 
(for example, General Motors Korea Co., Ltd. and Shinjin 
Jeep), and to further divest itself of all non-operating real 
estate owned either by the companies or by the majority share­
holders. The proceeds were then to be ploughed back into 
Han'gi. With the equity base thus improved, the government 
would then order domestic financial institutions to support 
Han'gi by: replacing high interest short-term loans with low 
interest long-term loans; postponing repayment of short-term 
loans; and designating Han'gi as "all industrial rationalization 
firm." 
The Shinjin Group was directed to file with tIle Board of 
Bank Supervision a detailed plan for implementation of these 
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directives, and this it did. However, iii January 1975, the group 
filed a revised plan proposing that proceeds from real estate 
sales and divestiture be used to build up Shinjin Autombile 
Manufacturing Company (the group's hclding company) and 
not for Han'gi. The group argued that the parent company was 
in trouble since it produced nothing itself, was earning minin, l 
dividends from its troubled companies, and yet was burdened 
with paying foreign debts inflated by the recent devaluation. 
Shinjin therefore proposed that group resources not be used 
to bail out Han'gi, but that Han'gi should expand its own equity 
base. A public offering of Han'gi stock being decened impossible 
because of low market valuation, it was suggested that most 
bank debt be converted into equity. This would have made 
KDB the majority shareholder and the company would have 
returned to the status of a full-fledged public enterprise. 
Segments of the government are known to have considered 
this proposal seriously, but within a few months the issue was 
resolved by sale of Han'gi to Daewoo Group."2 It is not known 
whether the government or Daewoo took the initiative in effect­
ing this sale, but it is certain that the deal would not have been 
consumnated without approval from the highest levels of the 
hierarchy. From the government's perspective, the sale was 
desirable as a means of bringing improved management to what 
was perceived as a growth sector. Shinjin had proven incom­
petent, and the KDB option was not particularly appealing 
given the government's general policy direction to sell off some 
of her existing subsidiaries. Daewoo held promise as the fastest 
growing new group, the only question being whether expertise 
gained primarily in light industry could be adapted to machin­
ery. 
Whatever the future of Han'gi, its past illustrates several 
features of government-business interaction in Korea. First, the 
government is pragmatic in choosing between public and private 
operation on rational rather than ideological grounds. Second, 
the government is prepared to intervene at any level deemed 
necessary to promote economic growth. Third, there is no 
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reluctance to use direct command as opposed to indirect para­
meter manipulation. Fourth, the intervention can be highly 
discretionary with decisions made on a conipany-by-conip,,ny 
basis. Fifth, credit is often the instrument around which inter­
vention coalesces. Sixth, these discretionary decisions regularly 
reach the highest tiers of the administration. 
The reader should not be left with the impression that this is a 
typical company. In fact, it is unique in having one of the worst 
performance records of any major Korean enterprise. It is for 
this reason that it has drawn such heavy government attention 
and allowed us to demonstrate atwide range of government 
intervention mechanisms in a single company. While the quan­
tity of intervention is thus atypical, the quality is not. The 
characteristics of the intervention process described here are the 
essence of the implementation process in Korea. Discretion and 
command are ubiquitous. 
THE EFFICACY OF DISCRETION
 
AND COMMAND IN A "HARD" STATE
 
THE PARADOX OF IMPLEMENTATION IN KOREA 
We have argued that field-manipulation and non-discretionary 
forms of intervention are generally held preferable on theoreti­
cal grounds, but we have demonstrated that Korea has relied 
heavily on both discretion and command. This paradox must 
now be explained. 
Note that the question does not arise from the government's 
Williizpuess to use discretion and command, but from its ability 
to do so effectively. LDCs around the world rely on these 
methods of implementation, and this is generally held to be one 
of their problems. Our task here is to explain why discretion 
and command are part of the solution in Korea. 
In brief, our answer is that Korea is a "hard state." Myrdal 
defines a "soft state" as atcountry where "Policies decided on 
are often not enforced, if they are enacted at all . . . (and where) 
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the autlhorit'-s, even when framing policies, are reluctant to 
place obligations on people.'' 73 in contrast, he implicitly defines 
a "hard state""4 in arguing that "the success of planning for 
development requires a readiness to place obligations on people 
in all social strata to a much greater extent than is now done 
. . . (and it) . . . requires, in addition, rigorous enforcement of 
obligations, in which compulsion plays a strategic role.'' 5 
The importance of this conclusion has not been recognized 
by the academic community, but it has been manifest in the 
revealed preferences of a generation of LDC political leaders 
who have shownl increasing impatience with the impediments of 
softness. Myrdal's work is based on observations of the weak­
nesses of soft states, with the advantages of hardness hypothe­
sized in the abstract. Korea under Park Chung Hee, however, 
provides a concrete example of hardness in action. 
A label, of course, is not an explanation, however appropriate 
it may be. We now elaborate on two major determinants of 
hardness-the ability to enforce obligations via compulsion, and 
the ability to direct administrative discretion towards desirable 
ends. 
COMPULSION 
Compulsion is not a highly regarded virtue, and yet it is cen­
tral to overcoming the problens of development. To avoid 
being branded a fascist for such an assertion, it is comforting 
to have the backing of a renowned liberal and Nobel prize 
winner such as Myrdal who believes: 
There is little hope in South Asia for rapid development without 
greater social discipline. To begin with, in the absence of more 
liscipline--w'hic will not appear wvithout regulations backed by 
compulsion-allmeasures for rural uplift will be largely ineffective.76 
This conclusion is by no means limited to South Asia and the 
rural sector. This follows from certain fundamental propositions 
on conditions in LDCs. To begin with, market imperfections 
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require some form of government intervention. As indicated 
earlier, non-compulsory field manipulation is most desirable. 
Field manipulation is, however, limited in its ability to over­
come many market imperfections. Command must be resorted 
to in some areas such as raising public revenue and enforcing 
standards. In many other areas, command is far quicker than 
field manipulation even if the latter will ultimately work. 
Send an outsider to manipulate a village's field with credit 
and news of a magic seed that will quadruple yields. Only some­
one who is really crazy will believe a story like that, and the 
supply of such people is limited. At the end of one crop year, 
you will therefore have only a minute fraction of the potential 
area under the new grain, with a few more coming on the second 
year, and the bulk in the third. Discretionary command could 
have accomplished the same thing in one year. There is, of 
course, the attendant possibility of the outsider being wrong 
and the whole crop being destroyed by blight. Discretionary 
command is fast, but very risky and accordingly needs to be 
administered with skill or luck or both. 
As more germane examples, consider the establishment of 
Hyundai Shipbuilding and Heavy Industries Co., Ltd., Pohang 
Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. and the opening up of closely held 
family corporations to public ownership.7 7 All of these might 
wel have happened eventually with sufficient parameter mani­
pulation, but they occurred as early as they did as a result of 
command. 
The question, then, is not whether or not command is neces­
sary for rapid development, but the wisdom of the ends towards 
which it is directed and the degree to which it is enforced. The 
previous chapter discussed the policy formulation process, and 
here we have explained enforcement as being accomplished 
through either police action or partial mutuality. The former is 
used largely in enforcing non-discretionary commands, while 
the latter is the enforcement mechanism for discretionary 
command. 
The use of police, like other scarce resources, needs to be 
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economized. Enforcement must therefore, of necessity, be 
selective but, when dramatic and well publicized, it may have a 
widespread deterrent effect. The selection process itself may or 
may not follow a random process. For example, the inspection 
of anti-pollution devices on diesel-engined buses was probably a 
random event, while the inspection of inheritance tax evasion 
may well be discretionary and aimed at someone who has 
violated an explicit or implicit discretionary command. 
Partial mutuality may be defined in the articulate language of 
Koopmans and Montias 8 or with the pithy phrase, "You get 
along by going along." In any event, it is the dominant means 
of enforcing discretionary command and includes some com­
bination of: 
1)The controllec's expectation of possible police action to 
enforce previously loosely enforccd non-discretionary 
commands (for example, tax laws). 
2) Implicit threats of the withdrawal or withholding of privi­
leges attained (or hoped for) under discretionary field 
manipulation. 
3) Appeals to "legitimacy" in the form of patriotism or na­
tional interest. 
This may be a subtle form of compulsion, but it is compulsion 
nonetheless. 
The entrepreneurship survey provides some support, albeit 
weak, for our hypothesis on the importance of partial mutual­
ity. Respondents were asked how often various compliance 
mechanisms were used by the government (see Table 21). 
"Friendly persuasion" ranked first, followed by "Moral exhor­
tation," "Making example of one firm," "Incentives and privi­
leges," and "Explicit threats." The first three all reflect partial 
mutuality, particularly "Friendly persuasion" which is the 
reigning euphemism. Given the biases inherent in our survey and 
their low statistical significance, 9 we do not wish to make too 
much of these results, but they are certainly not inconsistent 
with our hypothesis. 
The effective use of compulsion in pursuit of economic goals 
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TABLE 21 	 Businessmen's Perceptions of Government 
Compliance Methods 
Question: 	 "Ifthe government wishes to influence the conduct of a busi­
ncss, how important are the following means of insuring com­
pliance?" 
Response Scaling 
Used Very Sometimes Never 
Often Used Used 
1 2 3 4 5 
Alean Responses (ii = 118) 
Al Do-

Firms Largea Small a Exportb estic b
 
Incentives, privileges 3.65 3.47 3.70 3.53 3.77 
Moral exhortation 3.45 3.18 3.49 3.33 3.55 
"Friendly persuasion" 3.30 2.82 c 3.37 3.10 3.42 
Making example of one firm 3.58 3.38 3.62 3.62 3.54 
Explicit threats 4.17 3.69 c 4.26 4.18 4.20 
Soirce: Entrepreneurship Survey, see Appendix C. 
Notes: "arge- companies are those in top-quintile of respondent vaLuc-added dis­
tribution. 
b'Exporters" are those who derive Imorec thaii of revi exports.50',', te f' irom 
c= difference 	significant at 5%[,level. 
has hardly been a constant in the post-war equation. indeed, the 
Rlhee regime fits in perfectly to Myrdal's soft state categoriza­
tion. This should be apparent from our earlier discussion, but 
it is worth considering the opinions expressed in our entre­
prcneurship survey. Table 22 gives the entrepreneurship survey 
responses to the question as to how effective the government 
was in insuring compliance with government instructions. One 
could not ask for a more striking confirmatlon of the transfor­
mation of a soft state into a hard one." Under Rhee, only 3 
percent said that it was impossible to avoid complying with 
government decisions, as opposed to 78 percent under Park. 
It may be 	 that Rhee could have enforced economic interven­
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TABLE 22 	 "Hardness" of Implementation:
 
Rhee Versus Park
 
Question: 	 "Once the current government has made a decision affecting 
business, how effective is it in insuring compliance? What 
about the Rhee Government?" 
Responses 
Percent 
Current Rhee 
Always implemented: impossible to avoid 78.2 3.2 
complying 
Almost always implemented: sometimes 16.6 17.2 
possible to avoid complying 
Implemented with modification 1.7 50.5 
Seldom thoroughly implemented 3.5 29.0 
TOTAL 100.0 99.9 
Numbers 
Response 172 
No opinion 24 103 
TOTAL 196 196 
Source: Entrcpreneurship Survey, see Appendix C. 
tion had he tried to do so and that the softness of his regime in 
economic matters was a result of his giving priority to other 
matters. The hardness of Park's Korea may thus be as much 
a result of his leadership commitment to growth as of his 
authoritarian military background. Whatever the causal factor, 
it seems that effective economic compulsion is a dominant 
characteristic of the Korean economic miracle. 
THE PROBLEM OF DISCRETION 
There is a problem in designing intervention mechanisms. Some 
degree of selectivity is required in order to identify the parti­
cular behavior which is to be promoted or proscribed. The 
greater the specificity, the finer the possible tuning. Privileged 
access to credit is one example. The government might wish 
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to finance housing purchases by low income groups but not by 
the rich; or, it might wish to finance purchases of capital goods, 
but not land speculation. To distinguish between such groups 
requires specificity and selectivity. The difficulty is that this 
leads to administrative discretion which is subject to the abuses 
cited by Myrdal.8 ' 
One way out, suggested by Myrdal, is to rely on carefully 
defined legal rules which can then be automatically, though 
selectively, applied with a minimum of administrative discre­
tion. rhat is, high legal detail can narrow the gap between 
discretion in principle and discretion in practice. This is not the 
Korean solution. Instead, rather general laws are utilized and 
substantial administrative discretion is allowed. 
This reliance on the "rule of men" rather than the "rule of 
law" is not necessarily irrational. In the first place, tightly 
defined laws are exceedingly difficult to construct in a rapidly 
changing economy where intervention requirements change and 
where special cases abound. In many areas of industrial policy, 
therefore, scarce administrative talent can be better spent 
using general guidelines to deal with investment projects on a 
case-by-case basis than in framing aws which cover all possible 
situations, many of which will not eventuate. This is not to 
argue that case-by-case decision-making is ideal, but only 
that it is not irrational in the earlier, less complicated stages 
of development planning. 
There is a second reason why the legalistic solution is of 
limited use. However specific the regulation, someone in author­
ity must ultimately attest to the applicants meeting those re­
quireients. In the presence of official venality, the heightened 
specificity can itself provide marvelous opportunities for delay 
and corTuption. Consider thc various commands involved in 
the name of public safety-fire, :anitation, and building codes. 
Throughout the world these are often spelled out in great 
detail, but are, nonetheless, subject to great administrative 
abuse precisely for that reason. In at least one Asian country, 
construction of industrial plants was regularly delayed several 
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months because of the necessity to get fire department approval 
of construction plans, and subsequent payoffs were regularly 
required for construction to proceed. 
Now it is, of course, pe".!ctly legitimate, indeed mandatory, 
for government to enforce such standards so there will always 
be an ample supply of corruption opportunities in any country. 
if, in addition, fields are widely manipulated as in LDCs, then 
it is not surprising thac "no major and, indeed, few minor 
business decisions can be taken except with the prior permission 
of the administrative authorities or, at the risk of subsequent 
governmer.' disapproval." 2 This judgment is as true for Korea 
as it is for other LDCs. 
What is unique in Park's Korea is that the discretionary con­
trols are administered in such a way as not to seriously impede 
the progress of business. This is not to say the controls are 
administered in a disinterested impersonal fashion according 
to the Western administrative ideal. On the contrary, adminis­
tration is highly personalized and value is not infrequently 
returned for value given. The difference is that this process 
is not allowed to impede the processing of business docu­
ments. 
The explanation for this does not lie primarily in the quality 
of the civil service, any particular aversion to pecuniary awards, 
or any specific effort at minimizing opportunities for discre­
tion. Instead, it follows from leadership commitment to growth 
in a hard state where hierarchical command is rigidly enforced. 
Economic growth under private enterprise being well under­
stood as the dominant system goal, officials can seldom afford 
lo act in a manner that seriously obstructs that goal. 
sum, the lesson of the Korean case is that in a hard state 
,ich leadership commitment to growth, tile Myrdalian objec­
i )ns to discretionary controls on economic grounds may be 
obviated. Just as compulsion is necessary, so also is discretion. 
Both mechanisms are potentially subject to great abuse, and 
their use constitutes a high-risk/high-gain strategy which is 
feasible only in a Myrdalian hard state. 
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BFNEFITS AND COSTS 
We have argued that Park Chung Hee's establishment of a hard 
state in Korea has been instrumental and effective in achieving 
a high rate of economic growth. Nothing has been said about 
whether the process has also been efficient in achieving these 
benefits at minimum cost. Hardness, after all, is a multi-edged 
sword which can cut in several directions, and must, at best, 
be considered a necessary evil. 
The possible costs of the hard development model include 
negative effects on income distribution, concentration of 
economic power, and civil liberties. Available evidence suggests 
that by international standards Korea has actually done quite 
well on the income distribution side, with the income of tile 
lowest 40 percent growing at roughly the same rate as the 
economy as a whole during the 1960s.83 A few individuals at 
the top are obscent.iy rich, but this is the price the country 
has paid for a tripling of real income of Lae poor in fifteen 
years. Tile judgment on power distribution is somewhat more 
mixed, but we shall argue in Chapter 8 that the hardness of the 
state has been used to keep private economic power well below 
the levels it might otherwise havc achieved. It is in the realm 
of civil liberties that the costs of hardness are clear, and this is 
a major, if not dominant, offset to the economic successes of the 
regime. Even here, however, it is not at all clear that political sup­
pression is a necessary concomitant of hardness. Until the early 
1970s, tile Park regrne was both hard and reasonably democratic. 
Future costs must also be considered. As the economy grows 
increasingly complex, adm-inistrative discretion becomes propor­
tionally more difficult to exercise intelligently. As market mech­
anisms develop, discretionary intervention becomes less necessary. 
History's overall judgment of the Park regime will ultimately 
rest on the degree to which these present and future costs are 
minimized. For the moment, we can only make the single­
dimensional judgment that effective implementation via hardness 
has been a major causal factor in achieving Korea's phenomenal 
rate of economic growth from 1961 to 1975. 
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THE PUBLIC-ENTERPRISE SECTOR 
A minor paradox of Korean development is that an ostensibly
private-enterprise economy has utilized the intervention 
mechanism of public ownership to an extent which parallels
that of many countries advocating a socialist pattern of society.
This reflects the fundamental pragmatism of Park's approach to 
development, whzh is non-ideological in the sense of being
goal-oriented rather than process-oriented. In overcoming
private market imperfections that impede growth, the govern­
ment has selected intervention mechanisms on the basis of 
results rather than ideological consistency. The choice has often 
been public enterprise. 
This chapter first traces the historical origins of the public
enterprise sector (pp. 143-147) and documents its role as a 
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leading sector in the rapid-growth period (pp. 148-155). We 
then evaluate the causes and consequences of the choice of this 
particular microeconomic tool (pp. 148-159). We begin with a 
bit of semantic clarification. 
Public ownership is often thought of as the most thorough­
going form of government microeconomic intervention. In 
practice, the public-private distinction is often blurred. On the 
one hand, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, the private sector is 
by no means immune from the manipulations of the visible 
hand. On the other, international experience yields numerous 
examples of public enterprises operating with as much auton­
omy as private companies.2 Public enterprises are thus by no 
means unique in being subject to the government's will. They 
are, however, distinct in the means by which that will is im­
posed (a variant of discretionary command) and the behavioral 
consequences of that choice (for example, lessening of profit 
pressure and attendant lack of cost consciousness). It, therefore, 
forms a useful unit of economic observation, just as do the 
regulated industries in the United States. 
A unit of observation must be distinct as well as useful. The 
public-private boundary is a continuum in several dimensions, 
so any definition is necessarily arbitrary. Boundary specifica­
tion is nonetheless essential if we are to quantify the contri­
butions of a unique sector. We, therefore, define a public 
enterprise as a productive entity which is owned, or controlled, 
or both by a public authority and which produces a marketed 
output. A "productive entity" is an identifiable decision-making 
unit with an explicit or extractable budget and which produces 
goods or services. "Ownership" refers to equity holdings (direct 
and/or indirect) of more than 10 percent. "Control" refers 
to the power to be involved in the internal decision-making 
process, most commonly through the right to appoint top 
management. An output is "marketable" if sales cover more 
than half of current costs. The aggregate of all entities thus 
defined constitutes the sector whose evolution we now de­
scribe.3 
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT TO 1961 
Public enterprise in Korea dates to the traditional period when 
the government ran its own establishments to produce luxury 
goods (such as the famous green celadon of the Kory5 dynasty 
918-1389) for the royal family and segments of the yangban 
class. The modern sector, however, dates to the Japanese
period. In Chapter 2 we described the process by which private 
Japanese concerns were nationalized in 1945. Here we describe 
only the rather extensive operation of enterprises by the col­
onial government itself. 
Among the first Japanese institutional imports were public 
enterprises in the form of departmental agencies. By 1908, 
two years before annexation, the Japanese Residency General 
ran both Railway and Communications Bureaus employing 
over 4,000 people or more than 40 percent of the total govern­
ment employment.4 The most important later addition was the 
honestly named Monopoly Bureau covering ginseng, salt, 
opium, and tobacco. Ginseng had long been an official mono­
poly (under either the Crown Household Department or the 
Finance Department) as 2iad salt imports, but with annexation 
both activities were expanded and salt production added.' 
Tobacco was added to the list of monopoly products in 1921, 
following unsatisfactory efforts at extracting excess profits 
via special taxes.6 Opium was added in the 1920s, but yielded 
only a few percent of total monopoly profits. Overall, the 
public enterprises accounted for roughly one-quarter of total 
government revenue in the decade following annexation, and 
this increased to over 50 percent from 1926 on. Expenditures 
generally exceeded revenues prior to 1926 but were below them 
for the next decade, resulting in profits contributing amounts 
equivalent to between 5 and 35 percent of the tax bill.8 Given 
the crudity of the available accounting data, it is not possible 
to ascertain the real subsidy by, or profit to, the government 
from the operation of the sector (for example, we do not know 
how interest and depreciation were calculated). 
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While the public enterprise sector was thus important under 
Japanese colonial rule, it was by no means dominant. The 
economy remained basically private, with even much of electri­
city production outside the government sphere. The Japanese 
public enterprises, however, all survive today in one public 
form or another (except opium). By contrast, the Japanese 
private enterprises that were nationalized in 1945 were largely 
divested, though the process was slow, as described in Chapter 2. 
One seldom-noted consequence of the Korean War was a 
dramatic shift in the official attitude tcwards public enterprise. 
The 1948 Constitution had a decided socialist bent, specifying 
public ownership of a broad range of economic activity and 
open-ended provisions allowing nationalization of any other 
industries "related to the public welfare" or where "required 
for vital and urgent needs for national defense or the liveii­
hood of the people" (see 'Table 23, column 1). The 1954 
Constitution, in contrast, reserves no specific industries for public 
ownership and explicitly prohibits nationalization "except in 
cases specifically designated by law" (see Table 23, column 2). 
Tile change is probably not explained by ideological conver­
sion so much as by the winnowing of war; South Koreans of 
socialist persuasion who survived the war either went north or 
kept quiet. This is an important point, with ramifications weli 
beyond the public-enterprise sector. Economic policy in many 
LDCs evolves through a process of conflict between competing 
ideological blocks with temporary accommodations upset by 
shifts in the political power balance. The resulting temporizing 
solutions are generally unstable and often internally inconsis­
tent. Implementation may be blocked by opponents elsewhere 
in the system. Compromise may thus be less efficient than 
either polar position pursued in full. Be that as it may, the 
Korean War added ideological homogeneity to an already cul­
turally homogeneous population and significantly narrowed the 
range of economic dialogue. This was particularly true of the 
attitude towards public ownership, which now seemed far 
more appropriate to the north than the south. 
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TABLE 23 	 Comparison of 1948 and 1954 Constitutions 
Chapter VI: Economy 
1948 'ersion 	 1954 Version 
Article 84 
The principle of th2 economic order of tile Republic of Korea shall be 
to attain social justice, to fulfill the basic requirements of all citizens, 
and to encourage the development of a balanced national economy. 
The economic freedom of each individual shall be guaranteed within 
these limits. 
Article 85 
Mineral and other important under-
ground resources, marine resources, 
water power, and other econom-
ically usablt, natural power shall 
be owned by the state. A license 
for the development or utilization 
of such resources for a certain 
period or cancellation of the license 
based on public need shall be 
granted in accordance with the 
provisions of law. 
Licenses to exploit, develop, or 
utilize mines and other important 
underground resources, marine re­
sources, water p(,,er, and all other 
ccononuically available natural 
powers may be granted for limited 
periods in accordance with the 
provisions of law. 
Article 86 
Farm lands shall be distributed to farmers. The method of distribution, 
the extent of possession, and the nature of restrictions of ownership 
shall be determined by law. 
Article 87 
Important enterprises within tile 
following industries shall be placed 
under state operation: transporta-
tion, communication, finance and 
insurance, electricity, water utiliza­
tion, water works, gas, and others 
related to public welfare. A license 
for private operation or cancella­
tion of said license based on public 
Foreign trade shall be controlled 
by the government in accordance 
with the provisions of law. 
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TABLE 23 (continued) 
1948 'ersion 1954 Version 
needs shall be granted in accor­
dance with the provisions of law. 
Foreign trade shall be under the 
control of the state. 
Article 88 
If required for vital and urgent 
needs of national defense or the 
livelihood of the people, privately 
owned enterprises may be trans-
ferred to state ownership or placed 
under state control or management. 
Such acts shall be performed in 
accordance with the provisions 
of law. 
Private enterprises shall not be 
transferred to state or public 
ownership except in cases speci­
fically designed by law to meet 
urgent necessities of national life; 
nor shall the management or 
operation be controlled by the 
state or by juridicial persons 
organized by public law. 
This is not to say that the result was a sudden divestiture of 
all Japanese properties. In the first place, there are a variety 
of natural monopolies (for example, electricity and railways) 
that must either be regulated or publicly owned: second, it 
was arguable that there was an absence of private entrepre­
neurial talent capable of running tile larger enterprises; third, 
tile Office of Monopoly was a major revenue source; finally, 
denationalization must always deal with the inertia resulting 
from bureaucratic self-interest which is faced with a loss of 
direct power and patronage opportunities. Nonetheless, the 
Rhee period witnessed a steady diminution of the public­
enterprise sector, with only 36 entities left by the end of the 
1950s. 
Undcr Rhee, the operation of the public enterprises main­
tained the (low) standard set in the turmoil of the 1945­
1951 period (described in Chapter 2). A somewhat extreme 
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statement, tainted by self-interest but, nonetheless, reflective of 
the situation, is made by Park Chung Hee: 
[The operation of the state-run enterprises] is convincing proof of 
the corruption of greedy former politicians, before whom the jack­
pot was thrown like a rabbit flung before the starved lion. They ap­
pointed their own managers. In other words, they appointed their 
own subordinates and received from them certain tributes. There 
was not one trace of economic reconstruction. Every time the 
government changed, State-run enterprises became a market place. 
Many scandals which cannot be condoned occurred. Comedy and 
tragedy were publicly repeated. The people have experienced these 
scandals themselves and I will not say any more.' 
Park's own attitude towards public enterprise seems to be 
that it is a necessary evil: "Private ownership of production 
should be unconditionally encouraged except in instances where 
it is necessary to control it to stimulate national development 
and protect the interests of the people."'" As will be seen, the 
"except" in his statement is to be broadly interpreted. None­
theless, lie mirrors the official position of government as reflect­
ed in the one post-1954 substantive change in the economy 
section of the Constitution. It its 1972 version, Article 116 reads: 
The economic order of the Republic of Korea shall be based on the 
principle of respect for freedom and creative ideas of the individual 
in economic affairs. The state shall regulate and coordinate economic 
affairs within the limits necessary for the realization of social adjust­
ment and for the development of a balanced national economy to 
fulfill the basic living requirements of all citizens. 
Other provisions of the 1954 version are retained, most notably 
the assertion: "Private enterprises shall not be transferred to 
state or public ownership, nor shall their management be con­
trolled or administered by the state except in cases determined 
by law to !neet urgent necessities of national defense or national 
economy." We shall now see how this ideological position was 
tranaiated into practice. 
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PUBLIC ENTERISE AS A
 
LEADING SECTOR, 1961-1972
 
In 1972 the public-enterprise sector consisted of slightly over
 
100 enterprises producing 9 percent of GDP or 13 percent of
 
non-agricultural GDP. This is a rather high level, being similar to
 
that of India (on the basis of non-agricultural GI)P) and probab­
ly larger than that of Italy or the United Kingdom (in the late 
1960s) despite substantial socialist advocacy in all three coun­
tries. 
Knowledgeable Koreans are prone to explain this large public­
enterprise sector in terms of the Japanese colonial heritage. In 
fact, the sector has grown in absolute and relative terms during 
the rapid growth period from 1961 to 1972, as shown in Table 
24. Of the 35 enterprises in the sector as of December 31, 1960, 
over three-quarters were directly traceable to activities run by 
tile Japanese Colonial Government or confiscated from private 
Japanese firms. By the end of 1972, however, the number of 
enterprises had more than tripled. Value-added estimates of the 
sector are possible only from 1963 on, but it seems reasonable 
to assume that the sector was only moderately larger in 1963 
than in 1960, since most of the 17 new enterprises had not had 
time to enter full production. It follows that, during the period 
of rapid economic growth, the relative size of the public-enter­
prise sector increased by about a third in current prices and 
more than half in constant prices. Absolute size more t!,an 
tripled from 80 billion wn in 1963 to 272 billion in 1972 (in 
constant 1970 prices). This implies a real avera:, annual growth 
rate of 14.5 percent over a period when the economy as a whole 
grew at 9.5 percent and the non-agricultural economy at 12.2 
percent. "Old" enterprises (those in the sector in 1960) accounted 
for 6.7 percent of current price GI)P in 1972, while the "new" 
produced 2.4 percent. Ilisum, under Park Chung Hee, the new 
enterprises accounted for most of the increase in the relative 
size of the sector. It is thus quite misleading to view the current 
size of the sector as a mere passive residual of the colonial era. 
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TABLE 24 Growth Of Public-Enterprise Sector, 
1960-1972 
Sectoral [,ah1e ..Idded Sectoral Share of 
Number (hilliosoII"Th) Ciurrent Price 
of Current 1970 Noti-Agricul-
Year Enterprises Prices Prices GDP tural GDI' 
1960 36 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1963 52 31.8 80.4 6.98 12.70 
1964 54 42.9 90.6 6.49 12.56 
1971 119 262.1 246.7 9.17 13.46 
1972 108 320.7 271.7 9.07 13.14 
Sorce: Lcry Jotics, Piblic interprise ars l'iconm ic )' clopme : The KorCan 
Case (Scoul, 1976), pp. 73-74, 
The sector's role is equally impressive when consider d from 
tile financial side. Over the 1962 to 1973 period, public enter­
prises generated sliglitly more than 10 percent of savings while 
absorbing something like 30 percent of investment. The public­
enterprise sectoi also performed roughly 40 percent of all finan­
cial intermediation (that is, the acquisition of financial assets 
beyond the level required to fund one's own physical capital 
formation and their reinvestment in liabilities that finance tile 
capital formation of others). 
The contribution of the sector to growth is not measured 
simply by the level of output and financial flows, but also by 
strategic importance. An introduction to the kinds of activity 
in the sector is given by the industrial origin of sectoral output 
in Table 25. Of the 11 standard U.N. categories, the sector was 
all important factor in 5. It accounted for seven-eig' is of value 
added in finance; for two-thirds of electricity, water, and sani­
tary service; for slightly less than one-third botl in mining aid 
in transport and conlnl Lunicatiolls; and for 15 percent of manu­
facturing. Although a large number of public enterprises are en­
gaged in providing physical facilities, most of the actual work is 
contracted out so that the sector counted for only 5 percent of 
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TABLE 25 Industrial Origin of Public-Enterprise Value 
Added, 1972 
(%) 
Share oj Public Share of Industry 
Enterprise in in Public Enter-
Industry prise Total 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 0.20 0.68 
Mining 31.01 3.63 
Manufacturing 15.11 34.92 
Construction 5.44 2.98 
Electricity, water, and sanitation 66.19 13.66 
Transport and communication 30.51 18.95 
Trade 2.35 4.10 
Finance 86.95 19.28 
Ownership of dwellings 0.40 0.09 
Public administration 0.00 0.00 
Services 1.70 1.72 
TOTAL 9.09 100.00 
Source: Jones, p. 76. 
value added in construction. The public-enterprise share in each 
of the other industrial sectors was less than 2 percent. In terms 
of absolute size the manufacturing sector accounted for one­
third of public-enterprise value added, with finance, transport, 
and communications each contributing a fifth, and electricity a 
further 14 percent. The remaining industries are each responsi­
ble for less than 5 percent. 
A comparison of 1963 with 1972 shows no striking change in 
the industrial origin of sectoral product. The sector expanded 
by maintaining, or by slightly increasing, its share in industries 
that were large or rapidly growing or both, rather than by sharp 
expansion in a few sectors. In many industries (for example, 
electricity, rail transport, and communications), public-enter­
prise growth was "forced" in order to avoid development bot­
tlenecks. This is not true of manufacturing, however, so it is of 
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o rsonic interest that the public-enterprise share this industry 
held its own (15.3 percent in 1963 and 15.1 pel ent in 1972), 
despite the rapid growth of the industry as a whole. Real value 
added by public enterprises in manufacturing increased seven­
fold between 1963 and 1972. of this increase, 60 percent was 
attributable to expansion of "old" industries (those ill the sec­
tor in 1960) and 40 percent to "new" enterprises. Of all enter­
prises added to the sector under the government of Park Chung 
Hee, nearly half (in terms of 1972 value added) were in manu­
facturing. 
This pattern of public-enterprise activity is not unique. In 
fact, the scctoral shares in India are strikingly similar to those 
shown above for Korea.'' For manufacturing alone, Frederic 
Pryor has shown that the rank correlation of industries ill East­
ern and Western Europe is high. 12 The clear implication is that 
the pattern of public-enterprise operation is neither random nor 
wholly ideologically determined, but heavily dependent on cer­
tain underlying economic characteristics. We now identify these 
determinants of the nationalization propensity in the Korean 
case. 
First, consider the Hirschmanian concept of linkages. Forward 
linkages represenit sales to intermediate (rather than final) users, 
while backward linkages reflect purchases from intermediate 
producers. Industries with high linkages may thus have greater 
impact on other productive sectors, and might be taken as rep­
resenting "the commanding heights" of the economy." 3 Figure 
I shows direct forward and backward linkages for various sec­
tors of the Korean economy. The sector as a whole is shown to 
have extremely high forward linkages, but modest backward 
linkages relative to the entire non-agricultural economy. Most 
of the growth during the period, however, came from "new" 
industries which had very high linkages in both directions. 
A second technical characteristic of public enterprises is cap­
ital intensity.'" The data suggest that the public-enterprise sec­
tor is more than three times as capital intensive as the Korean 
economy, almost triple the non-agricultural economy, and more 
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FIGURE 1 	Direct Linkages Among Sectors of the Korean
 
Economy, 1972
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than double Korean manufacturing. Public enterprises are thus 
overwhelmingly capital intensive in Korea. The converse also 
holds, though tG a somewhat lesser extent, with tlhe capital-in­
tensive sectors gencra!!y influenced by public operation. Of the 
eleven most capital-intensive sector= in the Korean economy, 
public enterprises produce virtually ah output in four and are 
significant (10-50 percent of the market share) in six. 
A third characteristic is output-market concentration. In 
1972, 76 percent of public-enterprise value added was in mar­
kets that were egregiously imperfect (that is, monopoly, mo­
nopsony, bilateral monopoly, or regulat-2d public oligopo! ). 
Three-quarters of the remaining public enterprises were illman­
ufacturing sectors with an output-weighted, ISIC four-digit, 
four-company concentration ratio of 0.73 compared with 0.51 
for manufacturing as a whole. Public enterprises thus oper. 
ate overwhelmingly in imperfect output markets with at most 
10 percent of value added sold in reasonably competitive mar­
kets. The converse also holds, with public enterprise do.::iating 
highly concentrated industries. For the mining and manufactur­
ing sector, this is readily documented. Among all four-digit in­
dustries with four-firm -oncentration ratios of 0.70 or greater, 
there is at least one public enterprise in seven sectors, that to­
gether account for 73 percent of sales in the concentrated in­
dustries. The character of those conc,'ntrated sectors without 
public participation is instructive. Of the fifteen concentrated 
industries with annual sales greater than 15 billion wrSn, there 
is no major public participation in sugar, beer, candies, soft 
drinks, dairy products, paint, watches and clocks, or meat pro­
cessing. None of these, of course, is in any sense basic. Outside 
of manufacturing, no comparable statistics are available, but it 
is difficult to think of any import, r concentrated activity in 
Korea that does not have substantial public-enterprise partici­
pation. 
Given this high correlation between public enterprise and im­
perfect competition, what is tile direction of causation? One 
possibility is that government uses its powers to protect its 
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enterprises from competitive pressures. This is clearly the case 
with the Office of Monopoly where the goal is straightforward 
revenue maximization. In virtually all other cares, however, en­
terprises 'nay be interpreted to be in the public sector because 
they operated in imperfect markets rather than vice-versa. 
A fourth characteristic is absolute enterprise size, as measured 
by total sales. This variable is of interest, both as a very crude 
proxy for economics of scale, and because of its relationship to 
the illusive concept of economic power. There arc economies of 
scale in gaining a sympathetic government view of an enter­
prise's problems, and that understanding can be critical to an 
enterprise's success. Size is thus relevant to explaining an enter­
prise's behavior in the crucial, but little analyzed, market for 
government attention. Twenty of Korea's fifty largest enter­
prises are in the public sector, including twelve of the sixteen 
largest. Whatever the causal element, it is abundantly clear that, 
in absence of public enterprise, the private sector would control 
a far greater share of the economy's cash flow. 
A fifth characteristic is foreign-exchange effects. Direct and 
indirect sectoral imports substantially exceeded direct and in­
direct exports, yielding a sectoral trade deficit representing 11.7 
percent of that of the economy as a whole. However, the new 
enterprises were heavily import substituting, and this more than 
offset the explicit trade deficit. The nation's current account 
deficit would probably have been some 25 percent larger had 
the public enterprises not been operating and not been replaced 
by private activity. 
A sixth feature of the public-enterprise sector, often claimed 
as being of high importance, is employment generation. In 
Korea, because of its capital intensity, the sector accounted di­
rectly and indirectly for only about 5 or 6 percent of incr-ased 
employment from 1962 to 1973, while directly absorbing 30 
percent of investment. The sector was thus a most inefficient 
means of employment creation. 
In sum, the industries chosen for the public-enterprise sector 
are characterized by high forward linkages, high capital intensity, 
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large size, output-market concentration, and production of non­
tradeables or import substitutes rather than exports. These gen­
eralizations refer to sectoral averages and thus ignore many 
exceptions. Economic characteristics are not strictly determin­
istic, but they do strongly condition the probability of any 
given enterprise being in the public sector. 
PUBLIC OPERATION: CAUSES 
Given the characteristics of the enterprises in the public-enter­
prise sector, the government's decision to intervene is generally 
not surprising. Output-market concentration alone would justi­
fy intervention in enterprises producing at least three-quarters 
and perhaps 90 percent of sectolal value added. The size of the 
sector is thus largely explicable as a pragmatic government's re­
sponse to the various market imperfections that are virtually 
synonymous with low levels of economic development. Histor­
ical inertia and political predilection do affect the outcome, but 
to a lesser extent in Korea than in countries less single-mindedly 
devoted to growth. 
A rough idea of the relative importance of various market 
failures is given in Table 26, which assigns each enterprise or 
sub-unit to a single primary intervention category. Alternative 
categories and assignments are possible, and this morphology 
is presented primarily for its heuristic value. 
Three basic groups are distinguished. The first, termed "basic 
motives," includes productive activities that provoke public 
intervention in one form or another in virtually all economies. 
This group includes the natural monopolies and producers of 
collective intermediates and marketed merit goods. The second 
group, called "developmental motives," includes reasons com­
mon to the developing economies. These all arise from a constel­
lation of market failures involving entrepreneurial inadequacies, 
imperfect capital markets, shortages of information, and unwill­
ingness to bear risk. The third group is a heterogeneous class of 
155
 
TABLE 26 	Market Failures and Public Enterprise, 
31 December 1972 
Linkagesa 
Constant price capital stock over wage bill at 117 sector level.cTradeable (T) or non-tradeable (NT). 
PrimaryAlotive Forward Backward 
I. BasicMotives 
Natural monopoly 2.13 1.59 
Collective intermediates 1.07 1.82 
Merit goods 1.46 1.76 
II. DevelopmentalMotives 
Entrepreneurial support 1.82 1.29 
Entrepreneuial substitution 2.27 1.59 
Managerial substitution 1.73 1.77 
Transitional 2.06 1.83 
Ill. OtherMotives 
Power and control 2.44 1.79 
Revenue 1.11 1.63 
Source: Jones, p. 147. 
b Notes: Direct plus indirect. 
Capital 

Intensityb 

15.64 
1.54 
1.34 
0.65 
8.28 
4.26 
23.95 
0.96 
1.64 
Trade-
abilityc 
NT 
NT 
NT 
NT 
T 
T 
T 
NT 
T/NT 
Share of Sectoral
 
Value Added
 
0.42 
0.34 
0.04 
0.05 
0.25 
0.06 
0.11 
0.04 
0.04 
0.33 
0.12 
0.21 
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other motives including power, control, and revenue. Basic mo­
tives accounted for perhaps 42 percent of 1972 public enter­
prise valuc added, developmental motives for 25 percent, and 
other motives for 33 percent. 
A look at individual categories reveals that natural monopolies 
are characterized by very high forward linkages, but modest 
backward linkages. They are related to development in that 
their expansion is necessary if bottlenecks are to be avoided, 
but they cannot b. said to lead or initiate growth. They are 
characterized by increasing returns to scale iver the relevant 
market size. The alternative to public operation is regulation, 
private monopoly, or, given their extremely high capital inten­
sity, nonexistence. 
Collective intermediates and merit goods have very low for­
ward linkages, modest backward linkages, and low capital inten­
sity. Their provision is not directly related to economic growth, 
but rather a component of broader social development. Since 
all but one of the collective intermediates are non-tradeable, the 
alternative to pubiic-enterprise production is monopsonistic pur­
chase from private producers. For the merit goods, the alterna­
tive is directly or indirectly subsidized private production. 
The first two developmental motives deal with activities that 
are judged to be potentially profitable from a purely private 
point of view, but that the private sector will not undertake in­
dependently because of the magnitude of capital requirements, 
risk, uncertainty, technological complexity, lack of market 
knowledge, and so on. To compensate for this entrepreneurial 
failure, government may either provide technical assistance, or 
subsidized credit through entrepreneurial support organizations 
(for example, development banks), or it may itself initiate the 
activity taking the role of entrepreneurial substitute. 
The third developmental category is termed "managerial sub­
stitutio.i" It refers to cases where the private sector initiated 
activity, usually with the help of a supporting public enterprise, 
but then failed in the operational phase resulting in a threat of 
bankruptcy. Microeconomic theory suggests that the exit of 
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these firms should be accepted in pursuit of efficiency through 
economic Darwinism. Governments throughout the real world, 
however, are conspicuously reluctant to accept this premise, 
particularly for firms of any size: witness Lockheed and Penn 
Central. This does not necessarily represent economic irration­
ality. It may reflect a recognition that, even where price does 
not cover private costs, it may well cover social costs. 
The "revenue" motive category is dominated by the cigarette 
monopoly. Here the market failure is the existence of public 
goods and the resulting need for public finance. The alternatives 
to public ownership and control are, therefore, private owner­
ship combined with heavy taxation. 
The power and control motive is the most controversial cate­
gory, but also the most interesting. The group is primarily com­
posed of commercial banks and other financial intermediaries. 
ii purely economic rationale for intervention in these entities' 
activities follows from the disequilibrium interest rate system, 
the opportunities for profit sharing, and the resultant necessity 
for close control over the temptations prov Jed to bank offi­
cials. We suggest, however, that a much more important reason 
is a desire by the government in general, and Park Chung Hee in 
particular, to control private concentrations of economic pow­
er. Control of the banks was a central element of the Japanese 
zaibatsu power, and keeping the banks in public hands is a po­
tent constraint on similar developments in Korea. 
We may now summarize the use of the public-enterprise tool 
in Korea since 1961 by comparing the intervention motives for 
the old and new enterprises. The old enterprises included all but 
one of the natural monopolies, two-thirds of the collective in­
termediates, a little less than half of the merit goods, a third of 
the entrepreneurial support group, and the most important of 
the revenue activities. The new enterprises, by contrast, in­
cluded all of the entrepreneurial substitution activities, the 
dominant share of entrepreneurial support, and slightly more 
than half of the merit goods, as well as virtually all the power 
and control category. Roughly speaking then, the old enter­
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prises were basic (plus revenue), while the new enterprises were 
motivated by developmental and power considerations. 
PUBLIC OPERATION: CONSEQUENCES 
The prevalence of market failures provides a case for government 
intervention in general, but not necessarily for public enterprise 
in particular. In any specific case, more than one tool is usually 
available to achieve the desired intended deviation from uncon­
strained market behavior. There will then be a variety of unin­
tended deviations associated with each intervention mechanism; 
for example, public operation may reduce cost consciousness; 
rate-of-return regulation may lead to over capitalization; and 
taxes and subsidies will distort relative prices. In theory, the 
task of microeconomic policy is to choose that mechanism that 
achieves the primary intended deviation at a minimum cost in 
unintended deviations. In practice, we know too little about the 
associated costs to form a judgment as to whether or not the 
Korean use of public enterprise has been a least-cost choice. We 
must, therefore, confine ourselves to rather general observations. 
First, consider opportunity costs. The primary alternative to 
many of the Korean public enterprises is regulation and anti­
trust. Regulation, however, is very much a United States prod 
uct which has seldom been exported; public enterprises are used 
to deal with natural monopolies virtually everywhere else. T!is 
may or may not represent a rational implicit cost-benefit calcu­
lation on the part of potential importers, but it is hardly surpris­
ing that the Koreans have not chosen this route. The :Jternative 
to most other public enterprises is taxes and subF:dies. 
A strong case for taxes as an alternative to public ownership 
can be made in the case of the Office of Monopoly. The goal 
here is revenue extraction. Scale economies are apparently 
small, relative to the size of the market, so that privA.: compe­
tition is a possibility. It is thus likely that selling off the ':a.rious 
cigarette plants to the private sector and allowing them to 
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compete, while imposing a heavy excise tax, would increase 
both efficiency and government revenue. That this alternative 
has not been seriously considered is due to two factors. Since 
the operation always yields a substantial surplus, it is protected 
from serious scrutiny. International experience suggests that the 
most profitable public enterprises are likel) to be the least cost 
efficient, since fortuitous output-market conditions eliminate 
pressures for cost reduction. In the absence of such attention, 
the second factor becomes decisive, namely bureaucratic inertia 
and a natural desire to retain power. 
In other Korean enterprises the potential gains from divesti­
ture are less clear, hinging on the relative efficiency of public 
and private operation. Around the world, i. is widely believed 
that public enterprises are not cost efficient, so that resource 
wastage is a major price paid for public operation. Assessment 
of the situation in Korea is difficult, since we have few tech­
niques for comparing social operating efficiency given small 
numbers of similar units, and even these techniques have been 
sparingly applied to micro units in Korea. As a working hypoth­
esis, however, we would argue that, by world standards for pub 
lic enterprise, the Korean sector does extremely well. At the 
crudest level, this follows from the fact that, when an economy 
is growing at a real rate of 10 percent annually, a sector that 
takes 30 percent of investment cannot be using its resources too 
inefficiently. At a less aggregate level, it is simply not possible 
to find in Korea any prolonged examples of the sorts of egregi­
ous inefficiency that characterizes many public-enterprise sec­
tors. Indeed, preliminary work on Korean fertilizer and iron and 
steel industries suggests that, in at least some cases, Korean pub­
lic-enterprise engineering efficiency is extraordinarily high by 
LDC standards and not markedly deficient when compared with 
similar operations in industrial nations. It is, however, widely 
believed that Korean public enterprises are less cost efficient 
than their private counterparts. We would agree with this view 
but would also argue strongly that the public-private gap is 
much smaller in Korea than in most LDCs. 
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If these observations are broadly accurate, then how is the 
relatively high level of performance to be explained? A high 
absolute level of public-enterprise efficiency is not surprising, 
given the government's dedication to growth and the skilled 
and energetic labor force, which have combined to make private 
Korean producers so competitive in world markets. What must 
be explained is the relatively high performance of public enter­
prises compared with private ones. 
One way to attempt to explain the smaller public-private 
gap is in terms of organizational features of the control struc­
ture. Such features are often the first target of reformers, but 
in Korea they seem to explain very little. Consider the following: 
1) 	 Incentive System. Public ererprises are often held to 
be inefficient because of inadequate linkage of pecuniary 
rewards to performance. This is also true in Korea, with 
public-enterprise salaries generally below their private 
counterparts and little or no marginal incentives tor 
improving performance. For example, one fertilizer 
company launched an ambitious and successful cost­
reduction campaign and applied to its controlling organ 
for an increased employee bonus. This was rejected on 
the grounds that no other enterprise under that control 
unit had earned a similar profit, and bonuses had to be 
uniform! The Korean system of pecuniary incentives is 
in no sense unique. 
2) 	 Appointment Practices. Public enterprises are often held 
to be inefficient because managers are constantly rotated 
and are appointed for political reasons rather than man­
agerial skills. In Korea two-thirds of the presidents of 
public enterprises (and half of the vice presidents) were 
formerly either military officers or civil servants. Further, 
60 percent of the presidents (and 40 percent of the 
vice presidents) had spent less than three years with the 
company, and 90 percent had been there less than five 
years. Korean enterprises again fit the international 
pattern. 
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3) Autonomy versus Accountability. A basic problem for 
any organization is to decide where particular kinds of 
decisions should be made. Public enterprises typically 
fall into one of two extremes. Either all decisions are 
made at the enterprise level, thus ignoring social interest: 
or numerous minor decis'.ons are made or approved by 
the bureaucracy, thus making it impossible for the 
enterprise to react quickly to changing market condi­
tions. Korea comes closer to thu second pole of excessive 
accountability, and the problem is exacerbated by mul­
tiple controlling agencies. At least on paper, the enter­
prises are responsible to a variety of ministries and 
agencies for a multitude of mundane details, and man­
agers spend much of their time worrying about managing 
these bureaucratic relationships. Korea does rely heavily 
on holding companies-which in theory buffer the enter­
prise from bureaucratic involvement-but which in 
Korean practice seem to make little difference. 
In sum, in terms of control structure there is little to differ­
entiate the Korean public-enterprise sector from those else­
where. When the authors conducted a separate study of the 
efficiency ot the fertilizer industry, we were aware of these 
structural shortcomings and hypothesized inefficiency as the 
result. In the end, however, we found far greater efficiency 
than expected. 
The relatively high performance of the sector cannot be 
explained by some structural gimmick which can be readily 
exported. Instead we would suggest that the public-enterprise 
sector operates relatively well for the same reasons that other 
forms of intervention are effective. Public enterprise is one form 
of discretionary command, and the potential for abuse of this 
form of intervention is minimized by leadership commitment to 
growth administered by a competent hierarchy, producing a 
hard state with a pragmatic non-ideological approach to choos­
ing means. 
In the public-enterprise sector this translates into a lack of 
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tolerance for the more egregious forms of inefficiency on the 
part of managers and bureaucrats alike. When market restraints 
(via exit) on enterprise behavior are foregone, an enforceable 
political response to "voice" must be substituted. In Korea, 
while there is substantial slack before the political mechanism 
becomes effective, sustained and blatant inefficiency in larger 
entities is eventually brought to the attention of the Blue 
House; then things happen quickly. Public enterprises may thus 
be potentially less inefficient in "hard" states where political 
authority is able to act decisively. 
Similarly, the anti-pubic-ownership ideological bias makes 
the government less tolerant of public-enterprise abuses. 
Throughout the world, public enterprises tend to be "unlimited 
liability companies" in that they are never allowed to die and 
are seldom divested. In Korea, there have been numerous 
cases of d, -ititure, most notably in the 1967-1969 period. 
Many of these supposed sales (as well as a number in the mid­
1970s) were cosmetic in that government shares were sold to 
unrelated individuals or donated to the banks so that effective 
public control remained. A few real shifts of control did take 
place. On the negative side there is the example of Korean 
Machinery Manufacturing Corporation, described in Chapter 4. 
On the positive side there is Korean Air Lines which was a 
deficit operation when taken over (perhaps reluctantly) by 
Hanjin in 1968, but which is now highly profi:able and uses 
international earnings to cross-subsidize low government­
mandated fares on domestic flights. 
No public enterprise has been actually allowed to die, but 
euthanasia has been seriously considered, and the threat alone 
proved effective. In 1972, the government became dissatisfied 
with the continuing operational losses of Honam Fertilizer 
Co., Ltd. and considered closing it down. Instead, a decision 
was made to give the company one more chance by seeing if 
new management could rectify the situation. Accordingly it 
was made a subsidiary of Chungju Fertilizer Co., Ltd. whose 
head, General SSn-yup Pack began by visiting the factory and 
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making a speech which is vividly remembered by man)' of those 
present. The bulk of the speech was of the inspirational variety, 
coupling a patriotic plea by a Korean War hero with an appeal 
to provincial chauvinism. The conclusion, however, was a 
straightforward statement that, if' things did not improve 
immediately, the plant would have to be shut down. The com­
bination of threat and exhortation produce( a sharp increase 
in cost efficiency as nicasured by capacity utilization and 
social profitability (in constant shadow prices). This example 
is illustrative of a generally intolerant government attitude 
towards public enterprise, and this may explain the relatively 
narrow public-private gap. 
An alternative way of phrasing this story is in terms of non­
pecuniary incentives. Carrots and sticks are not provided in 
cash, but in the form of the approval or displeasure of the 
governmental hierarchy. Since chief executives are military or 
bureaucratic appointees, these non-pecuniary incentives may 
well be more effective than pecui iary rewards. What is unique 
in Korea is the degree to which these non-pecuniary incentives 
are tied to performance. 
As throughout this volume, a caveat is necessary to avoid 
misleading Korean readers. We have argued that the public­
enterprise sector is relatively efficient by international stan­
dards. This is not to deny that it is often less efficient than 
Korean private enterprise, leaving ample room for improvement 
through reforms of the control structure mentionLd above. 
Nonetheless, from the international point of view, the sur­
prising feature of the sector is not its inefficiency relative to 
the private sector, but that the gap is as sma. as we believe it 
to be. 
Public enterprise has been a "leading" sector during the 
period of rapid economic growth. That is, it grew significantly 
more rapidly than the economy as a whole, and there were 
identifiable mechanisms linking that growth to other sectors. 
'This is not to be explained by historical inertia stemming from 
takeover of Japanese properties, since these were largely di­
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vested by 1961. Rather it was the result of a pragmatic govern­
ment's willingness to use any available intervention mechanism 
in overcoming growth-retarding market imperfections. An 
antagonistic ideology obviously played no role in explaining 
the causes of public operation but may have been a factor 
contributing to its relatively efficient consequences. 
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ISSUES IN K(REAN ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
While the role of public enterprise has been impressive, the bulk 
of Korean growth has come in the private sector. From 1961 
to 1976, real private non-agricultural GDP grew at a compound 
rate of over 13 percent per annum.' If this is deemed the 1 ­
duct of entrepreneurial acts, then the net volume of such 
activity in these fifteen years was more than six times that of 
all preceding Korean economic history. in world history, there 
are only a handful of cases of sustained entrepreneurial expan­
sions of this magnitude. If four years are an economic sprint, 
and the half-century expansions of the United States and 
Japan are marathons, then Korean entrepreneurs may be said 
to be in the running for a world record in the middle distances. 
The story behind this recoid-setting pace can be told in terms of 
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how any of a variety of factors of production were mobilized. 
Entrepreneurship, termed by J. A. Schumpeter "the funda­
mental phenomenon of economic development," 2 is one such 
factor. An argument can be made that tile shortage of this 
talent is particularly acute in LDCs and forms one of the most 
intractable "bottlenecks" precluding growth. Capital can be 
borrowed internationally, and technology and intermediate 
inputs can be imported, but this leads only to debt if they are 
not combined effectively. This is the function of the entre­
preneur. 
By definition, any single-factor theory of development is 
myopic, but if one wishes to focus on a prime mover, then 
entrepreneurship is a likely candidate. With it, other factors 
can be found; without it, they will be squandered. This sort 
of consideration leads Hirschman to identify "the ability to 
make (development) decisions as the scarce resource which 
conditions all the other scarcities and difficulties in under­
developed countries." 3 This formulation incorporates public 
as well as private decision-making, but justifies two chapters 
devoted to the role of the private entrepreneur. In Korea, 
despite tile pervasive activity of tile government's visible hand, 
the bulk of decisions leading to production are taken in tile 
private sector. 
Our primary purpose is not to document the successes of the 
Korean entrepreneurs, though this will in part be accomplished 
through the case studies in Appendixes A and B. Here we take 
the record private-sector growth rate as ample evidence of an 
explosion of successful entrepreneurial activity and ask what 
lies behind it. At the broadest level, the question may be 
phrased in terms of whether the observed expansion in quantity 
is to be explained in terms of a shift of the supply curve, a 
shift of the demand curve, or both. Briefly, two alternative 
views compete in tie literature:4 
1) Demand Primacy. Mainstream economists are prone to 
argue that there is no real problem of entrepreneurial 
supply; there is an abundant reservoir of profit-responsive 
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individuals in all societies, and all that is necessary to 
call forth the necessary talent is to alter the environ­
ment and manipulate market incentives (that is, shift 
demand). 
2) 	 Supply Primacy. Sociologists and psychologists, on the 
other hand, are likely to argue that there are real con­
straints on entrepreneurial supply imposed by traditional 
social structures and the resulting psychological motiva­
tions and inhibitions. Shifts in demand may cause reac­
tions in deviant subordinated groups, but broad-based 
response will occur only with a fundamental shift in 
basic social values. The model here is Weber's "Protestant 
Ethnic" as a prime mover in the evolution of Western 
capitalism. 
The next two chapters will examine the Korean entrepreneurial 
experience in terms of this supply and demand dichotomy. 
The primary purpose of this chapter will be to identify the 
sources of expansion of Korean entrepreneurship from 1961 
to 1975. Our task will be to explain the observed change in 
the 	equilibruirn quantity in terms of shifts in the supply and 
demand curves. This is not a simple matter, since our language 
is imprecise, and the supply and demand functions are speci­
fied 	 vaguely in the literature. There are in fact a number of 
different entrepreneurial supply and demand functions. In the 
course of development, maiy things change and shift the 
various curves about in a complicated way so that the change 
in equilibrium is not readily predictable. To clarify matters, 
our 	first step is to examine the dynamics of entrepreneurial 
expansion to see how much of the growth was due to entrance 
of new entrepreneurs, and how much to expansion of old. Tile 
result is that growth is to be interpreted primarily as a qualita­
tive 	 phenomenon rather than a quantitative one. To explain 
this, we must sharpen our conceptual tools and therefore 
devote a section to specifying the entrepreneurial market more 
carefully through disaggregation of the entrepreneurial fun,-tion 
and 	a stress on the quality being demanded. With this more 
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detailed framework, we then examine the execution of the 
various functions in tie Korean experience. Finally, we bring 
the supply and demand sides together and attempt to tell an 
integrated story of the sources of the expansion of the equi­
librium quantity of entrepreneurial acts. 
In telling the story of shifts in the market, we shall emphasize 
the dema,.d side aid defer a detailed consideration of tile 
supply side until Chapter 7. This is possible because what we 
wish to explain is a fairly rapid and discontinuous change in 
the equilibrium quantity in the early 1960s. Insofar as tile 
position of the supply curve is a funztion of psychological 
motives resulting from sociological conditioning, no sudden 
change in the function is to be expected. What is to be ex­
plained is not so much the change in the curve as its height and 
slope. Chapter 7 will investigate this question by examining 
the social background of Korean entrepreneurs. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL DYNAMICS 
The simplest economic theory takes growth to be the net effect 
of two trends: entry of new firms-implicitly founded by new 
entrepreneurs-and tile exit of mature companies that have 
outlived their usefulness in tile market. In fact, the process is 
a bit more complicated, involving: 
1) Entrance of new firms (founded by new entlepreneurs). 
2) Entrance of offspring firms (founded by previously 
successful entrepreneurs). 
3) Expansion of existing firms in new lines. 
4) Expansion of existing firms in existing lines. 
5) Exit of putative firms (that were never viable). 
6) Exit of mature firms (that were once viable). 
These distinctions are importan! in analyzing entrepreneurial 
dynamics, as the nature of the entrepreneurial act differs in 
each case. Most important, only source #1 requires a supply of 
new entrepreneurs while #2, #3, and #4 utilize the existing 
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supply. In this section we therefore endeavor to decompose 
the growth of private output into these six categories. The 
attempt fails due to inadequate data, but comes close enough 
to demonstrate that the traditional entrepreneurial act-founda­
tion of a new firm by a new entrepreneur-is of minor conse­
quence in Korea. 
First consider Table 27 which indicates trends in the size and 
number of manufacturing establishments. From 1962 to 1974 
the number of establishments increased by less than 40 per­
cent, while size tripled in terms of employment per establish­
ment and rose ninefold in terms of value added per establish­
ment. The sources of real growth in value added may thus be 
decomposed as follows: 
Growth in average size (old firms at new size) 72% 
Growth in number of firms (new firms at old size) 3% 
Cross product (new firms at incremental size) 25% 
100% 
This is a striking and profoundly important conclusion for an 
understanding of the role of entrepreneurship in economic 
growth. It says that net entry of entrepreneurs by itself ac­
counted for only 3 percent of the growth of manufacturing 
output. What has to be explained is not how new entrepreneurs 
were found, but how old firms grew, and why new firms were 
so much larger than the old. The critical question is not net 
entry, but e.vpansion. The problem is less entrepreneurial 
quantity, than quality. 
To focus the issue more sharply, we should like to know how 
much of the size increase comes from expansion of existing 
firms and how much from replacement (exit of small firms 
and replacement with large ones). Some evidence on this 
question is provided by the corporate histories of the firms 
in our Entrepreneurship Survey. Firms more than one year old 
reported a median annual rate of expansion of productive 
capacity of 14 percent. Their mean employment at establish­
ment was 97 workers, while they averaged nearly two expansion 
projects with a mean increase in employment per project of 
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114 workers. These rates of growth-extrapolated to the estab­
lishment set as a whole-could explain virtually all of the 
growth of manufacturing output as the product of expansion of 
existing firms. This is not justified, of course, since there is 
probably an upward response bias in our survey, and our sample 
represents the larger and more successful firms. Nonetheless, it 
is clear that expansion, rather than entry, is the dominant ele­
ment in explaining the growth of industrial value added. 
If the net rate of entry of firms is low, what about the gross 
rate? Table 28 reveals available data on entry and exit of joint­
stock corporations and "other corporations" (it differs from 
Table 27 in excluding private proprietorships). It is woefully 
inadequate, with the stock series beginning in 1966 and the 
entry series ending in 1969, giving a complete picture for only 
three overlapping years. For that three-year period the gross 
entry flow was 2,142, while exit was 1,988, with each annual 
gross flow representing approximately 30 percent of the stock. 
While these figures are atypical in representing years with a low 
net flow, we take them as evidence of a very high level of turn­
over. 
If exit is this high, is it due to the failure of putative entre­
preneurs or the natural demise of mature firms? Some evidence 
is provided by our entrepreneurship survey samples which had a 
one-year exit rate of 13 percent. These firms were dispropor­
tionately young, as suggested by Table 29 which gives failure 
rates by year of establ'shment. Roughly a quarter of the com­
panies failed within four years of founding, and this is hardly 
maturity. After six years, morbidity was a fairly steady 10 to 
15 percent per year.' In addition to being young, the failed 
firms were extremely small, averaging one-sixth the size of the 
rest of the sample. 
These results are further supported by casual empiricism 
which suggests that large firms that falter are taken over by 
competitors, that those which become outdated convert to 
other lines, and that there are large numbers of putative entre­
preneurs taking a plunge with little more than hope to back 
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TABLE 27 Trends in Size of Manufacturing Establishments, 
1958-1974 
Year Establishments 
1958 12,921 
1959 n.a. 
1960 15,204 
1961 16,028 
1962 16,355 
1963 18,310 
1964 n.a. 
1965 18,396 
1966 22,718 
1967 23,833 
1968 24,102 
1969 25,098 
1970 24,114 
1971 23,412 
1972 23,729 
1973 23,293 
Workers 
260,427 
n.a. 
275,254 
296,585 
304,565 
401,981 
n.a. 
453,422 
566,665 
648,811 
748,184 
828,966 
861,041 
848,194 
973,415 
1,157,829 
Real 

Value A ddeda b 

62,520 
n.a. 
79,629 
69,892 
95,087 
140,457 
n.a. 

149,462 

204,389 

265,803 

358,678 

466,809 

549,793 

664,486 

759,763 

1,068,370 
Employees! 

Establishment 

20.2 
n.a. 
18.1 
18.5 
18.6 
22.0 
n.a. 
24.7 
25.0 
27.2 
31.1 
33.0 
35.7 
36.2 
41.0 
49.7 
Value Added
 
Establishrentb
 
4.8 
n.a. 
5.2 
4.4 
5.8 
7.7 
n.a. 
8.1 
9.0 
11.2 
14.9 
18.6 
22.8 
28.4 
32.0 
45.9 
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TABLE 28 Corporate Entry and Exit, 1955-1974 
Stock Flow.- Flow: 
Year (Year End)a Entryb Exitc 
1955 333
 
1956 
 373 
1957 304 
1958 231 
1959 278
 
1960 
 206 
1961 240
 
1962 
 374
 
1963 
 248
 
1964 
 289
 
1965 
 385
 
1966 2,367 601
 
1967 2,285 661 743
 
1968 2,310 644 619
 
1969 2,421 737 626
 
1970 2,542
 
1971 2,592
 
1972 3,083
 
1973 3,220
 
1974 3,774
 
Notes: EPB, Report on Aiming and Ala,:uJactrinq. Survey (Seoul, various years,.Includes joint-stoclk companies and "other corporations" in manufacturing. Differs fOn Table 27 in e.xcluding private proprietorships. 
New manufacturing corporations registered during the year from EPB, Korea Sta­tistical Yearbook (Seoul, various years).
CResidual. 
them up. We conclude that gross entry is a severalfold multiple 
of net entry, with the high level of exit explained dispropor­
tionately by premature disasters rather than mature burials. 
The tribulations of the small and medium entreprecieur are 
documented further elsewhere.6 For firms in a given size group 
in 1966, this source gives the percentage that has grown, shrunk, 
and remained unchanged as of 1969. Results, summarized in 
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TABLE 29 Enterprise Failure Rates 
Establishment Number %FailedDuring

Year Established 1975
 
1974 or 1975 14 7.1 
1972 or 1973 73 19.2 
1970 or 1971 47 8.5 
1968 or 1969 33 9.1 
1966 or 1967 44 11.4 
1964 or 1965 21 14.2 
1962 or 1963 20 15.0 
1952 to 1961 44 11.4 
1546 to 1951 6 14.3 
Pre-1946 9 11.1 
TOTAL 311 12.9 
Source: Entrepreneurship Survey, see Appendix C. The level of failure is overstated,
because some entries may represent a change of location which went undetected by 
our interviewer. However, there is no reason for this to affect the trend. 
Table 30, are striking in showing that smaller firms (under 75 
workers) were much more likely to shrink than grow, while the 
reverse was true for larger firms. 
Extrapolation from Tables 27 and 28 suggests that, during ,he 
period of rapid economic growth, the net annual entry of manu­
facturing corporations was in the vicinity of 200 per year and 
that of proprietorships in the vicinity of 300.' How much of 
this net firm entrance represents new entrepreneurs? That is, 
how much is represented by the offspring of already success­
ful entrepreneurs? We assume that most of the proprietorships 
are new entries, but this does not hold for the joint-stock com­
panies. As detailed in Chapter 8, 46 major chaeb'l control 382 
subsidiaries, and there are many smaller corporate groups as 
well. We lack a time series for this group, but it is not implaus­
ible that half of the new corporations each year are formed as 
offspring (including most of the larger ones) and many of the 
remainder by people stepping up from proprietorships. There 
has thus been an annual net flow of new entrepreneurs (mostly 
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TABLE 30 Growth Prospects by Size of Firm 
1966 Percentagewhich in 1969 were: Growth 
Employment Larger Smaller Unchanged Prospectsa 
5- 9 15.4 - 84.6 ­
10- 19 19.2 40.8 40.0 0.47 
20- 29 28.4 42.8 28.8 0.66 
30- 49 28.3 38.0 33.7 0.74 
50- 74 27.6 40.7 31.7 0.68 
75- 99 42.8 35.8 21.4 1.20 
100-149 47.0 27.2 25.8 1.72 
150-199 53.2 31.7 15.1 1.68 
200-299 46.9 27.2 25.9 1.72 
300 - 15.2 84.8 -
Source: Samyle size unknown from survey by: Ky'ng-ul Yi, "Chung so ki 'p," inHan guk kyongjero,, Hyong-yun Pyon and Yun-hwan Kim, eds. (Seoul, 1977), p.
486.
 
Note: a(Percentage of firms which grew in einploynment)/(percentage which shrank). 
small) of an order of magnitude of 400 per year over the entire 
rapid growth period, with a much smaller number of entries 
since 1969. 
Let us now summarize our interpretation of Korea's entre­
preneurial dynamics. There is a vast churning at the bottom, 
with a high level of aspiration and gross entry leading to rapid 
failure. Those who survive the initial entrepreneurial act then 
expand rapidly. Growth in value added is due first to expansion 
of existing firms, second to entry of offspring firms, and only to 
a minor extent to net entrance of new entrepreneurs. This is 
equivalent to saying that, on the supply side, expansion has 
been the result of qualitative rather than quantitative changes. 
Growth in output has not come from exploiting a new supply 
of entrepreneurs, but from making better use of tne existing 
stock.' To explain this qualitative change, we need to specify 
the entrepreneurial market more carefully. 
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THE ENTREPRENEURIAL MARKET
 
WHO IS AN ENTREPRENEUR? 
In principle, entrepreneurship is to be clearly distinguished 
from management, with the former referring to the initiation of 
new economic activity and the lattcr to the operation of on­
going activities. The critical characteristic is the formation of 
"new combinations of means of production.'' It should be 
stressed that Schumpeter interpreted "new combinations" in a 
much broader fashion than is commonly thought. He included: 
"1) 'hc inttroductioln ofa I'i, .good-that is, one with which 
consumers are not yet familiar-or of a new quality of 
good. 
2) 	 The ittroductioto.[a ne' m('tlod ofproduction, that is, 
one not yet tested by experience in the branch of manu­
facture concerned, which need by no means be founded 
upon a discovery scientifically new, and can also exist in 
a new way of handling a commodity commercially. 
3) 	 Thc opciiin.,, of a nen' ,market, that is, a market into 
which the particular branch of manufacture of the coun­
try in question has not previously entered, whether or 
not this market existed before. 
4) The comtjiust of a I('j, sourc' o/Slf/)ply of raw materials 
or half-manu factured goods, again irrespective of whether 
this source already exists or whether it has first to be 
created.
 
5) 	The carryil1,q O1t Of l Iu, orpuiization ofany indnstrv, 
like 	the creation of a monopoly position ... or the break­
ing up of a monopoly position."" 
If "new" is taken to refer to newness within the Korean rather 
than the international economy, then two-thirds of the com­
panics in our sample represented "new combinations" according 
to Schumpeter's first two criteria (see Table 31). Further, over 
half of the companies' expansion projects involved entrepreneur­
ship according to the same standard, and only 12 percent were 
mere extensions of the firm's existing products and processes. 
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TABLE 31 Type of Innovation Among Sample Firms 
At At 
Establishment Expansion 
Product new to Korea 31.3 20.7 
Production new to Korea 20.9 11.0 
Production process new to Korea 13.4 23.2 
Product new to firm (but not to Korea) ) 14.6 
Production process new to firm (but not 34.3 
to Korea) 18.3 
Existing product and process (within firm) - 12.1 
TOTAL 99.9 99.9 
Source: Entrepreneurship Survey, see Appendix C. 
Korean firms are clearly dynamic in expanding into new fields. 
While it is clear that not all founders of firms are Schumpeter­
ian entrepreneurs, we shall not make the distinction between 
entrepreneurial and roles in surveymanagerial reporting our 
results. There are several reasons for this. irst, many of the 
founders who are not entrepreneurs by criter'ia #1 and #2 will 
be so by virtue of #3 to #5, particularly by their expansion in 
world markets. Second, many who were not strict entrepreneurs 
at founding became so by virtue of more innovative expansion
projects. Third, an argument can be made that the mere act of 
binding together a new set of productive factors (regardless of 
newness of product, process, or market), is a significant "new 
combination" in LDCs. Fourth, chief executives form the 
observation set of virtually all studies we wish to compare our 
results with.'' 
For similar reasons, we shall generally make no distinction 
between founders and non-founders, although the latter group 
makes up roughly 40 percent of our sample (see Table 32). In 
the first place, given the rapid rate of growth of most firms in 
our sample,' 2 most non-founders must be innovators by one or 
the other of the criteria. Second, we ran a variety of tests on the 
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TABLE 32 	 Relationships Between Chief Executives 
and Founders (%) 
Current chief executive is: 
Founder 61.4 
Direct descendant of founder 7.8 
Other relative of founder 12.0 
Unrelated 18.8 
100.0 
Where current chief executive is not the founder, the founder is: 
Deceased 8.0 
Retired 16.0 
Active in related company 24.0 
Active in other company 16.0 
Other 36.0 
100.0 
Source: Entrepreneurship Survey, see Appendix C. 
backgrounds and opinions of founders and non-founders and 
found few significant differences. In sum, then, we shall refer to 
all chief executives as "entrepreneurs" without deviating sub­
stantially from the original Schumpeterian concept of the 
entrepreneur as the creator of "new combinations." 
While virtually all chief executives are therefore entrepreneurs, 
not all entrepreneurs are chief executives. In Schumpeter's 
words: 
We call entrepreneurs not only those "independent" businessmen in 
an exchange economy who are usually so designated, but all who 
actually fulfill the function by which we define the concept, even if 
they are, as is becoming the rule, "dependent" employees of a com­
pany, like managers, members of boards of directors, and so forth. 
13 
In Korea, the function (or portions of it) is performed by a 
variety of individuals other than the chief executive. This is 
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particularly true in the large chacb6l, where various managers 
take charge of penetrating target markets and initiating projects. 
In addition, the government, domestic companies, and foreign 
buyers and suppliers all contribute to new combinations. It may 
indecd be arged that the preseice of these complementary 
entrepreneurial contributions accounts for a substantial part of 
the success of Korean industry. To elaborate this proposition 
more fully, it is necessary to specify the functional components 
more carefully. 
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FUNCTION 
The popular perception of the entrepreneur is of a Henry 
Ford type who does it all himself. Most of the academic litera­
ture follows this monistic conception and assumes that the 
entrepreneur is either wholly present or wholly absent. We find 
it more fruitful to disaggregate and argue that portions of the 
function are always present, and only certain missing parts need 
be added to expand the effective entrepreneurial supply. On 
this point we are in complete agreement with Peter Kilby who 
argues that the monistic model 
is based upon implicit assumptions about the nature of a well­
functioning underdeveloped economy. These assumptions are that 
factors of production possess a relatively high degree of mobility; 
that inputs and output are homogeneous; that producers, consumers 
and resource owners have knowledge of all the possibilities open to 
them; and that there are no significant indivisibilities . . . When the 
assumptions are relaxed and ignorance, heterogeneity (segmented 
markets), impeded factor mobility, lumpiness, pervasive administra­
tive controls, and input nonavailabilities are brought into the model, 
then the extraordinary qualities of the entrepreneur-and the possi­
bility of their limited supply-become apparent.14 
In short, monism falters on pervasive market imperfections, and 
we propose an alternative "lenticular" concept which we now 
explain. 
There are a variety of functions that go into the making of an 
entrepreneurial bundle. These functions include: 
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1) Perception of a new economic opportunity, including: 
a) new products 
b) new processes of production 
c) new markets 
2) Evaluation of the profitability of a new opportunity 
3) Gaining command of financial resources 
4) Plant design, technology, and construction .upervision 
5) Recruiting and training new personnel 
6) Dealing with government 
7) Dealing with suppliers and purchaser: 
In a primitive economy, the absence of skill at any of the func­
tions is sufficient to impede seriously the entrepreneurial act. 
In a more developed economy, the missing item can be hired, 
permitting a le3s heroic type to successfully bring a project to 
fruition. In fact, as one goes down the list, it becomes apparent 
that not only can any of the functions be performed for the 
entrepreneur rather than by him, but in principle they all could. 
What then is left for the entrepreneur? The answer is the pure 
Schumpeterian function of combination. The entrepreneur 
takes ultimate responsibility for seeing that all the functions are 
carried out even though he performs few, or none, of them 
himself. He is like a lens that focuses the energies of others, and 
we therefore term this pure and unavoidable task the "lenti­
cular" function. 
Harvey Leibenstein argues that one major entrepreneurial task 
is "gap-filling," which refers to compensating for market defici­
encies." s That is, information about some inputs is either 
unmarketable or unmarketed, and it is the entrepreneur's task 
to fill these gaps. if the economy provided a complete set of 
demand functions, a similar set of production functions, and a 
complete set of prices (including prices for obtaining the pro­
duction and demand functions), then "perception of market 
opportunity" would be a trivial task easily performed by the 
average undergraduate with access to a computer. In fact, the 
market provides precious little information of this sort, and 
filling this gap is the entrepreneur's job and the source of his 
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reward. In our framework, such "gap-filling" must be per­
formed for each of the entrepreneurial functions with the diffi­
culty for each funcCon depending on the state of the market 
(for example, in developed economies for widely sold homogen­
eous commodities, "dealing with purchasers" becomes trivial). 
Our "lenticular" function is, then, the overview task of insuring 
that all relevant "gaps" are in fact "filled" and the entrepre­
neurial bundle completed. 
The various entrepreneurial functions may be performed (the 
gaps filled) in one of three ways: a) by the market, b) by an 
agent employed by the entrepreneur, or c) by the entrepreneur 
himself. Where the entrepreneur steps in and does the job him­
self, this is then what Leibenstein refers to as "input complet­
ing." If the entrepreneur performs all the functions himself, 
then he is of the pure monistic type of yesteryear. If markets or 
agents or both perform all of the functions, then he is purely 
lenticular. 
The process of entrepreneurial development may then be 
viewed, not so much as one of increasing the supply of the 
monistic entrepreneur, but as one of increasing the supply of 
agents and market mechanisms so as to allow success of the 
existing supply of lenticular entrepreneurs. Individuals with 
monistic capabilities are few; those with lenticular capabilities 
are many. As development proceeds, therequirement for a 
successful entrepreneurial act shifts from monism towards 
lenticularism, the rate of success rises, and growth accelerates. 
In the next section we shall examine the Korean experience 
for evidence of this process. 
THE QUALITY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Disaggregation of the entrepreneurial function allows us to 
specify three components of the supply of effective entrepre­
neurial activity: 
1) The stock of individuals with lenticular intent, 
2) The level of lenricular ability within that group, and 
3) The availability (quantity and quality) of agents and 
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TABLE 33 	 Average Lead Time from Conceptualization
 
to Operation of New Plants
 
Months Number 
1962 and prior 	 16.5 12
 
1963-1968 14.1 
 14 
1969-1975 10.2 36 
Source: Entrepreneurship Survey, see Appendix C. Only new establishment projects 
are included, as we recorded only seven expansion projects prior to 1969. 
markets that reduce the need for "input completion" by 
the entrepreneur. 
The results of the previous section on "Entrepreneurial Dynam­
ics" may now be rephrased by saying that the supply side of the 
Korean expansion has been largely due to qualitative improve­
ments-factors #2 and #3-and only to a minor extent due to 
quantitative increases-factor #1. 
The change in effective entrepreneurial abilities is perfectly 
illustrated by the development of the Korean fertilizer industry. 
There was a dramatic difference between tile irrplementation of 
the first two plants, started in the late 1950s, and the next 
three, built in the mid-1 960s. The first two were horror stories 
of inefficiency by contemporary Korean standards, but were 
quite typical of LDC projects in general and reflected the entre­
preneurial barriers encountered in the early stages of develop­
ment. Gestation periods for the first two plants were 67 and 54 
months respectively; the next three, though larger and more 
complex, took only 17, 18, and 21 months respectively. Such 
experience is not limited to the fertilizer industry. As shown in 
Table 33, the time from conceptualization to operation of new 
plants declined steadily over time among our sample firms. This 
is particularly impressive since the later plants were, on average, 
larger, and more technically sophisticated. These data are not 
conclusive since the sample is small relative to the variance. None­
theless, allowing for the greater size and complexity of later 
projects, we believe this is a fair reflection of a fundamental 
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trend in entrepreneurial capability. This improvement in tile 
quality of bundle supply is due to both an improvement in len­
ticular ability and an increase in the quantity and quality of 
non-lenticular entrepreneurial inputs. 
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FUNCTION
 
IN KOREA
 
If it is agreed that qualitative improvements are tile essence 
of the change to be explained, then the next step is to decom­
pose the quality change into improvements in lenticular ability 
and increased availability of complementary inputs. No defini­
tive answer is to be expected, but some insights are gained from 
the survey questions on the difficulty of performing various 
functions, the sources of assistance in solving those problems, 
and tile nature of government assistance. We are first interested 
in how the answers vary across functions, in order to identify 
the critical tasks most often performed by the chief executive 
himself. Second, we are concerned with changes over time, in 
order to ascertain the degree to which functional differentiation 
evolves with development.16 Third, we would like to examine 
differences related to size of firm and between exporters and 
non-exporters to distinguish biases in government assistance. 
Finally, we compare differentiation in expansion from that at 
establishment. The small sample size makes generalization 
hazardous, but some conlusions do emerge. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL PROBLEMS 
Responses to the question on the degree of difficulty en­
countered in carrying out various entrepreneurial tasks are 
summarized in Table 34. Despite the small sample size,"7 the 
following results are of interest: 
1) 	 The absolute level of perceived difficulty is low, with 
the modal response generally "simple" and the mean 
between "some problem" and "simple." This is not 
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TABLE 34 Businessmen's Perception of Entrepreneurial Problems 
Question: In establishing your enterprise, a number of problems had to be solved. Please indicate the degree of difficulty you encountered 
in e--ch.
 
lanking: Very 
 Some Not 
Difficult Problem Simple Applicable
1 2 3 4 5 () 
Results: Establishment Expansion 
Pre- 1969- Ex- Do- Pre- 1969- Ex- Do- Man-Problem All 1968 1 9 75 b port mestic All 1968 1 9 75 b port mestic agersa 
Perception of opportunity
 
and market identification 3.21 3.22 3.17 3.44 2.92 
 3.66 3.00 3.72 3.77 3.61 Obtaining financing 2.95 2 .5 0 c 3.17 3 .4;e 2.44 3.4i 2.71 3.46 3.64 
3.38 
3.23 3.08 
Plant design, technology, and 
construction 3.49 2.96 d 3.72 3.29 3.59 3.93 2.71 e 4.03 3.87 3.93 3.72 
Obtaining technicians and 
training 3.15 2.73 c 3.32 3.06 3.23 3.45 3.06 3.61 3.37 3.49 3.44 
Government support and 
permits 3.75 3.73 4.00 3.78 4.05 4.25 4.43 4.26 4.18 4.30 4.07 " 
Setting up organization and 
managing people 3.67 3.67 3.67 3.53 3.74 4.30 4.29 4.03 3.75 3.574 .3 1 c Sample size (74) (27) (47) (36) (39) (84) (7) (77) (39) (46) (101) 
Source: Entrepreneurship Survey, see Appendix C. Some response categories are abbreviated here, and two are omitted.N a 
.
 
Notes: Unwe~ghted responses on expansion projects.
bIn comparing 1969-1975 expansions with establishments, differences in "perception" are significant @ 5% and those in "managingEovernment" and "managing people" are significant @ 1%. 
t-test significant at 10% 
dt-test significant at 5%0 in comparing adjacent pairs (e.g., export and domestic)et-test significant at 1% 
Sources ofPrivateEntrepreneurship 
particularly surprising, since we are dealing with largely 
successful entrepreneurs in a rapidly growing economy. 
2) In terms of relative difficulty, "financing" is the biggest 
problem, followed closely by obtaining technicians, and 
perception of opportunity. Getting government support 
turns out to be the least problematical task, confirming 
the view of a supportative bureaucracy, and in marked 
contrast to what might be expected in other LDCs. 
3) 	 Over time, getting established becomes easier, though the 
differences are significant for only three of the six func­
tions. Since the size and sophistication of projects in­
creases over time, we take this as evidence, albeit weak, 
for 	 the hypotheses of improved lenticular ability and 
increasing functional differentiation. A similar time trend 
is exhibited by the ease with which expansion projects 
are carried out. 
4) Expansion projects face uniformly fewer and smaller 
obstacles than initial establishment, and the differences 
are significant (at 5 percent) in three cases. This is proba­
bly not due to greater simplicity. Only 13 percent of the 
expansion projects involve a mere extension of existing 
product and process lines, and the mean size of expansion 
projects is actually larger (in terms of employment) than 
at establishment.' 8 We would instead argue that a signifi­
cant role is played by learning: having gone through the 
process once, it is much easier the second and subsequent 
times. Second, and equally important, the government 
seems to provide more support for expansion than for 
establishment. This in turn is due to a combination of 
concern for scale economies and support for known 
entities. 
5) 	 Decomposition into export and domestic uses yields 
surprisingly little reduction in variance. To be sure, 
exporters have a much easier time getting financing, but 
that is the only "significant" difference. "Significance," 
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however, is not always the final word. Note that exporters 
report somewhat greater ease in "perception of opportun­
ity and market identification." Given our preconception 
as to the much greater difficulty of exploiting foreign 
markets, the absence of a st,;tistically significant differ­
ence is striking. It shows the remarkable degree to which 
government field augmentation has worked to reduce the 
information imperfections connected with exporting. 
6) 	 Size differences by value-added decile and quintile yield 
no discernible ,attern and are unreported. This is per­
haps the result of two offsetting tendencies: smaller firms 
have simpler problems, but they also get less help in solv­
ing them. This absence of a size distinction is intriguing 
and suggests that institutional development may have 
been more even-handed than generally thought in provid­
ing assistance at all levels commensurate with the prob­
lems being faced.' 9 
Establishing a larger firm requires more help than establishing 
a smaller firm, and it gets proportionately more, particularly in 
finance. Further, much of the extra help received by the large 
firm comes from foreigners and other domestic companies 
rather than the government (see below). It should be noted that 
the low size bias of government is in part due to our dealing 
with medium to large firms. Since our cut-off point is 50 work­
ers, we only begin to enter the range where evidence presented 
in Table 30 showed growth prospects to be negative. It must be 
stressed that we are speaking here of assistance relative to the 
problems involved and not of absolute help. The same propor­
tional assistance in, say, finance, means a much larger absolute 
volume of help and implicit subsidy for bigger firms. 
DISTRIBUTION OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FUNCTION 
The degree of perceived difficulty in performing each func­
tion depends on the magnitude of the project, the quality of the 
entrepreneur, and the availability of complementary entrepre­
neurial inputs. We now focus on the last element to see how 
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much functional differentiation existed, and how it varied 
across sub-groups. Respondents were asked: Who participated 
in performing the various entrepreneurial functions? Percentage 
shares of total responses are given in Table 35.20 Noteworthy 
results are as follows: 
1) Overall, there is a substantial evidence of functional 
differentiation. Even at establishment, entrepreneurs did 
not act alone: they provided only from 43 to 69 percent 
of the total participation. 
2) The greatest differentiation occurred in obtaining financ­
ing, technology, and technical training, with chief execu­
tives providing less than half the participation in each 
area. Note that, while obtaining financing was the most 
difficult task (Table 34), it is also the one in which the 
most help was available. Differentiation is one way in 
which the critical problem was solved. 
3) The least differentiation occurred in conceptualization 
and handling government and personnel relations. These 
are thus the functions least often delegated by the 
lenticular entrepreneur. 
4) Size differences are, not surprisingly, apparent. Chief 
executives of large firms performed a smaller share of 
each function than did those of smaller firms. Larger 
firms thus have an advantage over smaller ones in re­
quiring less "input completion" by the entrepreneur. 
5) 	 Contrary to expectations, time differentials are not 
generally significant, with chief executives performing 
roughly similar shares of each function in pre- and post­
1969 establishments. 2' This may be due to the fact that 
getting started in business is inherently difficult, and the 
change in economic environment has done much more 
to ease the difficulties of expansion than those of es­
tablishment. This hypothesis is consistent with evidence 
presented earlier on the dominance of expansion over 
entry as a source of growth. 
6) The last hypothesis is to some extent confirmed by 
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TABLE 35 Performers of Entrepreneurial Functions 
a
 (%) 
Employees Government Other 
b Chief and and Public Foreign DomesticFunction Executive Relatives Enterprises Entities Entities Tota 
Conceptualization 58.4 14.3 6.5 12.9 7.9 100.0 
Financing 	 45.1 13.4 22.5 5.6 13.4 100.0 
Technology 	 44.0 32.9 0.8 18.7 3.7 100.1 
Construction 53.5 29.5 1.6 10.9 4.7 100.2 
Technical training 43.0 39.3 0.0 12.6 5.2 100.1 
Government relations 62.0 22.8 12.0 0.0 3.3 100.1 
Personnel management 69.2 25.6 0.0 1.7 3.4 99.9 
Source: 	Entrepreneurship Survey, see Appendix C. Establishment only. Response categories are abbreviated here. 
Notes: aRespondents were asked to list up to three participants in the performance of each function. This table includes all indicated " 
Earticipants regardless of rank. 
See Appendix D for more detailed description of each function. 
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comparing the degree of differentiation in 1969-1975 
establishments with those of 1969-1975 expansions. 
In the three functions identified earlier as being most 
often performed by the lenticular entrepreneur himself, 
(conceptualization, government relations, and personnel 
management), there is no significant difference. For the 
other four functions, however, the degree of differentia­
tion is much higher for expansion than for establishment. 
Thus far we have described the degree of differentiation in 
terms of tile share of the chief executive. We now examine the 
distribution of differentiation by looking at who performed 
the remaining shares. 
among 
7) After the chief executive, the largest share in all functions, 
save financing, was played by employees and other in­
dividuals. 
8) In obtaining financing, government (largely the commer­
cial and special banks) played the largest supporting 
role with other private corporations, and employees and 
other individuals tied for third. Again, tile most difficult 
function (finance) is the one where the most help is 
obcained. It is also clear that this is the function in which 
participation is most widely distributed across a variety 
of contributors. 
9) Except for financing, foreign corporations are uniformly 
more helpful than domestic corporations. The advantages 
in being an "open" economy are not confined to access 
to foreign markets and exposure to the rigors of com­
petition. 
We now consider the structure of differentiation 
sub-groups defined by size, age, export share, and expansion 
versus establishment. Caution must be used in interpreting the 
results, since there are cross-correlations that cannot be distin­
guished because of small sample size. 
10) 	 In terms of size, the only noticeable difference is that 
larger firms get relatively more help from government 
and domestic companies in obtaining financing." This 
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is, of course, critical, and this result simply reflects the 
well-known higher debt/equity ratios of larger firms. 
11) 	 Exporters generally exhibit more differentiation than do 
domestic producers. Surprisingly, despite the export 
promotion policy, the extra help does not come from the 
government, but from foreign entities. There is a differ­
ence in this respect between expansion and establish­
ment, with government providing relatively more help 
at establishment. It thus seems that in the (largely 1970s) 
expansions, exporters had already attained a level of 
international respectability and were able to obtain assis­
tance on their own. Nonetheless, the low overall govern­
ment participation rate in exporting suggests that the 
direct field-augmentation efforts (for example, KOTRA) 
may have been less important than indirect market im­
provement via al open economy strategy. 
12) 	 In terms of time, there is an actual decrease in the rela­
tive, though not the absolute, level of government partici­
pation in establishment. This is particularly noticeable 
in finance, where the government role drops precipitously 
from 37 percent to 15 percent.2 3 A plausible explanation 
has two parts. First, there is increasing availability of 
non-governmental support as the economy diversifies. 
Second, the government entities find an increasing share 
of their resources devoted to expansion projects. 
13) The last hypothesis is substantiated by the one significant 
difference between 1969-1975 expansion and establish­
ment projects. In expansion, the government (again, 
largely through the banks) provided 37 percent of finan­
cial participation as compared with only 15 percent for 
new establishments. 
In sum, we find that there is indeed considerable differen­
tiation in the performance of the entrepreneurial function in 
Korea. There is also evidence that an increase in differentiation 
is a 	contributory factor to growth, though the change occurs 
in an unexpected way. There is surprisingly little support for 
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the hypothesis that over time the assistance available to brand­
new entrepreneurs has increased. Instead, the major contribution 
of differentiation occurs through its higher level in expansion 
projects (and similarly in offspring establishments). This, how­
ever, is a powerful force, given the dominant role of expansion 
and offspring in growth. 
It is well known that large firms are favored over small firms 
in obtaining finance. The usual explanation is that size creates 
pc, "er, and this translates into being at the head of the line 
at tL bank. While this is certainly part of the story (see Chapter 
8), we would suggest that to some extent the apparent size 
bias may be a proxy for an underlying expansion bias. That 
is, there is evidence that an entrepreneur who has proven 
himself gets more help than one who is just starting out, regard­
less of size. Should this bias be rectified and the government 
direct more of its efforts towards supporting first-time efforts? 
This is a question that deserves some thought, but the answer 
is by no means a clear-cut "yes." Scarce resources should be 
directed to where they will have the highest social return, and 
a first-time entrepreneur-regardless of size-is an unknown 
quantity with a high risk factor. By contrast, an individual who 
has successfully put together a small-scale combination might be 
an excellent prospect for a medium-to-large project. Whether or 
not one accepts this normative justification, the fact seems to 
be that in Korea the first entrepreneurial act is a go-it-alone 
proposition. Most fail, but those who succeed are then provided 
with substantial support, especially financial, in subsequent 
acts. Since expansion creates size, this expansion bias thus leads 
to-and helps explain-size bias. 
GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE 
The careful reader may feel he has found an inconsistency 
between our earlier stress on the high level of government 
intervention (Chapter 4) and the relatively low perception of 
"managing government relations" as a problem, and the modest 
role of perceived ,,overnment support for entrepreneurs (except 
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in obtaining finance). The first problem is resolved by bearing 
in mind an important distinction. The bulk of negative govern­
ment intervention via command involves the conduct of on­
going operations rather than the initiation of new operations. 
As will become clearer in Chapter 8, the government is much 
more concerned with wealth utilization than with wealth 
accumulation. Anyone who wishes to initiate new productive 
combinations is contributing to the very reason for existence of 
the Park regime and is in no sense discouraged by bureaucratic 
impediments. Managing government relations in performing an 
entrepreneurial act is thus not a problem and is indeed a plea­
sure by LDC standards. Once a firm is established, however, 
there are real constraints on conduct in the market place. 
These restraints are largely enforced through partial mutuality 
that involves implicit threats of interference in future expan­
sions. These threats, however, are believed, and so need seldom 
be actually carried out. The government is thus quite rightly 
perceived as a fundamental friend of business. 
The second apparent contradiction is more serious. We have 
placed a relatively high value on the role of field augmentation 
in expanding the opportunity set of businessmen by making 
them aware of new opportunities, particularly in foreign mar­
kets. Yet, Table 35 gives a relatively small share (6.5 percent 
overall) to government participation in the conceptualization 
function. This may, in part, be attributable to response bias, 
with entrepieneurs begrudging recognition of government 
assistance in one of their fundamental functions. There may 
also be a time factor involved. In the pre-1969 period, the 
government share in conceptualization was almost four times as 
large as in post-1969. It may therefore be that by the 1970s, 
entrepreneurial capacity had improved so as to obviate the 
government's direct field augmentations in manufacturing. 
That is, the 1960s augmentation in exports having served its 
purpose (12 percent participation at the margin is after all 
quite significant). the government has now turned greater 
attention to supporting service exports. 24 Within the export 
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sector it seems that government augmentation has shifted from 
direct gap filling (through KOTRA and the commercial attach6s) 
to indirect horizon expansion via expanding diplomatic contacts 
throughout the world. 
Recall, however, that there is a second element of field 
augmentation, namely, the reduction of uncertainty through 
plannii, and providing confidence in the government's ability 
to maintain a favorable business climate. As shown in Table 36, 
these aspects of government assistance are given "moderately 
important" rankings in affecting entrepreneurs' decisions to 
establish or expand. These field-augmentation efforts are ex­
ceeded in importance at establishment by parameter manipula­
tions (tax and tariff privileges), but are the mosv important 
elements in the critical expansion decisions. The most counter­
productive forms of parameter manipulation 
-tariff protection 
on output, exclusive licensing, and direct subsidies-are virtually 
irrelevant for both expansion and establishment. Exportersgain significantly more from these field manipulations in 
expansion, and naturally attach significantly less importance 
to tariff protection. 
In sum, our earlier conclusion of high government interven­
tion is not to be taken as indicative of either blindness or an 
anti-business bias. Intervention is structured to be supportive 
of entrepreneurial endeavor, with a bias towards expansion proj­
ects. Indirect field augmentation and parameter manipulation 
may be more important intervention mechanisms than direct 
performance of entrepreneurial functions. There is, nonethe­
less, a great deal of differentiation of the entrepreneurial func­
tion and some of this is attributable to the open-economy 
policy and the endogenous externalities of growth. 
INTEGRATION: SOURCES OF
 
ENTREPRENEURIAL EXPANSION
 
We now draw together the diverse elements of this chapter, as 
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TABLE 36 Types of Government Assistance 
Question: "How important were each of the following types of government assistance in contributing to your final decision that this 
would be a profitable project?" 
Ranking: Critical Moderately Important Irrelevant 
1 2 3 4 5 
Mean Responses: aEstablistkmen t Expansiona (as perceived by ChiefExecutives) (as perceived by) Expansion 
Type ofAssistance All Large Small 
Pre-
1969 
1969-
1975 
Ex-
pcrt 
Do-
mestic Chiej b 
Man-
agers c 
Ex-
port 
Do­
mestic 
Tax privilegesTariff privileges on inputs 3.093.27 2.912.76 3.133.37 3 .41d3.38 3.873.17 2.59 
f 
2.71 f 3.593.82 3.393.54 3.503.01 2 . 6 5 d2.87 f 3.174.10 
Tariff protection on output 4.02 3.38 e 4.18 4.07 4.02 3.89 4.11 4.46 4.09 4 . 1 6 e 3.60 
Exclusive licensing 4.34 3.86 e 4.44 4.20 4.41 4.30 4.38 4.58 4.51 4.28 4.64 
Direct subsidies 
Knowledge of long-run 
4.46 4.23 4.53 4.33 4.52 3.51 f 4.43 4.48 4.29 4.50 4.50 
development strategy 
Provision of SOC 
3.19 
3.61 
2.78 
3.48 
3.20 
3.67 
3.41 
356 
2.98 
3.65 
3.25 
3.55 
3.11 
3.66 
2.76 
3.44 
2.75 
3.43 
3.03 e 
3.26 
2.37 
3.61 
Confidence in gove.ment 
ability to mr.-:.cain favLAble 
business jmate 3.39 3.20 3.40 3 .7 8 e 3.14 2.30 3.47 2.84 2.86 2.73 2.93 
Sample 112 (22) (90) (46) (66) (56) (56) 78 6G 40 42 
Sor,-ce: Entrepreneurship Survey, see Appendix C. Response categories are abbreviated here. 
jutes: aComparing 1969-1975 txpansion and establishments, differences were significant @5% on "tax privileges" and "tariff protection."
- 969-1975 expansions only.
,Unweighted. 
t-test significant at 10% 
e a5%ft-test significant at 50 on adjacent pairs (e.g., large vs. small, pre- and post-1969) export and domestic. 
t-test significant at 1% 
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well as a variety of evidence presented elsewhere, and sum­
marize what we see as the major sources of the expansion of 
Korean entrepreneurship from 1961 to 1975. Readers with a 
low tolerance for economic jargon will prefer to skip ahead to 
the summary. 
THE MARKET 
As an organizing framework, we use the somewhat ill-specified, 
but pedagogically useful, device of a market for entrepreneur­
ship as a factur of production. 5 The market is for the entire 
bundle of entrepreneurial functions required to complete a 
new act of combination. The lenticular function is the single 
irrevocable role of seeli., that all of the other necessary func­
tions are carried oat. Employees may design the organization, 
foreign consultants may provide technology, the trade-promo­
tion board may identify the market, and government banks may 
provide the capital. Alternatively, some, or all, of these func­
tions may be performed by the entrepreneur, but this is not 
essential. His irreducible role is to serve as a lens that focuses 
the various functional energies on the selected target. 
Price in the market is the present value of the stream of rent 
accruing to the successful completion of the project. Some of 
this may be paid to external agents or employees, with the 
remainder going to the lenticular entrepreneur. In competitive 
equilibrium, of course, there is no rent, but neither are there 
any new combinations. Entrepreneurship, in fact, is the art of 
seeking out disequilibrium corners and exploiting the resulting 
rent-producing opportunities. Quantity in the market is man­
years of (bundle) entrepreneurship of a standard quality.26 
The market is defined as a moving average to dampen short­
term business-cycle fluctuations. 27 We now describe the ele­
ments of the market (see Figure 2), disaggregating to emphasize 
the role of market imperfections. 
SUPPLY
 
On the supply side, we wish to distinguish between individuals 
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FIGURE 2 Notional Entrepreneurial Market 
Rent 
SLE
 
SLI 
D P Tl' / / 
Q DPTDI 
I IDPR 
Q QA QP Man years of 
II standard quality 
Premature 
I Exit i 
Distortion IIla Gap 
SO -Supply of the entire bundle of entrepreneurial functions 
SLE Supply of effective lenticular ability 
SLI Supply of lenlicular intent 
OPTI m Potential demand at international prices 
-DPT Potential demand at domestic prices 
DPR = Perceived demand at domestic prices 
o Actual EquilibriumQA Attempted Equilibrium 
QP= Potential Equilibrium 
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who attempt to perform entrepreneurial acts and those who 
succeed. We, therefore, specify three different supply curves. 
The first is the supply of entrepreneurial intent of standard 
quality (SLI). This is a fInction of pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
returns to entrepreneurship and to alternative uses of time. 
Sunp)ly is a positive function of expected pecuniary return, 
if the other arguments are held constant. Over time, tile other 
variables change and the cur slhifts. Since non-pecu,niary 
return must also be considered, there will be a positive supply 
at zero price (and perhaps even at a.negative price) if prestige, 
power, and accomplishment yield satisfaction. We now posit 
a supply curve of lenticular intent in, say 1960, and ask what it 
will look like in the I 970s. Two factors are involved: increases 
in numbers of entrepreneurs and growth of average quality. 
A general proposition is that qunan titative supply of intent is 
a function of demographic variables on the one hand, and of 
psychological motives resulting from sociological conditioning 
on tile other. Rising population and growing urbanization have 
slowly increased the pool from which entrepreneurial intent 
is drawn. Since from 1961 to 1974 tlhe compound rate of 
growth in manufacturing establishments was only 3 percent, 
demographics alone can account for much of the quantitative 
expansion. 
For a given population, tile number that will attempt an 
entrepreneurial act depends on sociological and psychological 
factors. Since these change only slowly, the share of individuals 
involved will change only very gradually. We see no evidence 
of any significant movement of the curve due to this factor in 
the early 196 0s and attribute to it no role in the early expan­
sion. In the late 1960s, and particularly in the I 970s, however, 
the curve does shift as society's attitude towards the entre­
preneur begins to change. Success breeds popular approval, 
the government's linkage of nationalistic and patriotic goals to 
economic achievement adds a marginal non-pecuniary incentive,
and the transition from zero-sum to positive-sum entrepreneur­
ship adds respectability.28 We attribute a real, though probably 
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small, role in tile later expansion to such sociological fac­
tors. 
The change in the number of individuals with entrepreneurial 
intent is thus easily explained as a result of demographic 
factors, possibly augmented by social chainge. The real problem, 
however, is to explain the quality change. 
As lenticular ability improves, the quantity of standard­
quality entrepreneurship increases and the curve shifts indepen­
dently of any change in tile number of individuals involved. 
This shift occurs largely isa result of learning by doing (or 
by wvatching). As Hirschman observes, the ability to make 
decisions is the oniy scarce resource not consumed in the 
process of production but actually increased by it.29 Growth 
is thus a breeder reactor for entrepreneurial ability. The growth 
elasticity of entrepreneurial supply) is, in turn, a function of 
the societal level of educatiou and motivation. These factors 
are treated in Chapter 7 where we conclude that its cultural 
heritage gives Korea a much higher elasticity than other LDCs. 
Whatever the reason, there has been a steady and significant 
improvemcint in lenticular ability. Korea's entrepreneurs are 
far more finey ground lenses today than fifteen years ago. 
The supply of lenticular intent, however, also includes newly 
aspiring entrepreneurs. Many of these fail, and this is reflected 
in tile seco,-d supply curve of effective lenticularism (SLE). 
This is derived from tne intent function but necessarily lies to 
its left. At any given level of pecuniary return, only a portion 
of those willing to act as binding agents are capable of doing 
so. Available evidence suggests that in Korea the rate of increase 
of quality of existing entrepreneurs has outstripped tile rate 
of entrance, so the gap between SLE and SLI has narrowed. 
The third supply curve (SB) is for the entire bundle of entre­
preneurial functions. It is derived from the effective lenticular 
supply curve but necessarily lies above it, with the gap repre­
senting the rent accruing to the other entrepreneurial functions. 
With perfectly developed markets for each of the comple­
nientary functions, the entrepreneur can hire them done at their 
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opportunity cost. No rent accrues to these othc activities and 
tile effective lcnticular supply curve coincides with the bundle 
supply. In practice, there is alsubstantial gap between the two 
curves. 
Several factors are involved here. First, there has been the 
rise of competent alternative sources of the complementary 
entrepreneurial functions. Employees, ban ks, consultants, 
research institutes, and government agencies increasingly 
provide assistance. A portion of this is due to exogenous govern­
ment gap filling througli specialized agencies. This was ilnpor­
tant in the early years of the growth spurt, but has since been 
subordinated to the endogenous growth-induced perfection of 
the markets fo, the complementary functions. In addition, 
there has been a qLualitative improvement in the ability of 
entrepreneurs and others performing gap-filling functions. The 
process here is similar to the improvement of lenticalar ability 
already described. Finally, there has been a diffuse improve­
ment of the information markets. This again is in part due to 
governmental field augmentation through planning and in part 
to the endogenous effect of growth itself. 
DEMAND
 
On the demand side, it is agail useful to think of three distinct 
curves. The first is potential demand at international prices 
(DPTI) on the assumption that domestic markets are un­
distorted or operating at shadow prices. It is similar to an invest­
ment function in ranking all projects in order of return. It 
differs in that price is not the return per unit of capital, but 
the rent accruing to the entrepreneur upon successful comple­
tion. The curve is a function of technology (which defines tile 
available set of unexploited projects) and world prices (which 
defines the rent accruing to each). These prices are distorted by 
international disequilibrium market imperfections; other­
wise there would be no rent. 
A second curve is defined at existing distorted domestic 
prices (DPTD). The gap between DPTI and DPTD is responsive 
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to, if not solely dependent oil, the level of governmental para­
meter manipulation. There is no necessary relation between 
DP T D and DPTI, and they may even cross. 
Tile tdhird demand curve is the perceived one (DPR). It is 
derived from DPTD by delcting all projects that ire outside 
the perceived opportunity set of Korean entrepreneurs, and 
thus it necessarily lies below DPTD and to its left. The gap 
between DpTD and DPR is a function of information imper­
fections and can be reduced by field augmentation. 
How have these demand curves shifted over time? First, 
consider DI T I. The stock of projects is continually changing as 
some opportunities are wiped out by exploitation and techni­
cal change and others added by invention. The ranking of 
projects, and level of rent, changes with international pcices. 
We are in no position to specify shifts in this curve and for 
present purposes assume it to be more or less stable with new 
opportunities replacing old. 
What of the relationship between DpT I and I)PTD? As 
Chapter 8 will show, prior to 1962 the most egregious domestic 
market imperfections involved government privileges yielding 
exceptionally high rents to various zero-sum trading activities. 
Other price distortions kept the domestic rent below inter­
national rent on the majority of productive projects. The result 
was that DPTD was above DPTI at the left, and below it on the 
right, as shown in Figure 3. After the military revolution, the 
government eliminated the massive rents accruing to acquisition 
of government controlled inputs. This forced entrepreneurs 
into activities that may have yielded less private rent but which 
were socially more productive. In Chapter 8, we describe this 
loosely as a shift from zero-sum to positive-sum entrepreneur­
ship. Project ranking was thus altered and average rents un­
doubtedly declined, but the impact oil marginal rent is unclear. 
The marginal private return to entrepreneurship of standard 
quality may well have been reduced, but the social return in­
creased substantially due to this substitution effect. This did 
not have the effect of shifting the whole curve down, but of 
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flattening it as the massive rents accruing to government influ­
ence were deducted at the high end. Entrepreneurial activity 
was thus reoriented, but not increased. 
In addition to the reranking effect which flattened DPTD and 
dropped it at the high end, there was Istability effect. Follow­
ing years of political confusion if not chaos, the introduction 
and continuation of stability induced expectations of future 
stability, lengthened the time horizon, lowered the time prefer­
ence discount rate, and increased the expected return on virtually 
all projects. The potential domestic demand curve thus shifted 
up, and increased eqLuilibrium entrepreneurial supply. 
Whether or not this shift in DPT D left it above or below 
DPTI is a question beyond the scope of this study. From our 
discussion in Chapter 4, it is clear that there remain widespread 
price distortions in domestic factor markets, arising from 
government parameter manipulation. It is also clear, however, 
that these manipulations are particularistic and discretionary, so 
that, while some projects yield a higher rent, others yield a 
lower one, and the net effect on DPTD-DPTI is unclear. For 
present purposes we shall posit three characteristics of the 
relationship which we think capture the most essential features. 
First, the gap is relatively small by LDC standards, as evidenced 
by studies of international competitiveness and the low levels of 
shadow multipliers estimated for the economy. Second, the gap 
has probably been reduced slowly over time as government 
manipulation becomes more sophisticated and finely tuned. 
Third, the gap is probably positive (DPTD > DPTI) over part of 
its length, reflecting I subsidy which is paid by an implicit levy 
on other projects (for example, export projects are subsidized at 
the expense of domestic ones) leaving a negative gap (DPTD < 
DPTI) over the remainders. 
With respect to perceived demand (DPR), changes are more 
straightforward. Throughout the period, there has been a slow 
but steady expansion of the perceived opportunity set towards 
the potential. This follows in part from governmental field 
augmentation, in part from endogenous growth-induced reduc­
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tions in information imperfections, and in part from entrepre­
neurial learning. Perceived demand thus converges towards 
domestic potential demand. 
EQUILIBRIUM 
We have chosen to specify a variety of supply and demand 
curves in order to emphasize the critical role we assign to 
market imperfections. Consider the relationship between three 
critical intersections, defined as follows: 
QP (y DpT = SLI or Potential Equilibrium 
QA (0'DPR = SLI or Attempted Equilibrium 
Q (d D1p ' = 0 or Achieved Equilibrium 
The point QA thus gives attempted equilibrium and the point 
Q the achieved equilibrium. The gap (Q - QA) represents pre­
mature exit. The point Q gives the potential equilibrium 
quantity of entrepreneurial acts which would occur in the 
absence of domestic market distortions (except unavoidable 
short-term adjustments). The distortion gap (QP - Q) is the loss 
due to various domestic market imperfections. This may be 
further decomposed into shares attributable to entrepreneurial 
markt distortions and those in other factor and product 
markets. Entrepreneurial development is in part the process of 
eliminating these distortions so as to use the existing stock more 
effectively, and in part the process of improving the quantity 
and the quality of the existing stock. 
THE KOREAN CASE 
The initial growth spurt in the early 1960s was stimulated 
largely by changes on the demand side. Stability shifted DPTD 
up and changes in parameter manipulation flattened it (com­
pare Figure 3A and 3B). Growth was induced by the resulting 
increase in achieved equilibrium (Q6 3 - Q6 1 ) and by the fact 
that the equilibrium quantity was now receiving rent from 
socially productive, positive-sum activities. 
Thereafter, growth was maintained primarily through changes 
on the supply side."0 These include: 
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1) 	 An increase in tile number of individuals with lenticular 
intent, resulting from demographic factors and a rise in 
non-pecuniary incentives, and reflected in an outward shift 
o f S I .
' 
2) 	 An increase in the mean standard quality of lenticular 
ability' (shifting SLE towards sLI) resulting from learning­
by-doing. 
3) 	 An increase in the mean quality of performance of non­
lenticular functions by entrepreneurs and others, result­
ing from learning and field augmentation, and reflected in 
the convergence of SB towards SLE . 
4) 	 An increase in the quantity of performance of non-lenticu­
lar functions, resulting from increased differentiation and 
also reflected in the convergence of SB towards SLE. 
5) An expansion of the perceived oppo,tunity set, r,-sulting 
from experience and field augmentation, and reflected in 
the movement of DP R towards DP TI . 
Each of the five shifts has both an endogenous growth­
induced component and an exogenous government-induced 
element. The change in non-pecuniary incentives is in part the 
result of an explicit campaign of official praise, and in part the 
result of success breeding approval. The quantity of differentia­
tion is in part an externality of growth (with a larger economy 
providing more complementary inputs), and in part a result of 
conscious government institutional development (our evidence 
suggests the latter was more important in the mid-1960s and 
now plays a minor role). The quality of lenticular and non­
lenticular abilities and the expansion of the perceived opportun­
ity set are in part the result of learning by doing, a:id in part the 
consequence of indirect field manipulation. 
The result of these shifts is the steady increase in Q necessary 
to maintain a relatively constant rate of growth in an expanding 
economy. The effect on equilibrium rent is unclear. For a given 
DPTD, the shift in supply results in a lowering of rent accruing 
to the marginal entrepreneur of standard quality. This is an 
expected result of development. In a somewhat competitive 
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economy the entrepreneur must diligently seek out non-compe­
titive nooks and crannies in order to slip in and grab a little 
rent before a competitor drives it away. In a disequilibrium 
LDC, the nooks and crannies become chasms and valleys, and 
there is less competition, so that a rental position once attained 
can be maintained for a substantial period of time. Develop­
ment thus reduce!, marginal rent. On the other hand, any 
improvement in world technology and prices, or a rent-Positive 
Dchange in domestic distortions, will shift DP TI or D r and 
D'13Rpull outwards. Marginal rent will then increase. It should 
be noted that, even if the return per unit of standard input has 
fallen for the marginal entrepreneur, it has undoubtedly risen 
for the larger entrepreneur. This is so because the number of 
standard units per individual has increased with ability. Also, in 
this market tile supplier captures the whole of consumer and 
producer surplus so that most entrepreneurs earn substantially 
more than the marginal rate. Finally, we are talking here of only 
one year's entrepreneurial activity, but established entrepreneurs 
are always earning rent from previous acts as well. Py~ng-ch'61 
Yi wiil, therefore, gain an expanding rental income even as 
marginal returns decline. 
In any event, we must remain agnostic as to whether tile 
supply or demand shifts dominate and will leave it to others to 
identify the change in marginal rent that has occurred in the 
course of Korean growth. Our purpose has been only to explain 
the shift in equilibrium quantity. 
SUMMARY 
We began this chapter by asking what lay behind the expan­
sion of entrepreneurship, and we phrased the question in terms 
of the traditional supply-aind-demand dichotomy. Our first 
major empirical observation was that what was to be explained 
was not primarily an increase in the number of entrepreneurs, 
but the magnitude of their individual successes. That is, growth 
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in output was not primarily due to a rise in the number of pro­
duction units but to an increase in their average unit size: 
small units were replaced by larger units, and existing firms ex­
panded and split to form offspring companies. This observation 
led us to reject (at least in their simpler versions) both the 
traditional competing hypotheses (supply versus demand 
dominance), since both focus on the quntitv of entrepreneurs. 
Our primary problem, on the other hand, is to explain an ex­
ploding volume of effective entrepreneurship with only a 
modest increase in the number of entrepreneurs. This means 
we must focus on entrepreneurial quality. 
Our interpretation is that the expansion of effective entre­
preneurial supply in Korea from 1961-1975 is to be explained 
as follows: 
1) The supply of individuals with entrepreneurial intent 
(those who attempt to succeed in business) increased only 
slightly. This supply is largely a function of demographic 
and sociological characteristics and its modest shift from 
1961 to 1975 was largely a result of demographic change 
(increased population, and greater exposure to entrf,­
preneurial opportunities through urbanization and educa­
tion). There may also have been a small increase due to 
increased prestige for business activity. 
2) The bulk of the increase in effective entrepreneurship 
came from qualitative improvements. Entrepreneurs' 
lenticular ability to combine the various entrepreneurial 
functions grew through learning by doing. The quality of 
performance of the individtual unctions grew with learning 
and functional differentiatioi, as more and more of the 
entrepreneurial tasks were solved by employees, the mar­
ket, government, or others. 
On the demand side, there was a critical one-time shift in the 
early 1960s as stability and belief in government d.dication to 
economic growth increased the expected return. Perhaps more 
important, the reduction of license-oriented, rent-seeking 
opportunities reduced the gap between private and social return 
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and meant that a given volume of effective entrcprencurship 
had a greater real growth effect and hcnce fed the virtuous 
circle of learning by doing on the supply side. Thereafter, 
demand shifts were smaller and slower, largely taking the form 
of a steady rxuction in the gap between potential demand (all 
opportunities at world prices) and effective demand (perceived 
opportunities at domestic prices). 
On both sides, the process may be summarized as one of 
reducing distortions in the entrepreneurial market so as to take 
advantage of the existing stock of entrepreneurial aspirations. It 
should be emphasized, however, that these distortions are not 
to be conventionally thought of as price phenomena3 ' but as 
information imperfections. The problem was not to increase the 
ex ante expected return to entrepreneurship, since even in the 
I 950s this was high enough to entice substantial entry of entre­
preneurial intent. Instead, the problem was to reduce the gap 
between expectations and ex post actuality by improving 
quality in the ways we have described. Given the paucity of 
prior a. ademic work in this area, definitive and detailed specifi­
cations of these changes are not possible, but we hope .is 
analytic framework has allowed us to identify the major trends 
behind the expansion. 
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Whether or not one accepts our theory of the workings of the 
entrepreneurial market, it is clear that there has been no short­
age. If a real 14 percent annual non-agricultural private growth 
rate over fifteen years represents a world-record-class entre­
preneurial performance, and if decision-making is thc scaicity 
that underlies all others in LDCs, then it is worth examining 
the training methods of the contenders. This chapter therefore 
goes behind the supply curve to identify the distinguishing 
characteristics of Korean entrepreneurs. We do not, however, go 
very far behind the curve, confining ourselves largely to observ­
able social background variables. Only limited reference is made 
to the more fundamental, but ephemeral, psychological factors. 
The emergence of a thriving entrepreneurial class in Korea is 
particularly intriguing, since it runs counter to the traditional 
value system. Confucianism places commerce and industry at 
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the bottom of the sa, iion,', k on., sai ' (scholar-official, farmer, 
artisan, merchant) status hierarchy. A variety of authors have 
deplored this deep-rooted attitude as inimical to modernization 
in East Asia. The following Korcan variant is typical: 
The traditional idea of Korean Confucianism did not have much 
respect for technical and physical or manual labour but rather 
despised this. Laboring for material production could not have the 
qualities of being the gentleman. Labour was the job only for a 
workman. Therefore, industrial techniques could never be developed 
. . . Trade and commerce, without being esteemed, even nominally, 
had been regarded as the meanest sort of work . . . Such ideas of the 
Korean traditional Confucianism should be thoroughly eliminated 
to make way for the ideological bases for democratic and liberal­
istic modernization. I 
After the fact, it is evident that this value system has hardly 
proved an insuperable obstacle. One should remember, in con­
sidering the genesis of Korean entrepreneurs, that the choice of 
business was neither easy nor obvious. 
We proceed in three stages. In the first, we compare the back­
ground of entrepreneurs to that of the population as a whole. 
Studies of many LDCs find that business leaders come from 
narrowly defined sub-strata of the population rather than being 
randomly distributed as Schumpeter would suggest.2 Korea has 
had over two thousand years of unified history in roughly its 
present borders with no significant influxes of foreign elements. 
The result is one of the world's most homogeneous populations, 
so the definition of minority groups must necessarily be more 
finely drawn than elsewhere. We consider provincial origin, 
religion, work history, parental occupation, and education as 
possible differentiating factors. The last two variables also must 
serve as weak proxies for class, since it is impossible to dis­
tinguish traditional status classes (that is, ycm ',bm, Ilyan. ball, 
t'oban, c/zn ,iiz, sWJI, sanpmin and ch '5nin1in) through survey 
techniques.' We also consider birth order as one readily ascer­
tainable component of some psychological theories. 
The second stage of our scarch will involve an attempt to 
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distinguish more successful entrepreneurs from less successful 
ones on the basis of social background and economic variables. 
The third stage consists of asking entrepreneurs themselves what 
their distinguishing characteristics are. We conclude with a dis­
cussion of the implications of the Korean case for theories of 
entrepreneurial supply. 
PROVINCE OF ORIGIN 
There are three reasons for considering province of origin4 
as a distinguishing characteristic of the entrepreneurial set. 
First, Korean folklore teaches that there are profound person­
ality differences between individuals from different provinces, 
and these might affect entrepreneurial behavior. Second, 
popular opinion holds that political favoritism conveys special 
advantages to those from certain provinces. Third, the group of 
northern refugees constitutes a highly visible candidate as a 
subordinated group that might find upward mobility in entre­
preneurial activity. 
There are indeed pronounced differences in the provincial 
propensity to spawn entrepreneurs. These are show i in Table 
37, which compares the distribution of our entrepreneurship 
sample with the distribution of the male population cohort. The 
main results are as follows: 
1) Kyngsang provinces (the southeastern provinces surround­
ing Pusan and including Taegu) dominate in absolute 
terms with roughly a quarter of the entrepreneurs born 
there. Since, however, approximately one-third of the male 
cohort originates in Ky~ngsang province, the province is 
actually underrepresented (share of entrepreneurs over 
share of cohort- Ep/Cp = 0.8). 
2) 	 In relative terms, northerners are the most heavily over­
represented (Ep/Cp = 4.93). Within the northern provinces, 
there is a marked difference between Hamgybng and 
P'yiigan (Ep/Cp = 6.6), and Hwanghae (Ep/Cp = 1.8). 
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3) Seoul is also heavily overrepresented (Ep/Cp = 4.3), while 
those born abroad (Ep/Cp = 2.6) and those from Kydnggi 
province (Ep/Cp = 1.7) are well above average. 
4) Ch'ungch'5ng, Ch'611a and Kangw(n provinces are heavily 
underrepresentcd, (though the differences within this 
group are not statistically significant). 
Overall, these differences are statistically significant,' but do 
they represent causality? That is, the correlations may be ex­
plained by: 
1) Provincial differences in sociological or psychological 
propensities that lead to business success; 
2) Cross-correlation with other variables (education, religion, 
and so on) that explain entrepreneurship; or, 
3) Government biases in favor of particular regions. 
No definitive answer will be attempted here, in part because of 
data limitations, and in part because the "other variables" 
might themselves be attributable to socio-psychological propen­
sities. Some insight into the question may be gained, however, 
by comparing the place of birth of entrepreneurs with that of 
other Korean elites, and by examining the cross-correlations 
with other variables. 
Table 38 gives the place of birth of various Korean elites 
(private entrepreneurs, private managers, public managers, pub­
lic bureaucrats, and politicians). The first, gross result is that 
similar distortions appear in the distribution of all elites.6 if 
bias in selection is the causal factor, it occurs across elites. It is, 
for example, often believed tat the current regime favors 
individuals from President Park's Ky~ngsang province. In fact, 
individuals from this area are underrepresented in all elite 
groups by factors ranging from 0.63 to 0.88. Further, the 
region's representation is highest for the group where any bias 
should have the least effect (private managers) and lowest 
where bias should be most effective (public managers). In any 
event, contrary to expectations, there is no evidence of pro-
Kyongsang province bias.7 Individuals born in the north, Seoul, 
Kyonggi province, and abroad are overrepresented in all elites, 
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TABLE 37 Place of Birth: Entrepreneurs and Male Cohort (%) 
Entrepreneursa Male Cohortb Ent./Cohort 
Location TotalC Youngd Olde Totalf Youngg Oldh Total Young Old 
South 
Seoul 16.2 22.9 14.8 3.8 4.9 2.8 4.26 4.67 5.29 
Province: 
KyZ'nggi 17.0 29.3 14.5 10.3 10.1 10.5 1.65 2.90 1.38 
KangwZn 1.0 0.0 1.2 6.0 5.9 6.2 0.17 - 0.19 
Ch'ung ch'ong 
Ky'ngsang i 
7.5 
26.1 
8.9 
20.2 
7.3 
27.3 
16.4 
32.2 
16.1 
32.6 
16.6 
31.9 
0.46 
0.81 
0.55 
0.62 
0.44 
0.86 
Ch'511a 6.7 3.0 7.4 24.9 25.7 24.2 0.27 0.12 0.31 
Cheju Island 1.6 3.0 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.45 2.73 1.30 
North 
Province: 
Hamgy-ng 7.2 0.0 8.6 1.1 0.6 1.6 6.55 - 5.38 
P'y-ngan 11.2 8.9 11.7 1.7 0.8 2.4 6.59 11.13 4.88 
Hwanghae 2.7 4.0 2.4 1.5 0.8 2.0 1.80 5.00 1.20 
Foreign 2.9 0.0 3.5 1.1 1.4 0.8 2.64 - 4.38 
TOTAL 100.1 100.2 100.0 100.1 100.0 100.0 - -
(n) (194) (36) (158) 
TABLE 37 (continued) 
Subtotals
 
North 21.1 12.9 22.7 4.3 6.5 6.0 4.91 1.98 3.78
 
South 76.1 87.3 73.8 94.7 92.1 93.2 0.80 0.95 0.79 
a 
Notes: Entrepreneurship Survey, see Appendix C.bEPB, 1960 Populationand Housing Census of Korea, Vol. 2; 20% Sample Tabulation Report (Seoul, 1963), pp. 44-45.
 
Born 1897-1947
 
Born 1935-1947
 
Born 1897-1934
 
,Born 1896-1950
 
,Born 1936-1950
 
Born 1896-1935
 
Including Pusan
The differences between the (total) entrepreneurship and cohort frequencies are statistically significant (after recombining northern 
provinces and Cheju Island plus foreign to yield adequate cell observations). 
X (.95,7) = 14.07<39.24 (calculated) 0 
TABLE 38 Place of Birth: Korean Elitesa 
P1'rc,',,tagcDistributionis Ratio to Male Cohorts' 
Private Private Public Private Pri'ate 'ublicEiitr(,-b MUaP1 Ma- Bureau- lPoliti- Etre- Ala,,- Alan- Bureau- Politi-Location prctmcurs agcrs agcrsc cratsd ciapis e prec~lur.: agers aqvrs crats cians 
Central f 34.5 29.0 45.9 25.9 22.8 1.72 1.44 2.28 1.29 1.17
24.8 28.4 20.2 23.6 24.5 0.77 0.88 0.63 0.73 0.77 =
 Southwesternh 17.0 26.0 18.5 24.7 28.8 0.40 0.61 0.44 0.58 0.69 :.Northern 21.2 14.2 14.8 14.4 21.7 4.93 3.30 3.44 3.35 3.62 1ZForeign 2.6 2.4 0.6 11.5 2.2 2.36 2.18 0.55 10.45 2.75 
TOTAL 100.1 100.0 100.0 100.1 100.0 
n 194 169 357 174 316 
Mean birth date 1925 1932 1924 1926 1915 
Notes: aThe distributions of all five groups are sign~ficantly different 2from that of their cohort (at the 5% level, X test). Pairwise dif­ferences among the elites ate significant except for private enterprise versus private manager and private manager versus bureaucrat. 
bEntrepreneurshlp Survey, see Appendix C. Unweighted results are reported here, since weighting yields only minor differences on thisquestion and the tedium of weighting the management results was avoided. 
,1iCHun Yu, Kopggijq i Two -5isallocjik pacgyt,m (Seoul. 1974). Survey covered presidents, vice presidents. auditors, and operating di­
rectors of 56 government enterprises. Data on place of birth was not published, but was kindly made available to us. 
dDong Suh Bark and Chac-Jin Lee, "Bureaucratic Elite and Development Orientations," in Political Lcadership in Korea, edited by Dae-
Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee (Seattle, 1976), p. 95. Sample consisted of 176 out of 203 senior central government officials who held Grade 
I-A positions as of January 1977. 
eBae Ho Hahn and Kyu Taik Kim, "The Political Leaders: Their Social Origins and Skills," in Kor,'a: AIl'attcr, of Political Development,
edited by C. 1. Eugene Kim (Kalamazoo. 1964). pp. 17-41. Population is diverse group of cabinet ministers, vice ministe s. congressionalleaders, ambassadors, service chiefs, and higher civil servants in Rhee, Chang Myon and early Military Governments. Response was 65%
with 89% of this from ministers, vice ministers and congressional leaders. 
fSeoul, Ky8nggi province, Kangw-on province. ItCh'ungch'ong and Cholla provinces, Cheju Island. 
gPusan, Ky-ongsang provinces. iMale cohort from Table 37. "Old" cohort for Politicans and "To­
tal" for other groups. 
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while those from Kangw~n, ChZlla, and Ch'ungch'dng provinces 
and Cheju Island are always underrepresented. 8 
The popular opinion of pro-Ky6ngsang province bias is un­
doubtedly heavily influenced by the origins of the heads of the 
larger and more conspicuous chaeb l (for example, PyZSng­
ch'61 Yi of Samsung, In-hoe Ku of Lucky, S~ng-gon Kim of 
Ssangyong, Hong-je Cho of Hyosung). To examine the extent 
of size bias, Table 39 gives the place of birth of the founders of 
the forty-six largest chaeb~l. These results suggest that Kyzng­
sang province is indeed more heavily represented among the 
largest entrepreneurs than among the entrepreneurial set as a 
whole. This may suggest some favoritism at the higher end of 
the scale, but the fact remains that Ky~ngsang province is 
represented almost proportionately to its share in the popula­
tion. Even anong chaebdl heads it is still those from the north, 
Seoul, and Ky6nggi province who are overrepresented. 
To return to the individual distortion factors in Table 38, 
one intriguing result is the particularly large share of public 
managers from Seoul and Kygnggi province. When this rate is 
broken down, the distortion is higher for those entrepreneurs 
from government financial institutions and for presidents and 
(operational) directors (as opposed to auditors and vice presi­
dents), but not by large amounts. It is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that there is a political bias in public enterprise 
appointment practices, but that these are )ot pro-Kyyngsang 
province, but pro-Seoul/Kyenggi province. 
The most striking degrees of overrepresentation are found in 
the northern group (3.30<Ep/Cp<5.0). 9 This is most likely 
attributable to one of two factors: 
1) (Un)natural Selection. Those who choose to flee a 
Communist regime will be disproportionately educated, 
wealthy, and from industrial and commercial back­
grounds; hence, the refugee population will be far more 
likely to appear in the entrepreneurial population. 
2) Social Blockage. Displaced persons may be from a sub­
ordinated social group, forcing them into innovative and 
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TABLE 39 Place of Birth: Chaebbl Founders 
ChaebWl Heads Ratio to Cohort 
Central 23.9 1.23 
Southeastern 32.6 1.02 
Southwestern 23.8 .57 
Northern 19.6 3.30 
Foreign 0.0 ­
99.9 
Number (46) 
Mean birth year (1916) 
Source: Survey of founders of 46 largest chaeb l; see Chapter 8. Male population 
cohiort (older group) from Table 37. Place of birth from: Chong-gi Pack and 
Yong-jung Pak, Chaebol sainsininyotn sa I turarna(Seoul., 1976). 
previously undesirable activity, in an effort to gain (or 
regain) social status. In the case of northern refugees, this 
motive might be enhanced by a traditionally unfavorable 
southern perception of northerners. To gain some insight 
into the northern overrepresentation among Korean 
elites, it is useful to compare the social origins of north­
ern and southern entrepreneurs, as given in Table 40. The 
two groups are seen to be similar in the level of their own 
and their fathers' education, the place raised (Seoul 
versus city versus village, and so on), job experience and 
male sibling rank. Major differences occur only for 
fathers' jobs and religion." ° Northerners were more 
heavily influenced by Christianity (30 percent versus 18 
percent) and correspondingly less influenced by tradi­
tional Buddhism and Confucianism (37 percent versus 
54 percent). More than one-third of the northerners' 
fathers had been engaged in some form of trade as 
opposed to only one-seventh of the southerners'. South­
erners were more likely to have come from landowning 
backgrounds (32 percent versus 15 percent) and industry 
(15 percent versus 9 percent). These and other dif­
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TABLE 40 North-South Differences in Social 
Backgrounda 
Mfeans t-tests 
North- South- Significance 
erners erners t-statistic level (%) 
Age (years) 51.49 48.97 1.68 9.5
 
Family size b 4.27 5.19 -2.47 1.4
 
Male sibling rank 1.92 1.89 0.32 74.8 
Own education (years) 13.76 14.16 -0.73 46.4 
Fathers' education (years) 5.43 6.13 -0.72 47.5 
Percentage 
Distribution X Test 
North- South- X2 Sta- Critical 
FormerJobsc erners erners tistic Value (5%) 
Government 17.9 20.3 
Military 10.3 10.2 
Financial institution 7.7 10.9 
Export-import 25.6 14.1 5.05 < 15.51 
Domestic trade 2.6 9.4 
Korean company 56.4 54.7 
Foreign company 7.7 4.7 
Public enterprise 7.7 7.0 
Other 28.2 29.7 
(number) (39) (128) 
Where RaiseI 
Seoul 34.0 31.9 
Other city 28.8 29.1 
Small town 11.3 16.1 1.51 < 9.49 
Village 20.6 16.6 
Abroad 5.2 6.4 
(number) (45) (147) 
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TABLE 40 (continued) 
Father'sJob 
Landowner 
Other farmerd 
Industry 
Government 
Te.ching 

Professional' 
Trade 
Other 
(number) 
f 
Religious Influence
Buddhism 
Confucianism 
Catholicism 
Protestantism 
(number) 
Percentage
 
Distribution X Test
 
North- South- X 2 Sta- Critical 
erners erners tistic Value (5%) 
14.6 23.4 
21.8 29.1 
8.8 15.4 25.56 > 14.07 
6.3 5.7 
7.5 1.4 
2.2 8.0 
36.7 13.6 
2.2 3.4 
(44) (149) 
41.8 58.7 
31.2 48.5 
22.5 14.1 7.62 7.81 
36.6 21.1 
(37) (130) 
Source: Entrepreneurship Survey, see Appendix C. 
Notes: asplit according to father's birthplace.
bNumber of brothers aid sisters. 
c 
Totals add to more than 100% since many respondents had more than one former job.
dLargely owner-operators, but includes a few tenants and other farmers. 
eincluding banking. 
"Percentage responding that indicated religion had some degree of influence on them. 
Totals do not equal 100% since an individual could be influenced by more than one 
religion. 
220 
Religion 
ferences are real, but even more important is that both 
groups had parental backgrounds decidedly atypical of 
the population as a whole. 
In sum, there seems to be surprisingly little evidence to 
support the hypothesis that northerners form a subordinate 
class who were socially blocked thereby forcing them into in­
dustrial entrepreneurship. Instead, it appears that, ifa sample of 
southerners were drawn with similar family backgrounds, they 
would be just as likely to be entrepreneurs as northerners." We 
conclude that northern overrepresentation in the entrepre­
neurial set, and among elites in general, is predominantly due 
to (un)natural selection among those who moved south, rather 
than by any particular characteristics of northerners as a whole 
or by any special drives of displaced persons. 
RELIGION 
Since Max Weber stressed the role of the "Protestant Ethnic" in 
the development of Western capitalism, religious minorities have 
been examined as potential sources of entrepreneurial supply. 
The search has been productive: in Pakistan, Islamic sub­
castes representing two-tenths of a percent of the population 
control 44 percent of industry; 2 in Lebanon, Christians are 
more than four times as likely to become entrepreneurs as are 
Moslems; 13 in Indonesia, Clifford Geertz showed that, on Bali, 
enterprise was led by a ruling Hindu-Buddhist minority, while in 
a Javanese town it was dominated by a small group of liberal 
Muslims; 14 elsewhere, the role of Jains in India and Quakers 
in the United States has been stressed.'" 
In Korea, the major religious minorities are the Protestants 
and Catholics 6 who were heavily persecuted under the Yi 
dynasty. They have since prospered and played a prominant 
role in national affairs. In politics, they were particularly visible 
in the Rhee period (Syngman Rhee was a Christian) and have 
been in the forefront of protest movements from the colonial 
221
 
Supply of Private Entrepreneurship 
independence movement to the 1970s' civil rights effort; in 
education, three of today's five finest universities in Seoul are 
Christian sponsored. The question here is whether or not the 
Christian minority has played a similarly disproportionate role 
in industrial growth. 
Unfortur.a, ly, it is surprisingly difficult to get an accurate 
picture of religious preference in Korea. Estimates of the 
Christian share of the population vary from 3.5 percent to over 
13 percent.' 7 This is due to the areligious proclivity of Koreans. 
That iF, when a Westerner is asked his religion, it takes a con­
scious act to say "none"; for a Korean, it takes a conscious 
dedication to specify anything other than "none." The result 
is that many individuals with a strong religious upbringing none­
theless express no religious preference. Since it is religious in­
fluence rather than stated religion that affects behavior, our 
survey asked each respondent to specify the strength of the 
influence of each religion. Results are given in Table 41 and 
confirm the low regard for religious influence; roughly half 
said that even Buddhism and Confucianism were "irrelevant." 
The translation of "influence" into "affiliation" for compara­
tive purposes is a highly conjectural task that is attempted in 
Table 42. The results suggest the following very tentative hypo­
theses: 
1) Christians constitute rather similar shares of the entre­
preneurial and bureaucratic elites. 
2) The Christian share in these elites is, if anything, higher 
than in the population as a whole'" but clearly less than 
in the political and professional elites. 
These shares may be the result of two conflicting pressures. 
On the one hand, Christians might be more likely to be entre­
preneurs as they are less traditional, may have greater access tj 
education, form a subordinated group, and are more heavily 
represented among the northern refugees. On the other hand, 
the moral absolutism of the churches may mitigate against 
participation in what was often seen to be necessarily shady 
business activity; further, Christians may come disproportion­
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TABLE 41 Influence of Religion on Businessmen 
(O) 
n=174
 
"How strong was the influence of each of the following religions for you?" 
Very strong Moderate Irrelevant 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Confucianism 10.4 8.8 19.0 6.0 55.8 100.0 
Buddhism 14.2 27.47.2 6.6 44.6 100.0 
Catholicism 2.2 1.6 7.4 4.9 83.8 99.9 
Protestantism 9.2 1.7 5.7 8.0 75.3 99.9 
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 99.9 100.0 
Source: Entrepreneurship Survey, see Appendix C. 
ately from lower-class social origins that are not represented 
in the entrepreneurial set. 
In sum, neither tile available data nor a priori theorizing alle v 
us to form definitive judgements on the degree of over or under­
representation of Christians in the business elite. The resulting 
agnosticism, however, in itself, yields a rather strong conclusion. 
Relative to other societies, religion plays an extremely minor 
role in differentiating the entrepreneurial elite from the popula­
tion as a whole. In part, this is due to the religious minority's 
conflicting attitudes towards business. Perhaps more important, 
the attitudes of the Buddhist-Confucian majority have proven 
to be business-neutral or weakly held, so that no comparative 
advantage is conferred on the non-traditional religious minority. 
INTERGENERATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL 
MOBILITY 
The parental occupation of industrial entrcpreneurs is of in­
terest since it: 1) Serves as a crude proxy for class origin; 2) Is 
indicative of the degree of sociai mobility in Korean society; and 
3) Suggests the degree to which entrepreneuial talent is ran­
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TABLE 42 Religious Affiliations of Businessmen 
(%) 
Protestant Catholic Buddhist Confucian None Other Total Sample 
I. Population 
A. Institution's claima 10.7 2.5 26.8 13.7 39.3 k 7.0 100.0 -
B. National surveyb 2.4 1A 4.6 0.7 91.1 0.1 100.0 -
C. Sample survey: husbandc 6.9 2.0 15.5 75.5 - 99.9 (490) 
D. Sample survey: wifec 10.6 2.1 21.9 65.3 - 99.9 (479) 
II. Comparison Groups 
A. Political leadersd 32.5 8.5 13.3 17.5 27.9 0.3 100.0 (316) 
B. Civil servants' 11.9 3.4 9.3 5.5 69.6 0.2 99.9 (1640) 
C. Civil servantsf 14.0 3.7 8.4 73.9 - 100.0 ( ?) 
D. Professors g 33.4 8.6 9.4 6.6 39.7 2.2 99.9 (761) 
III. Entrepreneurs 
A. Estimate #1h 9.9 3.0 15.7 13.9 57.5 0.0 100.0 (174) 
B. Estimate #2' 12.4 4.6 36.5 25.3 21.3 0.0 100.1 (174) 
C. Estimate #3 j 14.8 4.7 37.6 26.0 0.116.8 100.0 (174) 
Notes: Korea Gallup Statistical Institute, Statistical Yearbook: 1974 (Seoul, 1975), pp. 313-314. These data are apparently based on:nstitutional claims (e.g., the "other" category includes 429,000 members of the International Moral Association).bcited in Bae Ho Hahn and Kyu Taik Kim, pp. 17-41. 
TABLE 42 (continued) 
CBom Mo Chung, et a!., Boy Preference and Family Planning in Korea (Seoul, 1974), p. 156. Sample consists of married couples withwives aged 45 and under from Seoul middle and lower classes and rural areas.dBae Ho Hahn and Kyu Taik Kim, p. 31. 
CHoon Yu, "Social Background of Higher Civil Servants in Korea," KoreaiaQuarterly(Spring 1968), p. 51. 
fDong Suh Bark, "The Problem of Korean Higher Civil Servants-Their Social Background and Morale," Some Problemsin PublicAdmin­istrationin Developing Countries (Hawaii, 1966), pp. 1-21.
 
gSu'ngjik Hong, COJisigin 14 kach 'igwan yon'gu (Seoul, 1972), p. 194.
hAssumes that the indicated religion is the affiliation of those whose highest single level of influence (from Table 41) 
 was "1" or "2."
 
Same as h, but "1," "2," or "3." 
 ft 
JSame as h, but "I," "2," "3," or "4." 
kResidual. 
TABLE 43 Intergenerational Occupational Mobility in 
Entrepreneurs' Families 
(%) 
Occupation 
POPU-d 
ltion 
Entre-
preneurs' 
Fathers 
Entre-
preneurs' 
Grand-
fathers 
Managers' 
Fathersg 
Fathersof 
Young Older 
Entre- h Entre­
preneurs preneuri 
Landlord 2.9 e 21.4 28.9 10.9 17.7 22.1 
Owner-operator 9.4c 25.4 45.5 30.1 6.0 29.3 
Other farnera 67.8 2.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 2.4 
Manufacturing: owner 0.4 12.4 2.5 9.0 28.6 8.5 " 
Manufacturing: white collarb 0.1 3.5 0.8 6.4 6.4 2.3 
Retailer: owner 4.9 2.5 11.5 5.9 4.7 
Wholesale: owner 1.6 11.5 2.5 8.3 21.6 9.4 
Export-import: owner 2.6 0.0 0.6 3.0 2.5 
Government 
Teaching 
0.5 
0.1 
5.9 
3.8 
3.5 
3.5 
5.8 
5.1 
3.0 
0.5 
6.5 
3.8 
Professionalc 0.2 6.7 6.1 7.0 7.4 8.4 
Other 17.0 0.0 0.9 5.2 0.0 0.0 
TABLE 43 (continued) 
TOTAL 100.0 100.2 100.1 99.9 100.1 99.9 
Sample size 6,212 f 192 121 156 33 159 
Notes: aincludes pure tenants, mixed owner-tenants, agricultural laborers, and other agricultural occupations.bIncludes engineers, managers, and clerks. 
CIncluding banking, journalism, and politics.
dEconomically active Korean males. Calculated from 1930 Census which breaks down employment into 377 categories. ChOsen Sotokufu
Ch~sen kokusei chsa h5koku: 1930, pp. 246-265.
 
eThe distribution between "landlord" and "owner-operator" varies with the treatment of the mixed case of those who farmed a portion
of their land and rented out another portion. The population 
 census gives 0.3% of Korean males as living wholly on land rental incomeMand 12.0% - - owner-operators, but this latter category undoubtedly includes many who were really "landlords" using hired labor to farmpsomeof their own land. A uefrior breakdown is given in: Ch5sen S~tokufu, Chasen Satok fu rkei neinp-. As a share of Korean and)Japaneseagricultural househo heads, pure landlords are 0.7o, mixed landlord/owner-operators are 2.9%, and pure owner-operators are17.6%. We use these shares to roughly reapportion the population census totals. The resulting breakdown between "landlord" and owner­
operator is only approximate. 
fThousands. 
gUnweighted. 
hUnder 40 years of age. 
iForty and oldr. 
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domly distributed in society. Table 43 gives the ancestral occu­
pations obtained from our survey as well as a matching distri­
bution for the parental cohort taken from the 1930 census. 
In absolute terms, agriculture dominates, with half of entre­
preneurs' fathers and three-qcuarters of the grandfathers active in 
this sector. This is not surprising given the primitive state of the 
Korean economy in the 1930s. Only 16 percent of the fathers 
and 3 percent of the grandfathers were in manufacturing, so 
there is substantial intergenerational mobility into industry. 
This is a trivial form of mobility, however, and merely reflects 
the rapid structural change that has occurred in the Korean 
economy. 
Of considerably more interest is the opportunity for move­
ment from the masses to the "elite" (where we use "elite" to 
include those with high incomes or high influence as well as the 
traditional yawigban occupations). In this more fundamental 
sense, mobility is minimal. Entrepreneurs' fathers were large­
to-medium19 landowners (47 percent), merchants (19 percent), 
factory owners (16 percent), civil servants (6 percent), teachers 
(4 percent), or professionals (7 percent). Ninety-eight percent of 
the fathers thus came from occupational groups representing per­
haps 15 percent of the male Korean cohort. This figure actually 
understates the degree of concentration, since the categories are 
fairly broad. For example, wholesalers are more than twice as 
numerous as retailers in our samples but undoubtedly represent 
a far smaller, but wealthier, segment of the population. Simi­
larly, in agriculture the sample owner-operator group reported 
an average holding of 3.3 ch~ngbo whereas in 1937 only 7 per­
°cent of all farms were more than 2 chngbo. Since 18 percent 
of farm households werc owner-operations in 1929, it seems 
clear that, even within the owner-operator group, it was primarily 
the larger holders who produced entrepreneurs." We may there­
fore safely conclude that very few entrepreneurs have risen 
from the poor masses represented by tenant farmers and rural 
and urban laborers. The industrial elite were recruited from the 
pre-industrial elite rather than from society as a whole. 2 
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This result may seem to be contradicted by some of the rags­
to-riches Horatio Alger stories given in our case studies of 
individual entrepreneurs. The paradox is resolved by recalling 
the general level of poverty and deprivation during the Japanese 
period. Even someone in the ninetieth percentile of the Korean 
income distribution in 1930 would be in poverty by today's 
standards. An individual from a relatively poor background 
could indeed raise himself through heroic effort to obtain the 
requisite education. Such cases are the exception rather than 
the rule, however, since under the Japanese it was difficult 
enough for even the upper-middle classes to obtain an education. 
Today's entrepreneurs indeed often came fron backgrounds 
that were poor in an absolute sense but which were, nonethe­
less, well-off relative to their Korean peers. 
To what extent las social background changed over time? 
Table 43 shows that younger entrepreneurs (under 40) come 
from quite different backgrounds from their elders, with nearly 
tw, thirds having parents in trade or manufacturing (compared 
wi- n just over a quarter for the older group). This is a rather 
more dramatic change than one would expect from tile shift 
in industrial structure alone, and indicates that tile base of 
recruitment is, if anything, narrowing rather than broadening. 
In any event, there is still little evidence of substantial recruit­
ment from the poorer segments of society. 
How does the social mobility into the industrial elite compare 
with that of other elites? Available evidence is summarized in 
Table 44.3 Managers come from backgrounds that are similar to 
entrepreneurs, the only major difference being that half as 
many come from the landlord class. Differences between entre­
preneurs and civil servants are somewhat more pronounced. 
For obvious reasons, entrepreneurs are twice as likely to come 
from industrial or commercial backgrounds and civil servants 
thrice as likely to come from bureaucratic origins. The landlord 
class has three times the representation among entrepreneurs 
(21 percent versus 7 percent) reflecting the conversion of 
agricultural to commercial capital. There are also more blue 
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TABLE 44 Comparative Intergenerational Occupational 
Mobilitya 
Landlord 
Independent farmer 
Tenant farmer and other agricultural 
Industry and commerce: owners 
NjIndustry and commerce: white collar 
Industry and commerce: blue collar 
Government 
Teaching 
Professional 
Other 
Total 
Sample size 
Mean birth date of sons 
Fathersof 
Civil PrivateProfessorsb Servantsc Entrepreneurs 
18.5 6.9 21.4 
22.9 40.7 25.4 
4.2 7.6 2.0 
18.8 16.0 31.4 
4.3 4.1 3.5 
- 2.2 0.0 
9.0 17.5 5.9 
6.5 2.2 3.8 
9.2 2.2 6.7 
6.5 0.7 0.0 
99.9 100.0 100.1 
(761) (583) (192) 

1925 1924 1925 

PrivateManagersd 
10.9 21 
30.1 
0.0 , 
29.4Z. 
6.4 
1.9 
5.8 
5.1 
7.0 
3.3 
(156)
 
1932
 
Notes: aThe mean birth date of the civil servants (1923) is sufficiently similar to that of the entrepreneurs and professors (1925) to per­
mit direct comparison, while the private managers are somewhat younger.
bs 'ng-jik Hong. p. 196. 
CHoon Yu, "Social Backgrounds of Higher Civil Servants," p. 39. 
dSee Table 43. 
99.9 
Education 
collar and tenant far -ier backgrounds among civil servants (10 
percent versus 2 percent). Professors are similar to private entre­
preneurs and differ from civil servants in having a heavy land­
lord background (19 percent). 
These differences notwithstanding, the dominant feature of 
all the backgrounds is their similarly narrow bases. Modern 
administrative, industrial, and educational elites come from 
somewhat different elements within the traditional elite, but all, 
nonetheless, recruit from a very narrow stratum of society.24 
EDUCATION 
Closely related to the narrow recruitment of Korean elites is 
the critical role of education in Confucian society. Internation­
ally, business leaders are not generally thought of as paragons of 
academic achievement, and, in Korea, popular opinion also 
holds that entrepreneurs are not particularly well educated. In 
fact, Korean business leaders are extraord-larily well educated, 
in both an absolute and a relative sense. As shown in Table 45, 
nearly 70 percent of our sample had some college education, a 
level attained by less than 10 percent of the male cohort. At the 
other end of the scale, only 3 percent of the entrepreneurs had 
a primary education or less, compared with 65 percent of the 
coort. Compared to the Korean norm, entrepreneurs constitute 
part of the minority educated elite. 
Since government is the traditional occupational choice of 
the educated, it is of particular interest to look at educational 
attainment within the elite and compare entrepreneurs with 
civil servants. Somewhat surprisingly, Table 45 shows that there 
is no significant difference between the levels of education of 
entrepreneurs and higher civil servants of similar age. Public­
enterprise managers are even better educated, with 84 percent 
having a college background. It should be stressed that we are 
here dealing largely with the first generation of entrepreneurs. 
The second generation is still better educated. Our admittedly 
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TABLE 45 Comparative Educational Attainment 
(%) 
HigherCivil Chaebo-7 Public 
Levela Entrepreneur Cohort b ServantsC Leadersd Managerse 
None 0.0 29.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Primary 3.1 35.9 5.0 8.9 0.0 
Secondary 27.8 26.1 32.3 40.0 15.8 
College and junior college 60.8 59.1 37.8 ,
Post graduate 8.3 8.6 59.1 
___ 
___3.6 13.3 8. 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sample , (194) 
- (1564) (45) (357) 
Mean birth date 1925 
­ 1923 1916 1924 
Notes: Including those who dropped out during each level as well as graduates. t bEducational attainment by year of birth from: EPB, 1970 Population and Housing Census Report (Seoul, 1972), 1, 164-165. Aggre­
gated using weights approximating age distribution of entrepreneurial sample.CHoon Yu, "Social Background of Higher Civil Servants," p. 41. This is the educational attainment at time of initial appointment, so it 
underestimates actual attainment, particularly at the graduate level.dSample consists of founders of leading chaebl groups as described in Chapter 8. Basis is "graduation" rather than "attendance," so fig­
ures are not consistent with other series. Source: Ch'n'guk Ky~ngjein Yinhaphoe, Han'guk ky'6ngje y 'gam 1 973 (Seoul, 1974).
eHun Yu, Konggi:p imwtnL'yzi sahoefjk paegy ng (Seoul, 1974), p. 41. 
Education 
small sample of entrepreneurs under forty have an average edu­
cational attainment of 16.2 years (versus 13.6 for older entre­
preneurs), with half graduating from the elite Seoul National 
University. 
The possibility of response bias must be considered. As one 
check, consider the published level of graduation for major 
chaebr6l leaders, also given in Table 45. Given their level of pub­
lic recognition, exaggeration is more likely to be detected, and 
indeed they appear less well-educated than our sample. Note, 
however, that the reporting basis for chaeb-ol leaders is "gradua­
tion" instead of the "attendance" basis used for other groups. 
Since a large portion of our sample would have been at the 
college level during the chaotic 1940-1953 period, dropouts are 
common, and the chaebol figures would be significantly higher 
on an attendance basis. Further, the mean age of chaebSl 
founders is nine years older than that of the entrepreneurs, and 
this explains a further share of the gap. Ever, if maximum 
response bias is assumed and the chaebl figures are taken as 
representative, the entrepreneurs' education level remains many 
times that of the cohort and only marginally below that of civil 
servants. 
Quality, however, must be considered in addition to quantity. 
In Korea, there are strictly held notions as to the desirability of 
various universities. This ranking may or may not correlate 
with the quality of education actually received, but we utilize 
it as the only available proxy for quality, however crude. Table 
46 gives the institutions of higher education that each group 
attended. Seoul National University (SNU)-the pinnacle of the 
system-produced roughly 35 percent of both the civil servants 
5and the public-enterprise managers 2 and 25 percent of the 
entrepreneurs. Similar shares attended Yonsei, Korea, and 
foreign universities, leaving entrepreneurs more heavily repre­
sented in the "other" category (44 percent versus 32 percent 
for civil servants). There is thus a noticeable difference in the 
institutional quality of the two groups. The difference, however, 
amounts to only having 10 percent more of the civil servants 
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TABLE 46 Institutions of Higher Education Attended 
by Korean Elites 
(%) 
Political 
Political Leaders 
Entre-
Higher 
Civil 
Public 
Alan-
Leaders 
Liberal 
Demo-
cratic 
Older 
Entre-
Younger 
Entre­preneurs Servantsa agersb Periodc Periodc preneurs preneurs 
Seoul National University 25.0 34.6 31.6 8.2 14.8 20.7 50.8 
Korea University 6.5 5.7 3.3 0.8 6.8 6.6 6.1 
Yonsci University 
Other Seoul university 
5.1 
23.4 
5.5 
19.4 
2.1 
19.6 
2.5 2.7 6.0 
21.2 
0.0 
37.0 
Provincial university 7.9 15.0 7.1 9.8 14.9 8.2 6.2 
College 
Japanese university 
12.9 
15.2 
-
9 
-
17.1 45.9 32.4 
15.1 
17.8 
0.0 
0.0 
Other foreign university 
Military academy 
2.5f 
1.3 
19.7 
0.0 
2.9 
16.2 
26.7 
6.6 
25.7 
2.7 
2.9 
1.5 
0.0 
0.0 
Total 100.0 99.9 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sample 84 974 240 148 86 72 12 
N a 
Mean birth date 1925 1923 1924 1906 1908 
Notes: Hoon Yu, "Social Background of Hiher Civil Servants," p. 46.bHun Yu, Koizggi~p imw*h, z7sahoejrkpaegyong (Seoul, 1974), p. 4 7 .Bae Ho Hahn and Kyu Taik Kim, pp. 17-41. 
Education 
from SNU rather than less well-known institutions. Given the 
bias towards civil service employment, the striking feature of 
the comparison is not the difference but the similarity. Korean 
entrepreneurs are well-educated, even by the high standards of 
the civil service. 
Now that a correlation between entrepreneurial activity and 
education has been established, we must addres: the question of 
causality. This is, as always, a highly conjectural task, as demon­
strated by the following range of alternative explanations. At 
one extreme, it may be argued that there is no causation what­
soever. Given the parental value placed on education in a 
Confucian socicty, it will be achieved by anyone with half-a­
brain, a little personal drive, and a family who can afford it. 
Anyone with the underlying personal and family characteristics 
necessary for entrepreneurship will therefore acquire an educa­
tion along the way. Education may thus merely be a proxy for 
these characteristics and makes no independent contribution. 
While there is substantial truth in the foregoing view of educa­
tion as a "validation" mechanism, it is, nonetheless, possible to 
identify several components of the educational process that 
might be expected to have positive marginal products. 
1) 	Given the respect accorded education in Korea, it is ex­
tremely difficult for an uneducated man to manage edu­
cated men (unless they are of a younger generation), and 
hence the uneducated would have a comparatively diffi­
cult time in running an enterprise of any significant size. 
2) 	 For the reasons just given, as well as the advantages con­
ferred by membership in the close-knit network of school 
ties, it is difficult for the uneducated to manage effectively 
the critical relationships with government. 
3) 	 Given Korea's export orientation, education is necessary to 
provide the breadth of perspective and urbanity necessary 
for dealing with foreigners. 
4) 	While the skills formally taught in school may not be 
critical for small-scale enterprise, their importance increases 
exponentially with the size of the enterprise. 
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5) Even if one learns no skills in school, the Korean educa­
tional system instills values of competitiveness and dili­
gence that are essential to entrcpreneurial success. That is, 
until recently, the highly competitive examinacion system 
for school entrance resultcd in such pressures that even 
elementary school children had many hours of homework 
per night with tutors. 
In comparing these features with educational systems else-. 
where, the third and fourth factors (imparting skills and breadth 
of perspective) are neutral in being c:)mmon to education every­
where. The first two (providing status and allies in dealing with 
subordinates and government) are perhaps negative in compari­
son with an impersonal merit system. It is possible however, to 
argue that the fifth is critical in explaining the extraordinary 
Korean growth rate-the long-hours, tenacity, and competitive­
ness that characterize Korean expansion into world markets 
may be directly traceable to the values instilled by the harshly 
disciplinariani traditional educational system. 
Even the "validation" view of education confers an advantage 
on the Korean system. Where putative entrepreneurs are neces­
sarily exposed to technical skills and ;:oadened horizons 
(factors three and four), the ultimate scope of their entrepre­
neurial endeavors is unconstricted. In comparison, where 
achievement-oriented individuals can drop out with impunity, 
business success is far more likely to be confined to small-scale 
domestic activity. The Korean obsession with education, re­
flected in the high level of education of Korean entrepreneurs, 
is thus an important explanatory factor underlying the rapid 
industrialization. 
FATHER'S EDUCATION 
The degree of education of entrepreneurs' fathers is of interest 
(together with their occupation) as a crude proxy for class 
background. Table 47 shows that the fathers are significantly 
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TABLE 47 Fathers' Educational Attainment: 
Ent: .­ neurs and Male Cohort 
(%) 
Level 
Integrateda 
Entrepreneurs Cohortb 
Segregateda 
Entrepreneurs Civil Servantsc 
None 
Primary 
Secondary 
37.1 
25.3 
22.2 
72.7 
18.5 
6.9 
37.1 
18.6 
19.1 
9.2 
24.5 
32.3 21 
Higher 
Confucian 
15.4 
____10.8 
1.9 14.4 16.4 
17.6 
TOTAL 
Sample 
Mean years 
100.0 
194 
6.0 
100.0 
-
100.0 
194 
6.0 
10 0 
? 
-
Notes: a"Integrated" listing incorporates those with Confucian education according to the corresponding number of years of school­ing, while "segregated" listing gives Confucian separately.bSame 
as note c to Table 46,assuming fathers are 30 years older than entrepreneurs. 
CDong Suh Bark, "The Problem of Korean Higher Civil Servants," pp. 1-21. 
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better educated than their peers, but by a substantial-y smaller 
margin than their sons. Fifty-two percent of the fathers had no 
education or only a primary education versus 81 percent of the 
male cohort. Further, entrepreneurs' fathers had significantly 
less education than civil servants' fathers although the sons' 
education levels were similar. In addition, 11 percent of entre­
preneurs' fathers versus 18 percent of civil servants' fathers had 
the traditional Confucian education. If education is a proxy for 
class, it follows that entrepreneurs' families have shown signifi­
cant upward mobility in two generations. 
This result is consistent with Man-Gap Lee's a priori theoriz­
ing that it is not the yaigban class that is most likely to produce 
entrepreneurs, but the hyaigbaii (that is, the class of former 
yaniqban whose status has deteriorated over several generations 
of rural residence). 6 This group is wealthy enough to retain 
the essential access to education, but their fringe social status 
makes them more likely to take risks and enter non-traditional 
endeavors in an effort to move up the social scale. 
WORK HISTORY 
The work history of our reduced sample is generally unremark­
able, as shown in Table 48. Entrepreneurs had a mean work 
history of some 22 years, of which 7.5 had been spent in the 
present company. Over the entire period, they spent a mean of 
8.5 years in each of 2.5 jobs. While this is a stable occupational 
pattern by Western standards, it is much more mobile than in 
Japan, where executives typically stay with a single company 
for life and average 1.8 jobs in a career."1 
As is natural, a majority of the entrepreneurs had experience 
in manufacturing (64 percent), or trading (23 percen,) before 
going into business for themselves. Nearly 20 percent had 
previous government experience, reflecting the close govern­
ment-business ties described in Chapter 4. Interestingly, less 
than 13 percent of the entrepreneurs had any kind of military 
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TABLE 48 Work History of Entrepreneurs 
(%) 
II. Number of FormerJobs 
I. Type of Worka Number ofJobs % Entrepreneurs 
Government 19.2 0 7.7
 
Military 12.6 1 
 46.7 
Officer 5.5 2 33.0 
Enlisted 4.9 3 8.2 
Foreign 2.2 4 3.3
 
Trading company 23.1 5 1.1
 
Domestic 7.7 100.0 
Export-Import 15.4 n 182 
Financial institution 5.5 
Irdustrial company 63.7 
Private 51.1 
Government 7.1 
Foreign 5.5 
Professional 4.9 
Other 25.8 
Source: Entrepreneurship Survey, see Appendix C. 
Note: aPercent of 182 respondents having previously worked in the indicated field.Total exceeds 100% as half the respondents had had more than one previous job, as 
snown in Part II. 
service, despite the fact that the majority were of military age 
during the Korean War. This, however, is less a reflection on 
businessmen than on the elftes in general, since during the 
1950s (unlike tile present) it was relatively easy to avoid 
military service. 
FAMILY STRUCTURE 
We have thus far examined the extent to which entrepreneurs' 
family backgrounds differ from those of society as a whole. We 
239
 
Supply ofPrivateEntrepreneurship 
now ask whether or not entrepreneurs comne froin a unique 
position within the family. That is, in the West it ha, been 
shown that first children are treated differently from their 
siblings, producing a distinct personality type measurable in 
disproportionate represeatation in certain high-status profes­
sions. In Korea, unique treatment is accorded the first male, 
and it is of interest to see how this affects representation in 
the entrepreneurial set. 
Korean custom holds that first sons should establish a base for 
maintaining the family line. If the parental occupation is 
prestigious, it should be followed; if not, the ideal is to move 
into traditionally respected government service. Striking out on 
an entrepreneurial venture of dubious repute and some risk 
might be fine for a second son, but not for the conservator of 
the lineage. This line of reasoning is further reinforced by 
casual empiricism (large numbers of prominent chaeb6l found­
ers are second sons) and by geomancy, which predicts greater 
success for first sons in China but for second sons in Korea. 28 
Interestingly, our empirical results run counter to these 
expectations. Table 49 shows that, while entrepreneurs have 
virtually the same number of siblings as their cohort, first sons 
are heavily overrepresented. Fifty-two percent of entrepreneurs 
are first sons versus 37 percent of the cohort, and the difference 
in the overall distributions is statistically significant. 
How is this gap between reality and popular perception to 
be explained? Four hypotheses may be tentatively advanced. 
First, at the psychological level tile treatment accorded first 
sons may produce a personality type with an entrepreneurial 
bent, and this internal pressure niay dominate tile external 
pressure for more a conservative career choice.29 Second, 
at the historical level it may be that blockage in traditional 
occupations drove first sons into a second-best solution for 
maintaining the family line. That is, land reform precluded the 
role of landed gentry and created excess demand for civil 
servant positions, with the surplus moving into business. Third, 
for the youngest entrepreneurs in the sample, there may be no 
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TABLE 49 	Family Structure: 
Entrepreneurs and Male Cohort 
(%) 
CohortaEntrepreneurs 
Mean sibling number 4.98 4.88 
Male sibling rank 
1 51.58 37.02 
2 27.37 28.11 
3 11.58 18.39 
4 5.26 9.84 
5 1.58 4.40 
6 2.11 1.61 
7 0.53 0.62 
TOTAL 100.00 99.99 
Calculatedb X2 = 21.39 
Critical X2 (.95,4) = 9.49 
Notes: awe know of no direct data on male sibling rank order, so we constructed 
an indirect estimate from data on children born by age group in: EPB, Preliminary
Report of 1975 Population and Housing Census (Seoul, 1976), pp. 110-111. As­
sumes entrepreneurs' mothers are 30 years older than entrepreneurs, and that malebirths are 50% of total births regardless of number of children. This procedure
somewhat underestimates the number of small families, since it is based on survivors 
gnd excludes mothers who die before completing child-bearing years. 
Based on 5 categories, collapsing ranks 5 and above. 
conflict. Attitudes towards business as a career have changed 
dramatically over the last decade, since success has bred accep­
tance. Lastly, first sons are given preference in education, with 
the rest of the family sacrificed if necessary. Given the cru­
ciality of education, one would expect more first sons in 
business, other things being equal. 
As economists, we shall judiciously refrain from pushing these 
lines of argument any further. It is hoped that our social science 
brethren, (or perhaps the geomancers) will explain the causal 
mechanism behind our finding that entrepreneurs are not 
randomly selected within the family. 
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CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCCESSFUL,
 
ENTREPRENEURS
 
Thus far we have been concerned with distinguishing the back­
ground of the entrepreneurial set from that of the population 
as a whole. Now we wish to ascertain whether or not the same 
characteristics serve to distinguish more successful entrepre­
neurs within the entrepreneurial set. Since our variables are now 
linked to discrete observation points (as opposed to the popula­
tion as a whole where we know, say, education level and family 
background, but not how they are associated on a case-by-case 
basis), we can utilize multiple regression techniques rather than 
partial correlation. The effort, however, will be exploratory 
and of a low order of sophistication, since we have little theory 
on which to build a model. 3" 
As a dependent variable, we need a measure of entrepreneurial 
success. Alternatives used here are: 
1) Profits (PROFITS). In the pure economic theory of the 
firm, the measure of success should be the absolute 
level of return to entrepreneurial endeavor. That is, 
economic rent earned by the entrepreneur, or net profit 
after taxes less the opportunity cost of capital plus (or 
minus) the surplus (or deficit) of his compensation over 
the opportunity cost of his time in non-entrepreneurial 
activity. As a very crude first approximation, we utilize 
available data on net profit before taxes. 
2) Profitability (PROFBLE). The rate of return on assets is 
of interest as a popular measure of entrepreneurial suc­
cess and also provides an alternative approximation to 
rent by crudely adjusting the profit level for the (uniform 
across firms) opportunity cost of capital. 
3) Value Added (VALADD). In the behavioral theory of the 
firm, the entrepreneur may be interested in power and 
control rather than pure personal monetary reward. 
Success is then measured by size, rather than rent. Value 
added is the preferred measure of economic size. 
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4) Assets (ASSETS). An alternative measure of size. 
5) Employment (EMPLOYEE). An alternative measure of 
size. 
6) Growth (GROWTH). Success may also be construed as 
a trend rather than a level. As a proxy, we use annual 
average rate of growth of productive capacity. 
As independent variabies we are primarily interested in the 
effects on success of the social background factors already 
discussed. Accordingly, w.2 utilize dummy variables for regional 
origin, education, religion, and father's occupation, as follows: 
1) DNORTH. If father's birth place was in the north. 
2) DSEOUL. If father's birth place was in Seoul or Ky6nggi 
province. 
3) DKYONG. If father's birth place was in Kyrngsang 
province or Pusan. 
4) DCOLL. If college graduate. 
5) DCHRIST. If Protestant or Catholic influence was other 
than irrelevant. 
6) DFJIND. if father's occupation was in manufacturing. 
7) DFJCOM. If father's occupation was in commerce. 
8) DFJLAND. If father's occupation was landlord. 
Second, the degree of entrepreneurial reward should be 
affected by the degree of innovation in the production effort. 
Accordingly, we introduce a dummy variable: 
9) DINNOV. If product or production process was new to 
Korea. 
Third, success may vary with the degree of privileged access 
to resources. John Harris suggests this may be measured by the 
size of the original plant.31 Accordingly, we include: 
10) ORIEMPL. Original numl'er of employees at establish­
ment. 
Finally, success may be affected by the industry or activity 
initially chosen. Accordingly, we define: 
11) EXPORT2. Current share of exports in sales. 
12) DTEXT. If producer of textiles or clothing. 
13) DCHEM. If producer of chemical products. 
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TABLE 50 Entrepreneurial Success: Regression Summaries' 
A. Linear Specification 
.--De endent 
lndependent PROFITS PROFBLE GROWTH ASSETS KA LA DD EIPLOYEE 
R2 
F b 
EXPORT2 
DTEXT 
DCHEM 
DMETAL 
DFOOD 
DWOOD 
DFJLAND 
DNORTH 
ORIEMPL 
DSEOUL 
DKYONG, 
DCOLL 
DCHRIST 
DFJIND 
DFJCOM 
Constant 
0.0914 
0.0093 
1.1128 
e 
() 
() 
(H) 
() 
() 
() 
0.0574 
-0.0278 
0.6735 
d 
(_)
() 
() 
0.1190 
0.0393 
1.4941 
d 
() 
(-) 
(_) 
d 
(_) 
(-) 
() 
0.2227 
0.1525 
3.1706 
e 
d 
f 
(-) 
() e 
- (-) 
() 
0.1111 
0.0308 
1.3833 
d 
(_) 
( 
() 
0.4501 
0.4005 
9.0597 
e 
H 
(-) 
f 
(-)(-) 
d 
d 
(-) 
TABLE 50 (continued) 
B. Log-Linear Specification 
Indepenentr PROFITS PROFBLE GROI'ThI ASSETS VALADD EMPLOYEFE 
R2 
R" 
b 0.1651 0.0730 0.0999 0.1946 0.1302 0.337'0.0897 
-0.0108 0.1852 0.12182.1890 0.8712 0.0519 0.27/11.2278 2.6733 1.6607 5.6279
 
EXPORT2 (-) d (-) ()DTEXT () ()DCHEM 
 (-)DMETAL () (_) (-)DFOOD (-) e 
DWOOD
 
DFJLAND c (-) d ()DNORTH 
 () (_) f 
ORIEMPL d
DSEO UL ( ) () ( ) ( ) (-) 
DKYONG 
 (-) () eDCOLL (-) (-) (-) (-) dDCHRIST () () ()DFJIND e (-) () ()DFJCOM H d () ()Constant () 
Source: Entrepreneurship Survey. see Appendix C. 
Notes: In exploratory work such as this, little meaning is to be attached to the magnitudes of the regression coefficients. Accordingly,we report only the sign and level of significance of the coefficients. 
bCorrected for degrees of freedom. There were 181 valid observations. 
COverall F-test. Equations significant at 5% level are indicated by underlining. Significance ( .05 levcl.dSignificance a .10 level. fSignificance (@.01 level. 
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14) DMETAL. If producer of basic metals or metal products. 
15) DFOOD. If producer of foodstuffs. 
16) DWOOD. If producer of wood or paper products. 
Since we are without priors as to the functional form of the 
relationship, we experimented with both linear and log-linear 
forms. The results, given in Table 50, are informative only for 
their impressive lack of explanatory power. Seven of the twelve 
specifications fail the F-test (5 percent level) meaning the 
multiple R2 does not significantly differ from zero. Of the 
remaining five equation ;, the corrected multiple correlation 
coefficient (R2) ranges from 0.09 to 0.04 with the bulk of the 
explanatory power (85 percent in the case of R2=0.40) coming 
from the single EMPLOYEE variable. This is not informative, 
as it simply says that current size is correlated with size at 
founding. Other individual regression coefficients are never 
significant (at the 5 percent level) in more than three of the 
twelve equations and often change sign even when significant. 
It would be difficult to imagine a less robust set of coefficients. 
It would undoubtedly be possible to alter our specification 
and come up with a somewhat better fit, but we believe the 
major point is apparent from this initial effort. That is, social 
background variables that distinguish entrepreneurs from non­
entrepreneurs do not, in Korea, serve to distinguish more 
successful from less successful entrepreneurs within th,,! set. 
Upon reflection, this is nol so surprising. It may well be, for 
example, that, compared with the U.S. population as a whole, 
economists have more schooling and different religious and 
political affiliations, but these variables do not corilate with 
publication records. There are two reasons for this. First, 
entry or validation criteria, such as education, are widely 
shared by all members of the set and do not serve to distinguish 
among them. Second, th-e social background factors are all 
intermediary rather than fundamental variables. That is, entre­
preneurial success is a function of personal characteristics that 
may be fostered in a variety of social backgrounds. Given the 
proper nutritive environment, the strength of development of 
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those characteristics is not measured by simple group variables 
such as father's occupation. To distinguish the characteristics 
of successful entrepreneurs, we must measure underlying per­
sonality variables rather than rely on proxy group variables. 
SELF-PERCEPTION OF ENTREPRENEURS 
While we have made no effort to measure directly the person­
ality characteristics of the entrepreneurs, we did ask several 
questions designed to reveal their own perception of their 
species. Answers to such questions are typically self-serving and 
must be heavily discounted, but some of the responses are, 
nonetheless, informative. 
The first self-perception question was specifically on the 
characteristics that distinguish successful entrepreneurs from 
their less successful brethren. Results are summarized in Table 
51. The top ranking of "hard work" may be suspect relative to 
some of the other factors, but there can be no doubt that 
Koreans work long hours by international standards. Respond­
ents report that their ordinary employees average 52 hours 
weekly, their senior staff 53, and they themselves 542 Judging 
by the expressed opinions of foreign visitors, these estimates 
are, if anything, conservative. The long hours of entrepreneurs 
not cnly distinguish successful from unsuccessful entrepreneurs 
but are characteristic of the entire economic system. As one 
example, the regular working hours of the senior staff of the 
most rapidly growing chaeb-o1, Daewoo, are from 8:00 a.m. to 
7:00 p.m. To staff its thirty-six foreign branches, necessary 
language training is provided from 6:00 to 8:00 a.m. daily, with 
an), absences "affecting promotion." 
To return to Table 51, the high ranking of "scientific think­
ing," the bottom ranking of "good luck," and the low ranking 
of "government relations" would seem as much due to image 
building as to fact. The high ranking of "skill in handling people" 
is noteworthy and probably is an accurate representation of its 
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TABLE 51 Businessmen's Perceptions of Success 
Characteristics 
Question: "How important do you think the following factors are in 
distinguishing successful Korean entrepreneurs from those 
who are less successful?" 
Ranking: successful have successful have 
much more some more same some less much less 
1 2 3 4 5 
Mean Responses: 
Value Addeda Established 
Pre- Post-
All Large Small 1963 1968 
Conscientious hard work 1.49 1.50 1.45 1.30 1.54 
Ritional and scientific thinking 1.56 1.50 1.95 1.90 1.41 
Skill in handling subordinates, 
peers, and superiors 1.61 1.58 1.80 1.66 1.63 
On-the-job training and 
experience 1.94 1.96 2.20 2.10 1.94 
Intelligence 2.15 2.10 2.15 2.07 2.02 
Willingness to make unpopular 
decisions 2.24 2.23 2.10 2.00 2.35 
Good network of friends 2.38 2.34 2.65 2.43 2.35 
Good formal education 2.56 2.48 3.05 2.43 2.50 
Skill in handling government 
officials 2.86 2.80 3.15 2.80 2.96 
Willing to take risks 3.20 3.20 3.10 2.90 3.51 
Greater personal or family 
capital 3.41 3.51 3.05 3.33 3.30 
Good luck 3.56 3.52 3.81 3.47 3.46 
Sample Size (118) (98) (20) (30) (54) 
Source: Entrepreneurship Survey, see Appendix C. There were no significant differ­
ences between the iean when broken down by age or export share. 
Notes: aLarge" firins are those wih se valeti added placed them in the top quintile 
of 311 firm sample. --Snall" firms are the remainder. 
Single uindcrlining = t test significant (a.05 level. 
Double tideriinig E t test significant (a .01 level. 
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importance in Confucian society. The modest role of "formal 
education" reflects the fact, noted earlier, that mo: entre­
preneurs are relatively well educated and differences in this 
variable do not serve to distinguish the better entrepreneurs. 
The low value placed on "personal and family capital" is not 
simply an affirmation of the "self-made" man. Rather, we take 
it as an accurate reflection of the ready access to capital afforded 
by the Korean financial system. 3 What is noteworthy in this 
response is that there is only a modest, though significant, 
difference between large and small firms in this regard. Another 
low-ranked item meriting comment is "willingness to take risks." 
The Korean entrepreneurs do not perceive themselves as risk­
takers, although significantly more emphasis was given this 
factor by heads of pre-1963 firms than by those established 
after 1968. The positive ranking given "willingness to make 
unpopular decisions" gives some support to the notion that 
entrepreneurs are to some extent social deviants who are willing 
to disregard accepted norms in pursuit of new ends. 
A second self-perception involves the degree to which various 
forms of formal and on -d:c-job training liipecd in preparation 
for the present job. As shown in Table 52, most of the responses 
simply reflect the diverse occupational background of the 
respondents. Two points are of interest, however. First, formal 
education is virtually tied for top place with a "moderately 
important" ranking. This tends to confirm our earlier conclu­
sion that education is important in distinguishing entrepreneurs 
from non-entrepreneurs, though not in distinguishing degrees of 
suczess among entrepreneurs. Second, foreign language ability 
is z.ccordcd top place with a "moderately important" ranking. 
This is not too surprising given the outward looking develop­
menrit strategy of Korea, but it is remarkable that there is no 
significant difference in this respect between exporters and 
those producing predominantly for the domestic market. This 
is probably explained by the fact that foreign technical assis­
tance, finance, inputs, and "inspiration by travel" are critical 
to many Jomestic producers. The high regard accorded foreign 
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TABLE 52 	 Businessmen's Self-Perceptions of Background
 
Contribution
 
Question: 	 "In preparing yourself for your present job, how important 
were each of the following factors?" 
Ranking Very Important Moderately Important Unimportant 
1 2 3 4 5 
Alean Responses 
Foreign language ability 2.95 
Formal education 2.98
 
Job during colonial period 4.37
 
Job related 	to allied military 4.78 
Work in family business 	 4.14 
Other work experience 3.52
 
Military experience 
 4.63
 
Government experience 
 4.31 
Sample Size (118) 
Source: Entrepreneurship Survey, Appendix C. 
language ability is a clear reflection of the drive for interna­
tional competitiveness. 
A third self-perception involves the motivation that drives 
entrepreneurs. To reduce bias, respondents were asked not to 
characterize themselves, but the entrepreneurial class in general. 
Results, summarized in Table 53, show thai for public consunip­
tion, entrepreneurs stress altruistic inotivations-.iationalistic, 
patriotic, and community goals come first, followed by family 
responsibility, wealth, fame and power, and excellence. One is 
entitled to a good deal of skepticism at the degree to which 
these announcements correspond to internal drives, but it is 
useful to recall Schumpeter's words on the non-hedonistic 
motivations: 
First of all, 	 there tb- will to found ais the dream and private king­
doma, usually, though not necessarily, also a dynasty. The modern 
world really does not know any such positions, but what may be 
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TABLE 53 	 Businessmen's Perceptions of Entre­
preneurial Motivation 
Question: 'Ingeneral, how important do you think the following factors 
are in motivating successful Korean entrepreneurs?" 
Ranking Very Important 
1 2 
Moderately Important 
3 4 
Unimportant 
5 
Responses 
Personal goal achievement 
Pursuit of excellence 
Fame and power 
Wealth 
Family responsibility 
Community responsibility 
Alean 
3.39 
3.04 
2.56 
2.44 
1.78 
Patriotism: north-south conflict 1.95 
Nationalism: catch the Japanese 2.23 
Sample Size (118) 
Source: Entrepreneurship Survey, see Appendix C. 
attained by industrial or commercial success is still the nearest 
approach to medieval lordship possible to modern man ...Then 
there is the will to conquer: the impulse to fight, to prove oneself 
superior to others, to succeed for the sake, no- of the fruits of 
success, but of success itself. From this aspect, economic action 
becomes akin to sport-there are financial races, or rather boxing 
matcl,!. The financial result is a secondary consideration, or, at all 
events, mainly valued as an index of success and as a symptom of 
victory . . . Finally, there is the joy of creating, of getting things 
done, or simply of exercising one's en;rgy and ingenuity. 34 
In Korea, 	 we must ask to what extent the achievement of 
national goals must be added to this list of non-pecuniary incen­
tives. The government is continually stressing that the country 
is waging an economic war, with national survival and the wel­
fare of the masses at stake. Entrepreneurs are the field-grade 
officers in this battle, and their success is praised by some 
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significant segments of Korean Society. The skepticism 
of intellectuals and sonic journalists can be subordinated in the 
face of official praise and awards for entrepreneurial achieve­
ment. The inherent pecuniary and power rewards of business 
endeavor are thus reinforced by a certain form of social approval, 
and there is a convenient perceived identity of individual and 
social returns. In Korea, this official sanction of entrepreneurial 
endeavor is particularly important in helping to break down the 
traditional aversion to business activity. 
The question is not whether or not nationalistic motivations 
dominate private motives, but whether official approval provides 
a real marginal incentive, increasing the total pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary returns to entrepreneurship. We believe that 
there is no question that these returns are significant and posi­
tive in Korea, and that the government's efforts have had a 
significant effect on the total output of the economic system. 
The impact of this appeal is reflected in the fact that com­
munity and national goals are announced as being even more 
important than family responsibility, the ultimate sanction in 
traditional Confucian society. 
It is widely believed in Korea that businessmen have enjoyed 
not only increasing government approval, but also accelerating 
popular prestige (at least outside the journalistic and academic 
communities). This, however, is somewhat harder to document. 
The evidence usually cited includes a rapidly increacing share of 
applications to business-related departments of universities, 
rising quantity and quality of applications to large corporations, 
and an often-cited survey of marriage preference at the prestig­
ious Ewha Womans University. At Ewha, as shown in Table 54, 
businessmen ranked first as desirable marriage partners from 
1964 to 1971. Their share increased steadily in the mid-1960s 
but dropped precipitously between 1966 and 1971. The high 
initial level supports the notion that the sa, nong, kong, sang 
ranking was no longer operative in the period of rapid grov\ th 
and had probably lost its sway over several generations, begin­
ning with the colonial period. The i964 rnd 1966 increase in 
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TABLE 54 Mate Preference at Ewha Womans University 
Ranking of Percentselecting
Year Businessmen businessmen 
1964 1 22.2 
1965 1 26.3
 
1966 1 
 31.1
 
1971 1 17.5
 
Source: lhwa Yo'ja Taehakkyo, "Haksaeng saenghwal yon'gu" (Study of student life) (Seoul, 1971), pp. 43-44. 
the share conforms to the idea that success and government 
recognition breed popular approval. However, the precipitous 
decline between 1966 and 1971 is inconsistent with the same 
hypothesis. 'rhe discrepancy may be due to statistical artifact 
(no statistical tests are contained in the study), to the fickle 
nature of Ewha women, to a change in the Ewha population, 
or to some real value shift. 
We leave this riddle to others, and for present purposes adhere 
to the conventional version. That is, economic success, abetted 
by government recognition and rising income, generated accel­
erating popular approval and increased the non-pecuniary return 
to entrepreneurship. There is thus an endogenous self-generating 
effect in which growth begets approval which begets growth. 
The importance of this, of course, depends onl the weight of 
non-pecuniary incentives in the entrepreneur's objective func­
tion. We suspect it is real, though perhaps small, and together 
with nationalism and patriotism makes a noticeable contribution 
to entrepreneurial supply. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF
 
ENTREPRENEURIAL SUPPLY
 
A recurring theme in studies of entrepreneurial supply is the 
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notion of a subordinated group struggling for otherwise blocked 
or threatened status and providing economic leadership in the 
process. Geertz provides an articulate summary with four hy­
potheses: 
"1) Innovative economic leadership (entrepreneurship) occurs 
in a fairly well defined and socially homogeneous group. 
There is ol a priori grounds no reason why tile entre­
preneurs could not come either randomly from the general 
population or from several distinct social groups at once. 
But they do not. 
2) 	 This innovative group has crystallized out of a larger 
traditional group which has a very long history of extra­
village status and interlocal orientation. 
3) 	 The larger group out of which tie innovative group is 
emerging is at present experiencing a fairly radical change 
in its relationships with the wider society of which it is a 
part ...(and) economic innovation seems in part to be a 
response to the status insecurity engendered by these 
shifts insocial structure. 
4) 	 On the ideological level the innovative group conceives 
of itself as the main vehicle of religious and moral excel­
lence withi:n a generally wayward, unenlightened, or heed­
less community.'' 3 
Nothing could be farther from the Korean experience, and the 
reasons are instructive. 
In the first place, economic leadership in Korea has not come 
from subordinated groups. Tile major candidates are northerners 
and Christians. While northerners are heavily overrepresented 
in the entrepreneurial population and Christians somewhat so, 
it is clear that this is the result not of subordination but of 
correlations with other variables. Other groups with similar 
occupational and educational backgrounds are similarly repre­
sented. The only way in which the theory applies to Korea is 
to view the entire population as subordinated by the Japanese 
with entrepreneurship an effort to gain international "face." 
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This is a little far-fetched, but does point to the (marginal) 
nationalistic motivation and the homogeneity of the Korean 
population. 
A second way in which Korea differs from the Geertz model 
is that no role is played by moral, religious, or ideological 
elitism. Elsewhere, minorities prosper because the value system 
of the majority is inimical to growth. In Korea, minority status 
can convey no special advantage, because the value system of 
the culture as a whole has become supportive of growth. We 
perceive the main elements of the system to be: 
1) Competitive dedication to improving the relative position 
of self and family. 
2) Respect for education as a vehicle for improvement. 
3) Inculcation of qualities of hard work, diligence, and self­
discipline. 
4) Absence of religious or ideological constraints inhibiting 
the pragmatic pursuit of ends. 
5) Ability to subordinate self and participate in a hierarchi 
cal framework with a synergistic effect on output. 
While the ent 'epreneurial elite is thus not defined by religious 
or ethnic status, it is emphatically not drawn randomly from 
the population as a whole. Instead, today's entrepreneurs come 
from family occupational backgrounds which represent perhaps 
15 percent of the population. The industrial elite thus de­
scended from the pre-industrial elite. The causal sequence, how­
ever, was not the capitalist equation: 
money- physical capital - industrial leadership 
but the Confucian-cum-capitalist equation: 
money - texts, tutors, and time - human capital industrial 
leadership 
The traditional value system is here again supportive of growth. 
The characteristics listed above are, of course, not limited to 
entrepreneurs. They also lie behind the capable performance 
of government officials in controlling the entrepreneurial en­
vironment and -he effectiveness of lower-ranking managers and 
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workers. This is yet another virtue of cultural homogeneity. If 
entrepreneurs are a subordinated minority in society, as they so 
often are, then they must fight a constant battle against com­
peting values in their contacts with government and workers. In 
Korea, by contrast, the basic value system is widely shared and 
conflict minimized.. Our focus on entrepreneurship should not 
obscure the fact that growth is a joint product of the entire 
society. 
We recognize the logical weakness in ending this chapter with 
a paean to the virtues of the Confucian tradition, when we 
began by quoting a diatribe against it. Value systems always 
seem useful in after-the-fact explanation (rcg:.rdless of what is 
to be explained), but not much good in prediction. Nonetheless, 
it seems clear that the pro-growth virtues of the traditional 
heritage listed above have survived and prospered, while the 
major negative value-antipathy to manual labor and business­
has withered away. This has not been a sudden process. Change 
undoubtedly began during the colonial period and continued 
through the 1950s. There was no sudden shift in supply in the 
early 1960s to explain the growth discontinuity. The initial 
change came from the demand side, but the resulting higher 
level of growth released social forces which, together with 
government approval, accelerated the rate of change on the 
supply side. These are reflected in increased non-pecuniary 
returns to entrepreneurship. 
Much remains unexplained. The critical question is why the 
social system was able to selectively retain convenient facets 
while selectively rejecting those that were incompatible with 
modernity. We must leave the dynamics of value modification 
to others. Here we only identify the importance of the process 
for economic growth. 
The heritage of which we speak is of course not confined to 
Korea. The dramatic achievements of japan, 'Faiwan, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore confirm the potentiality of the Confucian 
tradition when coupled with a growth-oriented government. 
The high performance of the East Asian bloc also underlies a 
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fundamental problem we have had in discussing our research 
with many Koreans. When we assert that some aspect of Korean 
entrepreneurship or government leadership is extraordinary, and 
we want to explain why, a typical response is: "What do you 
mean 'good'? Look at the United States, or Japan, or Taiwan. 
You're wasting your time. What you should be doing is explain­
ing what's wrong and how we can do better!" Now this self­
effacing, self-critical attitude is in itself a growth-supporting 
aspect of the culture, and we would not want to eliminate such 
a convenient social virtue. Nonetheless, from the academic 
point of view what is to be explained is not so much Korea's 
performance relative to the rest of East Asia, as its performance 
;elative to the rest of the world. 
In this respect, we believe the lomogcnieous Confucian heri­
tage is a major element in explaining the high level oflenticular 
entrepreneurial intent. It also contributes to the rapidity of the 
learning process and thus lies behind much of the expansion in 
qualitative entrepreneurial supply. 
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Private Economic Power:
 
Problems, Policies, and Prospects
 
THE CHAEB6L PROBLEM
 
There are two dimensions to the problem of economic concen­
tration. One is the share of a given number of enterprises in a 
particular market. The other is the share of a given number 
of affiliated enterprises in all markets. The first is convention­
ally termed industrial concentration, while we shall refer to the 
second as business concentration. While most Western econo­
mics is preoccupied with the effects of industrial concentration, 
the problem of business concentration has attracted particular 
attention in Asia-for example, the Japanese zaibatsu, Pakistan's 
"twenty-two families," and India's industrial houses. This is not 
surprising. Whereas industrial concentration confers advantage 
in a single product market, business concentration in an LDC 
may confer advantage in all product and factor markets. This 
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follows from the following relationship: size and power beget 
influence which in turn produces privileged access to credit, 
foreign exchange, and government's complicity in a multitude 
of rent-creating interventions. Business concentration can thus 
convert tile role of government in an LDC from one of over­
coming market imperfections to one of creating and exploiting 
them.' In this chapter, we therefore explore the quantitative 
magnitude of the problem in Korea, its historical evolution, and 
relevant government policies. 
Wc begin with a brief description of Korean business organiza­
tion. This may be usefully done by comparing the Korean 
chaeb(l with the well known Japanese zaibatsu. The Chinese 
characters for the two are identical, and che two forms share 
many common features, but there are certain distinctive dif­
fere n ce s. 
"Zaibatsu" has been defined as "a system of highly central­
ized family control through holding companies."' Hirschmeier 
and Yui identify three stages in their evolution. During tile first, 
from the Meiji Restoration to the Sino-Japanese War (1868­
1895), tile "old" zaibatsu emerged under driving individual 
leadership and had no particular pattern of corporate control.3 
Early in the second stage (1895-1946), the "old" zaibatsu 
faced increasing problems of coordination and control over 
their expanding empires and turned to a holding-company 
model with heavy reliance on non-family managers selected on 
the basis of merit.4 Stage three evolved during tile post-World 
War II days where the z-iibatsu were initially broken up but 
re-emerged as one set of nuclei' for modern keiretsu-"in­
dependent enterprises, clustered around one or several core 
city banks, with some coordination of policies, even some joint 
action, and personal regular meetings of the presidents. "6 
Contemporary Korean chaeb l correspond most closely in 
structure to the stage one zaibatsu of tile Meiji era. At the 
center of each group is tile hoejaii, or "chairman," who is tile 
dynamic and cohesive force of the group. Most typically, he 
is an entrepreneur, in the truest sense of the word, who founds 
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one enterprise and then leaves its managcment to a relative 
(or, more recently, to a trusted associate) as he moves on to a 
new venture. Majority shares in the various enterprises are held 
by the hocjalt, and his immediate relatives. There is alsr, an 
admixture of stage two, as a few ,fthe groups have formed 
holding companies, and professi ,nal managers are playing a 
rapidly increasing role. (;uidance and direction, however, re­
mai highly centralized in the hc)i ;,. There is no comparison.e 

with the loosely affiliated decentralized kiict.tsi of .Japall's 
stage three. Conteimporary chaeb-ol are thus roughlyv at the 
stage-one to stage-two transition and are not to be cIonpared 
structurally with their modern counterparts in Japan. 
From the point of view of this study, there is an additional 
difference between Korea and Japan whiich is of central impor­
tance. Most pre-war zaibatsu included, and post-war keiretsit 
are centered on, their own banks and other financial institu­
tions. Chaebl, on the other hand, must rely upon government­
controlled credit institutions. The causes and consequences 
of this situation were detailed in Chapter 4. Here we only 
remind the reader that individual chaeb51 were dependent 
upon government for their credit lifeblood and consequently 
exercise distinctly less economic power than their zaibatsu 
counterparts did. 
Economic power, of course, is also related to the size of the 
chaebo"l sector relative to the government and the rest of the 
economy. We therefore now consider the quantitative scope of 
chaeb~l activity. 
QUANTITATIVE DIMENSIONS OF 
BUSINESS CONCENTRATION 
In the absence of prior quantitative work on cihaeb~l size, we 
constructed our own estimates. A rough list of affiliates of the 
forty-six largest groups was obtained from the Federation of 
Korean Indt;.tries and modified by informal contacts with the 
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groups concerned. Sales and profit figures were then taken from 
a combination of published and Unlpublished sources. Value 
added was calculated indirectly for each company using 340 
sector I() coefficients for 1973. Since profits are a major 
source of divergence between sectoral averages and enter­
prise figures in any one year, and between sectoral averages in 
different years. the usual procedure was modified to utilize 
actual profits but estilmated non-profit value added. That is. for 
each enterprise: 
I iT + ( IT) 
where I is estimated value added, 7Tis net accounting profit, X 
is total sales, and U is obtained from the appropriate I() sector. 
Results for 1975, aggregated by claeb6. are given in Table 55. 
Given the crudity of 0ur est iatio procedure, they should be 
ta ken as indicative Ol v of the orders of nragn itude involved. 
As a sumnnmary, Table 56 presents the cuInulative shares of 
chaeb(l groulls inI various na tional accounts coillpoiients. It 
shows that the five largest chaeblui had a 1975 value added of 
425 billion wivn representing 5 percent of gross domestic prod­
uct or 7 percent of non-agricultural GDP. In manufacturing 
activities alone, the five largest cliaeb~l accounted for nearly 15 
percent of the economy total. The forty-six largest cliaeb6l 
accounted for approximately 13 percent of GDP, 19 percent 
of non-agricultural GDP, and 3-/ percent of manufacturing. 
To provide perspective on these magnitudes, it is useful to 
break down the entire economy by institutional origin of GDP, 
as shown in Table 57. The clm-bl sector is shown to be signi­
ficantly larger than both tie public enterprise and government 
sectors, but only one-third the size of other private non-agri­
cultural enterprise. 
How do these magnitudes compare with other Asian nations? 
For Japan, we have been unable to find modern data, but at the 
end of World War II, the four largest zaibatsu controlled one­
fourth of all paid-in capital of Japanese incorporated business.7 
Comparisons with India and Pakistan are given in Table 58. In­
sofar as the data are compatible, the results suggest that, at all 
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TABLE 55 Crude "ndicators of Chaeb6l Size, 1975' 
(Million w5n) 
Rank 
(Value 
Added) Name of Group 
Number ofb 
Companies Sales Profit 
Total 
ale 
Addedc 
Alanufacturini 
"alueAdded 
1 Samsung 22 18) 352.819 8,599 112,751 74.774 
2 Lucky 15 11) 417.407 16,239 87,850 83.243 
3 Hyundai 12 6) 234,450 22,020 87.619 64.662 
4 Hanjin 10( 9) 157.451 2,478 72,166 0 
5 Hyosung 11 ( 10) 163.680 3.783 64.883 38.989 
6 Ssangyong 12 ( 7) 142,883 2.760 51.281 37.324 
7 Daewoo 18 ( 17) 109,852 12,458 43.433 24,501 
8 O.B. 12( 10) 77,643 4,168 41.832 37,609 
9 Dong Ah Construction 11 ( 10) 75,117 3,902 39.184 904 
10 The Shin Dong-A 8 ( 6) 94,722 
-2,606 36,970 29,115 
11 Korea Explosives 14 ( 10) 147,769 2,652 31,688 22,900 
12 Hanil Synthetic Fiber 5 ( 3) 123,453 4,098 29.784 29,784 
13 Tai Han Electric Wire 16 ( 10) 80,233 3,941 28,370 27.713 
14 Sani 'ang 2( 2) 58,952 925 27,713 27.713 
15 Korea Raw Silk 21( 21) 67,075 1,437 25,485 15,394 
16 Kumho 10( 9) 70,375 2,876 24,843 18,677 
17 Miwon 12( 12) 57,505 4.556 21,601 19,942 
TABLE 55 (continued) 
18 Kia 
19 Kolon 
20 international Chemical 
21 Korea Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Corporation 
22 Sunkyung 
23 Sammisa 
24 Lotte 
25 Daelim 
26 Chon Bang 
27 Byuk San 
28 Jinro 
29 STC 
30 Dong Myung 
31 Dong Yarg Cement 
32 Dongkook S.R.I. 
33 Sung Chang 
34 Korea Glass 
35 Dainong 
36 Hai Tai 
37 IIShin 
9 ( 6) 
15 ( 12) 
10( 10) 
7 ( 6) 
7( 7) 
4 ( 4) 
11 ( 10) 
8 ( 
7( 
8 ( 
5( 
7( 

2( 
4 ( 
8 ( 
7 ( 
3( 
6 ( 
5 ( 
5 ( 
7) 
5) 
8) 
4) 
7) 
2) 
4) 
8) 
6) 
3) 
6) 
5) 
5) 
62.466 
75,936 
66.036 
48.565 
50.681 
46,759 
63.398 
35.905 
36.314 
35,052 
42.206 
32,524 
49,498 
25,639 
66.772 
39,511 
14,170 
52,862 
24,935 
11,504 
2,728 
-285 
2,274 
8,122 
-240 

3,76'-
1,432 
2,559 
719 
1,669 
718 
689 

902 
1,705 
-3,190 
1,968 
1,074 
-8,267 
1,369 
-305 
18,517 18,020 
17,754 14,860 
17,383 13,816 
15,082 8,365 
13.641 12,814 
13,235 11,288 
13.167 11,859 
12,297 890 
11,698 11,402 
11,323 8.117 
10.367 10,302 
10,279 3,761 
10,153 10,153 
8,998 8,434 
8,822 8,822 
8,092 7,850 
6,899 4,790 
6,692 0 
6,638 6,254 
6,498 6,455 
TABLE 55 (continued) 
38 Dong Boo 
39 Chung Bang 
40 11Shin S.R.I. 
41 Shin Won 
42 Sam Yang Food 
43 Kyung Bang 
44 Dae Han Textile 
45 Whashin 
46 HanYang 
Chacbol TOTAL 
9 ( 
7 ( 
6) 
4) 
17,443 
23.234 
417 
392 
6,046 
5.880 
1,646 
5,688 
5 ( 5) 41,270 
-2,275 5,647 5.647 
7 ( 4) 20.580 
-986 5.318 1,294 
5 ( 4) 33.101 407 5.187 5.122 
3 ( 3) 18.582 458 3,893 3.694 
2 ( 2) 16.218 
-614 1,969 1.266 
8 ( 3) 9.386 251 1.892 1.388 
3( 2) 387 57 266 0 
398 (326) 3.455.050 111.794 1.111.085 757.321 
Notes: alasic list of com;panies and sales arid 
patded by 
profit figures supplied by Federation ,fKorean 'nd-istrie. Thcse were updated anddirect contact withl the relev-ant ciaebo ex­tbt errors undoubted- remain. Similar calculations were ttade for 1973 ad 1974.but not reported here.
 
bAs of Dec. 31. 1975. Figures in parettheses tndic te number 
of companies actu.al1 included in -alkulatios. Exclusions. inorder of im­portance. were due t,,:
1/ firms itt pre-operatiotnal status
2) universities atid -cultural funds" (a Kotean forin 
 of quasi-philatithropit fomtt latior3 mitor companies for whichCValue added to date %as available.was generally calculated as I' = ir+ a (.\- ) where Q is from appropriate 34(01 a()atd- (profits and X\ sales) are from fi­
nancial stateietits of individual entcrprisc. Three exceptions involve cases whire ctmiventiinalv reported sales (.\) aresales (X()) used in 10. They are: 
I ; Trading coripaniesThe value added 
Foreign Trade 
l),.n sticRetail 
not equivalent to 
to net sales r.itios were taket fromt the BOK's Haz l'tk ii kiP .qy(lg.Seoul. 1968 as follhows: 
1973 1974 1975 
.10(7 .1191 
.125
.074) .154 .136 
TABLE 55 (continued) 
Domestic Wholesale 
.047 .055 .091 
These ratios were then applied to reported sales to generate value-added estimates. 
2) Securities firmsThe commissions earned were multiplied by the ratio of 1O value added to 1O sales (which iscommissions earned). The
ratio is 0.7970.
 
3) Insurance companies

AV= r + a (X -7r)where X1 for each year is calculated from relevant issues of insurance yearbook as: 
X 1 direct premiums + inward premiums + R/I (reinsurance) claims received + RI) commissions received -R11 premi­ums - direct claims paid - inward claims paid - RII commissions paid. 
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TABLE 56 Chaebtl in the Korean Economy, 1975 
Chaeb'6l Value Added as CumulativePercentageofNumber 
of 
Chaeb6l GDP Non-AgriculturalGDP ManufacturingGDP 
5 5.1 7.1 14.5 
10 7.7 10.7 21.8 
20 10.6 14.7 30.2 
46 13.4 18.6 36.7 
Source: See Table 55. 
levels, Korea in 1975 has substantially less concentration than 
Pakistan in 1959 of India in 1948, 1958, and 1968. For 
example, the four largest Korean groups accounted for 13 
percent of manufacturing versus 23 percent in India; the sixteen 
largest Korean groups accounted for 26 percent versus 34 
percent in Pakistan. 
A portion of these international differences in business 
concentration is attributable to the relative size and structure 
of the economies concerned. A small country with a few 
hundred manufacturing establishments might be naturally 
expected to have higher business concentration than a large 
country with several firms. Inthousand terms of structure, of 
two countries with the same absolute volume of manufacturing 
output, the more advanced economy with larger-scale plants 
would be expected to have greater business concentration. How 
do these two factors affect our comparisons? In terms of size, 
Korea's 1975 manufacturing value added was certainly smaller 
than that of India in 1968, similar to India in 1958, and larger 
than Pakistan in 1959. In terms of structure, Korea in 1975 was 
certainly far more advanced, so a larger share of manufacturing 
output was in large scale plants and a higher degree of concen­
tration might be predicted. Structural conditions thus make 
Korea's low level more remarkable in all four comparisons, 
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TABLE 57 Crude Institutional Origin of GDP, 1975 
(%) 
Government and other non-profit 
Public enterprise 
Chaeb~l enterprise 
Other private enterprises 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 
institutions 10 
9 
13 
40 
28 
100 
Source: Calculated from: BOK. Econoomic Statistics Yearbook, 1976 (Seoul, 1977). 
while size considerations make it less remarkable in two, more 
remarkable in one, and neutral in one. Though the comparisons 
may be crude, it is at least clear that, across these countries, 
differences in business concentration remain to be explained 
even after allowing for differences in the size and structure of 
the economy, 
The relatively low level of business concentration in Korea 
runs contrary to popular opinion, but is not surprising given 
tile fact that everyone started from a near zero base in 1951. 
Concentrations of power have thus evolved over only twenty­
five years in Korea versus three to four times that period in 
Japan and South Asia. As with income distribution, the crucial 
question is not so much the absolute level as the rate of change. 
Unfortunately, we have been able to put together a consistent 
time series only for the most recent years, as shown in Table 59. 
The results are striking, however, showing a substantial increase 
in concentration at all levels in only three years. While there is 
no justification for extrapolating a similar rate of increase over 
the entire rapid-growth period, we would argue that these 
figures reflect a long-term rise in the level of business concentra­
tion. This follows from the evidence in Chapter 6 on the domi­
nance of expansion over establishment as a source of growth, and 
the fact that chaeb~l founders are by definition the most 
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TABLE 58 Manufacturing Shares of Business Groups 
in India, Pakistan, and Korea 
(cumulative percentage) 
Number of Korea Pakistan India 
Groups 1975 1959 1948 1958 1968 
4 13 - 24 30 23 
7 18 21 - - -
9 21 - 31 36 28 
16 26 34 - - -
20 30 - 46 62 39 
24 32 40 - - -
37 36 47 
- -
_ 
46 37 -.. 
50 - - 60 71 50 
60 - 53 - - -
Sources: Gustav Papanck, Pakistan's 1)et-1vont: Social Goals Pritate Incetiv'es (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), p. 68. Arabind Ghiosh, "Role of Large Industrial Housesin Indian Industries," he Idia, Iconomic ]ournal, April-June, 1974, pp. 317-345. 
Note: Korean figures are shares of chaeb 'l manufacturing value added in total 
manufacturing value added, while Indian and Pakistani data cover group "assets" 
as a share of "industrial assets." The comparison is therefore valid only insofar as: 
1) value added is proportional to "assets" and 
2) "industrial assets" refer to the entire manufacturing sector. 
TABLE 59 Trends in Chaeb-l Concentration, 1973-1975 
(cumulative percent of non-agricultural GDP) 
Number 
of 
Chaebl 1973 1974 1975 
5 5.2 5.6 7.1 
10 7.9 8.5 10.7 
20 10.9 11.8 14.7 
46 15.0 15.3 18.6 
Source: Same as Teble 55. 
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accomplished expanders. This is further supported by casual 
empiricism, since the largest chacb6l have clearly grown at rates 
far outstripping the economy as a whole, and there have been 
only a limited number of cases of declining chacb~l. 9 
In sum, available evidence suggests that the problem of busi­
ness concentration in Korea is relatively low by historic Asian 
standards, but increasing at a rapid rate. 
THE 	SOURCES OF CHAEBOL 
ACCUMULATION 
THE ISSUE 
If Korean chaebWl have expanded rapidly, what is the source of 
their growth? How is it that a very small number of individuals 
have accumulated wealth at a rate even faster than that of the 
economy as a whole? Within the Korean academic-journalistic 
community, there is a wide consensus that the answer is "poli­
'tical connections.""' As a representative example of this view, 
Kyong-Dong Kim refers to the chaebSl leaders as "political 
capitalists" who 
accumulated capital mainly through such "non-rational" processes 
as speculation, price-fixing, tax ,,asion, and taking advantage of 
cumulative inflation. More crucial to this process, however, was 
that they played on political connections to gain economic favors in 
exchange for political contributions."' 
Our own view is that, while the consensus holds a substantial 
element of truth when applied to the Rhee period, it is mis­
leading (if not simply wrong) as a description of the dominant 
features of the Park era. 
Before outlining the accumulation process in the two periods, 
it is useful to follow Leibenstein in distinguishing between 
"zero-sum" and "positive-sum" entrepreneurship. 2 Traditional 
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microcconomic theory holds that all voluntary exchange and 
production are "positive-sum" in leading to mutual gain (or at 
least no loss) for all parties. Leibenstein, on the other hand, 
argues that in the real world, there is "zero-sum" activity when 
entrepreneurs 
spend their time and energy in any of the following ways that may 
directly or indirectly increase the personal wealth and income of 
some of them but which involve activities that add little or nothing 
to tile productive capacity of the economy. (1) They may spend 
their time in non-tradin activities in order to secure for their 
interests a greater monopolistic position, increased political power, 
more prestige, etc. Such activities can conceivably lead to greater 
financial gains for some of them than the alternative of engaging in 
investment activities that lead to increases in national product. 
(2) They may engage in trading activities that may secure for sonic 
of them a greater monopolistic position or simply what they believe 
to be better ways in which to hold their wealth so that such activi­
ties will not incre ase aggregate resources in any way. (3) They may 
use their talents and marshal wealth in order to engage in speculative 
trading which, in turn, need not increase aggregate resources or 
aggregate income. Such activities, even when they do not use up 
savings, do waste rare entrepreneurial resources. (4) Finally they 
may engage in activities that do use up net savings, but t'je invest­
ments involved are in enterprises of such a nature that their "social 
value" is either zero, or their social value is very much lower than 
their private value. 
13 
The question of chaeb~l accumulation may thus be posed in 
terms of the extent to which it resulted from zero-sum trade 
and speculation. 
THE PREVAILING VIEW OF
 
CHAEB6L ACCUMULATION
 
We now present a sampling of academic-journalistic descriptions
 
of the methods of chaeb-1 growth, reserving our comments
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until later. One observer summarizes the process under Rhee as 
follows: 
Before the Liberation, there were only a few Korean entrepreneurs 
in a modern sense. Wealthy men at the time were mostly landlords, 
local brewery owners, or mill owners. Therefore, most Korean entre­
preneurs were created during the 20 years after the Liberation. 
During the same period, there was not much new saving and invest­
ment. Therefore, these newly createdentrepreneursand their wealth 
accumulation must indicate redistribution of existing national 
wealth and/or foregn wealth transferred through aid rather than 
new wealth accumulated through their productive activities. It is 
well known that Japanese properties and aid dollars were distributed 
at ridiculously low prices. Even these acquisitions were made with 
cheap bank loans under the existing hyper-inflationary situation. 
And cheap bank loans were mostly concentrated on a few chaebol. 
Hyper-inflation, shortage of supply, high import tariff, import 
restrictions, protected chaebol's monopoly prices and the domestic 
tax structure were all favorable for chaebZl. These types of privileges 
were concentrated on a few chaeb~l since an inter-locking mecha­
nism was in operation. For example, once a businessman acquired 
Japanese property, he usually also received working capital or 
reconstruction loans from banks and foreign exchange for importing 
equipment and raw materials. As their production began, imports of 
foreign products were restricted on the excuse of protecting domes­
tic firms and at the same time, various tax privileges were also pro­
vided. As this example illustrates, most chaebl in Korea were 
created in a short period of time with the help of the government 
privileges provided. 14 
The italicized passage clearly reflects the prevailing view that 
accumulation was the result of zero-sum transfers. 
The major sources of chaeb6l accumulation during the Rhee 
period are thus thought to be: 
1) Non-competitive allocation of import quotas and import 
licenses. 
2) Bargain price acquisition of former Japanese properties. 
3) The selective allocation of aid funds and materials. 
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4) Privileged access to cheap bank loans. 
5) Non-competitive award of government and U.S. military 
contracts for reconstruction activities. 
Examples of each source of accumulation follow. 
One of the better known examples of improper foreign ex­
change allocation was the "Tungsten Dollar" incident of 1952. 
Three million dollars in earnings from tungsten exports were 
allocated to privileged firms for the import of grain and ferti­
lizer. A combination of monopoly sales practices and a dis­
equilibrium exchange rate resulted in "enormous profits. The 
government was then offered a large contribution in return for 
the favor, which was allegedly used in Rhee's Liberal Party 
campaign for a constitutional amendment that permitted his 
re-election as president.''' 
With regard to the privileged acquisition of Japanese proper­
ties, one writer describes a spinning mill sale in 1954. '6 The 
"market price" of the particular mill was said to be ten times as 
high as the purchase price. Further, the purchase price was to 
be paid off on an installment basis over fifteen years, and this in 
turn was financed by low-interest bank loans. During the subse­
quent fifteen-year period, however, the price level increased 
almost 260 times, making the factory a virtual gift. This illus­
trates how a cliaebBl could be created with virtually no equity 
base of its own. 
Even those who had their own, or Japanese derived, factories 
destroyed during the Korean War had a head start in accumula­
tion. The war was indeed a major economic leveling force, but 
certain individuals were in a better position to take advantage of 
the post-war disequilibria. One group was the Ky6ngsang 
province businessmen in Taegu and Pusan whose plants were 
not destroyed. In addition, all pre-war c,iners were given a 
competitive edge in taking advantage of the U.S. aid for recon­
struction after the war. As they gained privileged accesses to 
aid allocation, either in dollars or raw materials, they again could 
take full advantage of a rapid inflation and undervalued ex­
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change rate. ICA and AID allowed beneficiaries to build plants 
if they put up only 15 or 25 percent of their own funds, and 
even this could be financed via a low-interest, long-term loan. 
An even more important source of distortion in aid allocation 
was the favoriti,m said to have been shown to members of 
Rhee's Liberal Party. Jotngwon Kim reports that by 1960, the 
Controller of the Liberal Party "was estimated have largeto 
interests in twenty-nine projects, and the party was believed to 
have a large interest in at least 50 percent of all private projects 
receiving American aid."' 
Domestic credit seems to have been likewise distributed to the 
advantage of the Liberal Party. It is reported that,just prior to 
the 1956 election, the Commercial Bank of Korea made loans 
of 17 billion hwan (the pre-1 961 currency unit) to twelve indus­
tries which then kicked back as much as 100 percent of the 
loans to party campaign coffers.' 8 
Kyong-Dong Kim also emphasizes the role of non-competitive 
bidding for government construction contracts, leading to the 
emergence of the "Five Men" of the construction industry." 
The same group of transportation companies also benefited 
from U.S. military contracts. This to some extent resulted from 
a simple ability to do the job but was certainly enhanced by 
various formal personal contacts with military non-coins and 
officers. 
In the Park period, four of the five sources of zero-sum accu­
mulation were largely eliminated by policy or circumstance. 
The remaining element, domestic and foreign credit, is the 
dominant target of zero-sum accumulations under Park.2" It is 
somewhat more difficult to document post-1961 aberrations in 
the credit allocation process, so we simply present a typical 
scenario of chaeb~l growth via credit access in the 1960s."' 
Suppose one privately held company "luckily" gets govern­
mental approval for an industrial project. It will typically be 
financed by one-fifth equity and four-fifths foreign and domes­
tic loans. So the project starts with a meager equity base but 
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with substantial external debt and other government-provided 
privileges (notably tax advantages). The privately held firm may 
then grow rapidly if the project becomes successful. The firm 
then starts a new line of business with the profits accumulated 
from the first venture. Of course, once again the firm will not 
usually put up much equity but will rely heavily on external 
debt. The extension of this process leads to a group of firms, 
or chaeb61. Profits earned from the group may be extracted for 
distribution to stockholders, usually family members, through 
legal or illegal methods, or both. This is particularly likely for 
a weak firm that might be bled. This process gives rise to a 
popular saying that, "even when business goes bankrupt, busi­
nessmen survive." Even for the far more numerous plosperous 
firms in the group, the financial structure remains weak. 
The point of this scenario is that a very small initial equity 
base can be pyramided into a substantial empire. This is a com­
mon phenomenon as was demonstrated by our finding in 
Chapter 6 that growth of Korean output is more often due to 
expansion (or founding of "offspring" firms) by existing 
entrepreneurs than to entry of new entrepreneurs. A second, 
and far more questionable, contention that is popularly derived 
from this scenario is that, since credit is controlled by tile 
government, credit-based expansion derives from political 
influence and implies zero-sum activity. We now evaluate the 
zero-sum argument. 
EVALUATION 
It is necessary to exercise some discretion in evaluating the 
foregoing, since the mere existence of high profits in govern­
ment-controlled markets is far from sufficient to prove zero­
sum activity. In tile first place, accounting profit must be 
broken down into normal economic profit and economic rent. 
The former is the minimum return necessary to draw a given 
bundle of capital and entrepreneurship into a particular activity, 
while the latter is any return beyond that minimum. It is only 
economic rent that is to be associated with zero-sum activity, 
274
 
Chaebo'l Accumulation 
and this can indeed be minuscule even with high accounting 
profit. 
Consider the sale of the factories confiscated from the Japa­
nese. As explained in Chapter 2, the political and economic 
instability of the interwar years and the inexperience of domes­
tic entrepreneurs gave rise to a great deal of uncertainty about 
the future stream of earnings to be gained from ownership. Had 
the factories been auctioned off in a perfectly competitive 
fashion, the price would accordingly have been quite low, and 
appropriately so. The minimum return necessary for a nascent 
entrepreneur to bring his talents to bear was high, and the low 
sales value was to some extent the price paid by society to get, 
and keep, the factories operating. The crucial question, then, is 
not whether the price was "low" and the return "high," but 
whether the price was lower than the minimum necessary to 
get the factory operating. A qualitative answer to this question 
can be found by looking at the sales process itself. If bidding 
was competitive, then any return, however high, was "normal" 
in being the minimum society had to pay to get things running. 
If, on the other hand, the bidding was rigged so that a privileged 
few were able to obtain the properties at below the competitive 
price, then there was a zero-sum transfer involved. Even so, it 
would be incorrect to treat the whole transaction as zero-sum, 
since jobs were created and real output produced. 
Further, while rent is necessary for zero-sum activity, it is 
not sufficient. In addition, the rent must be "unnatural" rather 
than "natural." Natural rent accrues as a result of information 
imperfections or unanticipated shifts of supply and demand, 
while unnatural rent is the result of government intervention or 
private collusion. Natural rent accrues to the entrepreneur who 
discovers and fills a disequilibrium gap, while unnatural rent 
accrues to whoever fills the desires of the government official 
who maintains and protects a gap. Exploitation of a natural 
rent opportunity is positive-sum (for example, in filling a 
hitherto unperceived desire of the consuming public), while 
acquisition of unnatural rent is zero-sum (for example, in 
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getting an import license where the market is known to all, 
the only question being who will be granted the boon of collect­
ing the unnatural rent). Hyundai may have earned rent on its 
shipyard, but there was hardly a multitude clamoring for the 
opportunity. Had Hyundai not acted, the shipyard and its 
jobs might not have existed. To this extent, the rent was natural 
and the entrepreneurial act positive-sum. In contrast, if entre­
preneur A had not gotten a particular import license under 
Rhee, then it would have gone to individual B (or Z, or the 
state); society's value added is not affected, but the distribu­
tion of the rent is. 
With these distinctions in mind, it is clear that the earlier 
academic-journalistic indictment is somewhat overdrawn. Just 
how "overdrawn" is, of course, impossible to estimate with 
precision, but we are convinced that, in the move from the 
Rhee to the Park periods, there has been a shift a.way from 
zero-sum activity and towards positive-sum. 
This follows from two major trends-in market access and in 
the character of the privileged markets. With regard to the 
former, it is only a modest exaggeration to say that, whereas 
under Rhee political and bureaucratic connections were neces­
sary and sufficient for privileged access, under Park bureaucratic 
(not political) contacts are only necessary. Under Park it is 
sufficient that a convincing argument can be made to the 
bureaucracy that the privileges thus conferred will be used 
productively. To make such an argument effectively, it is also 
necessary that one be well connected with the bureaucracy. 
This condition clearly provides an advantage for those who are 
already wealthy and for those with backgrounds that parallel 
those of the bureaucrats. Nonetheless, the stock of those entre­
preneurs so endowed is sufficiently large that the bid price is 
reasonably competitive, and the positive-sum "minimum 
return" dominats pure economic rent. Under Rhee, in con­
trast, privileged access seCms to have been limited to those with 
much more narrowly defined political affiliations. 
The second difference between the two periods is in the 
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nature of the dominant privileged markets. Under Rhee, the 
most important source of zero-sum transfers was for foreign 
exchange and aid, with privilcge leading to massive profits with 
no further effort than a bit of paper work in ordering imports. 
Under Park, the dominant form of privilege is industrial credit, 
which leads to profits only if combined with the various entre­
preneurial functions to create productive activity. Here zero­
sum trans):ers may still exist, but are necessarily combined with 
positive-sum behavior. 
In both periods, of course, there was a mix of both sorts of 
activity. Consider the case of PyZng-cli'6l Yi (see Appendix B).
Under Rhee, the camebulk of his early capital accumulation 
from windfall profits in imports; given prevailing conditions, 
these were undoubtedly predominantly zero-sum. Some of 
these, however, were ploughed back into the nation's first 
large-scale sugar and woolen textile mills, a positive-sum achieve­
ment of no small magnitude, given the unsettled conditions of 
the time. In the 1960s, by contrast, Samsung's accumulation 
came overwhelmingly from production and competitive export 
trade. An effort at zero-sum importing in connection with the 
construction of a fertilizer factory led to forfeiture of equity in 
the plant. This shift by Py6ng-ch'6l Yi from a mixture of zero­
and positive-sum to predominantly positive-sum activity is 
reflective of the major change between the two periods. 
Zero-sum activity, of course, remains under Park. One ex­
ample of contemporary zero-sum activity involves the use of 
industrial credit for speculation in land. More broadly, there is 
no doubt that the dynamics of discretionary allocation result 
in economic rents beyond the minimum necessary to extract 
entrepreneurial effort. Just how much beyond the minimum is 
an empirical question that we leave to Theothers. critical 
point is that it now occurs largely as an add-on to some produc­
tive positive-sum entrepreneuri'al act. 
In sum, a major difference between Rhee and Park is that, 
under the latter, zero-sum activities were substantially reduced 
relative to positive-sum efforts. In part this followed from an 
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elimination of some zero-sum incentives by a shift to non­
discretionary allocation of foreign exchange. There nonethe­
less remained abundant o[ !)ortunities for discretionary 
allocation of underpriced resouices, most notably credit. Here, 
however, leadership commitment to growth ensured that bu­
reaucratic discretion was now exercised so that these resources 
were allocated to reasonably productive users. Tile result is 
that while zero-sum transfers still ex.ist, they occur largely as 
frosting on basically positive-sum ventures. 
Our view, then, is that under Rhee rmtuch, if not the bulk, of 
chaeb~l accumulation took place as a result of government­
controlled transfers that produced relatively few compensatory 
benefits for society as a whole. Under Park such transfers re­
main, but are decidedly ancillary to accumulation resulting 
from socially beneficial growth of productive activity. This 
change is not to be attributed to any consciousness-raising on 
the part of entrepreneurs. Businessmen may not strictly maxi­
mize profits, but they are certainly out to make a buck, and will 
take the path of least resistance ii doing so. Under Rhee, this 
path led to zero-sum activity; under Park, the rules changed, 
and the Keynesian "animal spirits of the capitalists" were 
channeled into predominatly positive-sum ventures. 
GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARDS CHAEBOL 
Two periods of notable activity stand out with respect to 
Korean government policies towards chaeb l expansion. The 
first was the "illicit wealth accumulation" measure designed to 
punish the zero-sum entrepreneurs at the fall of the Rhee 
regime. The second is the series of actions taken in the early 
1970s to begin to put brakes on the expansion of positive-sum 
entrepreneurs. These measures will be discussed in detail below, 
but we begin with an overview. 
ACCUMULATION VERSUS UTILIZATION 
It will be obvious to even rl.e most casual reader of this volume 
278
 
Government Policy 
that the Park Government has put no serious restraints on the 
rate of chaeb~l accumulttion. Growth has come largely through 
expansion of existing groups rather than entry of new partici­
pants, and the cliaeb¥1 have almost certainly grown much more 
rapidly than the economy as a whole. While income and pro­
perty taxes arc progressive, and the inheritance tax is probably 
more ambitious than is common in LDCs, there has been no 
serious effort at income redistribution by placing heavy levies 
on the very wealthy. Instead, the government has indirectly 
promoted business concentration by its single-minded devotion 
to growth and its credit allocation policy. Credit and other 
advantages are provided to those thought most likely to use it 
productively, and has those with trackthis meant a proven 
record. Reducing project gestation periods has taken precedent 
over improving the Gini coefficient. 
While there has therefore been implicit encouragement of 
chaeb{l wealth accumulation, it is important to note that 
there have been real restraints on its utilization. These are of 
three sorts. First, wealth has not been translated into political 
influence. Second, a high proportion of the wealth has been 
reinvested and remarkably little diverted to conspicuous con­
sumption. Third, there have been limitations on the utilization 
of wealth to acquire certain forms of economic power-most 
effectively in precluding chaebe1 control of banks, and more 
recently in a variety of restraints on chaebbl asset use. 
The first constraint-breaking the link between economic and 
political power-was discussed earlier in this chapter and need 
not be considered further. The second constraint-limitation of 
conspicuous consumption-is a subjective and relativistic ob­
servation which requires some elaboration. The life-style of the 
chaeboI rich varies from conspicuous frugality to moderately 
conspicuous consumption. Casual empiricism suggests, however, 
that by Southeast Asian standards the mean level is on the 
conservative side. While the Korean rich live indecently well 
by Korean standards, their homes, cars, and entertainments 
appear to us to be decidedly frugal in comparison to their 
counterparts elsewhere in Asia (except Japan and Taiwan). 
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If the foregoing generalization is correct, then there are four 
causal elements. First, Korean wealth is largely first-generation, 
and this is naturally more conservative in its consumption habits 
than profligate second-generation inheritors. Second, there 
may be in operation a Korean ethical asceticism that frowns 
on overt manifestotions of wealth. Third, government policies 
clearly discourage luxury consumption. The taxes on "luxury" 
vehicles (more than four cylinders) in 1974 totaled more than 
500 percent (of c.i.f.) at purchase and ran from 50 percent 
to nearly 100 percent per year thereafter. Fourth, the pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary returns to successful entrepreneurship are 
so great that the opportunity cost of consumption is higher 
than elsewhere. All of this serves to channel a high proportion 
of profits back into investment of one form or another. 
The third constraint on utilization-precluding certain forms 
of economic activity-is of particular interest. The abolition of 
private control over banks and the reduction of opportunities 
for zero-sum forms of speculation and trade have already been 
stressed. In the mid-1970s, however, there has been a marked 
upsurge in government attention to the chaeb&1 problem. 
This is not surprising, since, as our quantitative measures have 
indicated, chaebil size relative to the economy is small, but 
seems to have recently been expanding at a rapid rate. The new 
government concern has manifested itself in a series of measures 
aimed at opening the chaeb&1 to public ownership and control, 
lowering their debt/equity ratios, and prohibiting real estate 
speculation. These measures will be discussed in detail, after 
considering the earlier "illicit wealth accumulation" episode. 
THE "ILLICIT WEALTH ACCUMULATION" EPISODE 
One of the last acts of the short-lived Chang Myon regime was 
the passage of a Special Law for Dealing with Illicit Wealth 
Accumulation. This had the stated objective of punishing those 
who "accumulated wealth illicitly by taking advantage of their 
positions and power."22 One of the first measures of the new Park 
Military Government was the issuance of the following guideline: 
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The purpose of this guideline is in accordance with administrative 
procedures and criminal laws to deal with those who illicitly accu­
mulated wealth. They include civil servants, politicians, and high­
ranking government officials who took advantage of their positions 
and their power in their private fortune-making. They also include 
those businessmen and profiteering commercial agents who accu­
mulated wealth illicitly by associating with above-mentioned govern­
ment officials or politicians.23 
Based on this guidance, the Park Military Government 
immediately arrested most of the nation's leading business­
men. A new law was legislated in June 1961, and it defined 
illicit profiteers as those who during the period of July 1, 
1953, to May 15, 1961, had: 
1) Illicitly earned profits totaling more than 100 million 
hwan by either purchasing or renting publicly owned 
properties (largely those confiscated from the Japanese). 
2) Obtained loans or purchases of more than 100,000 dollars
 
worth of government- or bank-owned foreign exchange.
 
3) Provided political funds of more than 50 million hwan in
 
return for bank loans. 
4) Earned profits of more than 200 million hwan in the pro­
cess of contracting or bidding for public works or com­
modity trade in an illegal way. 
5) Earned profits of more than 200 million hwan by monopo­
lizing the purchase or allocation of foreign exchange. 
6) Avoided taxes of more than 200 million hwan. 
7) Illegally transferred their wealth abroad. 
This list illustrates the popular perception of the scope of zero­
sum activity during the Rhee period. 
In the end, as already described in Chapter 3, a compromise 
was worked out whereby criminal sanctions were abolished, and 
the accused businessmen were to build factories and turn them 
over to the government. The matter was closed in December 
1964 with most paying their fines in cash. Altogether the 
government collected about four billion win (about $16 
million).2 4 Some will view this episode as a "sell-out," while 
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others will agree with us that it reflects the government's 
dominant commitment to growth coupled to a belief that 
entrepreneurs were an essential scarce commodity to be utiliz­
ed in pursuit of that goal. In either case, a pattern was estab­
lished whereby substantial assistance was given to established 
businessmen who proved themselves capable of initiating 
new manufacturing and export activity. Those who fulfilled 
these qualifications were allowed to expand largely unchecked 
until the mid-1970s. 
THE MAY 29 PRESIDENTIAL SPECIAL 
DIRECTIVES OF 1974 
In 1974 a set of Presidential Special Directives were issued 
which may represent a turning point in the government's 
attitude towards the chaebo-l. At this writing, the ramifica­
tions are not entirely clear, but a new era may have been 
initiated. 
The background to the May 29 Directives was the effort 
that began in 1972 to force privately held business firms to 
open themselves to public participation by selling their shares 
on the stock market (see Chapter 4). Few chaebl firms re­
sponded, and the May 29 Directives were issued with the 
following objectives: 
1) Family-oriented management should be modernized. 
2) The scale of enterprises should be enlarged to enable 
them to become internationally competitive. 
3) The managerial and financial capacities of families are 
limited so privately held firms should go public. 
4) The accumulation of business assets in the hands of a 
few individuals or family groups should be prevented. 
To accomplish these objectives, the following measures were 
to be taken: 
1) Induce corporations to go public by means of appro­
priate privileges to "well-managed" publicly held cor­
porations. 
2) Establish a system of overseeing and controlling credit 
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allocations and tax records of privately held corporations 
(especially large chaebB1 firms). 
3) Reduce the debt/equity .'atio of large corporations by
managing the bank loan system appropriately, and by 
instructing indebted businessmen who want to start new 
projects to sell all or part of their existing equity and use 
the proceeds to finance the new project. 
4) Reinforce tax surveillance and the outside audit system 
for corporations and large shareholders to increase the 
creditability of corporations. 
In accordance with these directives, the Ministry of Finance 
prepared Measures on Bank Credit and Business Concentration. 
Business groups with outstanding credit of more than 5 billion 
w(Yn (including bank payment guarantees but excluding export
credits) were put into two categories according to whether their 
financial structure was weak (Group A) or strong (Group B).
Group B firms were to be ordered to go public, while Group A 
firms were to be directed to first improve their financial struc­
ture. 
In the meantime, Group A firms were prohibited from: 
1) Receiving new foreign loan guarantees. 
2) Establishing or acquiring additional businesses.
 
3) Investment in stock.
 
4) Acquisition of non-operating real estate.
 
In addition, the main companies of each chaeb~l were required 
to fie a three-year financial structure-improvement schedule 
using the following means to reduce their debt/equity ratios: 
1) Going public.
 
2) Increasing paid-in capital.
 
3) Selling off subsidiaries (proceeds to be used for 
 debt 
retirement or equity increase). 
4) Public offering of debt instruments in the securities 
market. 
5) Merger and rationalization. 
6) Other means. 
If these firms do not proceed as they are supposed to, or are 
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slow in implementing the annual plan, the Financial Normaliza­
tion Committee established under the Office of the Prime 
Minister will examine these cases, and tile government or Bank 
Audit Board will notify banks not to extend low-interest loans 
to these firms. 
Subsequent actions have strengthened these efforts. In August 
1975, al additional measure was taken to extend coverage of 
tile May 29 Directives to the main chaeb6l holding companies. 
In August 1974 a land bank was established "for the purpose of 
channelling otherwise idle capital invested in unutilized land 
into industrial uses, improving the financial structure of busi­
ness firms, and improved utilization of lands by publicly facili­
tating land transactions and utilization.''25 This was done to 
facilitate liquidation of firms' non-operating land holdings in 
tile spirit of the May 29 Directives. Accurding to the law,
2 6 
the Minister of Finance can order those business firms that have 
bank loans and bank guarantees above a given level27 to sell 
their non-operating real estate to the bank. In case those firms 
or individuals do not follow the order, the minister can direct 
financial institutions to limit the provision of credit. 
Thus far the only clear impact of the May 29 directives has 
been the decimation of the Shinjin Group-the chaeb6l which 
had been by far the slowest in converting to positive-sum 
activity.28 Overall, however, we call now only outline the kinds 
of effect that the measures might be expected to have on the 
more solid chaeb-1. Initially there is only a constraint on wealth 
utilization as they are forced to reshuffle their portfolios, ex­
changing one form of asset for another. In the long-run, how­
ever, the rate of accumulation may be reduced since: 
1) The reduction in the debt/equity ratio reduces leverage 
earnings. 
2) It becomes more difficult to use low-interest industrial 
credit to finance zero sum land speculation. 
3) The public offerings are made at well below recognized 
market value, giving an immediate transfer to middle- and 
upper-class buyers. Insofar as tile market undervalues 
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current offerings, there will be a further transfer as eco­
nomic rent from earlier entrepreneurial acts accrues to new 
equity holders. 
On the other hand, the rate of accumulation may be enhanced 
to the extent that
 
1) Openness improves managerial practices.
 
2) The cost of public-equity funding via dividends proves 
to 
be less than that of debt via interest payments. 
If, as seems highly likely, the negative distributional effects 
outweigh the positive from the point of view of tile chaeb~l, 
there will be a further negative-incentive effect leading to 
reduced chaeb6l entrepreneurial effort and thus to a further 
lowering of the rate of accumulation. 
Sorting out these various effects would require a research 
effort well beyond the scope of the piesent study. Here we only 
note that the government has once again shown its dominance 
over the business community and has finally taken a set of 
measures that could conceivably lead to a reduction in the rate 
of chaebSl accumulation. 
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Summary 
We began this volume by asking if there was any causal connec­
tion between the coincidence of economic and political turning 
points in Korea in the early 1960s. That is, to what extent was 
the government of Park Chung Hee in some sense "responsible" 
for the decade-and-a-half of 10 percent real growth ? This is not 
the sort of question with which economists are comfortable. 
Not only are many of the relevant variables unquantifiable, but 
we lack the scatter of observations that would allow us to 
identify the effect of various aspects of -govcrnment" in a 
multivariate framework under ceteris-paribus conditions. As a 
result, hypotheses cannot be "tested" but only "examined"; 
they are never "proven," but at best "survive." Any conclusions 
are thus necessarily subjective and leave one professionally 
vulnerable. 
We, nonetheless, believe this sort of question to be important 
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and now summarize our more important results by presenting a 
series of propositions that have survived our examination. Since 
the issues are inherently slippery, and since most have not 
previously received serious attention in the Korean context, it 
is to be expected that some will fail to survive further scrutiny. 
We only hope that our formulation will serve to stimulate 
additional work. 
THE COLONIAL HERITAGE (CHAPTER 2) 
While our focus is on the Rhee and Park periods, we begin 
with a summary of the historically imposed initial condi­
tions. 
1) 	The Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) brought rapid 
industrialization, with real manufacturing NCP growing at 
an average rate of 10 percent per year to a level of roughly 
20 percent of total NCP in the early 194 0s. 
2) 	 This impressive achievement in potential contribution 
to post-war growth was minimized by three factors: 
first, the colonial enclave industrial structure; second, 
the dominant role of Japanese owners, managers, and 
technicians; and third, the location of heavy industry 
in the north. 
3) Nonetheless, at Liberation, South Korea was left with 
a substantial set of productive facilities, a worklarge 
force familiar with at least low-level manufacturing tasks, 
and a group of entrepreneurs exposed to the demon­
stration effects of modern technology and organiza­
ion. 
4) 	 This heritage proved of little use to the new nation, how­
ever, as the physical capital was largely dissipated by a 
combination of administrative chaos (1945-1950) and war 
(1950-1951). The human capital was not destroyed but 
diverted into largely non-productive activities by incompe­
tent government economic management. 
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GOVERNMENT AND GROWTH
 
A return to our main theme gives rise to three propositions: 
5) The government of Park Chung Hee has in no sense pur­
sued a laissez-faire stratcgy towards the economy; rather, 
it has been heavily interventionist in attemptilg to influ­
ence the microeconimic decisions of productive units 
either through direct government participation in public 
enterprise or through stimulating, forcing, or cajoling 
private enterprises. 
6) These intervention efforts have been effective in actually 
altering private decisions, resource allocation, and eco­
nomic outcomes. 
7) The effective intervention has had a positive net impact 
on growth. 
We are quite confident that the first two propositions can be 
substantiated to the satisfaction of most readers, and we shall 
elaborate upon them presently. The third proposition, however, 
is somewhat more controversial. At first, this may seem sur­
prising. If the Korean economy has achieved a world-record 
growth rate over a fifteen-year period, and if the government 
has intervened effectively, then how can its role have been 
anything but positive? It is, nonetheless, possible to find foreign 
visitors who, having stayed in Korea long enough to be both 
impressed by the economic dynamism and aware of the per­
vasive intervention, make statements of the form: "My God, 
just imagine what these people could do if the government 
didn't stick its nose into everything!" 
Since some knowledgeable Koreans take a similar view, it 
would be a mistake to dismiss this position as purely facetious. 
Two forms of the argument are possible-marginalist and struc­
tural. 
The marginalist version would run as follows: 
We know that certain policies have had a negative effect on growth, 
that the bureaucracy sometimes processes paper too slowly (and 
288
 
Government and Growth 
other times acts too rapidly), that the public enterprises are not as 
efficient as they could be, and so on; if these demonstrable defici­
encies were corrected then the economy could clearly have grown 
even more rapidly;Q.E.D. 
We can hardly quarrel with the substance of this position, but 
would ask just how much perfection can reasonably be ex­
pected of human beings in a world of uncertainty. 
In any event, the critical question is not whether a slightly 
different intervention mix could have yielded slightly higher 
growth rates, but whether a fundamentally non-interventionist 
strategy would have yielded significantly higher rates. Assessing 
this structuralist variant of the argument would require a 
counterfactual exercise of substantial dimensiorns. Suppose that 
in 1961 the government had adopted and pursued a Friedman­
esque hands-off policy; where then would the economy have 
been fifteen years later? Consider the single issue of bank 
ownership. Under a laissez-faire policy, Pyeng-ch'81 Yi would 
have owned half of the banking system with the remainder held 
by other major chaebMl. The non-interventionist would have to 
argue: 1) that competitive pressures would have led to a dilu­
tion of this control; or 2) that pressures in other markets 
would have led even a concentrated banking sector into a 
basically competitive allocation of resources; or 3) that the 
costs of private oligopolistic allocation would have been less 
than the costs associated with a government-run sector. While 
the first two positions are palpably absurd, the third is at least 
arguable. Unfortunately, a systematic comparison of the relative 
costs (including the possibility that the resulting power concen­
tration would provoke a revolution) over fifteen years lies well 
beyond the scope of this study. A similar effort for the econ­
omy as a whole is even further beyond our means. 
In sum, we would readily agree with the marginalist position 
that a somewhat different pattern of intervention could have 
added a point or even two to the growth record. We do not pur­
sue this further since, from an international point of view, the 
fundamental question is not how Korea might have done a little 
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better, but how she achieved a 10 percent rate of growth in the 
first place. While we attribute part of this achievement to tile 
interventionist government, we cannot disprove the structural 
hypothesis that a laissez-faire pattern would have been superior. 
For the present, we only offer the following deductive theoriz­
ing: 
8) 	 The economic theory of government intervention implies 
that, for a de,,eloping economy sunk in the depths of al 
interlocking wc. of disequilibria, the theoretically optimal 
escape path involves substantial government intervention 
in order to achieve even a crude approximation to the 
Pareto efficient resource allocations that would prevail in 
the absence of such distortions (Chapter 1). 
9) Since Korea has the best sustained non-resource-based 
growth record of any LDC, it is therefore not only un­
surprising, but actually expected, that the level of govern­
ment intervention is high and has a positive net impact. 
The reason that positive intervention seems surprising is that a 
generation of development economists have bccome accustomed 
to working in LDCs where misguided intervention has been 
part of the problem rather than part of the cure. The intriguing 
questioii is, then, not why Korea is interventionist, but why 
intervention works. We now consider some propositions as to 
why this might be the case. 
GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC DECISION-

MAKING PROCESS (CHAPTER 3)
 
Planning, in the broadest sense, is tile laying out of a set of 
means-ends chains. The highest tier in this set, and thus the 
apex of the decision-making process, is the establishment of 
national priorities. In Korea: 
10) 	 The first and perhaps most important difference between 
the Rhee and Park regimes was tile degree of leadership 
commitment to growth. Rhet was an independence leader 
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who devoted his attention to politics and national integra­
tion while largely ignoring economics. Park's orientation 
could not be more different, with economic growth having 
priority second only to national and personal political 
survival. Since only the higher goals as being fur­are seen 
thered by growth, economic affairs have been enshrined as 
the dominant operational system objective. 
For leadership commitment to make a difference, it must alter 
the behavior of others. The first step is to affect bureaucrats, 
and the second-discussed in the next section-is to influence 
production units. 
11) Park's commitment to growth is manifested in part in the 
allocation of his own time, but even more important in 
his influence on the behavior of the entire bureaucracy. As 
a military man, lie is trained in using a staff. The Korean 
civil service, with its high selection standards and inculca­
tion of the Confucian hierarchical tradition, is admirably 
equipped to respond. As a result, virtually the entire execu­
tive branch has been mobilized to make decisions based on 
expected economic outcomes. To do otherwise brings 
shame on oneself and one's immediate superiors and sub­
ordinates. 
Bureaucratic decision-making is manifested both in formal 
medium-term planning exercises and in short-term day-to-day 
policy making. 
12) 	 Formal Korean planning has relatively little to distinguish 
it from its counterparts in a multitude of LDCs with undis­
tinguished growth records. It has been only partially 
successful in charting a detailed path for the economy, but 
has ;erved to map the economic terrain, educate officials, 
provide a focus for dialogue, and announce government 
commitment to business. The educational aspect was 
particularly important, as it helped bureaucrats make the 
short-term decisions that really drive the economy. 
We have stressed that Korea's economic growth performance 
is remarkable not only for 	its rate but also for the length of 
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time over which it has been sustained. In 1976, Park Chung 
Hee presided over an economy that was more than four times as 
large as the one he inherited in 1961. The accompanying struc­
tural changes were even greater, and the nature and sophistica­
tion of government policy has had to adjust at a corresponding 
rate. That one man has --coven capable of overscing such dis­
parate economies is remarkable. It is as though Calvin Coolidge 
were called upon to deal with the economy of the United States 
as faced by Jimmy Carter. One aspect of the problem is how 
Park was able to maintain his discipline and dedication in the 
absence of any effective internal threat via election or coup. 
13) Internationally, there is a common pattern of strong LDC 
leaders who take office with great dedication to the 
national welfare, but who over time deteriorate into cor­
ruption illpampered and isolated splendor. Despite the 
absence of an effective internil threat, this trend is not 
yet apparent in the economic sphere in Park's case. This 
may be due to persona.l character or to the substitution 
of an external threat from the north. 
The second aspect of the problem is how-given continued 
leadership dedication -the administrative structure was able to 
respond to change. 
14) 	 That the bureaucratic decision-making structure has been 
able continually and successfully to adapt to rapidly 
changing conditions is due in part to the following charac­
teristics of the short-term policy formulation process: 
executive dominance, speed, flexibility, pragmatism, 
particularism, and openness. 
15) 	 Executive dominance. The legislative and judiciary 
branches have become nearly irrelevant under Park. 
16) 	 Speed and Flexibility. Government policy response to 
changing conditions is typically closer to the alacrity of a 
crack air-force unit scrambling to the attack than to the 
lethargy usually associated with bureaucracy. This has 
costs in that the first decision may prove misguided, but 
such costs are minimized by flexibility in changing direc­
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tion as the effects of the initial decision become apparent. 
The Korean policy-making style is not so much a dcliber­
ate one of careful planning and debate, but more one of 
diving in, getting started, observing results, adjusting 
policy, and repeating the process until tile appropriate 
mix is found. 
17) Pragmatism. The selection of instruments to deal with a 
particular economic problem is not constrained by any 
ideological predilections. The test is what works, and the 
Koreans are perfectly willing to try anything from public 
ownership to free markets to coercion. 
18) 	 Particularism. Policies are often made with low levels of 
generality; for example, for application to a single firm. 
This allows fine-tuning of policy with attendant risks of 
corruption and uncertainty. 
19) 	 Openness. Economic olicy-making is open to a wide 
range of opinion inputs, even though the final decision 
process itself is closed. There is virtually unlimited free­
donm of economic expression with various levels of govern­
ment quite receptive to the opinions of businessmen, 
academics, and foreigners. The influence of labor unions, 
however, is negligi' 
The question of business influence is particularly interesting, 
since it raises the question of whether there is a "Korea, Inc." 
We argue that 
20) Given economic growth as the legitimizing goal of the 
Park regime, there is a clear harmony of interest between 
government and business, and this is reflected in close 
working relationships of a sort that might be crudely 
characterized as "Korea, Inc." The analogy with "Japan, 
Inc." is misleading, however, in that the Korean govern­
ment is clearly and unquestionably the dominant part­
ner. 
The reasons for the dominance of government can be seen by 
considering the mechanisms whereby government controls 
business. 
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IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT 
POLICY (CHAPTER 4) 
Implementation in a narrow sense is the translation of an 
administrative abstraction into concrete action by a production 
unit. We believe that 
21) 	 Korea is distinguished from less successful LDCs, not so 
much by the wisdom of the policy abstractions generated 
by its planners, as by its ability to implement these policies. 
This can be explained by examining the lower-but perhaps 
most crucial-level of government planning; that is, the set of 
mechanisms whereby individual or enterprise compliance is 
stimulated, forced, or cajoled. These compliance mechanisms 
are central to understanding any mixed economy. 
22) Despite our emphasis on the role of government, Korea is 
in no sense a command economy. Rather it is "mixed" 
both in terms of ownership and in the distribution of 
decision-making power. In such an economy, the critical 
point in the decision-making hierarchy is the gap between 
public influence and private decisions. This gap is bridged 
by compliance mechanisms. 
Selection of compliance mechanisms involves a two-dimensional 
choice between non-coercive field manipulation and command 
on the one hand and between discretionary and non-discretion­
ary administration on the other. Of the four possible sets of 
behavioral mechanisms, one-non-discretionary parameter manip­
ulation-is generally held to be superior on theoretical grounds. 
This is reflected in the popular dictum that, where intervention 
is necessary, it should be accomplished by "getting the prices 
right." However: 
23) 	 In Korea, non-discretionary parameter manipulation has 
by no means been eschewed, but it has been heavily sup­
plemented by the illiberal compliance mechanisms of 
command and administrative discretion. Korea is thus 
interventionist in the broad sense of altering decisions of 
productive entities, but also in the narrower sense of using 
compulsion and discretion in doing so. 
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The dominant uses of each compliance mechanism are as fol­
lows: 
24) 	 The single most important realm of non-discretionary 
field manipulation is the foreign exchange market. Oi the 
supply side, both Rhee and I r; used this device to a 
surprisingly similar extent to stimulate exports. The ex­
port boom thus does not seem to be attributable directly 
to "getting the price right" in terms of constant w~n­
per-dollar return to foreign sales. 
25) 	 On the demand side, foreign exchange was allocated to 
importers via discretionary command under Rhee but via 
non-discretionary field manipulation under Park. This 
had the important result of driving entrepreneurs out of 
zero-sum arbitrage activity and into positive-sum produc­
tion and thus contributing indirectly to exports. 
26) 	 Credit allocation is the most important example of dis­
cretionary field manipulation. There is no discernible dif­
ference between Rhee and Park in the degree of discretion 
exercised by government officials over the allocation of 
credit. There is, however, a major difference in the prin­
ciple guiding discretion. Under Rhee, political and personal 
gain seem to have played a major role. Under Park, such 
considerations are by no means absent but are clearly 
subordinate to economic priorities. 
27) 	 Non-discretionary command prevails in tax administra­
tion and consumption bans, while discretionary command 
occurs in price controls and in both "informal guidance" 
and formal directives in a plethora of areas. 
The critical question with both variants of command is not so 
much why it is attempted, but why it succeeds. Field manipula­
tion carries its own reward for compliance, but command must 
be enforced. Two methods are available: straightforward legal 
police action and informal "partial mutuality" (for example, 
the implicit threat of withdrawing a privilege previously confer­
red under discretionary field manipulation). In Korea: 
28) Partial mutuality is the dominant means of enforcing dis­
cretionary command, while selective police action is 
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typically used to ensure compliance with non-discretion­
ary command. 
29) 	 Discretionary credit allocation is the fulcrum upon which 
partial mutuality rests. The critical importance of credit 
to the enterprise, and its virtually complete control by 
tile government, make this a powerful tool for ensuring 
private compliance with almost any command the govern­
ment wishes to give. Government control of the banks is 
thus the single most important economic factor explaining 
the distinctly subordinate position of the private sector. 
The use of discretion in implementing government policy has 
been widely criticized as a source of corruption and inefficient 
resource allocation in other LDCs. In Korea: 
30) 	 Under Rhee, all the evils normally associated with bureau­
cratic discretion were abundantly apparent. Under Park, 
discretion remained, but the negative effects were re­
duced, and the advantages of flexibility under a "rule of 
men" rather than a rigid "rule of law" were reaped. The 
difference follows from leadership commitment to 
growth imposed on a rigid hierarchical structure in which 
no official can afford conspicuously to make decisions 
that run counter to the goals of economic efficiency and 
growth. 
The 	 efficacy of discretion and command under Park may be 
summarized in terms of Myrdal's distinction between "hard" 
and "soft" states. 
31) The second critical difference between the Rhee and Park 
periods (after leadership commitment to growth) is in the 
efficacy of implementation. Under Rhee, Korea was the 
familiar "soft" LDC in which economic regulktions were 
seldom enforced. Under Park, it became a prototype of 
the "hard" development model with tile ability to impose 
obliga-ions via compulsion and the ability to direct ad­
ministrative discretion towards economically desirable 
ends. 
Tile examination of the governmental apex of the economic 
decision-making triangle leads us to consideration of its base in 
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the productive units. We first briefly consider the public enter­
prises and then turn to the quantitatively more important 
private sector. 
PUBLIC ENTERPRISE (CHAPTER 5) 
Korea is widely, but mistakenly, regarded as being among the 
most capitalistic of LDCs. In fact: 
32) A minor paradox of Korean development is that, despite 
a rhetorical commitment to private enterprise, public 
ownership has been used to an extent that parallels that 
of many countries advocating asocialist pattern of society. 
33) 	The relatively large public enterprise sector is not to be 
attributed to the heritage of Japanese properties confis­
cated at Liberation. Most of these enterprises had been 
divested by 1961. 
34) 	During the period of rapid economic growth, public 
enterprises constituted a, "leading sector" in the sense 
that they grew substantialhy more rapidly than the ccon­
only as a whole, and there were identifiable linkages 
whereby that giwi was transmitted to other sectors. 
35) 	 Enterprises chosen for p':bilic operation are characterized 
by output-market concentration, high forward linkages, 
high capital intensity, large size and production of non­
tradeables or import substitutes rather than exports. 
Given these characteristics of the public enterprises: 
36) The alternative to the imperfections of public control is 
usually not the ideal of perfect competition, but tile im­
perfections of private monopoly (or oligopoly) or out­
right nonexistence. 
The 	 paradox of Korean reliance on public ownership is thus 
resolved: 
37) The size and growth of the sector is explicable in terms of 
a growth-oriented government's pragmatic response to 
some of the market imperfections that must be overcome 
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in the course of development. Public enterprise is simply 
one tool for dealing with these problems. 
What are the consequences of this choice? Public enterprises 
elsewhere are widely held to be "inefficient." Based on partial 
evidence, we believe that 
38) 	 Korean public enterprises are generally more cost effi­
cient than their counterparts in most LDCs, but much of 
this is due to the general competence of the labor force 
and the externalities of a well-run economy. More im­
portant, while the public enterpris,.s are less efficient 
than comparable private Korean firms, we believe the 
public-private gap is smaller than in most other LDCs. 
39) The relative efficiency of the public-enterprise sector is 
not to be explained in terms of novel organizational 
features of the control structure. These seem to be as 
inimical to efficiency as elsewhere. Instead, it may be due 
to the same features that make other forms of discre­
tionary command effective. Leadership commitment to 
growth, as administered by a competent hierarchy, pre­
cludes major prolonged inefficiencies. 
PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP: 
SOURCES OF EXPANSION (CHAPTER 6) 
The importance of government's visible hand and the scope of 
the public-enterprise sector notwithstanding, the quantitative 
bulk of decisions leading to growth are taken in the private 
sector. If decision-making is the scarcest of the scarce factors 
that must be mobilized in order to develop, then to under­
stand Korean growth we must understand the sources of ex­
pansion in the quantity of successful entrepreneurial acts. This 
may be phrased in terms of how much of the expansion in the 
equilibrium quantity of entrepreneurship is due to demand 
shifts and how much to supply shifts. We argue that 
40) The initial growth spurt in the early 1960s fromcame 
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demand side effects, but thereafter expansion is ex­
plicable largely in terms of shifts in supply. 
A first look at the important changes on the demand side 
reveals that 
41) After years of political and economic confusion, the 
imposition of the inilitary regime in 1961 brought 
stability and promises of economic support. This induced 
expectations of future stability, lengthened entrepre­
neurs' time horizons, lowered the time preference dis­
count rate, and increased die expected return on virtLally 
all projects. 
42) 	The military regime also took steps to eliminate the 
massive rents accruing to recipients of various govern­
ment privileges, notably foreign exchange. This had the 
effect of reordering the project yields that constitute the 
demand curve. The net effect on private return is not 
clear, but social returns increased substantially as the 
existing quantity of entrepreneurship shifted from zero­
sum to positive-sum activities. 
On the supply side, we distinguish between "lenticular" and 
"bundle" entrepreneurship. There arc a variety of entrepre­
neurial functions that must be fulfilled if a project is to succeed. 
However, the entrepreneur need not perform all (or any) of 
these "bundle" functions himself. He need only perform the 
combinatorial or lenticular function of insuring that they are 
all carried out by someone. There are therefore three entre­
preneurial supply curves: 
a) 	 Lenticular intent: individuals who are willing to try to 
provide a standard unit of the lenticular function at a 
given price. 
b) 	 Effective lenticularism: those who are able to provide a 
unit of standard lenticularism. 
c) 	 Bundle entrepreneurship: those who are able to provide 
a standard lenticular unit anid find (or supply) comple­
mentary entrepreneurial imputs. 
We argue that the major shifts in these curves have been as follows: 
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43) 	 Lenticular intent is a function of sociological character­
istics that change only slowly, so shifts in this curve play 
only a minor role. There may, nonetheless, have been 
sonic outward shifts as the non-pecuniary returns expand 
with increasing societal approval. 
44) 	 Learning by doing has progressively and substantially 
reduced the gap between intended and effective lenticu­
larism. 
45) 	 Bundle supply has progressively shifted outward (towards 
effective lCnticular supply) as gap filling has become 
easier. This occurs due to learning by doing, growth 
externalities, increased functional differentiation, and 
government field augmentation. 
A major implication of the foregoing is that 
46) 	The expansion of entrepreneurial acts seems to be due 
lncre to the (Itialitative improvement of the existing 
stock of entrepreneurs rather than to an increase in the 
quantity of active entrepreneurs. 
This is supported by an examination of entrepreneurial 
dynamics which suggests that 
47) There is substantial churning at the bottom of the entre­
preneurial ladder with a high level of aspiration and gross 
entry leading to rapid failure. Those who survive the 
initial entrepreneurial act then expand rapidly. Growth in 
value added is due first to expansion of existing firms, 
second to entry of offspring firms, and only to a minor 
extent to net entrance of new entrepreneurs. 
This 	has major implications for business concentration, a topic 
to which! we shall return after looking more carefully at the 
sou-ces of entrepreneurial supply. 
PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP:
 
SUPPLY (CHAPTER 7)
 
A recurring theme in studies of entrepreneurial supply is the 
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notion of a subordinated group struggling for otherwise blocked 
or threatened status and providing economic leadership in the 
process. Korea has an exceptionally homogeneous population, 
but there are two important minorities-northerners and Chris­
tians-which must be considered as candidates for subordinated 
group status. 
48) Northerners are indeed heavily overrepresented in the 
entrepreneurial population, and Christians somewhat so. 
However, examination of cross-correlations with other 
variables-notably parental occupation -make it clear that 
this is not due to subordination. 
49) Northern overrcpresentation is to be explained in terms 
of natural selection-those who chose to flee a Com­
munist regime are disproportionately educated, wealthy, 
and from industrial and commercial backgrounds. Social 
blockage does not explain their overrepresentation, 
as southerners from similar family backgrounds would 
seem to have an equal probability of representation 
among the entrepreneurial elite. 
if the sociologists' subordination theories do not work in 
Kore.a, neither does the notion of a random distribution of 
entrepreneurial energy: 
50) 	The entrepreneurial elite is emphatically not drawn 
randomly from the population as a whole. Rather, 
today's entrepreneurs came from a narrow selection of 
family occupational backgrounds-large to medium land­
lords, merchants, factory owners, civil servants, and 
professionals. Since these occupations were confined to 
at most 15 percent of the parental cohort, it is clear that 
the industrial elite has been derived from the pre-indus­
trial elite (though not necessarily from the traditional 
yangbai elite). 
51) 	 The link between traditional and industrial status does 
not seem to be primarily capital or influence, but educa­
tion. That is, the traditional elite had disproportionate 
access to the education which correlates highly with a 
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position within the entrepreneurial elite. Seventy percent 
of entrepreneurs have some college education compared 
with only 10 percent of the male cohort. Further, there 
is surprisingly little difference between the entrepre­
neurs and the renowned civil servants. 
Since education is not widely regarded as a determinant of 
entrepreneurial success, it is worth asking why the situation 
may be different in Korea. One possibility is that 
52) 	 In the Confucian system, education has such a high value 
that it serves as a validation mechanism for anyone with 
higher aspirations and makes it difficult for an unedu­
cated man to manage relations with subordinates or with 
government. Even if education yields few useful tech­
nical skills, it nonetheless provides social prerequisites 
that are useful for entrepreneurial success. 
It is widely believed that the government discriminates in 
favor of entrepreneurs from Park Chung Hee's Ky~ngsang 
province. However, our results show that 
53) While Ky~ngsang province dominates in absolute num­
bers, its citizens are actually underrepresented relative to 
the population as a whole. if there is any discrimination, 
it operates in favor of those born in the north, Seoul, 
or Kyinggi province. Even this, however, is probably 
due to differences in education and parental occupation 
rather than discrimination. 
Finally, consider the question of the generally high quality 
of lenticular entrepreneurial supply. One set of reasons may be 
that, in common with other high-growth East Asian societies: 
54) 	The Confucian heritage emphasizes certain virtues that 
are supportive of growth. Among these are: competitive 
dedication to improving the relative position of self and 
family; respect for education as a vehicle for self-improve­
ment; inculcation of qualities of hard work, diligence, 
and self-discipline; absence of religious or ideological 
constraints inhibiting the pragmatic pursuit of ends; 
and ability to subordinate self and participate effec­
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tively in a hierarchical structure yielding a synergistic 
effect on output. 
The notion that the Confucian heritage is growth supporting 
is, of cour:;e, open to the charge of "ex-postism." since twenty 
years ago .t was viewed by many as the curse rather than the 
cure. The question is why the growth-negating elements with­
ered away, -,..,whilc the growth-accentuating elements have pros­
pered; for example, why the "empty" classical education has 
yielded to the modern, but the traditional drive and respect 
for education has (if anything) increased. A superficial answer 
is that one element was compatible with modernity and tle 
other not, but such cultural Darwinism must itself be explained. 
We leave this puzzle to others, and only suggest that the non­
theistic flexibility of Confucianism may be a factor. 
Social homogeneity may also play a role in explaining the 
high level of entrepreneurial supply. Elsewhere, minorities 
prosper because the majority faith is inimical to growth. In 
Korea: 
55) The basic Confucian values are widely shared, even among 
those who profess some other religious faith. This means 
that minority status confers no special advantage, and 
that the entrepreneurs' contacts with workers and civil 
servants are less likely to be marred by competing values. 
PRIVATE ECONOMIC POWER (CHAPTER 8) 
One problem of capitalistic or mixed patterns of development is 
the tendency towards an increasing concentration of economic 
power in a small number of hands. This business concentration 
has spawned both academic research and corrective government 
policy towards such manifestations of the phenomenon as the 
Japanese zaibatsu, India's industrial groups, and Pakistan's 
twenty-two families. In Korea, the term for such groups is 
chaebl. 
56) The Korean chaebSl are similar to the early Meiji zaibatsu 
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in that control is centralized in a single dynamic in­
dividual who founds one enterprise, gets it running, 
passes management to a relative or associate, and moves 
on to something new. A major difference is that the 
chaeb~l do not hold their own banks. 
Our quantitative estimates suggest that 
57) 	 The forty-six largest chacbil produce roughly 13 percent 
of GDP or 37 percent of value added in manufacturing. 
This level of business concentration is surprisingly low in 
comparison to available Japanese, Indian, and Pakistani 
data. 
However, since most Koreans started from a near-zero base in 
1951, the level of business concentration is perhaps less impor­
tant than the trend: 
58) 	 The trend in business concentration seems to be rapidly 
upward. This follows both from empirical data on the 
brief 1973-1975 period and from our earlier conclusion 
that expansion dominates entry as a source of entrepre­
neurial growth. 
If so, then how is this rapid growth to be explained? 
Journalistic opinion in Korea holds that chaebdl accumulation 
is largely the result of political connections. We argue that 
59) 	 Under Rhee, a major source of chaeb&l growth was 
privileged access to government controlled markets, and 
the resulting transfers produced relatively few benefits 
for society as a whole. Entrepreneurs were thus largely 
involved in zero-sum activity. 
60) 	 Under Park, zero-sum transfers remain, but largely as 
add-ons to productive positive-sum ventures. In part 
this followed from elimination of some zero-sum oppor­
tunities (for example, the shift to non-discretionary 
allocaticin of foreign exchange). More important, it 
follows from insuring that bureaucratic discretion is 
exercised so that resources are allocated to reasonably 
productive users. 
The 	result, however, has not been egalitarian: 
304
 
Private Economic Power 
61) 	 Underpriced resources-notably credit-have nonetheless 
been channeled predominantly into the hands of a rela­
tively small number of chaeb1. This is not necessarily 
due to political favoritism but may simply reflect the fact 
that they have a proven track record that shows them to 
be capable of using the resources most efficiently. 
This last point is certainly not gratuitous, probably not trivial, 
and deserves some elaboratioi. We begin with the proposition 
that all entrepreneurs are not created equal. In the mid-iJ960s, 
Pygng-ch'6l Yi oversaw the construction of a 300,000-MT 
fertilizer factory in 18 months; in the early 1970s, CImu-y6ng 
Clng built both a shipyard and two world class tankers in 
thirty months; during the I 970s, U-jung Kim has been discover­
ing new export markets at a rate of increase of over 70 percent 
a year. What if these and other chaeb61 leaders had been denied 
credit on the grounds that it was time to give someone else a 
chance? How many Koreans could have done as well? What if 
the counterfactual set of allocations went to entrepreneurs who 
were merely good rather than great, and this meant longer 
project gestation periods, greater lags in identifying and exploit­
ing foreign markets; lower cost efficiency, and so on? It does 
not require a very heroic set of assumptions about the magni­
tudes involved to demonstrate a significant negative effect on 
the growth rate. The point is simply that "X-efficiency," as 
well as allocative efficiency, must be considered in making 
allocation decisions. Economists devote much time to getting 
resources to the right industry, whereas getting them to the 
right individualmay be far more important. 
In any event, whatever the rationale for the government 
policies actually pursued, it is clear that 
62) 	While there have been no serious government attempts 
to control the rate of chaeb61 asset accumulation, there 
have been two sets of major constraints on asset utiliza­
tion. First, by the international standards of mixed 
economies, wealth has purchased a minimum of political 
influence. Second, there have been restraints on certain 
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forms of asset acquisition-most important, in the pro­
hibition of bank ownership. 
While the historical record thus shows implicit government 
support of largely unlimited chaebSl accumulation: 
63) 	 In the mid-1970s, the government has shown increasing 
concern with the rate of chaebl expansion and has 
begun to take measures that might constrain their future 
growth. The seriousness of this effort remains to be seen. 
DECISIONS AND GROWTH IN A 
"HARD" STATE 
We have taken a somewhat unconventional view of the dy­
manics of development. Instead of focusing on factors of pro­
duction and policies, we have emphasized the behavior of the 
individuals and structures that produce economic decisions: that 
is, on the economic system. This approach would find favor 
with the architects of Japan's Meiji reform who argued: 
If we assign weights to these three factors with respect to their 
effectiveness (in building Japanese industry), the spirit should be 
assigned five parts, laws and regulations four, and capital no more 
than one part.' 
The major thing wrong with this statement is that it over­
emphasizes the role of capital. If one could somehow quantify
''spirit" and "regulation" and use them together with capital 
as independent variables explaining growth, one might ome out 
with the coefficients specified above. The results wo:Ald, none­
theless, be erroneous and suffer from multicollinearity, since 
the equation is misspecified-the behavioral and structural 
variables lie deeper in the causal chain and themselves explain 
the level of capital accumulation. 
"Spirit" presumably has something to do with the latent 
energy and ability of the population. Important as this is, it 
cannot have changed dramatically between the Rhee and Park 
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periods. There was, howevr,-, a major change in the structure 
of the economic system, allowing the tapping of the potential. 
We characterize this change as the imposition of a hard growth­
oriented state. 
Consider the economic decision-making hierarchy running 
from the president through tile bureaucracy, chaeb6l leaders, 
enterprise chief executives, and workers. In a hard state, deci­
sions at one tier in the hierarchy result in a change in behavior 
at lower levels. In a soft state they do not. In moving from Rhee 
to Park, several major changes occurred in this structure. First, 
economic growth was given top emphasis. Second, that priority 
was effectively transmitted to the forefront of bureaucratic 
consciousness and mnadc to strongly condition their decisions. 
Third, the crucial discontinuity in the hierarchy-between 
government and enterprise-was breached by a set of com­
pliance mechanisms that selectively, but effectively, guided 
the behavior of entrepreneurs and managers. The modifier 
"selectively" is important, for we are in no sense describing a 
highly centralized comm.. -d economy. Where the market yields 
reasonable prices, fine; wnere it does not, prices are manipu­
lated, information provided, or commands imposed. Scarce 
decision-making talent is further conserved by concentrating 
on large-scale industry. Even there entrepreneurs are allowed 
substantial latitude within bounds set by the government, 
and subject to intervention at the government's discretion 
even within those bounds. Finally, decision-making talent has 
been further conserved within tile private sector by providing 
a disproportionate share of resources to a limited number of 
chaeb6l leaders who have proven themselves able to stimulate 
their subordinates to use those resources efficiently. 
CONCLUDING CAVEATS 
To avoid misunderstanding, it is necessary to reiterate several 
caveats that should be borne in mind when interpreting our 
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work. First, we have summarized our results in a series of prop­
ositions that should he taken as hypotheses that have survived a 
first cut rather than conclusions that have been proven. While 
some of the assertions are solidly based in empirical evidence 
(for example, those on the social background of entrepreneurs), 
most are open (and indeed designed to provoke) alternative 
interpretations and revision based on further research. We are 
acutely conscious that we have only scratched the surface of an 
underdeveloped area and have had to sacrifice depth of primary 
work to the breadth of an overall story of how economic 
decisions are made. 
A second major concern is that our generally positive view of 
the economic role of the government of Park Chung Hee should 
not be extended beyond the limits intended. It should be 
obvious that approval of economic policies in no sense implies 
endorsement of developments on the political side. We believe 
this factoring is possible, since authoritarianism is neither neces­
sary nor-sufficient for hardness. Recall that hardness refers to a 
government's ability to translate decisions into action, and this 
ability may vary from decision to decision. A "hard-state" 
designation is thus the result of a subjective weighting of various 
functional areas. Idi Amin may be able to enforce any decision 
where he can mobilize sufficient troops, but in the absence of 
more subtle compliance mechanisms and a basically supportive 
population, the range of decisions that he can in fact implement 
is extremely limited. Iran (prior to the 1978 revolution) and 
Burma are but two conspicuous examples of states that are 
highly authoritarian but extemely "soft" when it comes to mak­
ing a variety of decisions stick. In marked contrast, Norway and 
Sweden would seem to qualify as non-authoritarian states that 
are, nonetheless, "hard." Further, even if authoritarianism 
should be chosen as the means of initiating hardness in an LDC, 
there is no necessity that it take on its more brutal forms. For 
these reasons, we feel approval of the Park regime's economic pol­
icies can be divorced from its more controversial political actions. 
Third, our stress on hardness and hierarchy is relative. Com­
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pared with the Rhee period and with most LDCs, the Park 
regime has been able to enforce its desires. This is not to say 
that the structure is monolithic, that pluralism is absent, or that 
there is no slack in the enforcement mechanisms. 
Fourth, while the "hard" development model has served 
Korea well, it must be remembered that it is a risky strategy, 
potentially subject to great abuses. The fact that discretion and 
command caz work-and have worked in Korea-is not to say 
that they necessarily will work elsewhere. We have stressed that 
the Confucian culture and the homogeneous population are 
particularly well suited to the discipline of the hard state. To 
imply that it would serve equally well in a consensus-oriented 
society such as Indonesia, or with a heterogeneous population 
such as India, would be unwarranted. 
Fifth, our analysis of the factors behind Korean growth in no 
sense implies a universally applicable model of rapid develop­
ment. It may be true that growth of capital stock is strictly 
necessary for substantial growth, b'mt if we wish to go deeper 
and explain that growth in terms of institutions and decision 
processes, then there are no necessary conditions, only sufficient 
ones. South Korea has grown rapidly with an open market 
economy, but North Korea has (in some periods) not done 
badly with a closed command system. South Korea prospers 
with a single strong leader, while Hong Kong does well without. 
We submit that these, and other, counter-examples do not dis­
prove our analysis of what drives the Korean economy. Rather, 
they suggest that there are alternative institutional paths to 
capital accumulation, and all that can be said is that some 
combinations work in certain historical contexts and others do 
not. 
Finally, our emphasis on decision structure should not be 
taken as disparaging the importance of economic policies. While 
these policies have not been nearly as close to tile laissez-faire 
model as sometimes supposed, they have obviously been instru­
mental; for example, one price which has been more or less 
"right" is that of foreign exchange, and this has been critical 
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in subjecting entrepreneurs to the discipline of the international 
market place. Our point has simply been that it is far easier to 
find someone to give good advice than to find someone to take 
it. The surprising thing about Korea i nut so much that particu­
lar policies have worked, but that they came to be adopted in 
the first place. 
In sum, we have argued that, if we are seriously concerned 
with explaining economic results, we must ask inconvenient 
questions as to how and why decisions are made. For example, 
consider the economic outcome of growth. It can be explained 
at one of three levels. At the shallowest level, growth is a func­
tion of the expansion cf the quantity and quality of factor 
inputs-notably capital. The second level involves the policies or 
strategies that lead to, say, capital accumulation. The third is 
the process whereby political entities make decisions that lead 
to the policies, and whereby productive entities respond to 
policies in a way that produces a particular level of accumula­
tion and, for that level, a particular rate of growth. Thus, one 
might "explain" part of tile difference between Korean and 
Indian growth rates in terms of differential investment (level 
one); this is further partly explained by interest rates and the 
interest elasticity of investment (level two). Growth is not 
.eally understood, however, until one moves to level three and 
asks why one country chooses an interest-rate policy that 
"works," and why, for a given rate, entrepreneurs in different 
countrics produce markedly different effects on output. Level­
three questions thus lie deeper in the causal chain. They are 
inherently more complex but concomitantly more fundamental 
in explaining economic outcomes. It is to such issues of political 
economy that this volume lia. been addressed. 
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Case Studies of Small
 
and Medium Enterprises
 
by 
Vincent S. R. Brandt 
This chapter summarizes the results of a brief anthropological study of 
Korean entrepreneurship in small and medium industry that my wife and I 
carried out during the spring and summer of 1976. We conducted extended 
interviews with the presidents (and founders) of 11 firms, and we collected 
whatever additional information we could from employees or knowledge­
able outside observers about the experience, personality, and business 
performance of our principal informants. 
With such a small number of firms, it was impossible, of course, to 
obtain a representative sample. Nine companies were chosen because we 
had personal ties with, or good introductions to, the owner, while in 2 
cases we simply walked in cold off the street. Nevertheless, because our 
initial contacts were with people of extremely varied background and 
social status, there is a good spread in terms of these factors. 
Six of the firms were small (20-50 employees), while the other 5 all had 
between 100 and 400 workers. The industries represented were: textiles 
(4), machinery (3), aluminum-foil products (1), deep-sea fishing (1), plas­
tics (1), and buttons for export (1). 
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In addition, we talked at length, both informally and in more or less 
structured interviews, about entrepreneurship with 17 other Koreans, 
including sonic who started out with small firms but now run large com­
panics, others who were bankers, corporation lawyers, and professors of 
business administration, and one man engaged in the speculative lending of 
risk capital to small but promising and innovative firms. 
BRIQUI.TTE-MACHINE FACTORY 
This company, located in tile twoeastern suburbs of Seoul, manufactures 
products: 1) a massive briquette-making machine, and 2) a device for 
increasing the efficiency of crude-oil burners. The plant with its equipment 
seemed impressive for only 25 workers. It was obviously much more 
capital intensive than any of the other establishments we looked at. Six 
briquette machines in variouswere stages of construction. We didn't see 
the place where the oil-burner attachment is made, but there were about 
50 of them crated and stacked for shipment, with several destined for 
Southeast Asia. 
The person we talked to, Mr. Cho, is a mechanical engineer and inventor. 
He developed a coal-crushing and briquctte-making device in 1960 with 3 
mechanics and a capital of 8,000,000 w~n. He is more interested in his new 
inventions than in their production and sales and, once a workable and 
economically feasible invcntion has been patented, he turns the produc­
tion over to someone else; he claimed that about 20 of his inventions are 
being produced in Korea at several other small factories, some of which he 
started himself. In this case, however, although he introduced another man 
to us as the company president, Mr. Cho was very much in charge; the 
titular president plays a definitely subordinate role-that of a hired mana­
ger. We weren't able to find out just what Mr. Cho's stake in the business 
is, though. In response to fairly persistent questioning, he said the com­
pany has assets of several billion won, and ownership is shared. He also 
said the company would probably go public in the near future. He claimed 
that his briquette-making machines are far superior to others being manu­
factured in Korea but also more expensive. He also claimed that his crude 
oil-burner device greatly improves efficiency, and he predicted that export 
sales should increase rapidly, unless the idea is stolen or improved on by 
the Japanese, who might then export a better and cheaper model. 
PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
Mr. Cho's father, who lived in North Ch'ungch'8'ng province, had been a 
minor local official, a small landowner, a yangban (really hyangban), and a 
314 
Briquette-AlachineFactory 
practitioner of Chinese medicine. His education was in the Chinese classics 
at a local sc-ida g (a village school). 
Mr. Cho, who is an eldest son with many brothers and sisters, has been 
interested since childhood in any new mechanical device, and he has 
always enjoyed tinkering with and repairing machinery. As a youth he 
dropped out of college in order to earn money and engage in more practi­
cal activities. 
He described himself as having more vision and accomplishing things 
more quickly than others. After several years as managing director of a 
fuel and oil company, he decided in 1960 to go on his own as an inventor. 
In spite of his lack of formal education, he has been asked recently by 
Korea University to teach a course at its engineering college. He drove his 
own car, which was not at all new, however.1 
Mr. Clio was only a private do.-ng the Korean War, because he did not 
have a college degree. A friend of mine, who was a lieutenant colonel and 
at that time' Private Cho's superior officer, told me recently that Cho's 
energy and intelligence were quickly recognize(], and he was soon perform­
ing staff jobs at battalion headquartcrs that were usually assigned to a 
captain or a major. His superiors were already predicting that lie would be 
extremely successful after the war. 
ENTREPREN EU RSHIP 
Mr. Cho asserted that all of the usual qualities that are cited as necessary 
for entrepreneurial success, such as the ability to utilize new technology, 
manage a firni effectively, supervise employees, sell at a profit by riding 
herd on costs through efficient accounting procedures, and so on, really 
amount to only about 60 percent of what is needed. He labeled this 60 
percent, "intelligence and action," while the other 40 percent is "timing 
and luck." By timing he meant perception of an opportunity within the 
context of contemporary possibilities, both for production and sales. 
Entrepreneurs and managers, he thinks, should have 'uvision of an im­
proved society through technological achievement, and they have a respon­
sibility to produce better quality products. He stressed the importance of 
free-market competition in promoting this process. On the one hand, he 
praised government initiative in providing capital, know-how, and export 
market information to help industry, while on the other he criticized the 
kind of favoritism that resulted in the enrichment of inefficient producers 
and other distortions. He indicated that government administration was 
becoming more efficient and more impartial, at least with regard to small 
industry, and that personal connections with government officials were 
now much less crucial than in the past. 
Mr. Cho is a man of great energy and self-confidence. He likes to delegate 
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anything routine to others in order to retain his independence and free­
dora to work on his own inventions. He doesn't speak much English, but 
he seemed to be thoroughly westernized in his outlook, both in terms of 
his own uncompromising individualism and in his evaluation of Korean 
industrial capacity. He said that the distaste of Koreans for hard, dirty, 
manual labor is a major problem, and that technicians with education and 
skills want to keep their hands clean. Uneducated laborers, although most 
of them have plenty of native intelligence, do not fUnction well under 
contractual wage relationships; they do not recognize the priority of tech­
nological precision, efficiency, and merit promotions within a factory, 
expecting rather that seniority and connections are enough to entitle them 
to permanent employment at good wages. 
Finally. Mr. Cho said that, although lie does not consider himself primar­
ily an entrepreneur, lie has been involved in helping start and in nursing 
along several small companies, so he is something of a judge of entre­
preneurship. He that, while factory headfeels a must begin by presiding 
effectively over his employees in a traditional paternalistic way, he must 
gradually introduce rational scientific attitudes and operations into his 
organization in ,rder to succeed competitively today. It is much better, 
lie thinks, to hav, a small number of intelligent, rational, highly motivated 
employees than to hire a lot of cheap labor. 
He was highly critical of what lie called the temporary, emergency, guess­
work approach to management decisions characteristic of much Korean 
medium and small industry. There is little long-range planning, and most 
important decisions are made on the basis of hunches in order to deal with 
short-term crises. Another problem is that all responsibility and decision­
making power is usually concentrated in one man, who, as lie gets older, 
is unlikely to maintain the necessary adaptability to new challenges and 
the flexibility to adopt needed innovations. In contrast to traditional 
practice, lie said, lealers should train younger men, give them adequate 
naterial rewards, and then delegate authority. 
In addition to careful, systematic planning, lie advocates highly struc­a 
tured organizational setup wi'h extensive functional specificity. In spite of 
the Korean emphasis on hcerarchy in personal relationships, lie has found 
a great deal of sloppy informality in thc way most small manufacturers 
operate; they try to get by on personal influence, connections, or through 
offering bribes, rather than by a determination to achieve planned objec­
tives through syste/matic organization. 
KNITTING FACTORY IN TAEGU 
The present owner and president, Mr. Choi, started his knitting enterprise 
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in 1966 with 4,000,000 w'n of his own money. At first there was just one 
machine and 3 machine operators. He and his wife were the main skilled 
technicians, and he had 15 employees all together. in 5 years he had 170 
workers; today there are 300. It is still a small, family-style operation, 
however, with everyone crammed together in old buildings and a minimum 
of office space for administration. In producing knitted clothing, his fac­
tory performs three operations: 1) spinning yarn; 2) knitting material; 
3) designing, cutting, and making clothes. Mr. Choi said that, while the 
first two operations are fairly routine, his particular talent and the reason 
for his rapid, independent success in his flail- for design and color. In Taegu 
we heard from other sources as well that Mr. Choi not only has a good 
personal sense of design, but he keeps close track of fashion trends in 
Japan and the United States. He seems to know what consumers want and 
to have a good sense of timing in introducing new styles. Everything he 
makes is bought up quickly, he said, and there is never any trouble with 
large unsold stocks. In his reception room (which is a kind of anteroom to 
the factory with all sorts of people passing through) there is this framed 
motto: 
1) Let's make the utmost effort to produce high quality products. 
2) Let's make new products that the consumer wants, and that fit the 
time. 
3) Let's work with trustworthiness for our common bright future. 
Mr. Choi touched on, or rather emphasized at some length and with 
evident sincerity, all three of these points in talking to us. He said that, 
urlike many other textile plants, he is more concerned with establishing 
his new company's reputation for trustworthiness and quality products 
than he is with making large profits. He claimed to be scrupulous about 
maintaining quality and meeting contract deadlines. He said he wants to 
become really big, and it is just a question of time, because his reputation 
in the field is already so high. 
PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
Mr. Choi had a difficult childhood. His father, having graduated from 
"middle" (now high) school, was under the Japanese a relatively well­
educated farmer in a village near Taegu. Mr. Choi's mother was Christian, 
and as a small boy he attended Sunday School. His father got into finan­
cial trouble before the Liberation and became further impoverished in the 
post-Liberation period. He died during the Korean War, having sold all his 
land to pay off debts and feed his family. Mr. Choi spent several years of 
his childhood peddling things on the streets of Taegu and as a result was 
obliged to miss several months of elementary school each year. When he 
applied for the entrance exam to middle school, the teacher refused to 
accept his application, saying that, because of his prolonged absences, he 
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would never be able to pass. The boy went to his principal and obtained 
permission to take the examination. Then he studied at home night and 
day for one month, sleeping only three or four hours a night. According to 
the exam results, his work was equivalent to that of a third-year middle 
school student. Mr. Choi told this story, not only to illustrate his deter­
rnination and ability, but also to show how strong his reaction was when 
lie felt he had been unfairly treated or slighted. This early feat gave him 
great self-confidence, so ie feels he can do anything if he wants it badly 
enough. 
His mother was constantly supportive, urging him to get good anas 

education as possible and trying to make it possible for him 
 to do so. He 
feels, however, that his dominant motivation during his school years was 
to achieve business success and escape poverty rather than to distinguish 
himself academically. Formal education has had little to do with his own 
success, he said. Rather it is due to the experience of petty commerce and 
industry Ie acquired as a boy and later on as a small factory manager, com­
bined with great determination and diligence. 
During the period 1958-61, lie was a Katusa (a Korean enlisted soldier 
assigned to an American unit). He worked in a personnel office for 16 
months, learned a fair anount of English, and was fascinated by what was 
to him a completely novel way of thinking. It was clear that, although he 
admired the American way of doing things and tried to imitate it, lie 
resented the patronizing way in which the U.S. military treated Koreans. 
He often wanted to show the Americans that lie was as intelligent and 
civilized as they and should not be treated as a simple barbarian. 
After finishing his military service, Mr. Choi got a job in a small knitting 
factory through a friend's introduction. The method of manufacture was 
backward and inefficient, "since no one connected with it had any educa­
tion." (He explained the apparent contradiction with his previous remark 
about education by saying that constant inquiry and self education are 
necessary for success in business.) He did his best to improve the system 
and in a few months became manager of the factory because of his hard 
work and good ideas. But although profits increased, his salary remained 
low. The owners thought the business success was due mainly to their own 
good luck and failed to give Mr. Choi credit. 
In 1966 lie started on his own with money saved during the previous 
three years. The contacts he had made and the reputation lie had estab­
lished for himself during the previous years in tIre knitting industry were 
very helpful, particularly in arranging for the distribution of the products 
of his new factory. He pointed out, however, that, while such connections 
are important iii getting started, they are only useful the first time around. 
After that it depends on tire quality and price of the product. Further, lie 
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said, knowing useful people is far more crucial to the very small business­
man. As the volume of business gets larger, such ties, while still of some 
help in facilitating transactions, are much less important. 
Mr. Choi described himself as the careful systematic type who plans 
ahead, trying to foresee every possibility. He admitted that tile bold inves­
tor who takes big risks sometimes makes a killing but added that when he 
(Mr. Choi) makes a mistake, it is usually a minor one and doesn't cost him 
his business as happens so frequently with others. During the late 1950s 
and early 1960s the bold-gambler approach was often suitable, he thought, 
but now there is more stability and keener competition, so that knowledge, 
experience, and rational calculation are necessary. 
He has completed two five-ycar development plans for his company, and 
so far things have gone pretty much as expected, although the pace of ex­
pansion has been a little faster than originally anticipated. Now that he has 
established his firm's reputation for trustworthiness and high quality, he 
believes lie can attract capital and expand still more rapidly. 
He said that he knows as much about the technical side of the business 
as anyone in Korea. He knows just how much each machine is capable of 
producing according to international standards, and he makes sure his 
supervisors and workers know this too. They then feel a strong personal 
obligation to do as well as workers in other countries. Mr. Choi said he 
pays his 15 supervisors well (as much as they would get in the big textile 
mills) and keeps in close and constant touch with them. 
With regard to accounting, he admitted that tile way he does it is pretty 
simple and sloppy-more like a family system than a business firm. What­
ever income there is goes into one account; then he pays his employees, his 
material costs, and his own expenses front that. In the past, somewhat 
more elaborate books were kept, but they were phony and used only to 
dodge taxes. Now, with the recent crackdown by tax officials, this kind of 
evasion is impossible, lie said. In the near future he expects to incorporate 
his business and sell shares to the public. Then he will have to hire a pro­
fessional accountant, which lie thinks would, in spite of the additional cost 
arid nuisance, help him keep better track of his expanding business. 
With regard to motivation, Mr. Choi stressed that, because of his de­
prived life as a child, his goal was to attain financial security and live in 
luxury. He wondered if his children (who are now small) would share 
%is attitude towards conscientious hard work. Most young people, lie said, 
are more interested in having a good time now than in preparing for the 
future. They are suspicious of the advice of all those over forty who 
"have never learned how to enjoy life." Choi's last point was that the girls 
who work in the factory today are more independent and less docile than 
they were ten years ago. The company can no longer take the same kind of 
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paternalistic attitude-scolding and exhortng employees-as in the past. 
Instead it is less troublesome and more profitable to keep them contented 
by making sure conditions and wages are adequate. 
ALUMINUM-FOIL PLANT IN PUSAN 
The company is a medium-sized manufacturer of aluminum foil for cigar­
ette and chewing-gum wrappers, for other industrial uses, and for the 
home. The owner and president, Mr. Kim, aged 50, started the company 
in 1960 with 12 employees and an ICA loan of $60,000. Now he has 304 
employees. His products were all new in Korea when he started making 
them, although other competitors have now entered the field. The tech­
nology-both know-how and machinery-was all imported. He received 
the original ICA loan because of the policy of fostering import-substitu­
tion industries. 
The idea originally came to him when, while working for a paper com­
pany in the 1950s, he found out how much the government tobacco 
monopoly was spending to import the inner foil wrapping for cigarettes. 
Also his company sent him to Germany in the late 1950s to study tech­
nology connected with other aspects of paper making, but while there he 
was able to Iirn a good deal about making aluminum foil for packaging. 
On returning to Korea, he spent several months carrying out his own 
informal but, nevertheless, thorough study of production costs and poten­
tial markets before launching his firm. 
His most serious problem has been acquiring enough capital for expan­
sion and technological improvements but, since his company went public 
three years ago, the supply of capital has been adequate. There have been 
no major problems with regard to personnel supervision or accounting, and 
lie said he has no trouble finding intelligent, hard-working technicians to 
maintain and repair the machinery. Technology is not a problem, since hehimself has a thorough knowledge of the technical aspects of the business. 
Mr. Kim claimed that he is in close communication not only with his 
supervisors but with other employees as well. There is a constant exchange 
of ideas that plays in important part in major decision-making. 
PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
Mr. Kim's father was a small businessman from South Ch'ungch' ng prov­
ince, who moved to Seoul as a young man. He had a classical education in 
the local The was never wellrural sYdang. family off ("lower-middle" 
income), but they managed to send their son to the best schools-Ky 'nggi 
High School and Seoul National University. Mr. Kim called himself an 
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atheist and his father a Buddhist (Confucian would be more appropriate 
from a social science perspective). 
Mr. Kim graduated from Seoul National University in 1950 just before 
the Korean War and then went to Pusan as a refugee. If there had been no 
war, he thinks that he probably would have gone on to grnduate school 
and become a college professor. He warked in Pusan for a newspaper for 
6 months, then an import-export firrm tur 6 months, another import­
export firm for 3 years, and finally for a paper company for 5 years before 
starting on his own. 
ENTREPRENEU RSHIP 
Mr. Kim said lie prefers the careful systematic approach to business leader­
ship. Although he carries out Confucian rituals at home, he does not think 
traditional values and ways of thinking are of any use in industry and 
commerce. He insisted that Western techniques and ideology based on 
scientific rationality and inpersonal contractual relations must replace 
old-fashioned Korean ideas. On the other hand, when Mr. Kim talked 
about his style of leadership, it all sounded very much like the typical 
paternalistic form of industrial organization. 
Mr. Kim gives an impression of quiet scholarly dignity-of being an 
intellectual entrepreneur. Also, he talked as though diligence, competence, 
and technical know-how are the only qualities needed for success. Never­
theless, lie received his early training and experience in the "export"-im­
port field (there were no exports) in Pusan during the Korean War period, 
so that he is thoroughly familiar with the seamy side of doing business in 
Korea. In the 1950s and early 1960s, lie said, it was relatively easy to get 
started, provided one had access to some capital and was willing to study 
and work hard. Today it is much tougher. All the easy niches have been 
filled, and the technology of most new industries is much more complex 
and expensive. Also, it may take several years for a new product to gain 
widespread market acceptance, so that, unless there is some sort of guaran­
teed (by the government) profit, which is extremely rare in small and 
medium industry, the risks are high. He pointed out that, in fact, the 
number of business turnovers and bankruptcies is large. 
Mr. Kim said there have been no official pressures on his company or 
troublesome outside interference of any kind. Because the government is 
interested in promoting exports, he has received some encouragement to 
expand his facilities with the objective of promoting sales overseas, but 
there has been very little offered so far in the way of concrete incentives. 
With regard to domestic operations, Mr. Kim believed he !tad exerted influ­
ence on the government rather than the other way around. Because of his 
independent thinking, he sometimes differs sharply with the opinions of 
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officials of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and, in some cases, he 
has been able to use his official connections to persuade the bureaucracy 
to change its regulations and outlook, not just for his own company's 
benefit, but for the good of the industry as a whole. 
Mr. Kim thinks many Koreans are motivated to work hard by their 
experience of deprivation and hardship; as a result they try to make the 
most of any available opportunity. There is also a strong and persistent 
desire to catch up with the Japanese and show them what Koreans can do. 
My assessment of Mr. Kim was that, although he appears to be gentle, 
unassuming, and have a quiet manner, he is actually extremely tough and 
knowledgeable. We attended a meeting of several company presidents who 
have an informal coffee break together each morning and, although Mr. 
Kim made less 	 noise than the others, he commanded evident respect
2among his peers. Whatever his actual performance may have been in 
terms of bold decision-making, Mr. Kim's style was the antithesis of the 
heroic, risk-taking, intuitive genius. 
AUTOMOBILE REPAIR SHOPS IN 
INCH'ON AND SEOUL 
Mr. Lee, who is only 29 and a country boy from a small, isolated farming­
fishing village of South Ch'ungcli'6ng province, started with nothing and 
now owns 3 car repair shops in the Seoul-Inch'6n area.3 One of these 
has a small machine shop attached for manufacturing hard-to-get parts. 
All together he employs 32 people.4 
The first repair shop was acquired in 1973 in partnership with 2 other 
young men, one of whom is now in jail; the other has returned to his 
native village. The partner who is in jail obtained his capital by dealing in 
TV and Hi-Fi sets, typewriters, and other valuables stolen from private 
homes. The other partner, who is from the same village as Mr. Lee, has 
returned to farming. He had previously made a good deal of money as a 
lucky and capable fishing-boat captain out of Inch' n. 
Although Mr. Lee's capital was mainly derived from real-estate specula­
tion1 in the suburbs of lnch6n, his original stake had come from the profits 
maL :by stealing auto parts when he first came to Seoul as a migrant and 
woi -ed in a repair shop. 
The two other shops were acquired by Mr. Lee alone, using his profits 
from a variety of sources, including the first shop (which now als3 sells 
gas), further real estate deals, investments in sleazy lnch'On restaurant.; and 
bars, and a taxi venture. Mr. Lee estimated his current income from his 
various investments at a little more than 600,000 w-n per month (S1,300). 
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He is living very inconspicuously in Inchon in a small room with the 
woman who runs one of his sailors' bars, but he is starting to invest money 
in rice land near his native village. 
PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
Mr. Lee's parents were farmers from North Korea. During the war his father 
died as a refugee when Mr. Lee was four years old. His mother, as a not-too­
young widow with two small children, was lucky to obtain an arranged mar­
riage with a poor, widower fisherman in South Ch'ungch' ng province. The 
fisherman, a jovial, hard-drinking, second son with no schooling, maintained 
his family at the subsistence level through working on other people's boats 
and with the grudging assistance of his more prosperous relatives. 
When the boy was 19, he left the village for Inch'6n where, after a year 
or so working on the fishing boats, ie joined a gang of youths engaged in 
petty thievery, street peddling, pimping, and any other availai~le "hustl­
ing" activities. His mother visited him in Inch'Sn and was so horrified by 
his lifestyle and associates that she found (through North Korean con­
nections) an apprentice job for him at an automobile-repair shop and made 
him promise to go to work. As a devoted son he did as she asked him, but 
within six months he was using his job as a base for illegal earnings. The 
transactions in auto parts were complex. On the one hand, ie connived 
with his boss to replace good-quality parts on late-model cars with old but 
still serviceable parts, then the parts acquired in this manner were sold as 
new to other customers. In addition, he stole parts both from the shop 
and from customers on his own, using his unierworld contacts in order 
to dispose of them.
5 
He left his job just in time to avoid the ine-'itable investigation and hid 
out in the Inch'6n slums for six months. During this period he lent out 
some of his money at high interest rates and bought some cheap suburban 
!ots. Many migrants from his village were working on Inch'Sn-based 
fishing boats; he was able to utilize their contacts in order to learn a ,oud 
deal about the waterfront entertainment industry. When apartment build­
ings were built in 1972 on the ;rea where he had bought land, he made 
large windfall profits, and decided to invest in a repair shop. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Mr. Lee's experiences are similar to those of a great many other petty 
capitalists who are constantly involved in a variety of investments, many 
of which are illegal or on the fringes of normal legitimate commercial or 
industrial activity. The ups and downs of such people are usually meteoric, 
and Mr. Lee is unusual in that he has pyramided a series of successes into 
a fairly substantial financial position. 
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Although he has only a primary-school education, his earnest, convincing 
manner, and a fast flow of glib conversation give him the qualifications of 
a first-rate con man. He told me that the secret of success is gauging 
people. He knows how to inspire confidence in others, and he can usually 
predict how reliable his "associates" will be in any given situation. The 
other essential, he said, was to know a business really thoroughly through 
personal participation before risking one's own money. 
There is no shortage of skilled mechanics, according to Mr. Lee, and his 
main problem in the repair business is obtaining parts and supervising his 
employees. There is a rapid turnover of personnel in the business, and he 
must guard against the likelihood that his employees and the chauffeurs of 
private cars or taxis will get togethe in order to defraud him as well as 
the owners of the cars. He added that his experience in the business helped 
him devise effective measures of control. 
Mr. Lee seemed to be still hiding out from official scrutiny, using two 
front men to handle most of his business arid bureaucratic contacts. Never­
theless, he was also concerned about establishing a respectable public 
position. The purchases of rice land would give him a more solid rural 
base, lie thought, and periodic attendance at night school would eventually 
provide a high school diploma.6 In the future he expected to buy more 
land on the outskirts of Seoul for speculation, but lie was undecided about 
expanding his automobile repair business. "I have as much money as I 
need now," he said, "and it's a dirty business." 
He attributed much of his skill at judging others' characters and motives 
to his mother's intelligent advice. They had been low-status outsiders in 
the village, and he had always dreamed of succeeding in the city, so he 
could return home as someone important. 
HANDWOVEN-SILK FACTORY 
Mr. Ham, aged 44, is founder and president of a company manufacturing 
high quality, handmade silk, mostly for export. He started in 1959 with a 
small amount of capital (he declined to say how much), some of which 
came from his former employers, the USAID Mission in Korea (then called 
Office of the Economic Coordinator, OEC). The remainder was obtained 
from his family. In the beginning there were only 4 looms and 15 em­
ployees. He himself knew nothing about the textile business, but he had 
read about Thompson's success with Thai silk in Life magazine. Also, his 
office at the USAID Mission had recently sponsored a craft center at 
which foreign designers were paid by the U.S. government to come to 
Korea and advise craftsmen on how to improve their products for sale in 
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the international market. He had heard from them that good opportunities 
existed, if really attractive hand-woven silk could be produced in Korea. 
Mr. Ham was able to recruit a few old, professional silk-weavers in 
order to get started. But since they had not worked for many years and 
had never used wide looms, there was a difficult breaking-in period, during 
which quality was irregular. Also, the old weavers had trouble maintaining 
high export standards, because a considerable number of imperfections in 
the cloth had always been tolerated in the past; they saw no need to be so 
precise. Eventually he replaced them all with younger men trained on the 
job. The other major technical problem at the start was getting the dyes 
right, both in terms of shade of color and fastness. They experimented and 
eventually obtained good results through trial and error. 
Another problem was getting hold of silk yarn at reasonable prices. One 
large Korean filature dominated the business and, because of close connec­
tions with the Korean government, it was able to export all its production 
to Japan (a high-cost producer of silk) at prices above those in the world 
market. Mr. Ham, who had to compete with low-cost silk producers in the 
American market, needed cheap yarn but was at the mercy of his monopo­
listic supplier. As a result, the company was struggling in the early 1960s 
trying to find buyers for its silk, and it was only bailed out when the Far 
East Post Exchange system of the U.S. Army started selling their silk. The 
result was all almost unlimited market, and by 1970 Mr. Ham was oper­
ating 40 looms, still on a craft basis. 
In 1971 his company merged with another silk-weaving firm that h .d 
been started and supported lavishly by a foreign investor. Mr. Ham spid 
that under his general direction the operations of the combined firm were 
rationalized, so that it was possible to reduce the number of workers while 
increasing production. As a result of firing nearly half the work force, 
however, there were serious troubles with the local (enterprise) labor 
union. These were dealt with in a somewhat high-handed manner. Through 
persuasion, threats, and other incentives, the plant manager was able to 
obtain a vote from a majority of the remaining workers in the firm dissolv­
ing the union on the grounds that it was causing needless trcaole and 
wasting their dues. Later he rehired some of the leading troublemakers, 
and gave them responsible, well-paid positions. Morale is now high, Mr. 
Ham said, and Fis plant has a reputation for having the best labor-manage­
ment relations in the region. 
We heard other accounts of the merger and subsequent labor troubles 
that contrasted somewhat with this story, particularly with regard to the 
amount of credit due Mr. Ham for resolving the firm's problems. But these 
comments came from informants connected with the other company. 
In any c...:, the combined firm is thriving today. 
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PERSONAL BACKGROUND
 
Mr. Ham's father, the seconf son of a fairly well-to-do farmer (not yang­
ban), was from North Korea and was educated both at a s~tang and at a
 
Japanese middle school He was determined and ambitious, and at the age 
of 20 he left home, obtaining a job in the far north as an apprentice in a 
Japanese-owned ,awmil. After several years, he was able to start a pros­
perous busines making railroad ties with the patronage and help of his 
former Japanese employer. Subsequently he moved to Ch'unch' 'n (Kang­
won province) and set up a good sized sawmill. 
Although he had thrived in the colonial period in close association with 
the Japanese, Ham's father was unable to function in the conditions of 
chaotic instability that followed Liberation. He was taken in again and 
again by sharp operators, each time bewailing the loss of the atmosphere 
of mutual trust and honesty that had prevailed und, "Japanese rule. 
Mr. Ham was in high school when the Korean War broke out and escaped 
to Taegtt just ahead of the North Korean troops. Eventually lie went to 
offic.,rs candidate school, ending up as an interpreter with the U.S. 2nd 
Divison in combat. After the retreat from North Korea in the winter of 
1950, lie spent three years at Fort Benning, Georgia. After getting out of 
the army, lie worked for OEC (USAID) in Seoul until starting his own 
business. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
 
I heard Mr. Ham referred to twice as "the reluctant entrepreneur," once
 
by a Korean businessman who had invested money in his firm and 
once
 
by a foreigner in the import-export business. He was criticized for his
 
extreme conservatism and caution in financial matters and for his un­
willingness to expand his firm and adopt mass-production methods. The 
importer said lie had been willing to guarantee overseas markets and fi­
nancing on favorable terms, but Mr. Ham was reluctant to borrow the 
substantial amounts necessary for expansion, and lie was extremely jealous 
of any hint of control or interference by outsiders in his firm. 
The Korean critic pointed out that, in the 1960s, Mr. Hani had run into 
a lot of trouble through delegating authority within his company to a 
couple of dishonest relatives. These in turn had hired their own cronier, 
and the company had been on tileverge of bankruptcy in spite of steadlIy 
expanding sales. He added that the 1971 merger had finally enabled Mr. 
Ham to get rid of nearly all his administrative 
-'rsonnel and build up a 
much more efficient organization. 
The following comments by Mr. Ham regarding the management of his 
firm are revealing in the context of this background information. He 
contrasted the situation in a well-run factory under strong leadership such 
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as his own with that of nany Korean companies where the directors 
or managers are in a weak position, because they have made bad mistakes 
or engaged in illegal activities. Others on the office staff' find out about 
such weaknesses, and the vulnerable executive is obliged to keep them 
happy for his own survival. It may be necessary for him to grant unwar­
ranted promotions, hire relatives, or increase salaries. He, in turn, is then 
involved in covering up their failures and incompetence, so that a kind 
of reciprocal intrigue of conspiracy is established among the top em­
ployees, whereby they protect each other, while placing increased pressure 
on workers to make up for their own errors and extravagance. An in­
evitable result is greater hostility and a sharper separation of interests 
between workers and management. 
Mr. Hamti feels strongly that, with the exception of two key men, his 
office staff is more expendable than the workers, and he occasionally 
tells them so. He attributes much of his success in dealing with employees 
to his production manager, a Mr. Kim, who, although a former military 
officer and strict disciplinarian, is greatly respected by the workers. Mr. 
Ham said it was necessary that he show a constant interest in the welfare 
of the workers but retain a certain social distance. When he goes to the 
factory or participates in company recreation and ceremonies, however, 
he rides the same bus, wears the same kind of clothes, and eats the same 
food. He thus tries to give the impression of sharing a common existence 
as well as participating in a common enterprise. Nevertheless, various 
kinds of protocol, including respectful forms of speech and behavior, are 
always observed and reinforce his status. 
AWNING FACTORY IN KUNSAN AND
 
TEXTILE PLANTS IN PUSAN
 
An awning factory, that was formerly Japanese, was acquired in 1950 by
 
Mr. Pyun (now aged 6i ). He invested his own money in this and some
 
small factories in the PL san area that manufacture kimonos and towels 
for the Japanese market. With these textile plants, he was able to take 
advantage of an extensive network of personal relations and resume the 
export business engaged in by his father and older brothers during the 
colonial period. 
Mr. Pyun said the awning factory with 50 employees is reasonably effi­
cient and profitable, but there seems to be little prospect of further expan­
sion. Therefore lie has delegated much of the responsibility for running 
it to trusted local personnel, and concentrates most of his efforts on the 
companies producing cheap textiles for export to .Japan. In addition to 
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modern weaving plants in the city, lie has oiganized a cottage in'dustry, 
employing small groups of farm wives in a number of nearby rural areas. 
The total assets for all of Mr. Pyun's companies are substantial, but no 
single plant is very large. 
PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
Mr. Pyun comes from a wealthy, landowning, yangban family based orig­
inally in Pusan. His father was one of the relatively few Koreans to establish 
a successful industrial irin ol his own under Japanese rule. Although the 
family business was entirely dependent on the Japanese market, and 
extensive collaboration with the colonial regine was necessary, the atmos­
phere within the family group was strongly nationalistic. 
Mr. Pyun was involved twice in anti-Japanese agitation as a student, 
spending 40 days in jail. On the other hand, he received a thorough Japa­
nese education, eventually studying economics at two universities in Japan. 
On his return to Korea, he entered the intensely bureaucratic atmosphere 
of Japanese colonial banking, where he worked until Liberation. His 
indoctrination at home as a child had been one of strict traditional Con­
fucian ethics and, despite his anti-Japanese bias in political terms, this 
native Confucianism seems to have been strongly reinforced by Japanese 
puritanism. 
At one point in his youth he was determined to be a "man of culture 
and the arts" but, after trying to paint for a year, he realized that his 
talent was mediecre. 
After the Korean Liberation in 1945, he became an economics professor 
at Pusan University. Then, during the Korean War he worked at a large 
machinery factory in Inch'"n, while continuing to draw his salary at the 
University in the time he was inPusan. At same investing extensively 
local industry. By he devoting himself full time to1953 was managing 
his companies. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Mr. Pyun believes that Korea's recent history, while tragic, has taught 
valuable lessons. During the Japanese period, Koreans were indoctrinated 
with the ideals of loyalty, faithfulness, and hard work. The Korean War 
showed them the evils of communism. Now, he said, under the orderly 
stable leadership of Park Chung Hee, native Korean ability at last has the 
opportunity to flourish. But, according to Mr. Pyun, Koreans have one 
critical flaw which is their desire for immediate wealth with its tempta­
tions to corrupt unethical business behavior. Mr. Pyun's recipe for correct­
ing the evil seems to be strong paternalistic political leadership and the 
reinvigoration of the traditional family system. He said that Koreans 
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do not perform well if there is too much individualism and lack of dis­
cipline. 
The exceptional ability of Koreans lies in their intelligence, imagination, 
and capacity for hard work. But they do not have the innate conscien­
tiousness and loyalty of the Japanese. Therefore effective strong leadership 
by the government, in industry, and in the family is crucial. There is no 
shortage of skills and competence either among workers or managers. The 
problem is to get everyone working together and maintain morale over a 
period of many years. 
Entrepreneurial success, according to Mr. Pyun, does not require a 
special or rare talent. Anyone can do the job provided lie has honesty, 
faithfulness, and sufficient determination. He pointed to himself as an 
example-a plain college teacher who was running several companies profit­
ably (the fact that Mr. Pyun grew up in an industrial family, studied 
economics in Japan, and had many years experience in banking and com­
pany management glossed at this point). Hewas over did say, however, 
that theoretical learning at school is of little use to the businessman, who 
needs practical experience. 
Mr. Pyun pointed out that, while political connections can be useful, 
politicians and officials in Korea eventually always lose their power; and 
those who are too closely associated with them are usually dragged down 
too. 
PLASTIC-CONTAINER FACTORY 
Mr. Shin, aged 49, is the founder and president of a small company located 
on the outskirts of Seoul that makes plastic medicine and cosmetic con­
tainers. He started in 1965 with 250,000 w'on, 7 workers and 2 simple 
machines. Each machine required 3 men to operate it. Now he employs 25 
workers, and he has installed 10 more or less automatic machines during 
the past 6 years. With only one worker per machine, productivity is, of 
course, much higher than before, but because of the cost of the machines, 
he has a heavy debt burden. Mr. Shin said the industry is very competitive, 
and he would not have been able to survive without modernizing his 
system of production. The new machinery was purchased with loans from 
the Small and Medium Industry Bank, The Tong Hwa Pharmaceutical Co. 
(his principal customer), and from relatives. He believes his business is in 
good shape at present, but he pointed out that, since the marketing of 
his product depends largely on his own personal connections with the 
buyers, there is a good deal of uncertainty concerning future prospects. 
With regard to technological innovation, Mr. Shin said that fairly 
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frequent seminars arc held by tile K -ea Institute of Science and Tech­
nology (KIST) or by the Korean Plastics Industry Association, at which 
there is an opportunity to learn about new products and processes. But in 
any case the demand for current production seems to be increasing, so 
there is no immediate pressure for technological change. 
Two men from the original company group are still working for Mr. 
Shin. They are his key assistants, and he shares profits with them ol an 
almost equal basis, he said. One of these mncn takes care of the installation, 
maintenance, and repair of the machinery; the other provides detailed 
day-to-day supervision of the employees and product quality. 
Mr. Shin thinks sometimes of ciarging and further modernizing his 
plant, but lie is also a little reluctant, because there are advantages to a 
small operation. In particular, lie emphasized the importance of main­
taining a family atmosphere among the workers. He pointed out that, 
because of this, his workers are conscientious and obedient, often putting 
in longer hours than their pay really warrants. He is also reluctant to share 
ownership with outsiders, feeling that, because of his lack of higher 
education and his South Cholla province origins, his position might be 
undermined. 
PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
Mr. Shin's father was a small shopkeeper in Kwangju (South (Thlla prov­
ince) who had attended only primary school. As a child Mr. Shin re­
members that they were not as poor as most other Koreans, and there 
was always plenty to eat. He attended a primary school for Japanese 
colonial children, and he still has bitter memories of their discrimination. 
Also, he admired and envied the more luxurious lifestyle of his classmates. 
At the time of Liberation in 1945, Mr. Shin had just graduated from a 
vocational middle school, an education that lie regarded as superior to 
contemporary high-school instruction. Training under the Japanese was 
extremely thorough, providing both practical knowledge and skills and a 
disciplined moral indoctrination that produced respectable, hard-working 
people. Mr. Shin thought that if the colonial regime had not pushed 
emperor worship and Japanese superiority so hard, it would have been 
able to win over the respegt, and even the loyalty, of a great many Kor­
eans. As it was, Koreans hated the Japanese, even while becoming half 
Japanese themselves. 
After 1945 Mr. Shin worked at home for a while and then got a job 
with a glass-bottle maker nearby. During the Korean War he was a non­
commissioned officer and wounded twice.was In 1956 after his father's 
death he sold the shop and land in Kwangju and invested all his money in 
a bottle-making plant. But lack of good connections with Rhee's Liberal 
330 
Plastic-Container Factory 
Party's local hierarchy and a crooked partner resulted in failure and 
impoverishment. His family moved to Seoul, where for a while his 
earnings as a laborer and those of a sister in a "service" job (presumably 
a bar, nightclub, or restaurant) were all that kept them going. Mr. Shin's 
mother and his other relatives often reproached him for not having con­
tinued the family store in Kwangju. Previously his parents had urged 
him to invest his money at home, and there had been considerable con­
flict as a result of his determination to go off on his own. After his 
failure, it had been painful for him to have to listen to their reproaches. 
Mr. Shin was vehement in describing how difficult it had been to resist 
family pressures. But he insisted that a man must do as he feels right. 
In his case, lie didn't like the merchant's role and wanted to produce 
something, rather than just trade on other people's work and money. 
He thinks that most Koreans follow thz safest and easiest coulse to en­
sure their own economic security, and that only those who have the 
courage to take risks and defy the opinions of others can succeed in 
business. 
Under the Chang Myon regime (1960-1961), he was hired as a clerk by 
an import-export firm engaged in trading with Japan. Although such jobs 
were scarce then, he was hired because of his superior skills in doing 
arithmetic calculations in Japanese. The firm prospered during the few 
months before the Military Revolution, and Mr. Shin made so much 
money, mostly through "side deals" that he was able to carry out on his 
own, using company cha.nels. The trading firm was eliminated and the 
owners arrested for profiteeiing following the coup, but Mr. Shin was not 
important enough for official notce. Subsequently lie got a job in the sales 
department of a pharmaceutical company, where he was able to learn a 
lot about the business as well as to establish the personal ties that have 
been essential for the development of his own business. He joked that, if 
he had stayed with the company, which was now much larger, lie would 
probably be a director and have a luxurious office and a big black car. 
During this period (1961-19 5), lie had lent out his money on the in­
formal curb market at very high interest rates, and by 1965 he had 
enough capital accumulated to start his own business. At present, Mr. 
Shin said, he Jives reasonably wen, but lie is not yet able to afford a 
car and driver. 
Confucian rituals were always regularly carried out in his family, and he 
continues the practice today. Mr. Shin gives an impression of toughness 
and strong will without much social grace. His remarks were blunt and 
stated aggressively, as if lie had something -f a grudge against a hostile 
world. One of his managers, with whom we talked separately, said that he 
was fair but very demanding. 
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ENT . EP It EN EU R SHIP 
Mr. Shin derided the idea that special talent or brilliance had anything to 
do with his accomplishment in starting his own business. He pointed 
around to the drab dirty office and to the t;ny factory, asking rhetorically 
if such a result "tn. a lifetime of hard work indicated genius. 
Instead he stressed the importance of faithfulness, diligence, and stub­
born determination. One must not pamper the employees, he said, but one 
must show kind heartedness, respect for their feelings, and occasional 
generosity. Then the right kind of person will respond with hard, devoted 
work; the others can leave. He added that a company as small as his could 
not give a substantial bonus-just a little extra at New Year's. Thus, the 
key factors, he feels, in managing the firm are maintaining close ties with 
his customers and recruiting good (docile, hardworking) personnel. 
There are no serious problems in the areas of technology, quality control, 
or financial management, according to Mr. Shin. Supervision of the product 
is very strict, both within the factory and by outside inspectors. Mr. Shin 
emphasized the need for a company president to be on his guard in order 
to avoid being cheated. He feels fortunate having two absolutely trust­
worthy assistants who, so far, have been able to get rid of any other 
employees whose behavior was at all questionable. In general he thinks it 
is better to deal with big companies, both in obtaining raw materials and 
in marketing his products, because their business ethics are somewhat 
better. 
Mr. Shin said that representatives of official agencies have usually been 
helpful, although he does not deal with them often, and he credited the 
government with a positive, supporting role towards business. Tax officials 
are increasingly nosy and insistent, and he has had to make some changes 
in his bookkeeping methods in order to satisfy them. More effective and 
impartial tax collection would be helpful in the long run to his company, 
he thinks, because his competitors are evading their taxes much more than 
he is. 
DEEP-SEA FISHING 
Mr. Moon, who is now 50, started his fishing business in 1970 with a loan 
of $150,000 from a Japanese trading company. He also received various 
kinds of assistance from one of his wife's close relatives who was a high­
ranking Korean government official. During the first year of operation 
(1970) with just one boat, he landed fish with a value of $350,000. In 
addition to the 30-man crew, there were 4 office workers. By 1975 he had 
9 boats that caught fish worth $2,500,000. His office staff has grown to 
9. Because of the decreasing numbers of tuna due to over-fishing, he does 
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not expect his business to grow in the future, and there is some con­
cern that the fish catch may decline. He estimated his firm's current 
assets at 15 billion w~n ($30,000,000). Mr. Moon lives very well. He 
has a late-model car with a radio telephone; he belongs to the most pres­
tigious clubs and frequents the most expensive places of entertainment 
in Seoul. 
PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
Mr. Moon comes from a devout Presbyterian family who lived in North 
Korea. His father graduated from middle school under the Japanese and 
was an elder of the churli. Mr. Moon was still a high school student just 
after the Liberation when he left Communist North Korea and fled south. 
He worked for the Customs Bureau from 1948, when South Korea was 
still under the U.S. Military Government until the outbreak of the Korean 
War in 1950. As a refugee, he was seized by tile Korean military police, 
drafted into the army and participated in the invasion of North Korea with 
American troops. At the time of the retreat in the winter of 1950, lie was 
evacuated to Japan with the help of a friendly American officer who got 
him a job in Tokyo as a civilian employee of the U.S. Forces. Mr. Moon 
also attended college for two years in Japan during this period, but lie 
became impatient n;id dropped out, never obtaining a degree. Next lie 
worked for a Korean firm engaged in engineering construction and foreign 
trade during the period 1953-1963. He eventually became a branch 
manager, learning all aspects of the business. 
In 1963 lie formed a construction business of his own with an American 
partner. They contracted with thle U.S. Army to build barracks and 
bachelor officers' quarters in Japan, sub-contracting the actual construc­
tion to several smaller firms. The business was profitable, and lie learned a 
great deal about construction materials, machinery, and purchasing proce­
dures. This business was dissolved abruptly in 1967, when the American 
partner was jailed for large-scale black market dollar transactions. 
With the help of his well-placed Korean relative, Mr. Moon next got a 
job in Japan with the Korea Shipping Corporation as a consultant. He 
utilized this position to learn about the shipping industry and to develop 
close personal ties with many Japanese businessmen. One of these was the 
vice president of Mitsui Bussan Kabushiki Kaisha. In 1969 this friend 
became Mitsui's president, and Mr. Moon, now assured of financial support 
from Mitsui and convinced that the time was right for a deep-sea fishing 
venture, started his own company. 
Mr. Moon is tall, handsome, articulate, and extremely likeable. He has a 
flair for personal relationships, constantly creating a mood of confidence, 
expansiveness, and excitement. 
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ENTREPR EN EURt SHIP 
Mr. Moon represents a sophisticated variant of the flamboyant gambler­
speculator type that has sometimes been regarded as the characteristic 
Korean businessman. His explanation of the entrepreneurial personality 
was straightforward. 
Most men have the personality of a clerk, and they will remain 
clerks all their lives, no matter how much brains or ability they havc. 
The entrepreneur, on the other hand, must have bold ideas and the 
daring to back them up with action. The game with all its picayune, 
boring details isn't worthy playing unless it's for big stakes. There 
are thousands of good opportunities available in the world, but they 
have to be seized and exploited. The more different ventures a man 
tries, the greater will be his experience, skill, and chance of success. 
But because luck too is important, he must be willing to keep on 
trying even though he fails. 
Establishing and running a business should not be a matter of 
agonizingly slow, careful decisions. It is necessary to be able to act 
forcefully and confidently on the basis of a quick assessment of the 
situation. Too much caution can never meet the challenges of a 
rapidly changing economic and political situation. 
If a serious mistake has been made, one must have the resilience to 
shrug it off and bounce back. There is always a way out of every 
difficulty, even if it involves humiliating dependence on others or 
temporary poverty. Everyone should expect to go through bad times 
in his life as well as good. 
Mr. Moon's business activities fit in with these opinions rather well. He 
is constantly traveling in order to settle crew problems in the Caribbean, 
to negotiate fishing rights in Saudi Arabia, or to sell his tuna in New York. 
He travels alone, making mjor decisions out of his briefcase, while manip­
ulating and expanding the network of personal relations that constitutes 
one of his greatest assets. 
Mr. Moon also pointed out that most successful businessmen of any sta­
tdre have received favors from the government. For this it is necessary 
to pay bribes, even when everything is perfectly legal. He criticized such 
practices, since they amount to a heavy informal tax on businessmen with­
out rewarding efficiency and productivity. On the other hand, he thought 
the government's policy of encouraging foreign direct investment through 
tax and other incentives has been beneficial. Koreans have been able to 
observe and learn many of the techniques of foreign businessmen first 
hand; also, they are increasingly obliged to compete with foreign firms, so 
that traditional, inefficient ways of doing things have to be abandoned. 
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BUTTON-MANUFACTURING PLANT 
Mr. Song, aged 47, founded his button factory in 1971 with 10 workers 
and 5 million w-On (3 million of his own and 2 million borrowed from the 
bank). Of his 10 initial workers, 4 were experienced button-makers whom 
he had hired away from other small firms. He claims to be the first in 
Korea to get into the business of producing standard-grade buttons for 
export goods. As the volume of exported clothing rapidly increased in the 
1970s, the demand for his buttons rose as well. Today he has 35 workers 
and a lot of relatively complicated machinery uhat can fabricate buttons 
out of 5 different raw materials. Now that Korea is exporting more e3 pen­
sive clothes, Mr. Song plans to improve thc quality of his buttons in order 
to supply the new demand. 
He said that, while there are many button manufacturers in Korea, only 
one is large enough to be a threat to hin competitively; so far he has had 
no difficulty marketing his products, however. Eventually he expects to 
diversify, making belt buckles and other accessories for clothing. 
Before starting to manufacture buttons, Mr. Song spent several months 
talking to people in the import-export business in an effort to find a prod­
uct that could be easily produced in Korea, and that would compete 
successfully with imports. Once he had decided on buttons, he spent a 
year as button broker, taking orders from exporters and then contract­a 
ing with local suppliers for delivery. Although lie was able to make money, 
lie decided he could do better with his own factory. 
PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
Mr. Song, the youngest of 6 brothers and sisters, is from one of the most 
prominent lineages of Korea. For hundreds of years his family has pro­
duced high officials. An uncle was briefly President of the Republic of 
Korea. Another uncle was president of Seoul National University. A 
grandfather, who held high office under the Japanese colonial administra­
tion, insisted on a modern education for his children and grandchildren, 
emphasizing military training, political science, and engineering over the 
humanities. 
In spite of this modernizing influence, Mr. Song grew up in a traditional 
yangban family atmosphere. His family wa= poor compared to other 
branches of the lineage, however, and lie had been determined since his 
youth to improve its financial position. As it turned out, lie the firstwas 
person among all his relatives to enter business; curiously, he seemed 
proud that his family retained the traditional yangban prejudice against 
merchants and commercial activity. Some 150 of his relatives are now 
living in the United States, where most are active in the professions. 
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Apparently his lineage publishes such statistics along with the regular 
genealogies. 
After graduating from the College cf Foreign Languages, where he 
majored in Russian, Mr. Song started raising cattle for r-.;lk production in 
1961 near Ch'ungJu. This was one of the first attempts to produce milk 
by modern methods on a large scale, and he obtained a 4 ,000,000-w'n loan 
from the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF). After ten 
years, during which he was elected president of the Korear. Milk Producers 
Association, Mr. Song became so frustrated by the failure of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries to support farmers with consistent, effective 
policie, that he sold his farm and moved back to Seoul in 1971. He de­
nounced the incompetence and corruption of officials of that period in the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the NACF. Also, he criticized 
the government's support of low food prices to benefit the urban popula­
tion at the expense of farmers. 7 
Although he had been unable to make a profit producing milk, the 
increase in land values during the ten-year period provided him with a 
substantial amount of capital when he sold his farm in 1971. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Mr. Song said that self-confidence, determination, and detailed knowledge 
or experience are all more important to the entrepreneur than extra­
ordinary brilliance or intuition. A man must have a definite goal and a 
carefully worked out plan of how to reach it. Then he must pursue that 
goal doggedly without being swayed by all the rumors and opinions that 
he hears from day to day. He should study the situation carefully and 
make up his mind only after long deliberation. But, once his decision is 
made, he must follow through with all his energies. The producer's men­
tality is quite different from that of the broker who is constantly looking 
this way or that for a chance to make money by participating in a transac­
tion. Many Korean entrepreneurs have been diverted from concentrating 
on production by the temptation to speculate in land prices, exchange 
rates, or the value of commodities. It is true, of course, that the economic 
environment has often pr .4-d greater rewards in the past for such activi­
ties. 
According to Mr. small entrepreneur who starts out on his own 
must have enough faitl n is own ability and destiny to resist the advice 
of those (usually relatives) who caution him against taking risks. On the 
other hand, he should not try to exceed his real capacity and potential; 
he must reject the advice of those who urge him on to impossibly grandiose 
schemes. 
With regard to government control and intervention, Mr. Song thinks 
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bureaucrats are increasingly performing service functions for commerce 
and industry instead of arrogantly throwing their weight around as in the 
past. He thinks that the larger firms are manipulating the administration 
rather than the other way around. Except for a few outrageous cases the 
principles of merit and accomplishment are predominant. In general Mr. 
Song, while extremely critical of the government's previous agricultural 
policy, spoke favorably of the administration's role in support of business. 
Mr. Song said he is able to hire men with technical and financial skills 
without aniy difficulty. In his company he has two key men whom he 
pays well, providing them with health insurance and retirement benefits. 
The rest of his workers receive low pay but, since there are plenty of 
applicants ior jobs at such gages, he is able to choose fairly well-educated, 
conscientious workers. Usually they are young, live near his plant, and 
work to supplement the earnings of the household head rather than to 
support themselves independently. 
Mr. Song thinkf; the company president's role is crucial in that he must 
handle relations between the company and its suppliers and customers as 
well as with the bureaucracy on the one hand, and he m" ;t establish and 
supervise the internal organization and environment on the other. Because 
there is plenty of cheap, docile labor, the latter job is relatively easy. He 
added, however, that worker satisfaction is important, and young people 
no longer will accept the authoritarian-paternalistic manner of the past. 
TEXTILE MILL IN TAEGU 
Mr. Hwang, aged 59, formed a company producing cheap cotton cloth in 
1965. He invested about 2 billion w'6n (1965 prices) and employed 200 
workers. The company's assets have doubled in value since then, he said, 
and he is now employing more workers. Most of the capital came from a 
cotton yarn mill he had been operating until 1965; the rest was borrowed 
from a bank. During the middle 1960s, according to Mr. Hwang, it was not 
too hard for small entrepreneurs to obtain loans (although there were 
informal costs involved), but in recent years the government has favored 
large industry, and as a result it is much harder to borrow money. In the 
winter of 1975-1976 he bought another cotton-cloth mill also employ­
ing about 200 workers for an undisclosed amount.8 The business had been 
owned jointly by 16 Koreans resident in Japan, and Mr. Hwang stepped in 
when they failed. He attributed the failure to lack of experience, shortage 
of capital, and the inability to provide unified, forceful leadership. He 
has turned the management of his other mill over to a younger brother, 
and he is now devoting himself full time to making the new acquisition 
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profitable. He seemed to be confident that this could be done without too 
much difficulty. 
PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
Mr. Hwang's father was a small shopkeeper with only a primary school 
education; the family was poor. The second of 4 brothers, Mr. Hwang 
was brought up in a Confucian household, but he no longer performs any 
family rituals. The family must have had some money, because he gradu­
ated from middle school (the equivalent of high school today), and at the 
time of Liberation in 1945 he was working in his older brother's small 
cotton-batting factory. In 1955 he and his older brother started produicing 
cotton yarn; a younger brother took over the cotton-batting plant. So far 
none of his business ventures has failed. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Mr. Hwang does not want to expand his business further. He prefers to 
operate small companies, acquiring them and disposing of them whenever 
it is to his advantage. He said that it is important to understand one's 
limitations, and that he does not have the qualifications to operate a large 
factory, although he is thoroughly experienced in all aspects of the textile 
business. Also, a small firm can avoid involvement in politics, which 
requires a quite different kind of skill than entrepreneurship. 
With regard to personal qualities, he thinks the entrepreneur must be 
diligent, forceful, and stubborn or determined. He must "desire to live 
well." 9 
As far as the entrepreneur's functions are concerned, he rated the 
political aspects involving personal relationships with suppliers and cus­
tomers as the most crucial; next comes internal management and the 
supervision of employees; technology, innovation, and the quality of the 
product provide relatively few problems. It is always easy to find techni­
cians (or hire them from other firms) who can furnish whatever informa­
tion or instruction is required. 
Mr. Hwang said that strong leadership and forcefulness are essential 
because Koreans, unlike the Japanese or Americans, will not work well 
together unless there is firm direction. "Koreans are like grains of sand; 
they will not stick together." 
Mr. Hwang's manner was relaxed and confident. He made no effort at 
formality or even good manners; he joked and used an occasional crude 
expression. This is unusual in Korea in relations with strangers and seemed 
to betray low-class origins rather than a modern egalitarian attitude. 
Another textile executive in Taegu said that Mr. Hwang does in fact have 
difficulty dealing with Seoul bureaucrats because of his lack of social 
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competence. Within the "textile world," however, his style is very effec­
tive. 
SMALL MACHINE SHOPS IN SEOUL 
We had no introduction to Mr. Kim (aged 49), who owns several small 
machine shops in the Chongno borough of downtown Seoul. By chance we 
walked through a part of Chongno borough at night where rickety old 
Korean-style buildings housed big lathes, drill presses, and cora­other 
plicated machine tools. Work was going on under bright, naked light bulbs 
in rooms that opened right onto the alleys. The atmosphere was one of 
relaxed, noisy informality, with numerous other men and boys gathered 
around the machines in addition to those who were operating them. 
Usually one room was just big enough for one or-where a partition had 
been knocked out-two machines. Everything was cluttered and dirty; 
bits of metal, ags, grease, and other refuse were scattered around. 
After being rebuffed at two places, we asked a teen-aged apprentice 
where the boss was; he led us several houses down the stree' to a some­
what larger shop that had living quarters attached. Mr. Kim was willing to 
talk and asked us into his house, eventually providing hospitality in the 
form of a mixture of soju (an inexpensive hard liquor) and cider (lemon 
soda). We subsequently saw him on two more occasions and returned the 
hospitality. 
After failing and losing everything in 1960, Mr. Kim bought a lathe for 
600,000 wZ'n (1963 prices) with earnings from his new wife's wine shop. 
Mr. Kim did fairly well after that and entered into a kind of partnership 
with two other expert machinists. He furnished the site, of thesome 

capital, 
 and the sales outlets, while they provided additional money 
towards the purchase of two more machines. Since Mr. Kim had a close 
ex-army friend in the automobile parts business, most of their work at 
first consisted of manufacturing spare parts to keep Seoul's ancient fleet of 
taxis running. Their debts from high interest rates were heavy, howe,,er, 
and they could never have gotten through the early 1960s without peri­
odic capital infusions from the wife's flourishing entertainment business. 
By 1966 the volume of orders had increased substantially, and Mr. Kim 
was able to get a bank loan of several million won. He bought 4 more 
machines and hired men to operate them while continuing his special 
profit sharing relationship with the two original "partners." Business 
continued to improve, although there were some difficult years as well, 
and at present Mr. Kim has 22 machines scattered about the neighborhood 
with a work force of 49 men and boys. He has not taken on any more 
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partners and would like to buy out the 2 that now exist, despite their long 
and successful relationship. Sonic of the apprentices from several years 
before are now machinists. 
Mr. Kim said he has recently gotten in touch with officials of the Minis­
try of Commerce and Industry about tile possibility of relocating his 
scattered shops in a single small plant outside the city. There has been a 
lot of official talk about governmental promotion of the small-scale 
machine-tool industry, and he hoped to obtain financial help for tile move. 
Although the officials were receptive, they wanted him to leave the Seoul 
area and move to South KySngsang province. Mr. Kim recognizes that he 
will eventually be forced out of his present location by Seoul city plan­
ners, but he is determined to stay in the metropolitan region. 
PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
Mr. Kim's father, a farm boy without education from North Ch'ungch'6ng 
province, left his village to work on the railroads during the colonial 
period. He became foreman of a track gang and was able to send both his 
sons to vocational middle (high) school. Mr. Kim, the second son, grad­
uated just before Liberation in 1945 and obtained an apprentice position 
in the Inch'6n Machinery Company. He had become a full-fledged ma­
chinist by 1950, when, after the retreat to Taegu, he was drafted into the 
army. He also worked in military machine shops during the war and left 
the army as a sergeant in 1956. Through his experience and connections 
and the "informal" payment of a large sum of mone y, lie was able to 
obtain two high-quality machine tools of U.S. manufacture as military 
surplus; he then set up shop in Seoul with the friend who had supplied 
the money. This "friend" absconded in 1960 with all the partnership's 
assets, leaving large debts foi which the machines were collateral. Mr. 
Kim was wiped out. 
He recouped two years later by marrying the prosperous owner of a 
nearby wine shop where he had been a regular customer. Today Mr. Kim 
appears to be living well below his means. He owns valuable property in 
the heart of Seoul in addition to the machines, and he has bought a large 
residential lot south of the Han River. His wife still owns her business, 
but she now delegates the day-to-day operation to a younger cousin. 
Mr. Kim has a breezy, confident, almost overbearing manner; lie is also 
a thoughtful and intelligent man. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Mr. Kim thinks life was so hard for ordinary Koreans under the Japanese 
regime, with so few opportunities for advancement, that there was an 
enormous pent-up desire among all Koreans for material success. They had 
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learned about the importance of hard work and productivity under the 
Japanese, and many, like himself, had learned useful skills; but until the 
Japanese left, there was nothing for them but low rank and low pay. Then 
division of the country, the war, and bad leadership had resulted in eco­
nomic chaos, so that only within the last 10 or 15 years had there been a 
chance to gain real rewards from one's own labor. Until fairly recently it 
was only the smugglers, brokers, speculators, bureaucrats, and politicians
who could make money, but now anyone who was willing to work hard 
and learn could get by. Except for those who are lazy or crooked, most 
Koreans, Mr. Kim thinks are eager to get ahead through hard work, and 
anyone who can provide a place to work and reasonable incentives will 
get all the good labor he needs. Of course, his own workers always com­
plain that they are not paid enough, and after several years some may 
become discontented and move on to another shop. But Mr. Kim sees 
this as a kind of natur .. restlessness that can only be cured by a change 
of scene. 
Because of the temptation for some workers to make extra money on 
the side, he keeps close-although indirect and informal-watch over the 
machinists, and all financial matters connected with buying raw materials, 
paying maintenance costs, and selling the product are in the hands of two 
close relatives whom lie knows he can trust. 
Mr. Kim feels that no amount of brilliant business sense is worth much 
without an intimately detailed knowledge of a particular industry. A man's 
hunches will be right only if they are based on such "dirty-handed"
 
participation. 
 Sc far he feels he is not at a disadvantage in dealing with 
college-educated businessmen or bureaucrats, even though he occasionally
 
has to react fairly sharply against their assumptions of pervasive and
 
superior wisdom.
 
With regard to risks, he said he has much more to lose now than when he 
was young, and he is therefore more careful in making additional invest­
ments. In particular, he is suspicious of plausible, profit-making schemes 
proposed by charming likeableand people. He contrasted his wariness 
with the gullibility of many others who get taken in again and again be­
cause of their greed and susceptib-lity to flattery. On the other hand, 
he said sometimes it is necessary to act forcefully and quickly on impulse 
when the right opportunity comes along. The skill lies in judging both the 
situation and the person correctly. Everyone, himself included, who wants 
to be more than a clerk or a laborer, must be good at winning over people 
by giving an impression of sincerity, trustworthiness, and good will. To 
succeed, one must sustain a reputation for these qualities. In Mr. Kim's 
opinion, the combination of these skills (in personal relations) plus 
detailed practical knowledge make entre­and hard work the successful 
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preneur. He does not think that an austere lifestyle or a penny-pinching 
emphasis on savings is a particularly useful attribute. 
Mr. Kin is confident tha- he can make the transition from a collection 
of loosely organized, scattered downtown machine shops to a conventional 
factory system without much trouble. A year ago he had hired his first 
accountant, a niece who h:.d just graduated from commercial college, and 
he was pleased with the results. He realizes that many savings should be 
pissible through more rational procedures; his oldest son would eventually 
study business administration, and he expects they would make many 
changes together in the future. 
Mr. Kim complained that some of his machinists tended to be rather in­
dependent, insisting as they got older on discussing their work as if they 
were fellow-owners of the business. He would like eventually to replace 
all but the most skilled with younger men who are better trained, both in 
terms of schooling and, where possible, as apprentices in his own shops. 
In his opinion most government officials now seen, to be more con­
cerned with promoting industry rather than with extracting personal 
advantage from it, but Mr. Kim thinks that too much assistance is being 
given to large firms. 
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Chaebbl Case Studies
 
In this appendix we sketch the evolution of five of Korea's leading 
chaeb1. The goal is not in-depth critical analysis but a fleshing out of the 
dimensions of Korean growth by decomposition into individual entre­
preneurs and companies. 
The groups presented have been selected to illustrate the diversity that 
characterizes Korean entrepreneurial success. We bein witil one of the 
oldest chaebMl, Sam Yang, and trace its origins to the colonial period 
We then consider three groups that started during, or immediately follow­
ing. the Korean War and prospered during the Park regime: Sarnsung, 
the largest chaebMl which produces largely consumer goods; Hyundai 
which concentrates on producers' goods: and Hanjin which deals in the 
transportation sector. Finally, we consider Daewoo, one of the "new 
generation" groups which was founded in the late I 9 60s and has since 
enjoyed phenomenal success. 
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SAM YANG: CHAEBOL FORMATION
 
DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD
 
Sam Yang is today only the fourteenth ranked chaeb'61,' but it is, none­
theless, of considerable interest as one of the nation's oldest groups. Its 
history illustrates the conversion of traditional aristocratic landowners 
into modern industrialists; their prosperity under the Japanese; the trib­
ulations during the chaos of 1945-1951; the political nature of entre­
preneurship under Rhee; and the devolution of power as control was 
passed to the "second generation." 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BACKGROUNI) 2 
So'ng-su Kim and Y6 n-su Kim were brothers who came from a traditional 
yangban family. Their father was a wealthy landlord who had also once 
been chief administrator of a county and had edited a 17-volume national 
history. S(Yng-su Kim was the fourth son and Y Sn-su Kim the fifth, but 
their three older brothers had died in infancy. In keeping with Confucian 
tradition, SZSng-su Kim was adopted by his father's elder brother who did 
not have a son. The adoptive father was also, of course, a wealthy land­
lord, who had also been a chief county administrator and had established 
a private school. 
S(Yng-su Kim was born in 1891. When he was seventeen years old, he 
left home without his parents' permission. Together with a friend, Chin-u 
Song, the famous patriot, he traveled to Japan where he majored in politi­
cal science at Waseda University and eventually graduated in 1914. In 
Japan, he was also very active in extracurricular activities. He was once 
the president of the Korean Student Association in Japan and made good 
friends with many of his contemporary expatriots. 
Y~n-su Kim was born in 1896. He majored in economics and graduated 
from Kyoto Imperial University in 1921. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL HISTORY: 
S(ONG-SU KIM 
After returning to Korea in 1915, SZ'ng-su Kim first showed his interest 
in education by taking over the Chungang School which was in financial 
trouble. Then in 1917 he entered the industrial world by acquiring a 
failing textile venture, and in 1919 K founded a modern spinning fac­
tory-Kyo~ngso'ng Spinning Co. (nov, named Kyungbang Limited). 
It is often argued that Mr. Ki:,,'s motive for engaging in entrepreneurial 
activities was nationalism. i-or example, Ki-Zun Zo maintains that Mr. 
Kim established Kyungbang Limited as part of a movement to develop 
domestic enterprises and thus make the nation economically independent. 
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Zo thus sees the establishment of the Kyungbang Limited as a part of the 
March 1st Independence Movement of 1919.' 
Mr. Kim's involvement in the textile industry was influenced by one of 
his friends who had majored in textile weaving in Japan and who per­
suaded him to take over the financially troubled Kydngsrng Chigyu. This 
firm had been the first Korean joint-stock textile company in the nation. 
It had been organized by two earlier Korean entrepreneurs who integrated 
scattered small-scale owner-operators. The company made various cotton, 
jute, or silk products such as belts, hair ribbons, and small bands for hats. 
The production method was still not really modern and mostly hand­
operated, though there was some electrification. The company's plant 
space as of 1913 was 237.5 p'y~ng and was equipped with 67 pedaled 
textile sewing machines and one motor generator of five horsepower. The 
company encountered financial difficulties, in part because it had started 
producing traditional products in large quantities just as the process of 
modernization reduced the demand for old-style hairdos, clothing, and 
accessories.
 
When Mr. 
 Kim took over the company, lie was not interested in produc­
ing those same products but wanted to move into cotton fabrics, which 
were at that time largely imported from Japan. Mr. Kim imported 40 
Japanese power textile weaving machines, but found ie could still not 
compete with Japanese cloth. He therefore decided to establish a new 
large-scale textile company, the Kyungbang Limited. 
Selling shares of the company at the time was not an easy task. Mr. Kim 
traveled all over the country to emphasize the national need for establish­
ing such a company. Even though the concept of a joint-stock company 
was new, many people bought shares as a gesture of patriotism, since the
 
timing was immediately after the 1919 anti-Japanese uprising. Most of
 
those who actively participated 
 in founding the company were provincial
landlords who were influential in their regions and who had become inter­
ested in the nation's modern enterprises. These promoters together bought 
3,790 shares, and the rest (or 16,210) shares were sold to the public. 
Those who see nationalism as a primary motive in establishing the 
company also see a similar influence in its operation. 4 For example, its 
employment advertisement usually specified "Koreans only," paralleling
the "Japanese only" designations of some Japanese-run companies. The 
company also appealed to the public with promotional catch phrases 
such as "Koreans with Korean cotton clothes." The marketing strategy
also took full advantage of the company's use of traditional Korean 
symbols for its trademark (see below). It concentrated its marketing 
effort in the north, especially in P'yongan province where nationalism was 
well established. 
345
 
Appendix B 
The company also benefited from the Chosen Mulsan Changyuhoe 
(Korean Products Promotion Group), established in 1920 in P'yl'ngan 
province by a famous patriot. This nationalistic movement stressed indus­
trial development, promotion of domestic products, reduction of lux­
urious consumption, and frugality. 
An episode involving the company's 'aegi-iksi-ng trademark is famous. 
"'laegi*sthe symbol used the Korean national flag, and the trade­is in 
mark also included eight stars to indicate the eight Korean provinces. 
Japanese police allegedly asked the company to explain the trademark, 
because it was politically sensitive. Since trademark control was handled 
in Japan, rather than by the colonial administration in Korea, the com­
pany was able to get away with a nonsense explaation. 
In 1928, when the Kyungbang Limited celebrated its tenth anniversary, 
So ng-su Kim retired from business activities to devote himself to journal­
isin and education. He had established today's Don q-A Ilbo (l)ong-A daily 
newspaper) in April 1920 and had expanded the Chungang School to the 
middle-school level in 1921. Stimulated by a visit to America and Europe, 
he decided to establish a private college. In 1933, he took over the finan­
cially troubled Pos6ng Professional School with the intention of develop­
ing it into a university. His effort was interrupted by World War 11,but he 
founded today's Korea University in 1946. 
Song-su Kim was also active in politics, becoming Vice President of the 
country in 1951, but resigning in 1952 due to a feud with Syngman Rhee. 
He died in 1955. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL HISTORY: 
YO N-SU KIM 
When Y'n-su Kim returned to Korea after his graduation, he became the 
managing director of Ky~tngsdng Chigyu under the presidency of his 
brother. He was then appointed executive director of the newly founded 
Kyungbang Limited and became its president in 1935. 
Ydn-su Kim also paid much attention to his family land in Ch11a 
province. These holdings were so extensive that it was said that "one 
can't go anywhere in Cholla province without walking on Mr. Kim's 
land." 5 In 1924, he bcgan to regroup and consolidate his holdings, and in 
1927 he estabiished Sansu Sa to manage his agricultural efforts. in 1931, 
Samsu Sa was renamed Sam Yang and became a limited partnership in 
1934. The company then acquired management control of Kyungbang 
Limited but continued land reclamation projects in Chlla province. 
In 1933, Kyungbang Limited participated in an industrial exhibition in 
Manchuria and in 1934 established a branch there. In 1936, Kim estab­
lished the Sam Yang in Manchuria in an effort to resettle Koreans on six 
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farns that he owned there and to promote other business interests in 
Manchuria. In 1939, he established the Nam Man Spinning Company and 
in 1940 took over Samch'ok Ki6p, a logging venture. With all these activi­
ties, Mr. Kim was one of the best known entrepreneurs in Manchuria. 
With Liberation in 1945, Mr. Kim lost all of his business interests in 
North Korea and Manchuria, as well as an office in Osaka. His ventures 
in the south also encountered difficulties. Imediately after the Japanese 
left the country, workers of most Japanese-owned companies took over 
nanagenent. Kyungbang Limited, being the only major company in the 
textile industry run by Koreans, remained under family control, but soon 
ran afoul of the labor unrest of the period. The employees went on strike, 
accused the management of being "capitalist exploiters," and demanded 
inventory distribution and wage increases. Workers sometimes confined 
managers and harassed Mr. Kiin at his residence. Similar revolts occurred 
on his farms, and tenants also cane to Seoul to confront him. To meet 
these demands, Mr. Kim decided to pay employees a "special bonus to 
celebrate tlie nation's independcnce," amounting to 20 percent of annual 
sales. The bonus per cimploys', was equivalent to 100 times the Imiontlily 
wage. Conditions nonietheless continued to deteriorate, and in l)eccmber 
1945 lie decided to retire from Kyungbang Limited and all of his other 
businesses. 
In 1948, the new National Assembly passed a law on the punishment of 
anti-nationalistic behavior during tIle colonial period, and YZn-su Kim 
was detained the following January. He was accused of having: 
I) been elected as the Kyonggi Province Representative by the colonial 
government; 
2) been appointed as an Honorary Counsellor in Manchuria, 
3) been selected as a member of colonial government advisory body; 
4) served as a staff member of an agency designed to cooperate with 
the Japanese war effort: 
5) encouraged Korean students in Japan to take part in the war. 
His al ended with dismissal of the charges. The reasons given were: 
1) In managing tile Kyungbang imited, lie always fought against 
.!:palese capital 
2) He always made efforts to establish a national economic foundation. 
3) Kyungbang Limited's use of the twaeik trademark should be taken 
into consideration. 
4) It was proved that his taking colonial government offices or hon­
orary offices were mostly involuntary and the result of pressure. 
5) A few hundred Korean students were supported by him as a part of 
his effort to educate more Koreans. 
fhe Land Reform Act delivered a further blow. According to Mr. Kim's 
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memoir, he had to hand over 6 big farms producing 150,000 sk (bushels) 
of grain. In return, he got land bonds worth 100,000 s6k. As explained in 
Chapter 2, the value of these bonds decreased drastically in the ensuing 
years and, when sold in 1953, brought returns of only 30 to 70 percent. 
Proceeds from the bond sale were used to finance his return to the 
industrial sphere. In 1953, he established Sam Yang Tong Sang Co., 
Ltd. (Sam Yang Trading Co.) to replace Saim Yang which had become little 
more than a personal real estate holding company. He decided to move 
into food and textiles, so he submitted an application for government 
permission to establish a sugar mill in 1953, at about the same time that 
Samsung submitted its application (see below). Samsung received permis­
sion imniediately, and two other firms were smilarly entitled before Sam 
'Y;,ggot its permit in December 1954. Mr. Kim thinks that this was 
clue to his being identified with the major opposition party. Even after 
receiving approval, Saim Yang could not get a government dollar loan for 
importing equipment at tile privileged exchange rate of sixty to one. 
Instead, it got FOA (Foreign Operations Administration) funds at a 320 
to one exchange rate. 
As his sugar mill in Ulsan started its operation. the Sam Yang Tong 
Sang Co., Ltd. changed its name to Sam Yang Co., Ltd. in] June 1956. In 
the late 1950s, the Rhee administration became more open in suppressing 
businesses related to the opposition party. The Sam Yang Group was one 
of the first targets, and it was often subjected to tax investigation. This 
was believed to have been done primarily to prevent political funds from 
flowing into the opposition Chang Myon party. With the Student Revolu­
tion of 1960 this party came into power, and Yni-su Kim emerged 
as president of a newly formed business federation. 
Despite the change in its political fortunes, Sam Yang Co., Ltd. did not 
prosper in the 1960s. At the time of the April Student Revolution, Y~n-su 
Kim was already sixty-four years old, and a process of devolution of con­
trol-begun in the 1950s-continued. In 1955, the salt division of Sam 
Yang Co., Ltd. had become an independent company. It separated from 
the group in 1956, with YZn-su Kim's eldest son as president. Kyungbang 
Limited separated floma tileSam Yang group in 1958 when Sam Yang's 
shares were sold. It is now under the leadership of Y~n-su Kim's brother­
in-law and is itself the nation's forty-third ranked chaeb6l. The Dotg-A 
Jibo is controlled by one of Song-su Kim's sons, while another of YZn-su 
Kim's sonas is President of Korea University. 
The main branch of Sall Yang Co., Ltd. acquired a financially troubled 
textile firm in 1963 and built it into the Sam Yang Woolen Textile Co., 
Ltd. More recently, it has acquired 56 percent of a heavy equipment com­
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pany and 33 percent of a grape sugar company. It is currently headed by 
Yon-su Kim's third son. 
The centralized first-generation control has thus been heavily decen­
tralized in the second generation. Descendants still control the original 
businesses, but have to some extent gone their independent ways. It 
remains to be seen whether the newer chaeb'6l will follow this or a more 
centralized inheritance pattern. 
SAMSUNG: THE LARGEST CHAEBOL 
6 
PyYng-ch'o Yi is widely regarded as the richest man in Korea, and our 
value-added calculations confirm that his Samsung group is the largest 
chaebNl in Korea. The group's 1975 sales amounted to over 700 million 
dollars and its exports to over 200 million dollars (see Table B-1 for these 
and other quantitative indicators).7 
Yi got his start as a provincial businessman under the Japanese but 
prospered in the import trade before, during, and immediately after the 
Korean War. In the mid-I 950s, lie moved into import substitution of con­
sumner goods such as sugar, flour, and textiles and from there into a wide 
range of services and products (see Table B-2 for a complete listing). 
Yi has often been criticized as "profiteering" from his early concentra­
tion on the so-called "three wites"-sugar, flour, and cotton yarn. While 
it is certain that there was a substantial zero-sum element in these early 
activities, it is equally clear that the group has since prospered in funda­
mentally positive-sum ventures. Yi has proven adept at taking the fullest 
advantage of tile economic opportunities offered by the government and 
the environment. While he was a leader in the consumer-goods import 
substitution of the 1950s and the export expansion of the 1960s, he has 
been a follower in the basic industries. This can be interpreted as a simple 
reflection of his personal style, which is known to be meticulous, cautious, 
and "steady as you go." This had led him to operate in markets where 
demand was assured, comparative advantage clear, and the risks small. His 
strength had been in early recognition of these opportunities and rapid 
mobilization of resources to fill the perceived demand. When followers 
begin to enter one market, he has typically moved on to something new, 
one step ahead of thc crowd. Where demand and comparative advantage 
have not been clear-as in the heavy and chemical industries-lie has 
moved slowly. In his mnemoirs lie attributed this to a desire "to aoid trial 
and error" in areas where mistakes are terribly costly. 8 His entrepr;:ieurial 
style has thus been basically conservative and in marked contrast to the 
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TABLE B-i Samsung Group: Quantitative Indicators 
197i 1974 1973(a) (b) b x (a) (b) b (a)Nati-m Samsung a- 100 Nation Samsun (b) b-X 100 Nation Samsung a-x 100 
Number of ccmnpaniesc 17 16 16Number of companies in
 
non-agriculturec 
 17 16 16Number of colpanies in
marufacturing c 22,7 8 7 a 9 2 2 ,6 3 2 a 8 23,293a 8Total salesd 352,819 197,461Total manufacturing salesd 7,994,143 a 175,405 a 91,056
 
Value addet 
2.19 5 ,43 8 , 1 0 4 139,345 2.56 3,4 5 0 ,8 7 9 a 61,606 1.79
at factor costd 8 , 2 5 9 , 2 8 0 b 112,751 77,8891.37 6 ,3 0 7 ,7 4 0 b 1.23 4 , 5 1 5 ,8 3 0 b 39,367 0.87Non-agricultural value
 
added at factor costd 
 5 ,9 6 5 , 5 7 0 b 112,751 1.89 4 ,6 2 5 ,6 0 0 b 77,889 1.68 3 ,2 6 3 , 9 7 0 b 39,367 1.21Manufacturing value added 
at factor costd 74,774 3.582 , 0 8 8 ,7 1 0 b 60,195 3.76Employment 1 ,6 0 3 , 0 6 0 b 1 ,1 0 5 ,3 0 0 b 26,925 2.44 
1 1 ,8 3 0 e 21,541 0.18 11,586 e 18,741 0.16 11,139c 17,711 0.16Employment in manu­
facturing e 
2 , 2 0 5 14,405 0.6' 2,012c 12,462Export f 0.62 1,774 13,050 0.745,081,016 349,346 6.8b 4,460,370 108,728 2.44 3,225,025 85,1409 2.64 
Notes: aSource: EPB, Report on Aining and ManufacturingSurvey, 1973-1975. 
bBOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1977. 
CCorporazions existed bt not in operation at the time were excluded from the calculation (e.g., there were 21 entities in 1975, but 4 en­
tities were excluded f-,m the calculation).
dln current million won.
 
eln thousands of v. -rkers.
 
fin current thousa.,d U.S. dollars.
gSamsung Corning Company's export is included 
even though the company is excluded from other calculations­
Sanzstng 
TABLE B-2 Samsung Group: Affiliated Companies 
Textile and Paper 
Cheil Wool Textile Co., Ltd. 1954, est. 
Cheil Synthetic Textile Co., Ltd. 1972, est. 
Chonju Paper Manufacturing Co., Ltd. 1965, acq. 
Food 
Cheil Sugar Co., Ltd. 1953, est. 
Electronics 
Satosuog Electronics Co., Ltd. 1969, est. 
Samnsung Electric Co., Ltd. 1969, est. 
Samnsung Electron Devices Co., Ltd. 1970, est. 
Samnsung Corning Co., Ltd. 1973, est. 
Samnsung Electrical Parts Co., Ltd. 1973, est. 
Petrochemical and Machinery 
Samnsung Petrochemical Co., Ltd. 1974, est. 
Samsung Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. 1974, est. 
Daesung Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. 1977, acq. 
Samsung Precision Equipnment Co., Ltd. 1977, est. 
Samsung Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. 1977, acq. 
Trade 
Samsung Co., Ltd. 1952, est. 
Shinsegyc )epartment Stcrc Co., Ltd. 1962, acq. 
Real Estate and Construction 
J onngang Development Co., Ltd. 1966, est. 
Sanisung Construction Co., Ltd. 1977, acq. 
Finance 
Ankok Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. 1958, acq. 
Dongbang Life Insurance Co., Ltd. 1957, acq. 
Mass Communication 
Joongang Daily Newspaper Co., Ltd. 1965, est. 
Tongyang Broadcasting Co., Ltd. 1963, est. 
Other 
Hotel Shilla Co., Ltd. 1973, est. 
Korea General Hospital, Inc. 1966, est. 
Yongin Farm 1975, est. 
Samsung CulLural Foundation 1965, est. 
Sung Kyun Kwan University 1965, acq. 
adventuresome risk-taking pattern of Hyundai's Chu-yo'ng Ch~ng, de­
scribed in the subsequent section. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BACKGROUND 
Yi was born in 1910 in South Ky'ngsang province in a small village of 
about 300 households. He was the second and youngest son of a wealthy 
landlord. His early education was in a so-dang, or traditional Confucian 
school that taught largely Chinese literature and philosophy. Yi wanted, 
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however, to go to a modern school, and his parents finally allowed him to 
do so at the age of ten. He first went to a primary school in Seoul and 
eventually entered the Chungdong Middle School. Although he did not 
graduate from middle school, he proceeded to Japan and enrolled in the 
Political Science-Economics Division of Waseda University. However, due 
to "poor health" he dropped out after a couple of semesters and returned 
to Korea. He then spent a couple of years wandering around Seoul doing 
nothing in particular. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL HISTORY 
Pyo'ng-ch'ol Yi's entrepreneurial activities began in 1936, when he estab­
lished a local rice mi'l with funds inherited from his parents. He recalls 
that his decision was rather hasty, and he is today not really sure why he 
chose this career. He nonetheless did quite well and by 1945 had expanded 
into trucking, real estate, domestic trading, 9 milling, noodle-making, and 
brewing. These activities were largely confined to Taegu, but were of 
sufficient magnitude to make him one of the biggest taxpayers in the 
province. 
After Liberation, Yi became interested in starting a new line of business 
in Seoul, using funds accumulated primarily from his brewery profits. He 
moved to Seoul in 1947 and decided to engage in international trade. His 
decision was based on his assessment of the prevailing economic environ­
ment in which demand for daily necessities was increasing rapidly,
although the nation lacked domestic production capabilities. Yi estab­
lished the Samsung Mulsan Company in Seoul in November 1948. Within 
two years, his import activities were successful enough for his trading 
company's sales to rank in the nation's top ten. This venture was devas­
tated by the Korean War, but was reestablished in Pusan in January 1951. 
The success of this company laid the foundation for the chaeb'61's subse­
quent rap'l expansion. Concentrating on import activities, this company is 
claimed to have grown 17-fold in the first year of its existence-a substan­
tial achievement, even after allowng for inflation. 10 Yi admits that wind­
fall gains of this magnitude were only possible because of the abnormal 
circumstances of the war. 
With his substantial trading profits in hand, he started thinking about 
establishing a manufacturing firm and decided the best prospects were in 
import substitution of dail, consumer necessities. In pursuit of this 
philosophy, he established the Cheil Sugar Company in Pusan in 1953. The 
company was initially a monopolistic supplier and reaped the natural 
benefits of this status. The resulting profits were put into another import­
substitution consumer product when he established the Cheil Wool Textile 
Company, Ltd. in 1954. This company became very profitable as it 
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gradually replaced foreign-made woolen textiles and became the backbone 
1
" of today's Samsung Group. 
With this foundation established in the early 1950s, the Samsung Group 
emerged as a formidable chaebZl in the late 1950s and took over numer­
ous firms, including financial intermediaries. He actually purchased al­
most half of all commercial bank shares in the later years of the Rhee 
12 
regime. 
With the inception of the Park Military Government, Yi became a major 
target of the illicit-wealth-accumulation investigation discussed in Chapter 
8. The official calculation gave his illicit wealth as 800 million wn or 
about 19 petcent of the national total.' 3 He was also accused of providing 
political funds of 64 million wn and evading taxes amounting to 451 
million w'n. 14 Yi was in Japan at the time of the military coup and so 
initially avoided arrest. When he returned to Korea, lie participated in the 
meeting with Park Chung Hee that led to the compromise described in 
Chapter 3. He emerged as the leader of the new entrepreneurs, served as 
the first president of the association that became FKI, and headed the 
businessmen's economic mission to the United States. 
Yi had explored the possibility of entering the fertilizer field in the late 
3950s but had been deterred by the April Student Revolution. Now, as 
part of the compensatory entrepreneurship program, he committed him­
self to constructing a fertilizer plant whose shares would be turned over to 
the government. The government's permission to build the plant, however, 
was abolished in December 1963,1s and Yi finally paid his fine in cash. 
Less than a year later, in August 1964, he founded the Han Kook Ferti­
lizer Company, one of the largest industrial projects of the period. The 
plant was completed in record time and commenced production in early 
1967. Even before the plant was in operation, however, the company was 
plagued by the "saccharin smuggling" scandal. In September 1966, it was 
discovered that some of Py'ong-ch'ol Yi's staff-including one of his sons­
had illegally profiteered by smuggling saccharin when they imported raw 
materials from Japan. This became a controversial social issue and un­
doubtedly contributed to the unfavorable public image of Samsung and Yi 
himself. The President himself ordered a full investigation, and in the end 
Yi decided to "donate" 51 percent of the company's shares to the govern­
ment. 
The fertilizer setback, however, was hardly fatal, and, throughout the 
1960s, Samsung continued to expand into new fields such as department 
stores, securities brokerage, educational institutions, real estate, paper 
mills, and mass media. In the early 1970s, the group moved into electron­
ics and, in the mid-1970s, they began to enter the "heavy and chemical 
industries" emphasized by the nation's Fourch Five-Year Economic 
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Development Plan, establishing or acquiring ventures in petrochemicals, 
heavy equipment, precision machinery, construction, and shipbuilding.
Samsung thus promises to maintain its prominence, if not its pre­
eminence, for the foreseeable future. Though Py ng-ch' l Yi was sixty­
five years old in 1975, the group as yet shows no signs of dissolution. 
HYUNDAI: AGGRESSIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
IN PRODUCERS'GOODS 16 
Hyundai's evolution has been markedly different from that of Samsung, 
even though it is the second or third largest chaebbl.' 7 In tile first place,
Samsung concentrated oil consumer goods, while Hyundai has focused 
on producers' goods-construction, shipbuilding, machinery, cement,
engineering, and one durable,consumer automobile: (see Table B-4 for 
a complete listing). Second, and more important, Hyundai has been the 
leader in the 19 70s effort to move the economy into a stage of indus­
trialization that is higher in the product cycle. The uncertainty of success 
in this effort has meant that Hyundai has taken far more risks and had to 
be far more innovative-witness its construction of world-classa ship­
yard, efforts to export automobiles, and successful competition with 
established American and European giants for Middle Eastern construction 
contracts. Hyundai also is viewed much more sympathetically by the Blue 
House than Samsung, since heavy industry development is a long-run 
government objective; risky endeavors require implicit government contin­
gency insurance, and the personal style of the chairman of the group is 
more compatible with that of the President. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BACKGROUND 
The chairman and founder of the Hyundai Group is Chu-yong Ch'ng.
He was born in a village of KangwZ'n province in November 1915, the first 
son of an average farmer. He attended a traditional Confucian sYdang for 
a few years before entering a modern primary school from which he 
graduated at the age of fifteen. His parents naturally wanted him to follow 
his father in the ancestral occupation of farming, but the boy was nor 
satisfied with this idea. Early one morning, lie withleft home another 
village boy and headed towards Ch'ongjin where he had heard job oppor­
tunities were available. Oil the way, they got jobs as laborers on a road 
building crew in order to earn travel expenses. There, Ch-ng's father 
caught up with them and took the boy back home. He then worked on hisfather's farm for about two years before again deciding to leave home with 
one of his friends. This time he went to Seoul, where he first worked 
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TABLE B-3 Hyundai Group: Quantitative Indicators 
1975 1974 1973 
(a) (b) b (a) (b) b (a) (b) ebNation Hyundai - x 100 Nation Hyundai - x 160 Nation Hvundai - x 100 
a a a 
Number of companies 6 6 5 
Number of companies in 
non-agriculture 6 6 5 
Number of companies in 
manufacturing 22,787a 5 2 2, 6 3 2 a 5 2 3 , 2 9 3 a 4Total salesd 234,450 136,221 63,509Total manufacturing salesd 7,994,143 a 179,950 2.25 5,438,104' 104,742 1.93 3,450,879' 31,982 0.93GDP at factor cost a 87,619 1.068 ,2 5 9 ,2 8 0 b 6 ,3 0 7 ,7 4 0 b 47,313 0.75 4 ,5 1 5, 8 3 0 b 23,045 0.51 
Non-agriculture valuek-n 
iJ added at factor cost 87,619 1.475 , 9 6 5 ,9 7 0 b 4 ,6 2 5 ,6 0 0 b 47,313 1.02 3 , 2 6 3 ,9 7 0 b 23,045 0.71Manufacturing value 
added at factor costd 64,662 3.102 ,0 8 8 , 7 10 b 1 ,6 0 3 ,0 6 0 b 5,747 2.23 1 , 1 0 5 ,3 0 0 b 11,764 1.06Employment e29,329 0.251 1 , 8 3 0 e 11 ,5 86 L2,742 0.20 20,531 0.181 1 ,1 3 9 e 
Employment in manu­
facturing 2,205e 26,345 1.19 2,012 21,655 1.08 1 , 7 7 4 e 19,616 1.11Export f 5,081,016 120,710 2.38 4,460,370 163,733 3.67 3,225,025 71,213 2.21 
Notes: aSource: EPB, Reporton Mining andManufacturingSurvey, 1973-75. 
bSource: BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1977. 
CHyundai Shipbuilding and Heavy Industries Co., Ltd., was excluded from the 1973 calculations except for employment. 
din current million wo'n.
 
eln thousands of workers.
 
fin current thousand U.S. dollars. 
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TABLE B-4 Hyundai Group: Affiliated Companiesa 
Construction and Real Estate 
Hyundai Construction Co., Ltd. 1950, est. 
Keun Kang Development Co., Ltd. 1958, est. 
Shipbuilding 
Hyundai Shipbuilding & Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. 1973, est. 
Automobile Industry 
Hyundai Motor Company 1967, est. 
Machinery 
Hyundai Industrial Co., Ltd. 1962, est. 
Cement and Ceramics 
Hyundai Cement Co., Ltd. 1969, est. 
Keum Kang Co., Ltd. 1958, est. 
Engineering 
Hyundai Engineering Consultant Co., Ltd. 1974, est. 
Repair Service 
Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co., Ltd. 1975, est. 
Hyundai Motor Service Co., Ltd. 1974, et. 
Marine Transportation 
Asia Merchant Marine Co., Ltd. 1976, est. 
Note: aBesides these firms, there are a few more small-scale firms in the group, e.g.,
Korea Urban Development, Korea Pavement Construction, and Dong Suh Industrial 
Co. We could not gather data on these firms. 
briefly as a port laborer in Inch'-n and then became an errand boy for 
a small rice mill. The owner of the mill was impressed by his hard work 
and sincerity and, after about a year, made him a bookkeeping clerk. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL HISTORY 
After three years at the mill, he had learned enough about the rice trade 
to open his own retail shop. He was then twenty-two years old. His shop 
became prosperous and expanded into the wholesale business, but his 
success was brought to a quick halt by the colonial government control 
of the rice trade which accompanied the Sino-Japaneso. War. In 1940 he 
acquired a small auto-service shop. The shop burned down once but re­
opened with personal loans. He also provided transportation services in a 
mining region. After the nation's Liberation, Chang established the Hyun­
dai Motor Company-and auto repair shop-in Seoul in 1946 and the 
Hyundai Construction Company, Ltd. in 1947, with the two merging in 
1950. 
With the onset of the Korean War, Chang and the company moved to 
Pusan. With the assistance of one of his brothers' 8 -who possessed the 
requisite fluency in English-the company got contracts for U.S. Army 
barrack construction and airport expansion projects. Throughout the war, 
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he continued to obtain extensive contracts from both the Korean govern­
ment and the U.S. Army. This activity provided both the profits for later 
expansion and the contacts that allowed later contracts in Vietnam and 
Thailand. 
After the war, the construction industry was understandably in demand 
for reconstruction of the facilities destroyed by the war. The Hyundai 
Construction Company, Ltd., took full advantage of the boom, expanding 
into unloading, warehousing, and international trade. Its growth rate was 
even faster during the rapid national expansion of the 1960s. Hyundai 
constructed many of the large-scale infrastructure projects undertaken 
under Park, including the Soyang Dam, Ch'unch'6n Dam, Ky~ngin High­
way, Ulsan Thermal Plant, the six Han River bridges, Y55i Apartment 
complex, Chosun Hotel, and National Assembly building. By 1965 the 
company's contract volume was already the highest in the nation. 
A striking feature of Hyundai's growth has been its expansion into 
international construction markets. Its initial contracts were with the 
U.S. Government for work in Thailand and Vietnam. These were in part 
due to the contacts made through successful completion of similar con­
tracts in Korea, but the subsequent expansion into the Middle East demon­
strates the himportance of the entrepreneurial spirit-as one opportunity 
dries up, a new one is developed. 
Hyundai's first overseas contracts were in 1966-the Pattani-Narathiwat 
Highway' 9 in Thailand and dredging work in Vietnam. The company 
acquired a reputation for completing projects successfully and on time 
and won further contracts with the expansion of the U.S. war effort. 
The experience thus earned was transferred to the Middle East, where in 
1976 alone Hyundai was awarded SI.4 billion worth of contracts, includ­
ing a S931 million industrial port at Jubail, Saudi Arabia.2 0 
One of tie more impressive entrepreneurial feats in Korea, and indeed, 
the world, was the creation of a woild-class shipbuilding firm by Chu-y~ng 
Chang. This venture seemed quixotic to most Koreans, with the notable 
exceptions of Chairman Chang and President Park. 2' Not only had Hyun­
dai had no previous experience in shipbuilding, but Korea itself had never 
produced a vessel larger than 10,000 tons, and no nation anywhere near 
Korea's level of development had ever built world-class tankers. Inter­
national financiers and shipbuilders were no doubt bemused at the pre­
tensions of someone soliciting funds with little more to show than a 
picture of a lovely sandy beach where the proposed Hyundai dry dock was 
to be built. It is no wonder that the first year's efforts at finding financing 
led to failure, and ChB'ng persevered only because of the urgings of Presi­
dent Park. Finally, in April 1972, an agreement was reached with a Greek 
shipowner whereby two vessels-of 240,000 and 260,000 tons-were to 
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be delivered in two-and-a-half years (July and December 1974). While the 
terms of the contract arc not known, one may assume that the Greek was 
not risking a great deal in tie event of failure. iemay indeed have been 
astounded that the contract was honored and the dry dock built, workers 
trained, supplementary facilities completed, and the ships completed. 
Actual construction of the first vessel was begun in March 1973, and 
it was delivered nineteen months later in November 1974. 
The contribution of government is of course crucial in amieffort of this 
magnitude. In the first place, without the personal urging of President Park 
it is virtually certain that the project would have been shelved. In the 
second place, without efficient and energetic bureaucratic support the 
project could riot have been completed on tiime-there are many countries 
in the world where one could not complete the necessary paper work in 
the allotted time, let alone build a shipyard and deliver ships. Finally, for 
risky ventures of this sort, partial mutuality comes into play thr-agh the 
government's provision of implicit contingency insurance. When the 
1975 world shipbuilding slump led to the cancellation of orders for three 
virtually completed tankers, the company faced a potentially enormous 
loss as the vessels sat at their moorings. At this point, the government 
happened to decide that it would be a good idea if the Korean oil re­
fineries started to ship crude from the Middle East in Korean-owned 
bottoms. Though the companies were reluctant to comply, given the 
prevailing tanker surplus and attendant low shipping rates, the govern­
ment's view prevailed. After a year of discussions, the Korea Oil Corpora­
tion (a government-Gulf joint venture-began leasing the services of the 
three tankers from the newly created Hyundai Shipbuilding and Heavy 
Industries Company, Ltd. This is a perfect example of the practical opera­
tion of partial mutuality. 
HANJIN: SUCCESS IN THE SERVICE SECTOR2 2 
Hanjin is the fourth largest chaebol in Korea (see Table B-5 for quantita­
tive indicators). It is similar to Hyundai in that U.S. military contracts 
during and after the Korean War provided its initial accumulation, and 
Vietnam contracts provided further impetus to its growth. It differs 
sharply from the other chaeb'l considered thus far in that its activities 
are largely confined to transportation and ancillary services (see Table 
B-6 for acomplete list). 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BACKGROUND 
Chung-hun Cho was born in Seoul in 1920, the second son of a middle­
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TABLE B-5 Hanjin Group: Quantitative Indicators 
(a)
'ation 
1975 
()
Hanjin b - x 100a 
(b)
Nation, 
1974 
(b)
Hajic c b x 
a 
100 
(a)
N.Vo.rfn 
1973 
(b) cb 
Hanjin b x 100 
a 
Number of companies 
Number of companies in 
non-agriculture 
Number of companiesin manuf cturing 
Total sales 
GDP at factor costd 
Non-agricultural value 
added at factor costd 
Manufacturing value 
2 2 ,7 8 7a 
8 ,2 5 9 ,2 8 0 b 
5 , 9 6 5 , 9 7 0 b 
8 
8 
0 
157,451 
72,166 
72.166 
8.74 
1.21 
2 2, 6 3 2 a 
6 ,3 0 7 ,7 4 0 b 
4 ,6 2 5 ,6 0 0 b 
8 
8 
0 
98,779 
41,366 
41,366 
0.66 
0.89 
23, 2 9 3 a 
4,51 5 , 8 3 k;b 
3,263,970 ° 
7 
7 
0 
63.113 
31,741 
31,741 
0.70 
0.97 
added at factor costd 
Vi e added factor cost 
2 ,0 8 8 , 7 1 0 b 0 0 1 ,6 0 3 ,0 6 0 b 0 0 1 , 1 0 5 , 3 0 0 b 0 0 
(Tratuportatjon &Storage)d 
Employment 
Employment in manu­
facturing 
Export 
375,470 
11, 8 3 0 
e 
2 , 2 0 5 e 
5,081,016 f 
63,667 
10,161 
0 
214,793 
16.96 
0.09 
0 
0.04 
295,650 
1 1 , 5 8 6e 
2,01 2e 
4,460,370f 
36.247 
8,144 
0 
149,841 
12.26 
0.07 
0 
0.03 
219,780 
11,1 3 9 
e 
1, 7 7 4 
e 
3,225,025 f 
2 9 .4 0 2g 
7.776 
0 
113,853 
13.38 
0.07 
0 
0.04 
Notes: aSource: EPB, Report on Mining and ManufacturingSurvey, 1973-1975.bSource: BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1977. eln thousands of workers.
cUnits not in operation were excluded from the calculation. fin current thousand U.S. dollars.dln current million won. gHanjin Tourist Co., Ltd. was acquired in 1973 but excl,ded from 
the calculation of value added at factor cost. 
Appendix B 
TABLE B-6 Hanjin Group: Affiliated Companies 
Transportation 
Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. 1969, acq. 
Hanjin Transportation Co., Ltd. 1945, est. 
Dacjin Shipping Co., Ltd. 1967. est. 
Korea Airport Co., Ltd. 1968, est. 
Construction 
Hanil Development Co., Ltd. 1968, est. 
Sightseeing 
Hanjin Tourist Co., Ltd. 1973, acq. 
Livestock 
Jacdong Industrial Co., Ltd. 1973, est. 
Securities and Insurancc 
Hanil Securities Co., Ltd. 1973, est. 
The Oriental Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. 1966, acq. 
Education 
Inha University 1968, acq. 
class business family. His education was curtailed at the middle school 
level when his family's business failed during the world depression. He left 
home for Japan when he was about 17 years old. Because he was fond of 
mechanics, he became an apprentice in a shipbuilding plant where sub­
marines and warships were constructed. He then worked as a ship's 
mechanic for about three years, widening his perspective through visits 
to various Southeast Asian cities such as Hong Kong, Shanghai, and 
Singapore. He returned to Korea toward the end of World War II and 
opened a small machinery shop in Seoul. This venture did not prosper, 
thanks to the Japanese colonial control of mechanical and engineering 
firms. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL H1STOR'Y 
With the nation's Liberation in 1945, Cho went to lnch'6n and opened 
the Hanjin Transportation Company, Ltd. with one truck. His company 
grew quite fast, and by the Korean War he owned a fleet of about 30 
trucks and 20 small ships. The war took all his property, and afterwards 
lie had to start all over again. He managed to get service contracts for 
transporting military supplies and became a supply agent for the U.S. 
Army in Korea. Hc established his creditability with the U.S. Army 
authori:ies, and this became critical for his future involvement in Vietnam. 
He also saw the inseparable relation between war and transportation, and 
this led him to look for business in Vietnam before others did. He believes 
his successful involvement in Vietnam was due to the creditability estab­
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lished in Korea among U.S. Army officers, some of whom were again 
serving in Vietnam. His company in Vietnam started to engage in land 
transportation with trucks imported from Japan and the United States, 
and sea transportation using barges imported from Hong Kong. Hanjin's 
performance was such that the U.S. Army asked them to take over com­
plete operation of the important port of Qui Nhon, and they did so. It 
is estimated that the Hanjir,'s total dollar earnings in Vietnam amounted 
to S 10 million in 1966 and S28 million in 1968. 
The dollars earned in Vietnam allowed further expansion of his domestic 
ventures, which expanded 150 trucks in 1965. Chohad to Chung-hun 
established an airline and a marine transportation company in 1967, 
largely to carry necessary equipment and workers to Vietnam. With this 
experience he bought the government's Korean Air Lines in March 1969. 
It is said that the government urged Cho to take over the deficit-ridden 
Korean National Airlines, and he complied despite advice to the contrary 
from some of his major subordinates. In the end, the venture proved quite 
profitable, and the purchase price paid off in five years instead of thewas 

contracted ten. By 1977, KAL routes covere d much of the world with 
a 
fleet of 5 jumbo jets, 4 DC-10s, 6 air buses, and 17 other planes. 
DAEWOO: A "NEW GENERATION" CHAEBOL 2 3 
In 1975 Daewoo was the seventh largest chaebbl in terms of value added 
(see Table B-7 for selected quantitative indicators). It is of particular inter­
est for two reasons. First, it is in all probability the fastest growing chaebol 
of the 1970s. Second, and more important, it is one of the "new genera­
tion" of business groups. Unlike the entrepreneurs discussed previously, 
Daewoo's founder grew up in an independent Korea (he was eight years 
old at the time of Liberation) and did not get a start in business until the 
high-growth years 1960s. group's initialof the The success came in the 
export trade but soon expanded into export production and, in the mid­
1970s, diversified into a variety of areas including construction, elec­
tronics, and heavy machinery (see Table B-8 for a complete list). 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BACKGROUND 
U-jung Kim was born in l)ecember 1936 to a family of educators. Both 
his parents were among the limited number of college graduates during the 
colonial era. His brother, TMk-chung Kim, als,. entered academia as a 
professor of economics before joining Daewoo in the mid-1970s. 
U-jung Kim himself was quite active in extracurricular activities and 
showed leadership capabilities during his school days. He was the head of 
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TABLE B-7 Daewoo Group: Quantitative Indicators 
1975 1974 1973 
(a) (1) 1ba) (b) b (a) bb0
.Vati,,n laIcV, x 0 N,.tio,, Daewoo - x 100 Nation DacItoo x00 
a aa 
Number of companies 16 15 10 
Number of companies in 
non-agricuture 16 15 10 
Number of companies in 
bSource. B)K. Jc.,,.,mit Statitics Yea-book, 1977. 
danu'.Lturing 
Tot,a salcs d 
Total nm.nufacturji 
GDP at tactor cost d 
salesd 
22.787 a 
1.994.143" 
8 . 2 5 9 28 0 b 
9 
109.852 
88,213 
43.433 
1.10 
0.53 
22.632 a 
5.438.104" 
6 .3 0 7 ,7 4 0 b 
8 
69.089 
58.647 
21.741 
1.08 
0.34 
2 3 .2 9 3a 
3.450.870 a 
4,515, 8 3 0b 
7 
70.885 
62,128 
22,123 
1.80 
0.49 
Non-agriculture value added 
it factor costd 5 .9 6 5 ,9 7 0 b 43.433 0.73 4 ,6 2 5 ,6 0 0 b 21,741 0.47 3 ,2 6 3 ,9 7 0h 22,123 0.68 
Manufacturing value addedat factor costd 2 088.710 b 24.501 1.17 1.603.060 b 15.062 0 )4 1,105,300b 15.970 1.44 
Erpontcnt 11.830' 24.244 0.21 11 .586' 14.386 0.12 11.139' 11.130 0.10 
Entploytcnt In tianu­
facturltjIV 
Exportst 
2 .205' 
5.081.016 
23.022 
223.871c 
1.04 
4.41 
2 ,012' 
4.460.370 
13.624 
153,i36' 
0.68 1.774' 
3.225.025 
10.772 
9 5 ,1 6 4 c 
0.61 
2.95 
Notes: *Source: EPB, Reort ,s 3ti,io, aocd !a. ta turing SurveY. 1973-1975. 
CTclDaewoo Group produces most of the products that it exports. In 1975. 90%of the group's exports were produced by group men­
bers. compard with 85'%, it 1974 and 80% in 1973. 
d1;, current million w'on. 
C In thousands f %workers. 
tin current thousmLid U.S. dollars. 
D~aew'oo 
TABLE 11-8 Daewoo Group: Affiliated Companies 
Trading 
Daewoo Industrial Co., Ltd. 1967, est. 
Shinsung 'ongsang Co., Ltd. 1973, acq. 
Textile and Leather Products 
I)aewoo Textile Co., Ltd. 1974, acq. 
Shinwom Textile Lo., Ltd. 1975, acq. 
Koryo l.eathar Idustrial Co., Ltd. 1972, acq. 
SambonhIcorporated 1976, acq.
Finlancing 
Korea Capital Corp. 1973, acq. 
t)rint hnvestment & Finance Corp. 1973, est. 
l)ongyaaag Securities Co.. Ltd. 19 73, acq. 
l)ailan Education Insurance Co., Ltd. 1975, acq. 
Ca 'itrate ti on 
).aewoo0 I)c-VCs'enaaeit Co., Ltd. 1973, est. 
Machinery and Its Sales 
l)aewooa I eavy Idustries Co., Ltd.a 1973, acq. 
Daian loiler Idustrial Co.. Ltd. 1976, acq. 
)aewoo Machines Sales Co., Ltd. 1976, est. 
Electronics 
I)acwaa Electronics Co., Ltd. 1974, est. 
Engiaacering 
)aewaa Engineering Co., Ltd. 1976, est. 
Casmetics 
I'ceres Casmetics Caa., Ltd. 1975, acq. 
Nate: aKaareaa Machinery Manufacturing Corp. was acquired ill 1976 and merged 
into this company. 
the high school student body's disciplinary division and the president of 
Yonsei University's student body. Upon graduation he went to work for 
a trading company. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL HISTORY 
In 1967 Kim teamed up with three of his close business friends to form 
their own trading conpaiy-l)aewoo Industrial Company, Ltd. Kim 
initially dealt with foreign buyers he knew front his previous job, but 
rapidly expanded his contacts. The company's growth was impressive. 
Over the nine-year period, 1967-1976, real Korean exports grew at a 
simple a;nutal average rate of 35 percent, whereas )aewoo grew at 122 
ptlcent (see Table B,-9). Bv 1976, it was cxpoarting over S300 million 
worth of goods representing about 4 percent of the nation's total exports. 
This success is in part attributed to a upolicy of paying employees ex­
tremely high wages but demanding comensurately long hours. 
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TABLE B-9 Daewoo Industrial Co., Ltd.: Growth of Real Exportsa 
An nual 4 ?1iual (a) 
Korea t 
Growth 
Rate 
(b)
Daewooc 
Grawth 
Rate b/a in % 
1967 327.4 593 0.18 
38.0 488.0 
1968 451.8 2,894 0.64 
43.8 42.7 
1969 649.8 4,130 0.64 
28.5 106.7 
1970 C35.2 8,536 1.02 
29.4 186.9 
1971 1,080.6 24,493 2.27 
50.4 115.7 
1972 1,625.7 52,834 3.25 
58.3 28.2 
1973 2,573.1 67,752 2.63 
8.2 14.5 
1974 2,784.3 77,581 2.79 
23.0 48.3 
1975 3,423.9 115,066 3.36 
35.9 67.1 
1976 4,653.4 192,306 4.13 
Average 35.0 122.0 
Notes: aCurrent dollars deflated by export unit value index.b In million 1970 U.S. dollars. Data from BOK, Economic Statistics Yearoook, 1976. 
c In thousand 1970 U.S. dollars. Data from Daewoo Industrial Company, Ltd. 
In its first year the company engaged only in trade, but in 1968 it estab­
lished its own textile plant and added four more by 1972. With its founda­
tion in textiles and trade, the group expanded into finance, construction, 
electronics, and cosmetics. In 1976 the group tok a major new direction 
when it acquired the infamous Korean Machinery Manufacturing Corpora­
tion (Han'gi: see Chapter 4, pp. 127-132). Leaving the group'sother opera­
tions in the hands of his brother, Kim devoted himself to "turning around" 
the new acquisition. There is some evidence of success, as Han'gi stock 
nearly doubled in price in the following year. In 1977 Daewoo took over 
the financially troubled Shinjin Automobile Manufacturing Company from 
the same group that bad held Han'gi. 
Overall, the group's growth has been phenomenal, even by Korean stan­
dards. In less than ten years it has grown from a miniscule base to 23 
companies with 30 foreign branches and 35,000 employees. Its 1975 sales 
were nearly a quarter of a billion dollars, and its rate of growth is, if any­
thing, accelerating. 
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EntrepreneurshipSurvey
 
The KDI/HIID "Modernization" studies were conceived on the premise 
that extensive primary research had already been conducted, and the 
primary need was to synthesize existing work. The topic of "Government, 
Business, and Entrepreneurship in Economic Development," however, had 
heretofore attracted little scholarly attention in Korea, and the gaps 
dominated the explored areas. 
To partially fill this lacuna, a two-part research effort was initiated. 
First, case studies were made of selected small entrepreneurs, and large 
conglomerates. 1 Since we could not hope to carry out enough case studies 
to yield generalized conclusions, it was decided to administer an "Entre­
preneurship and Management" questionnaire in a random sample of 
Korean industries. The depth of the case study approach was thus to 
be complemented by the breadth of the survey. 
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SURVEY DESIGN 
QUESTION NAI RE 
An initial draft questionnaire was prepared by the two principal authors. 
Because the comparative disadvantage of economists in such an endeavor 
was recognized, the participation of a sociologist-Man-Gap Lee-and an 
anthropologist-Vincent Brandt-was solicited. These two individuals, both 
with extensive field experience in Korea, assisted in revising the initial 
questionnaire and added the sections on "Values, Attitudes, and Manage­
ment Philosophy." Following a field test in 25 firms, a revised and short­
ened final questionnaire was prepared. Questions cover 5 sets of topics, as 
follows: 
1) Company Characteristics (for example, size, location, product mix): 
to allow exploration of the extent to which the type of economic 
activity affects responses to other questions. 
2) Entrepreneurship (problems faced in founding or expanding the 
enterprise, and how they were evercome): to identify the various 
economic factors which contributed to fulfilling the entrepreneurial 
function. 
3) Social Background (for example, place of birth, family background, 
job experience, education): to identify any unique social subsets 
that contributed disproportionately to entrepreneurial success. 
4) 	 Government-Business Relationships (opinions on the nature of 
government-business interaction): to identify extent and techniques 
of government influence on business and vice versa; and a coinpari­
son of the Rhee and Park administrations in this respect.
 
5) Personal Values and Attitudes (for example, motivation, 
 success 
criteria, and management philosophy): to suggest attitudinal con­
comitants of successful entrepreneurship. 
There are two versions of the questionnaire-one for "entrepreneurs" 
and the other for "top managers." Because the latter is a shortened and 
slightly reworded version of the former, only the entrepreneurs' question­
naire is reproduced below as an appendix. Top managers were added for 
two reasons: 1) to add perspective on questions such as government­
business relations and contributions to enterprise expansion; 2) to provide 
a control on certain social-background questions where comparable 
society-wide data is not available. 
SAMPLING PROCEDURE 
The universe was defined as all manufacturing enterprises listed in the 
Han'guk kihp ch'ongnarn (Directory of Korean business) 2 as employing 
more than 50 workers as of June 30, 1975. This resulted in a population 
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of 1,867 firms? Application of a one-in-six equal probability of selection 
procedure resulted in a sample size of 311 enterpri!,es (after eliminating 
wholly goverrment-owned enterprises). Table C-1 gi es sample character­
istics in terms of asset size, location, industry, and year of establishment. 
The sample size was determined by a resource constraint rather than by 
optimal sampling theory. Had we been interested in estimating a single 
parameter for which we held reas',n:,ble priors its to th? variance and mean 
of various subsets, then we would have applied a stratified random-sampl­
ing procedure with different probabilities for different strata. This was 
inappropriate here, however, because we were generally without priors and 
interested in many different questions whose response distributions would 
vary independently across strata. Further, we hoped to allow for cross­
strata correlation (for example, if northerners were disproportionally 
represented in the entrepreneurial population, was this explicable in terms 
of education, class, and/or religious background?) To "fine-tune" our 
answers in this fashion requires multiple stratified cell observations large 
enough to be statistically significant. Because we were beginning in ignor­
ance of just how much cross-correlation would be required, it was, there­
fore, clear that, the larger the sample 3ize, the better. Constraints on inter­
viewer availability and funding made 300 firms the largest feasible level. 
SURVEY EXECUTION 
Interviews were conducted by 15 sociology students from Ewha Womans 
University, most of whom had had prior survey interview experience.4 
Training began with a one-day seminar on interviewing techniques. Each 
interviewer then pre-tested the draft questionnaire in two enterprises 
outside the sample. A half-day session was then held to discuss problems 
encountered and, after questionnaire revision and shortening, an additional 
instructional seminar was held to insure common interpretation of the 
questionnaire. Interviews were then conducted during February 1976. 
All sample firms were sent three letters-from the Deputy Prime Minister, 
KDI, and HIID. These explained the purpose of the survey, stressed the 
national interest i' the results, and guaranteed anonymity. Enterprises 
that were initially reluctant were subjected to repeated visits by inter­
viewers and telephone calls from the KDI staff. 
Despite these measures, the success rate was poor, amounting to only 
about 40 percent of the sample in the case of the entrepreneurship version. 
The problem was gaining access to chief executives; once this was attained, 
the 45-minute interview generally went smoothly. Managers were much 
easier to interview. 
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TABLE C-1 Sample Characteristics 
(%) 
2. Si:eb1. Loca ti,,,a ,'tsser 
Seoul 56.9 0- 0.1 31.2 
Pusan 8.0 0.1- 0.2 17.0 
Seoul vicinity 3.9 0.2- 0.4 17.4 
Ky(iggi province 12.9 0.4- 0.8 10.3 
Kangw6'n province 0.6 0.8- 1.5 6.1S. Ch'ungch'dihg province 4.2 1.5- 3.0 7.7 
N. Ch'ungch'6ng province 1.9 3.0-- 5.0 2.2 
S. Cholla province 2.9 5.0-10.0 2.9 
N. Ch~lla province 1.6 10.0-20.0 4.2S. Ky'6ngsang province 4.8 20.0-50.0 1.0 
N. Ky'6ngsang province 2.0
 
Cheju Island 
 0.3 TOTAL 100.0 
TOTAL 100.0 
3. Industry 4. Establishment Date 
Foodstuffs 6.1 1975 0.6 
Beverages 
 1.9 1974 3.9Fibers and textiles 13.8 1973 14.2
 
Clothes and leather 7.4 1972 9.4
 
Lumber and wood 2.3 1971 7.8
 
Paper and publishers 6.1 1970 7.5 
Petroleum, coal and 1969 5.5 
chemicals 13.2 1968 5.2 
Medicine and medical 1967 7.4 
instruments 4.5 1966 
 6.8 
Cement, glass, and clay 4.54.8 1965 

Basic metals 
 3.5 1964 
 1.9
 
Fabricated nietals 6.1 1963 2.3 
Machines 7.4 1962 3.9
Electrical and electronic 1952--1961 14.2 
products 13.5 1946-1951 1.9
 
Transport equipment 2.6 Pre-1945 2.9 
Miscellaneous 6.8
 TOTAL 99.9 
TOTAL 100.0 
Source: Data from Han'guk Saengsans ng Ponbu, Han'guk ki~p ch'ongnan (Seoul,
1975). 
Notes: aMain plant only. Sonic readers may be surprised at this distributi3n, par­ticularly the very low representation of North Kyongsang province. A check againstthe entire population in the Han'guk klp ch'ong.iatn shows that our sanple doesnot differ from the ,population in a statistically significant way. The population is2.7% frnm North Kyongsang province whereas our sample is 2.0%. 
bBillion w'6n as of June 1975. 
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To improve the response rate, two additional steps were taken. First, it 
was thought that a foreigner might gain access where a college student 
cfailed. Accordingly, a pilot group o 11 recalcitrant firms were visited by 
an interviewer, a KDI research assistant, and the American researcher. The 
results were: 1 additional interview ultimately compelted; 6 assurances 
from junior executives of support that never materialized; 3 chief execu­
tives too "ill" to be interviewed; and 1 failure to get past the guard at the 
door. This was deemed an unproductive use of time. 
In the second stage of response upgrading. we accepted the fact that we 
could not gain direct access to all chief executives and lowered our sights 
to a "reduced questionnaire" distributed by mail.5 The primary aim was to 
attain a statistically significant response to the more straightforward 
empirical questions. A secondary purpose wa3 to ascertain the extent to 
which the original respondents differed from the non-respondents, in order 
to see whether or not A~e could safely generalize from our limited number 
of full respondents. This effort, coupled with additioiial telephone prod­
ding, yielded an additional 74 observations. 
The final results were as given in Table C-2. While the final response rate 
was thus 63 percent of the sample as a whole, it amounted to 74 percent 
of the "effective" sample (after eliminating the "could not respond" cate­
gory). The reliability of the resulting response pattern will now be evalu­
ated. 
SURVEY RELIABILITY 
The results of our survey may be biased in three ways. First, there is a "no­
response" problem, since the omitted firms may differ from the included 
ones. Second, there is a "partial-response" problem, since those chief 
executives which were willing to submit to an interview may differ from 
those who were only willing to fill out a reduced questionnaire. Third, 
there is a "distorted response" problem, since the recorded answers may 
deviate from the actual circumstance or opinion. These possibilities will 
be evaluated in turn. 
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TABLE C-2 Survey Response Categories 
Nutiber Percent 
Response 196 63 
Full (122) 
Reduced 74) 
Would not respond 69 22 
Could not respond 46 15 
Misclassifieda 6) 
Failedb 40) 
Total 311 100 
Notes: aTrading organizations misclassified in source as engaged in manufacturing. 
bEnterprise failed between miid-1975 date and early 1976 interviewing. Includes 
11 known failures and 29 failures assumed on grounds that enterprise was no longer
at listed address, no address could be found, and neighbors knew nothing about thefirml. Sone of these cases no doubt reflected a change of name and location rather
than strict failure, but the firms were probably at the margin of existence. 
NO-RESPONSE PROBLEM 
We can generalize from our survey results only to the extent that the 
omitted firns are similar to the included firms. For the no-response firms 
we have data only on assets, sales, profits, value added,' and location. The 
greater the similarity of the "response" and "would not respond" sets in 
these variables. the greater the chance that the other responses would be 
similar. 
Tables C-3 and C-4 give comparative data on the available indicators. 
First, consider the various size comparisons of the response and "would 
not respond" sets as given in Table C-3. For assets, sales, profits, and value 
added, the t values from 0.09 to 0.1 5)7 are such that we accept the null 
hypothesis that the two sets have the same mean." 
A look at the location differentials in Table C-4 reveals that the opposite 
conclusion holds. Again comparing the "response" and "would not re­
spond" sets, Chi 2 values are large enough that we reject the null hypothesis 
of no difference in location. This is an expected result of interviewer 
assignment bias. For obvious reasons of transport efficiency, companies 
were assigned to interviewers on a geographic rather than a random basis. 
Interviewer success rates varied from 30 percent to 95 percent, and this 
produced different geographic success rates (for example, Seoul is over­
represented and Pusan is undeirepresented). There is every reason to 
believe that these differences reflected variable interviewer tenacity and 
the difficulties of transport rather than the differences in provincial willing­
ness to cooperate. With differential response thus a function of the survey 
procedure rather than the response set, then it is appropriate to eliminate 
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TABLE C-3 Size Diffcrences of Sample Sections 
-- Sales ',aleAddedAssets 	 lProfis 
U . t X I I t 
Would not respond 69 2,916 2,496 131 600 
>0.77 >0.10 >0.09 >0.15 
Response 196 2.193 2,600 139 637 
>2.07' >1.68 >-.65 >1.38 
Could not respond 46 4141 712 7 152 
Full response 122 1,266 1,912 58 413 
>2.93'' >1.64 >2.72'' >2.33' 
Partial response 74 3,722 3,733 273 1,005 
Notes: .x mean inimillion won 
t 	 absolute I value
 
significant at 95% value
 
"igtlificant at 99, value
 
TA I1I E C-4 Location Differentials of Sample Subsets 
Itou:ldt not Full Partial 
rcspiourd Respows' Resp;oiise Response 
Seoul 47.8 56.1 58.2 52.7 
Pusan 14.5 6.1 5.7 6.7 
Seoul vicinity 4.4 4.6 3.3 6.8 
Other Ky(tnggi province 20.3 9.7 5.7 16.2 
Ch'ungchJng province 2.9 7.7 9.0 5.4 
Cholla province 1.5 6.6 8.2 4.0 
Ky ngsatig provincc 8.7 7.7 8.2 6.8 
Kang vn province aind 
Cheju Island 0.0 _1.5 1.6 1.4 
TOTA L 100.1 100.0 99.9 100.0
 
Number 69 196 122 74
 
Chi 2 value 	 15.278 8.885 
V 	 A 
Critical value (0.95,7) 14.070 14.070 
the bias by weighting the responses to compensate for variable non-re­
sponse rates. This is explained below. 
PARTIAL-RESPONSE PROBLEM 
We can compare the "full" and "partial" response sets on many more dimen­
sions than the "response" and "would not respond" sets. Consider first 
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the various measures of size already presented in Table C-3. It would 
be possible to report that "in terms of sales, the full and pat tial response 
sets are not significantly different at the 95 percent level; and in terms 
of value added, the differences are not significant at the 99 percent level" 
and go ol to accept the null hypothesis. However, for profits and assets, 
the two sets are significantly different even at the 99 percent level; at the 
90 percent level, all variables are significantly different. We must there­
fore in conscience admit the probability of size bias and adjust by re­
weighting as explained below. The adjustment is critical, since many 
answers vary with firm size. 
Tests were also done on location (Table C-4), establishment date, 
export share, founder/chief-executive relationship, birthplace, number 
of male siblings, and father's job. In all cases t and Chi 2 values were low 
enough to vot reject the null hypotheses at the 95 percent level, although 
a few were rejectable at 90 percent. We feel that these divergences are 
acceptable and make 11o attempt to adjust by reweighting along any of 
these dimensions. 
IISTORTED RESPONSE PROBLEM 
Recorded responses may be misleading if the question is ambiguous or 
if the inte,-vic-xee feels it is in his best interest to be less than candid. The 
first problem was hopefully minimized by our pre-test and training pro­
cedures, but the second possibility must be borne in mind throughout. 
The problem of distorted response is most conspicuously reflected in 
the absence of any question on class origin. 1i, the United States, entre­
preneurs are quick to stress their humble origins and project the image of 
a self-made man. In Korea, the reverse is true---today, everyone usually 
pretends to come from the elite yaubai class. Following the pre-test, 
we dropped the class-origin question and instead must rely on loose in­
ference from ancestral occupation. 
Distorted responses are particularly likely in sections dealing with 
government relationships; our "guarantee" of anonymity was not uni­
formly accepted is ironclad. "Values-and-attitudes" questions are suspect, 
since "effective" values may differ from the "image" values a manager 
wishes to project and may even differ fron the conscious self-image of 
the manager. 
All of these problems must be dealt with on a question-by-question 
basis. In the most problematic cases, we have not even reported the 
results; this is particularly common in the values-and-attituides area. 
Basically, however, our solution is to stress comparative rather than 
absolute responses, (that is, the role of government under Rhee as opposed 
to Park; the opinions of managers versus those of founders; and support 
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Reweighting 
of large versus small firms or exporters versus domestic producers). This 
comparative device adds a measure of respectability to our interpretations, 
but in the end it is very much a subjective effort. Other readers will no 
doubt attach different meanings to our results. This is as it should be, 
for a major purpose of the survey is to stimulate research into a neglected 
area of Korean economic history. 
REWEIGHTING 
The weights for each group i are calculated as follows: 
where ni is the number of enterprises, and s and a subscripts designate the 
originally drawn sample and the actual achieved sample respectively. 
Applying the weights to the achieved sample produces a weighted sample 
with the same distribution as the originally drawn sample, but of the 
same size as the achieved sample. The effect is similar to that of replacing 
missing observations with the mean of similar achieved observations, 
except that in this case, the size of the weighted sample would be that of 
the drawn sample. Note that we are weighting observations rather than 
responses so thit, for example, the standard deviation is: 
( w i x i ) 2 
- 3 )2 w i and not S = _ s r ;(x i 
n-I 	 n-i 
Two different weighting systems were used: 
1) 	 For questions on the "reduced-form" questionnaire, we have an 
achieved sample of 196 firms which differs from the drawn sample 
only in location (see pp. 370-371). Accordingly, when dealing with 
these questions, we use a 196-firm sample weighted by location 
only. 
2) 	 For questions on the "reduced-form" questionnaire, we have an 
achieved sample of 122 firms, which differs from the drawn sample 
in both location and size (see pp. 371-37 2 ). Accordingly, when dealing 
with these questions, we used a 122-firm sample weighted by both 
location and value added. That is, w i are calculated for each of i = 80 
cells of an eight location by ten value-added decile matrix. 
Unless otherwise noted, all results reported in the text are based on these 
weighted samples. 
373 
Appendix D
 
Survey Questionnaire
 
This is an English translation of the questionnaire used in the Entrepre­
neurship Survey described in Appendix C. Questions indicated by a box 
around the number (for example, W ) were included in the "reduced­
form" version. 
Enterprise I.D. No. [I] 
Interviewer 
Date Time: from 
to 
Name of respondent: 
Name of company
 
Name of chief executive
 
Date established
 
Address: Main office 
 Phone 
Plant(s) Phone 
Phone 
1973 1974 1975
 
Total assets 
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1. 
F] 
2. 
W] 
W 
Survey Questionnaire 
Total sales
 
Net profits
 
Company History 
a. 	When was the company established? 
Date
 
Location
 
b. 	 If the plant was not established by the present owner, when was it ac­
quired? 
1) Date 
2) Location 
3) From whom? 
a. Japanese, directly 	 ( ) 
b. Japanese, via government 
c. Korean, going concern 	 ( 
d. Korean, failing or bankrupt 
e. Other (specify) 
4) 	 If the present location of the company is different from that of estab­
lishminent (or acquisition), when did the company inove here? 
a. 	 Have you had any expansion projects?
 
Yes ( ) No ( )
 
b. 	 If so, when and where? 
Date Location 
1st expansion started 
2nd expansion started 
3rd expansion started 
4th expansion started 
5th expansion started 
W] 	 What was your 1975 average employment of regular workers? 
[] 	 At establishment-acquisition? After cach major expansion? 
Establishment 
_1st expansion 
Acquisition 2nd expansion 
3rd expansin 
4th expansion 
5th expansion 
What are your major products? How has their production capacity grown? 
(100 = acquisition, establishment, or initial production under expansion 
program). 
1 2 3 4 5 
Product 
Acquisition-Establishument
 
1st expansion
 
2nd expansion
 
3rd expansion
 
4th expansion
 
5th expansion
 
Present
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5. What is the composition of those major products? 
1 2 3 4 5 Other Total(%) 
Product 
Acquisition-Establishment 100 
1st expansion 100 
2nd expansion 100 
3rd expansion 100 
4th expansion 100 
5th expansion 100 
Present 100 
Wj is domestic-export sales composition for each of your major prod-hat the 
ucts? 
Unit: % 
Product 1 	 32 4 5 
Market Dom Ey xp Ex Ex ExpDom Dom Dom Dom 

Time
 
Acq uisition-Estab!ish ment 
1st expansion
 
2nd expansion
 
3rd expansion 
4th expansion 
5th expansion 
Present
 
7. What is the present financial structure of your company? 
At establishnment-acquisition? 
Est. or Acq. Now 
Debt 
___%% 
Equity (paid-in capital 
plus retained surplus) 01_% 
Total 100% 100%
 
8. a. Is your enterprise a member of any industrial trade association? 
Yes ( ) No ( )
b. 	 If so, when did you join? Was membership voluntary or compulsory? 
Trade asscciation Year joined Voluntary Compulsory 
1) 	 ( ) C)
2)_ 	 ( ) ( ) 
3) 	 (_) ( ) 
4) 	 ( ) ( ) 
5) 	 ( ) ( )
II. Entrepreneurship
 
[] Is the current chief executive of the firm:
 
a. 	 founder (first generation) 
b. 	 second generation (son or other relative) 
c. 	 unrelated manager 
d. 	 others (specify)
10. If the current chief executive is not the founder, is the founder: 
a. deceased
 
b. 	 retired 
c. 	 active in parent or related company (specify)
d. 	 active in 	 another field (specify) 
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11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
c. 	 other (specify) 
(Note to interviewers: questions 11 thru 16 for founders only)
 
When you began production, which of the following statements applied?
 
a. 	The major product was new to l'orea 
b. 	 Production was new to Korea
 
(but the product had been sold here!before)
 
c. 	 The production process was new to Korea
 
(but the product had been made here previously)
 
d. Production process had been used previously in Korea
 
How did you first get the idea to get into this business?
 
a. 	prcriously employed in company producing same product 
b. 	 previ.usly trader of same product 
c. 	 previously user of this product 
d. 	 saw local use of imported product and decided I
 
could produce it
 
e. 	 saw other local producer and thought I could
 
do better
 
f. 	 suggested by foreigners 
g. 	 suggested by government 
h. 	 saw during foreign travel 
i. other (specify)
 
From the time you began actively pursuing the idea until operations began,
 
how long did it take?
 
months 
In establishing your enterprise, a number of problems had to be solved. 
Please indicate the degree of difficulty you encountered in each. 
Very Some Not 
difficult problem Simple applicable 
a. 	 perception of opportunity 
and market identification 1 2 3 4 5 
b. 	 obtaining financing 1 2 3 4 5 
c. 	 plant design, technology, 
and construction 1 2 3 4 5 
d. 	 getting technicians and 
training 1 2 3 4 5 
e. 	 government support and 
permits 1 2 3 4 5 
f. 	 recruiting personnel, setting 
up an organization, and 
managing people 1 2 3 4 5 ( ) 
g. 	 importing capital equipment 1 2 3 4 5 
h. 	 importing intermediates 1 2 3 4 5 
i. 	 other (specify) 1 2 3 4 5 
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15 	 In solving these problems, you rmay have had help from others. Please indicate all significant participants (if you had 2 or more, 
please rank). 
DOMESTIC FOREIGN1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
- -Z- I eiy
"' 
*0 
" ,"-" g" other-g -_ other 
~ t bo seif) o .SY (specify)perception of El ] ] Dc 0 0 EJ E] 0 FI 0 D 
business oppor­
tunity and market
 
identification
 
b. 	 obtaining financing El Q E] El 0 0 El EJ 0 _ __ 0 0 E]
c. 	 production process ED 0 EE -
_ _] 
_ _ 
choice and plant
 
design

d. 	 plant const-uction ED 0 Ej 0 0 0 El E] 	 0 
_ _ oD_ [] E]
e. 	 getting technicians EJ E] 0 0 El 0 E] 0 [-
_ _ [] E] [] 
_ _ 
and training 
f. 	 government sup- 0 0 0 [ 0 0 El 
- _ _ F1 
__ 
_ 
port and permits 
g. recruiting personnel, 0 El [] El El El ] [] 	 l ElEEl [-- l 

setting up organiza­
tion structure and
 
managing people
 
16 
Survey Questionnaire 
How important were each of the following types of government assistance in 
contributing to your final decision that this would be a profitable project? 
Moderately 
Critical important Irrelevant 
a. 	 direct tax reductions. 1 2 3 4 5 
exemptions 
b. 	 tariff reductions- 1 2 3 4 5 
exemptions on imported 
inputs 
c. 	 tariff protection on 1 2 3 4 5 
output 
d. 	 exclusive licensing 1 2 3 4 5 
privileges 
e. 	 direct govcrnmcnt 1 2 3 4 5 
subsidies 
f. 	 knowledge of long-run 1 2 3 4 5 
government development 
strategy 
g. 	 government provision of 1 2 3 4 5 
social overhead capital
 
(that is, transport,
 
communications, utilities) 
h. 	 confidence in3government's 1 2 3 4 5 
ability to maintain 
favorable business climate 
(Note to interviewer: questions 17 to 23: founder; Answer for recent expan­
sion project. nos-founder; Answer for early expansion project.) 
17. When was your most recent (or earliest) expansion? 
18. When you began production: 
a. 	 Was your ni,-jor product new to Korea? 
b. 	 Was production new to Korea? 
c. 	 Was the production process new to Korea? 
d. 	 Was the product new to your firm? 
e. 	 If the product was not new, was the process new to your firm? 
f. 	 Exi,;ting product and process 
19. How did you first get the idea to initiate the expansion project? 
a. 	 previously employed in company producing samc product 
b .	 previously trader of same product 
c. 	 previously user of this product 
d. 	 saw local use of im ported product and decided we would produce it 
e. 	 saw other local producer and thought Icould do better 
f. 	 suggested by foreigners 
g. saggested by government
 
Ii. saw during foreign travel
 
i. 	 othet (specify) 
20. From the time you begin actively pursuing the idea until operations began, 
how long did it take? 
_months 
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21. In your expansion, a number of problems had to be solved. Please indicate the 
degree of difficulty you encountered in each. 
Very Some No 
a. 
difficult 
perception of opportunity 1 2 
problem 
3 4 5 
problem 
and market identification 
b. obtaining financing 1 2 3 4 5 
c. plant design, technology, 1 2 3 4 5 
and construction 
d. getting technicians 1 2 3 4 5 
and training 
e. government support 1 2 3 4 5 
and permits 
f. recruiting personnel, 
setting up an organization, 
1 2 3 4 5 ( 
and managing people 
g. 
Ii. 
i. 
importing capital equipment 
importing intermediates 
other (specify) 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
( 
( 
( 
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F20 In solving these problems, you may have had help from others. Please indicate all significant participants. (If 2 or more, please 
rank.) 
DOMESTIC FOREIGN1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
C 
o > U *.= o 
E E o 5 .-. other R:E > other
oS o Q L Q E (specify) o.u .'U E (specify) 
a. perception of 1 0 El JLID J[1 El 
___ LJLJL 
___ 
business oppor­
tunity and market 
identification 
b. obtaining financing El l I Li Li Li Li Li Li l ElLi El Qic. production process L] El []E] []i[i ED 11i] 
_ _ i i 
choice and plant 
_ _ 
design 
d. plant construction Li i i]i]i]i[i[El i i i L i i i0 
_ 
_e. getting technicians Li l D [- i E-1 ] i Eii 
_ 
i L ] i 
_- _­
and training 
_ 
f. government sup- Li i i]i]i]i[i[ i i iEli[] ___ 
_DE 
port and permits 
g. recruiting personnel, Li Li Li Li Li Li Li Li Li Li Li L_ 1i 
settiag up organiza-
_ _ 

tion structure, and
 
managing people
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23. 
25. 
I1l. 
2] 
How important were each of the following types of government assistance in 
contributing to your final decision that this would be a profitable project? 
Moderately 
Critical important Irrelevant 
a. 	 direct tax reductions- 1 2 3 4 5
 
exeniptio,is
 
b. 	 tariff reductions-exemptions 1 2 3 4 5
 
on imported inputs
 
c. 	 tariff protection on output 1 2 
 3 4 
 5
 
d. 	 exclusive licensing privileges 1 2 3 4 5
 
c. 	 direct government subsidies 1 2 3 4 5
 
f. 	 knowledge of long-run govern- 1 2 
 3 4 5
 
ment development strategy
 
g. 	 government provision of 1 2 3 
 4 5
 
social overhead capital
 
(that is, transport, conimuni­
cations, utilities)
 
h. 	 confidence in government's 1 2 3 4 5
 
ability to maintain favorable
 
business climate
 
(Note to interviewer: there is no question 24. Question 25 is to be answered
 
only in the case of acquisition.)
 
How important were 
each of the following types of government assistance in 
contributing to your fimnl decision that acquisition would be profitable? 
Moderately 
Critical important Irrelevant 
a. 	 direct tax reductions- 1 2 3 4 5
 
exemptions
 
b. 	 tariff reductions- 1 2 3 4 5
 
exemptions ou inputs
 
c. 	 tariff protection on output 1 2 3 4 5
 
d. 	 .-xclusive licensing privilege. 1 2 3 4 5
 
e. 	 direct government subsidies 1 2 3 4 5
 
f. 	 knowledge of long-run govern- 1 2 3 4 5
 
ment development strategy
 
g. 	 government provision of 1 2 3 4 5
 
social overhead capital
 
(that is, transport, comumuni­
cations, utilities)
 
h. 	 confidence in government's 1 2 3 4 5
 
ability to maintain favorable
 
business climate
 
Social Background 
What is your age? years 
What was your place of birth? Your father's? 
Self Father 
a. 	 Seoul ( )
b. 	Pusan ( ) 
c. 	 Ky~nggi province ( )
d. 	 Kangw'n province ( ) ( 
e. 	 Ch'ungch'ng province ( ) ( 
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Self Father 
f. 
g. 
h. 
i. 
Kyb'ngsang province 
Ch'61la province 
Hamgy ng province 
P'y' ngan province 
( ( (
C 
j. hwanghae province ) 
k. Cheju Island 
I. Other (specify) 
) 
28. What is your family origin (pon)? 
[] Were you primarily raised in: 
a. Seoul 
b. Other city or province (to) capital 
c. Town where county office (kunch ong) is located 
d. Rural village or place where district office (tny'nsatnuso) is located 
e. Japan ( ) 
f. Other foreign country (specify) 
a. How many sons and daughters did your parents ever have 
(including self)? 
b. What is your male sibling rank (rny~ttchae adc"-!' 
No. 
31 What was the primary occupation of your father? 
Your paternal grandfather? 
Grand fathc:r 
Father (Paternal) 
a. Farming 
1) Landowner 
2) Independent owner-operator 
() _Chngbo 
) _ Chongbo 
( 
( 
3) Mixed owner-tenant 
_ Ch'ngbo ( 
4) Tenant ) _ Ch8 ngbo ( 
5) Other (specify) 
b. Fishing 
1) Large owner ) 
2) Small owner-operator ) C 
3) L borer 
c. Industry 
1) Large owner (over 200 employees)( 
( 
2) Small and medium owner-operator ( 
3) Manager 
Foreign firm 
Korean firm 
4) Technician 
5) Clerical?.! 
6) Wor.er 
( ) 
C ) 
C ) 
( 
( ) ) 
d. Government 
Yi Japanese Liberal Post 
Time Dynasty Colony Party 5.16 
Ranking I Father IGrandfather 
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[ 
IV. 
[3 
34. 
e. 	Teacher Father Grandfather 
1) Traditional Confucian (
 
2) Primary school (
 
3) Middle school (
 
4) College or university ( )
 
f. 	 Politician ( 
g. 	 Journalist ) ( 
h. 	Trade ( )
 
1) Domestic trade
 
a) self-employed: retail (
 
b) self-employed: wholesale (
 
or large retail
 
c) employee (foreign-owned firm) (
 
d) employee (Korean firm) (
 
2) 	 Foreign trade (import and export)
 
a) self-owned ( )
 
b) employee (foreign-cwned firm) (
 
c) employee (Korean firm) ( 
i. 	 Military 
tion Enlisted Officer 
Branch of Branch of 
Relation Ranking the Service Ranking the Service 
Father
 
Grandfather
 
Father Grandfather 
j. 	 Laborer (urban) ( 
k. 	 Financial institution employee ( 
1. 	 Professional (lawyer, doctor, etc.) ( 
m. 	 Money lender ( 
n. 	 Craftsman ( 
o. 	 Other (specify) 
_ _) 
How strong was the influence of each of the following religions for you?
 
Very Ir­
strong Moderate ,1'levant
 
a. 	 Confucianism 1 2 3 4 5 
b. 	 Buddhism 1 2 3 4 5 
c. 	 Catholicism 1 2 3 4 5 
d. 	 Protestantism 1 2 3 4 5 
e. 	 Other (specify) 1 2 3 4 5 
Education 
i-low many years of formal education have you completed? 
Your father? 
self: __ years father: __ years 
Under what system was most of your pre-college education? 
Your father? 
Self Father 
a. 	 Traditional Confucian ( ) 
b. 	 Japanese colonial school ( ) 
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35. 
36. 
37. 
V. 
f] 
39. 
40. 
Self Father 
c. 	 Modern Korean school after
 
Independence ( ) (
 
d. Foreign (specify) (
 
If you graduated from a higher educational institution:
 
a. 	 institution 
b. 	 major field 
c. 	 the institution was
 
1) technical college
 
2) junior college
 
3) college
 
4) university
 
5) military academy
 
6) graduate school
 
How was your higher education financed? 
a. 	 parents % 
b. 	 relatives %0 
c. 	 self 0%0 
d. 	 schol.rship 1 %0 
e. other (spec-ify) %
 
How many moiths have you spent in special training programs related to your
 
profession (in addition to your formal education)?
 
a. 	 domestic months 
b. Japan 	 months 
c. 	 other foreign (specify) months 
d. 	 nothing 
Work Experience 
How long have you been with this company?
 
- years -_ months
 
How long have you held your current rank?
 
-__ years I months 
Excluding the company you now work for, how many years have you spent in 
each of the following lines of work? 
a. 	 government years months 
b. 	 military: officer 
c. 	 military: enlisted 
d. 	 financial institution 
e. 	 trading company (export-import) 
f. 	 domestic trading company 
g. private Korean-owned industry 
Is. private foreign-owned industry 
i. 	 government-owned enterprise 
j. 	 professional 
k. 	 employee of foreign military or 
government 
I. 	 other (specify) 
* 	 total employment outside present 
company 
In preparing yourself for your present job, how important were each of the 
following factors? 
41. 
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Very Moderately Unim­
a. formal education 
important 
1 2 
important 
3 4 
portant 
5 
b. job during colonial period 1 2 3 4 5 
c. job related to allied military 1 2 3 4 5 
d. work in family business 1 2 3 4 5 
e. other work experience 1 2 3 4 5 
f. military experience 1 2 3 4 5 
g. government experience 1 2 3 4 5 
h. foreign language ability 1 2 3 4 5 
i. other (specify) 1 2 3 4 5 
VI. 	 Government-Business Relationships 
91 	 To what extent can you (or your company) influence government policies 
affecting your business? 
a. 	 can get anything ( ) 
b. 	 can frequently affect 
c. 	 can sometimes affect 
d. 	 seldom attect 
e. 	 affect not at all 
f. 	 other (specify)_ 
43. 	 If you can have some influence on government economic policy, how fre­
quently are the following methods used? 
Used Some­
very times Never 
often used used 
a. 	 direct formal impersonal 
appeal to government 1 32 4 5 
b. 	 direct informal personal 
appeal to government 
officials 1 2 3 4 5 
c. 	 indirect appeal through 
business association 1 2 3 4 5 
1) Industrial Trade 
Association 1 2 3 4 5 
2) Chamber of Commerce 1 2 3 4 5 
3) Small and Medium 
Industrial Association 1 2 3 4 5 
4) Federation of Korean 
Industries 1 2 3 4 5 
5) Korean Traders 
Association 1 2 3 4 5 
6) Other (specify)___ 1 2 3 4 5 
d. 	 indirect personal appeal 
through politician 1 2 3 4 5 
e. 	 indirect impersonal appeal 
through political party 1 2 3 4 5 
f. 	 indirect impersonal appeal 
through newspaper 1 2 3 4 5 
g. 	 other (specify) 1 2 3 4 5 
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[ 
45. 
46. 
47. 
[] 
Once the current government has made a decision affecting business, how 
effective is it in insuring compliance? What about the Rhee Government? 
Current Rhee 
a. 	 Always ilnplmiented; impossible to avoid ( 
complying 
b. 	 Almost always implemented; sometimes ( 
possible to avoid complying 
c. 	 Inplemented with modification ( 
d. 	 Seldom thoroughly implemented ( 
e. Don't know ( )
 
If the current government wishes to influence the conduct of a business, how
 
important are the following means of transmitting the request?
 
Used Some­
very times Never 
often used used 
a. general impersonal law 1 2 3 4 5 
b. specific regulation for 
one firm 1 2 3 4 5 
c. personal request 1 2 3 4 5 
d. request via industrial 
association 1 2 3 4 5 
e. other (specify) 1 2 3 4 5 
If the government wishes to influence the conduct of a business, how impor­
tant are the foUowing means of insuring compliance? 
Used Some­
very times Never 
often used used 
a. 	 incentives, privileges 1 2 3 4 5 
b. 	 moral exhortation 1 2 3 4 5 
c. 	 "friendly persuasion" 1 2 3 4 5 
d. 	 making example of 
one firm 1 2 3 4 5 
e. 	explicit threats 1 2 3 4 5 
f. 	other (specify) 1 2 3 4 5 
How often do you meet personally with government officials at different 
levels concerning business matters? 
Once Several Once 
a a a 
Never year year week Daily 
a. 	President, Prime Minister 1 2 3 4 5 
b. 	 DPM and minister 1 2 3 4 5 
c. 	 Vice minister/assistant minister 1 2 3 4 5 
d. 	 Bureau director 1 2 3 4 5 
e. 	 Division head or below 1 2 3 4 5 
f. Local government officials 1 2 3 4 5 
The government affects your operations in many ways. In each of the follow­
ing areas, would you rate their involvement as having a positive, negative, or 
neutral effect on your business? If you were in business under the Rhee 
Government, please rate them on the same items. 
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[] 
VII. 
51. 
52. 
Rhee 
Very Very Gov.:rn­
positive Neutral negative ment 
a. 	 establishing business 1 2 3 4 5
 
b. 	 conducting ongoing
 
operations 1 2 3 4 5
 
c. 	 expanding business 1 2 3 4 5
 
d. 	 foreign marketing 1 2 3 4 5
 
e. 	 domestic marketing 1 2 3 4 5
 
f. 	 obtaining foreign
 
financing 1 2 3 4 
 5
 
g. 	 obtaining domestic
 
financing 1 2 3 4 5
 
Ii. 	 stimulating general level
 
of economic activity 1 2 3 4 5
 
i. 	 controlling prices 1 2 3 4 5
 j. 	 providing long range
 
planning 1 2 
 3 4 5
 
k. 	 controlling unfair com­
petition 1 
 2 3 4 5 ()

1. 	 key industry rearing and social 
overhead capital formation 1 2 3 4 5
 
oh. other (specify) 1 2 
 3 4 5
 
n. don't know.
 
Please list the two important ways in which 
 the current government is an 
improvement over that of the Rhee Government in contributing to the eco­
nomic development of Korea. 
a. 
b. 
Please list the two rmost important things you think the government should 
change in order to further improve the business climate. 
a. 
b. 
Questionson ManagerialPractices 
In order to invest in a new project, what return on equity do Korean entre­
preneurs in companies of your size generally expect (after paying all expenses 
includiog tax)? What about in 1960? 
Now __% 1960 
 % 
Do your employees ever play an important role in innovative decision-making? 
Some-
Often times Never 
a. 	 developing new products 1 2 3 4 5
 b. 	 identifying new markets 1 2 3 4 5
 
c. 	 introducing new process of 
production 1 2 3 4 5
 
d. 	 introducing cost reducing 
modification of production
 
process 
 1 2 3 4 5
 
e. 	 change in management organization 1 2 3 4 5
 
f. 	 other (specify) 1 2 3 4 5
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53. 
54. 
55. 
VII. 
56. 
In general, in Korea today, how important are the following in attaining a 
high ranking job in a company? How about under the Rhee Government? 
Today Rhee 
Very Moderately Unim­
important important portant 
a. 	 merit 1 2 3 4 5 
b. 	 personal ties within
 
company 
 1 2 3 4 5 
c. 	 outside influence 1 2 3 4 5 
d. 	 school prestige 1 2 3 4 5 
e. 	 experience within firm 1 2 3 4 5 
f. 	 experience in pi ious
 
job 1 2 3 4 5 )
 
g. government experience 1 2 3 4 5 
h. 	 military experience 1 2 3 4 5 
i. 	 other (specify) 
__ 1 2 3 4 5 
On the average, how many hours per week are worked in your company by: 
a. 	 ordinary workers 1) technicians hrs. 
2) administrators 
_ hrs. 
b. 	 high-ranking staff __)hrs. 
c. the chief executive 
_hrs. 
In country A, employees are hired on a merit basis and fired whenever they 
perform below expectations. In country B, employees are hired for life, be­
come part of a business family, and are seldom released. Is your country closer 
to A or B? 
Life Fire!d 
employment quickly 
a. 	 managers, technicians, 1 2 3 4 5 
executives 
b. 	 workers 1 2 3 4 5 
Values, Attitudes, and Opinions 
In general, how important do you think the following factors are in motivating 
successful Korean entrepreneurs? 
Very Moderately Un­
important important important 
a. 	 personal goal achievement 
1) pursuit of excellence 1 2 3 4 5 
2) fame and power 1 2 3 4 5 
3) wealth 1 2 3 4 5 
b. 	 family responsibility 1 2 3 4 	 5 
c. 	 community responsibility 1 2 3 4 	 5 
d. 	 patriotism 
1) originating from the fact 1 2 3 4 5 
the south is in confrontation 
with the north or in a semi­
war situation with north. 
2) 	 originating from the 1 2 3 4 5 
Japanese colonial­
imperial experience.
 
3) other (specify) 
_ 1 2 3 4 
 5 
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57. What do you think the general opinion among your entrepreneurial peers is on 
each of the following statements? 
Strongly
Strongly Dis- dis­
agree Agree Neutral agree agree
a. 2 3 4 5You should not accept 1 
the idea of your boss 
if you think it is wrong. 
b. You should not accept 1 2 3 4 5 
an under-the-table request 
by the government even if 
failure to comply will 
have a unfavorable impact 
on your business 
c. To achieve an objective, 1 2 3 4 5 
one sometimes has to 
take certain measures 
which might be considered 
somewhat (questionable 
legally. 
58. How important do you think the following factors are in distinguishing
successful Korean entrepreneurs from those who are less successful? 
Successful Successful 
have Iouch Some Sonie have 
more more Same less less 
a. conscientious hard 
b. 
work 
willing to take risks 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
5 
c. intelligence 1 2 3 4 5 
d. skill in handling people 1 2 3 4 5 
e. skill in handling govern­
f. 
ment officials to get support 1 
good formal education 1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
5 
g. greater personal or 1 2 3 4 5 
familial capital 
(inheritance) 
h. on-the-job training 1 2 3 4 5 
i. 
and experience 
rational and scientific 1 2 3 4 5 
way of thinking 
j. goodluck 1 2 3 4 5 
k. good network of friends 1 2 3 4 5 
1. willingness to make 1 2 3 4 5 
unpopular decisions 
in. other (specify) 1 2 3 4 5 
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Notes 
ONE Introduction 
1. The real annual compound rate of GNP growth was 4.2% from 
1953 to 1962 and 9.8% from 1962 to 1975. Further, the variance was 
nominal: the highest rate of growth in the pre-1962 period (7.7% in 1957) 
was lower than all but two of the rates (6.1% in 1965 and 7.0% in 1972) 
in the post-1962 period. BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook: 1976 
(Seoul, 1977). 
2. Including "size of traditional sector, extent of duali~m, degree of 
urbanization, character of basic social organization, size of the indigenous 
middle class, extent of social mobility, extent of mass communication, 
crude fertility rate, and the degree of modernization of outlooic." Irma 
Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, Society, Politicsand Econom c Devel­
opment: A QuantitativeApproach (Baltimore, 1967), pp. 151, 152, 170. 
3. Gilbert T. Brown, Korean Pricing Policies and Economic Develop. 
ment in the 1960's (Baltimore, 1973), p. 265. 
4. The "enterprise" sector sells its output, while the "institutional" 
sector, largely government, does not. The "unorganized" sector loosely 
refers to small production activities such as agriculture, petty commerce, 
and handicrafts. 
5. John Maynard Keynes, The End of Laissez Faire (London, 1927), 
p.40. 
6. For a more comprehensive survey in a similar spirit, see Edward S. 
Mason, Economic Planningin Underdeveloped Areas (New York, 1958). 
7. Eli F. Heckscher, "Mercantilism" in Revisions in Mercantilism, ed. 
D. G. Coleman (London, 1969), p. 32. 
8. Keynes, pp. 46-47. 
9. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York, 1937). 
10. William J. Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p. 51. 
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Notes to Chapter One, p. 8 - ChapterTwo, p. 18 
11. For a succinct summary, see Kenneth J. Arrow, "The Organization 
of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus 
Non-market Allocation," in Public Expenditure and Policy Analysis, 
eds. Robert H. Haveman and Julius Margolis (Chicago, 1970), pp. 59-73. 
12. Kenncth J. Arrow, "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of 
Medical Care," American Economic Review, (December, 1963), p. 947. 
13. Albert 0. Hirschman, "Ideology: Mask or Nessus Shirt?", in Compar­
ison of Economic Systems, ed. Alexander Eckstein (Berkeley, 1971), 
p. 294. For a contrasting view on the role of ideology, see Alexander 
Gerschenkron, "Ideology as a System Determinant," in Comparison of 
Economic Systems, pp. 269-2%. 
14. Talcott Parsons, "Some General Theories in Sociology," in Theoreti­
cal Sociology, ed. John McKinney and Edward Tyriakian (New York, 
1970). 
15. Bert Hoselitz, "Economic Policy and Economic Development," in 
The State and Economic Growth, ed. Hugh J. Aitken (New York, 1959), 
pp. 325-352.
 
16. Keynes, p. 31. 
17. Ibid., p. 47. 
18. For example, Alexander Eckstein, "Individualism and the Role of 
the State in Economic Growth," Economic Development and Cultural 
Change (Vol. 6, 1957 & 1958), pp. 81-87. 
19. A particularly strong exposition of this view is found in Harry 
Johnson, "Planning and the Market in Economic Development," in Eco­
nomic Development: Readings in Theory and Practice, eds. Theodore 
Morgan and George Betz (Belmont, Calif., 1970), pp. 289-299. 
20. Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, eds., Asia's New Giant: How 
the JapaneseEconomy Works (Washington, D.C., 1976). 
21. Tjalling C. Koopmans and John Michael Montias, "On the Descrip­
tion and Comparison of Economic Systems," in Comparisonof Economic 
Systems: Theoretical and Methodological Approaches, ed. Alexander 
Eckstein (Berkeley, 1971), pp. 27-78. 
22. Benjamin Ward, "Organization and Comparative Economics: Some 
Approaches," in ComparisonofEconomic Systems, pp. 103-133. 
23. The Korean chaebMl is equivalent to the Japanese zaibatsu. See 
Chapter 8. 
TWO The ColonialHeritage 
1. The following is our interpretation and synthesis of several sources: 
394
 
Notes to ChapterTwo, pp. 18-29 
Ho Chin Choi, The Economic History of Korea (Seoul, 1971), pp. 139­
187; Daniel Sungil Juhn, "Entrepreneurship in an Underdeveloped Eco­
nomy: The Case of Korea, 1890-1940" (PhD dissertation, George 
Washington University, 1965), pp. " -62; Woo Keun Han, The History 
of Korea (Seoul, 1970), pp. 229-255, %8-3J.5. 
2. Ho Chin Choi, Economic History of Korea, p. 197; Paul W. Kuznets, 
Economic Growth and Structure in the Republic of Korea (New Haven, 
1977), p. 19. 
3. There were also 4 Chinese-owned factorieswith 42workers.Juhn, p.30. 
4.Juhn, pp. 33-34; Ki-Zun Zo, "Types of Enterpreneur in Muderniza­
tion Process of Korean Economy," in Report of InternationalConference 
on the Problems ofModernization in Asia (Seoul, 1966), pp. 618-619. 
5. Ki-Zun Zo, p. 619. 
6. Ki-jun Cho, Han'guk ki-pka sa (Seoul, 1973), pp. 17-20. 
7. For a summary, see Kozo Yamamura, "A Reexamination of Entre­
preneurship in Meiji Japan (1868-1912)" in Entrepreneurshipand Econo
mic Development, edited by Peter Kilby (New York, 1971), pp. 267-286. 
8. Sang-Chul Suh, Growth and Structural Changes in the Korean 
Economy, 1910-1940 (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), p. 119, (Table 56). 
9. Juhn, p. 47. 
10. Ibid., p. 48. 
11. Ki-Zun Zo, "Types of Entrepreneur," p. 618. 
12. Juhn, pp. 68-71. 
13. Sang-Chul Suh, p. 100. 
14. For a detailed discussion of the group, see Appendix B, pp. 344-349. 
15. Sang-Chul Suh, p. 106. 
16. Ibid., p. 194. 
17. Ibid., p. 180. 
18. Ibid., p. 193. 
19. Ibid., p. 185. 
20. George M. McCune, Korea Today (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), p. 332. 
21. Table 1, and Sang-Chul Suh, p. 50, Table 21. Change is overstated, 
since 1910 figures are for household heads. 
22. McCune, pp. 332-333. 
23. See Table 5.
 
24.Juhn, p. 122.
 
25. Calculated from Sang-Chul Suh, pp. 196, 246.
 
26.Juhn, pp. 131, 140.
 
27. Gregory Henderson, "Japan's Chosen: Immigrants, Ruthlessness and 
Developmental Shock," in Korea UnderJapanese ColonialRule (Kalama­
zoo, 1973). pp. 268-269. See Chapter 7 for a reflection of the Japanese 
experience in the motives of modern entrepreneurs. 
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28. Sang-Chul Suh calculates trade dependency (exports plus imports 
over GNP) at approximately 55% in 1938-1939. Suh, p. 120, Table 57. 
Modern trade ratios were 22% in 1961, 40% in 1970, 47% in 1972, and 
leapt to 67% in 1973. Computed from BOK, Economic Statistics Year­
book, 1976. 
29. Kyo'ng-nam Yi, Han 'guk u"kiopka Vol. 2, (Seoul, 1976), pp. 113-114. 
30. To our knowledge, no serious study has been made of this critical 
feature of Korean economic history. An excellent exploratory survey has 
been made by Harold Koh, upon whom we rely throughout this section. 
Harold Koh, "The Early History of U.S. Economic Assistance to the 
Republic of Korea, 1945-1955," (Mimeo., Harvard Institute for Inter­
national Development, Cambridge, Mass., September 1975). Available 
statistics are highly inconsistent, befitting the chaos of the period. For 
additional coverage, see My6ng-su Hwang, Ki~pka sa y&T'gu (Seoul, 
1976), pp. 316-321. Ch'ang-hwan Sng, Han'guk kyngjeron (Seoul, 
1959), pp. 80-104. 
31. Sung Hwan Ban, Pal Yong Moon, and Dwight H. Perkins, Studies 
in the Modernization of the Republic of Korea: 1945-1975, Rural Devel­
opment, (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), pp. 283-297. 
32. Kwang Suk Kim and Michael Roemer, "Macroeconomic Growth 
and Structural Change in Korea," (Seoul, KDI Working Paper 7705, 
April 1977), p. 40. 
33. Ch'ang-hwan Sng, p. 82. 
34. See Chapter 5 for the fate of these public enterprises. 
35. U.S. Armed Forces in Korea, South Korea Interim Government 
Activities (No. 28, January 1948), p. 10. Another source says that only 
17% of the plants were shut down in June 1948. This may in part reflect 
an increase over the intervening 6 months, but probably is largely attri­
butable to a distinction between plants that were open and those that 
were producing. Also, the army figure is much more consistent with 
the levels of production actually achieved. See Ch'ang-hwan Slyng, p. 84. 
36. E. Grant Meade, American Military Government in Korea, (New 
York, 1951), p. 49. Meade himself had 9 months of civil affairs training 
but only a one-hour lecture on Korea. 
37. See Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea: The Politicsof Development, 
1945-1972, (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), pp. 47-85. 
38. McCune, p. 98. 
39. Meade, pp. 67, 203-212. 
40. Ibid., p. 204. The People's Committee was the local branch of the 
"People's Republic of Korea" which took de facto control of the govern­
ment upon surrender and later jousted with the occupation forces for 
control. 
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41. Ibid., p. 210. 
42. McCune, p. 100. 
43. Joungwon Kim, p. 84. 
44. W. Reeve, The Republic of Korea: A Politicaland Economic Study 
(London, 1963), p. 103. 
45. Ibid., p. 103. 
46. Roy W. Shin, "The Politics of Foreign Aid: A Study of the Impact 
of United States Aid in Korea from 1945 to 1966" (PhD dissertation, 
University of Minnesota, 1969), p. 51. 
47. United Nations Command, Office of the Economic Coordinator, 
"Fiscal Year 1955 Congressional Presentation," (Seoul, March 1954), 
p. 20. 
48. Moon Hwan Choi, "A Review of Korea's Land Reform," Koreana 
Quarterly (Spring 1960), p. 67. 
49. According to one study of 11 plants, sales price ran between 38% 
and 82% of the "goverament estimated price." How this price was deter­
mined is not explained. My'6ng-su Hwang, p. 319. 
50. For a somewhat similar position stressing the failure of the govern­
ment to utilize the vested properties, see Ho-jin Ch'oe, "Kwisok chaesan 
purha wa kongrphwa i chwaj'ol, 1945-1953" in Han guk kyongje clhong
ch'aek sarnsimny ;n sa (Seoul, 1975). 
THREE Government EconomicDecision-Making Process 
1. Economic growth, of curse, need not be considered a primary end. 
It may be valued for its contribution to human happiness, which in turn 
may be valued as service to some theistic principle. 
2. Adelman and Morris, pp. 237-238. 
3. Ibid., p. 246. 
4. Ibid., p. 246 and the correlation matrix on p. 290. 
5. David C. Cole and Princeton Lyman, Korean Development (Cam­
bridge, Mass., 1971), p. 27. 
6. Ibid., p. 166. 
7. Ibid., p. 167. 
8. Park Chung Hee, The Country, the Revolution and I (Seoul, 1970), 
p. 26. 
9. Park Chung Hee, OurNation'sPath (Seoul, 1970), pp. 39-40. 
10. Maeil Kyi'ngje Sinmun Sa, Pak Chong-h-"i taet'ongnyong ui chido 
inycym kwa haengdong ch'trhak (Seoul, 1977), p. 42. 
11. Park Chung Hee, The Country, the Revolution and I, p. 31. Also 
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see the section entitled "Foreign Aid with Emphasis on Consumer Goods 
and its Consequences," pp. 36-38. 
12.Joe Won Lee, "Planning Efforts for Economic Development," in 
Joseph S. Chung, ed., Patterns of lconomic Development: Korea, 
(Detroit, 1966), p. 2. 
13. Ibid., p. 5. 
14. David C. Cole and Young Woo Nam, "The Pattern and Significance 
of Economic Planning in Korea," in PracticalApproaches to Development 
Planning,edited by Irma Adelman (Baltimore, 1969), p. 32. 
15. Article One of Puh~ngbu chojikp'op (the Ministry of Reconstruc­
tion Organization Law), Presidential Decrce Number 1001, February 17, 
1955. 
16. W. Arthur Lewis, Development Planning: The Essentials of Eco­
nomic Policy, (London, 1966), p. 245. 
17. 	 SMk-chun Cho, "Kyelioek," in Han-bin Yi, et al., eds., Han'guk 
4 0 9haengj5ng -uiyoksaj-k puns5k, 1948-1967 (Seoul, 1969), 	p. . 
18. Hahn-Been Lee, Korea: Time, Change, and Administration (Hono­
lulu, 1968). 
19. In 1956, the Ministry of Reconstruction did prepare a Five-Year 
Reconstruction Plan, but this plan was hurriedly put together to be shown 
to the visiting U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles. See, S'k-chun Cho, 
"Han'guk kunsa ch'ngbu ha e iss'os6 'ii tugaji haengj ng kaehy'k e kwan­
han pigyo ygn'gu" in Han'guk haengyf6ng nonch'ong 6.2:97-98 (1968). 
20. Hahn-Been Lee, p. 91. 
21. Ibid. 
22. David Cole and Young Woo Nam, p. 33. 
23. Ibid., p. 100. 
24. S'k-chun Cho, "Han'guk kunsa ch~ngbu." 
25. Hahn-Been Lee, p. 123. 
26. Sk-chun Cho, "Chojik," in Han'guk haengrong u-" y-ksajok pun1ok, 
1948-1967 (Seoul, 1969), p. 428. 
27. This operates to the advantage of large businesses as well as govern­
ment. See Chapter 7. 
28. ROK, "Ch5ngbu chojik kaep'yZin e kwanhan pgpkyu," July 22, 
1961. 
29. The Ministry of Reconstruction was replaced by the Ministry of 
Construction in May 1961 and made responsible for long-range planning, 
resource budgeting, national construction work, regional development, etc. 
The Economic Development Council was absorbed into the Ministry. 
30. This group of civilian advisers contacted government officials, BOK 
staff, and business associations for inputs of data and opinions. At the 
same time, they made use of the previously prepared but unimplemented 
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plan of the Chang Myon regime. For details, see S~k-chun Cho, "Han'­
guk kunsa ch~ngbu," p. 103. 
31. The Military Revolution took place on May 16, and the directives 
were handed to the government by civilian advisers on July 18. Ibid., 
p. 105. 
32. David Cole and Young Woo Nam, p. 34. 
33. Consideration of alternative planning models began nearly two years 
before the plan was fnali2ed. Ibid., p. 19. 
34. See ROK, The Ser.ond Five-Year Development Plan, 1967-1971, 
pp. 122-128.
 
35. This proposal was not implemented immediately, I-ut deferred until 
the end of the plan period when the Korea Development Institute was 
established. 
36. Working committees can be classified into two broad categories­
those committees dealing with macro aspects of the plan and those dealing 
with specific industrial projects. Members included government officials, 
scholars, businessmen, bank staff, researchers, and foreign advisers. 
37. This council was established in December 1963 to advise the Pre­
sident regarding important policy decisions on economic development and 
the promotion of science. 
38. See David Cole and Young Woo Nam, pp. 36-37. 
39. ROK, The Third Five-Year Economic Developtment Plan, 1972-1976, 
p. 1. 
40. David Cole and Young Woo Nam, p. 35. 
41. Lawrence Westphal and Irma Adelman, "Reflections on the Political 
Economy of Planning: the Case of Korea," in Sung Hwan Jo and Seong 
Yawng Park, eds., Basic Documents and Selected Papers of Korea's Third 
Five-Year Economic Development Plan(1972-1976) (Seoul, 1972), p. 24. 
42. This committee was established in March 1969 to advise the DPM. 
It consists of vice ministers and heads of government agencies, representa­
tives of national banking institutions, representatives of business associa­
tions, and scholars. It included a USAID official as an observer. The 
committee is chaired by the vice minister of EPB. The Lommittee can 
organize working groups when necessary to work out details of the plan. 
Actually, these working groups formulated plans which were finally adjus­
ted by the Coordinating Committee. 
43. This committee was established to assist the prime minister in 
setting basic directions and taking important policy measures in the 
formulation of the plan. Te committee consists of all ministers, heads 
of national banking ins.itutions, business association heads, scholars, 
representatives of journalists' associations, labor associations, etc. 
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45. Westphal and Adelman, p. 18. 
46. Ibid., p. 17. 
47. Ibid., p. 20. 
48. ROK, Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan, 1967-1971 
(Seoul, July 1966), p. 122. 
49. For documentation, see the section entitled "Executive Supremacy" 
in Chitoshi Yanaga, Big Business in Japanese Politics (New Haven, 1968), 
pp. 103-107.
 
50. Ibid., p. 105. 
51. Data provided by Secretariat of the National Assembly. By period, 
the share of passed legislation initiated by the executive branch is: 
Rhee regime (May 1948-Apiil 1960) 62.5% 
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The goveriament-initiated share of economic legislation after 1972 w.,s 
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52. For an analysis along these lines, see Tong-sZ Pak, "Haengj~ng kwa 
ch-ngch'i," in Han'guk haengi'ng u-iy-ksaj-k punsk, 1948-1967 (Seoul, 
1969), pp. 61-71. 
53. Chitoshi Yanaga, pp. 100-101. 
54. For example, see Saul Ky'ngje Sinmun, June 10, 1977. 
55. We cannot vouch for all the details of this story, but feel it is a 
plausible reflection of the way things are done. See S'-ul Ky'ongje Sinmun, 
January 16, 1974. 
56. The magic number of 10 is said to have been decided on th "objec­
tive" grounds that it was the number of such leading companies in Japan. 
57. Translation based on article reported in Soul Ky'6ngje Sinmun, 
Aup,,,-t 31, 1977. 
58. Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1968). 
59. Philip Trezise and Yukio Suzuki, "Politics, Government and Eco­
nomic Growth in Japan," in Asia's New Giant: How the JapaneseEco
nomy Works, (pp. 753-812), ed. Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky 
(Washington, 1976), p. 756. 
60. For a summary, see Patrick and Rosovsky, pp. 48-49. 
61. Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
62. For example, see "Korea, Inc.-'Volcano With the Lid On,'" Busi­
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64. Eugene Kaplan, Japan: The Government-Business Relationship 
(Washington, 1972), p. 16. 
65. Ibid., p. 15. 
66. For one version of the meeting, see Yong-wan Kim, "Kutt-ae kI 
ildul" (Memoirs), Dong-A Ilbo, May 12, 1976. 
67. Ai.do, Yoshio, "Zaikai no Chii to Yakuwari," Ekonomisuto (Decem­
ber 1957), p. 16. Quoted in: Chitoshi Yanaga, p. 32. 
68. Han'guk Muy~k Hy6phoe, Muy-ok yon'gan (Seoul, 1974). 
69. For a description of the Japanese manifestation, see Chitoshi Yanaga, 
pp. 12-13. 
70. Contrary to expectations, "direct formal impersonal appeals" rank 
much higher than "direct informal personal appeals." This may be due to 
response bias. 
71. Small firms rate the government more favorably only on controlling 
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1. Eli F. Heckscher, An Economic History of Sweden (Cambridge,
 
Mass., 1954), p. 10.
 
2.Jawaharal Nehru, quoted in Albert Waterston "A Hard Look at
 
Development Planning" in Economic Development: Readings in Theory
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Lindbloom, pp. 106-109. 
9. Koopmans and Montias, p. 58. 
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28. Wontack Hong, "Trade, Distortions and Employment Growth in 
Korea," (Seoul, 1977). 
29. The omissions, however, may be even greater in the 1950s than in 
402
 
Notes to ChapterFour,pp. 92-103 
the 1960s, because data on tax and tariff exemptions were not available 
until 1962. 
30. For a similar story of the "push" effects of exchange-rate reform, 
see Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development: Social Goals Private 
Inc entives (Cambridge, Mass., 1967). 
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(Seoul, 1975). 
40. Liabilities over Net Worth. BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 
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special banks, and other private members designated by the President. 
See Article 49 of The President's Emergency Measure Regarding Economic 
Stability and Growth, August 3, 1972. 
51. Ibid., Article 50. 
52. Ibid., Article 51. 
53. Ibid. 
54. Until nationalization in both countries in the first half of the 1970s. 
55. Jorgen Lotz and Elliot Morss, "Measuring 'Tax Effort' in Developing 
Countries," in I. Al. F. Staff Papers,November 1967, pp. 478-499. 
56. For a more sophisticated measure of tax effort, see Roy W. Bahl. "A 
Regression Approach to Tax Effort and Tax Ratio Analysis," in I. M. F. 
Staff Papers, November 1971, pp. 570-612. 
57. Raja J. Chelliah, "Trends in Taxation in Developing Countries," in 
1. Al. F. Staff Papers,July 1971, pp. 254-331. 
58. Chosen Ilbo, July 24, 1976. 
59. Sul Kyngje Sininun, September 12, 1976. 
60. Our description of non-tariff barriers is based on Frank, Kim, and 
Westphal, pp. 37-38, 48-49, 58-63. 
61. Ibid., p. 59. 
62. See Appendix B, p. 353. 
63. Dong-A lbo, September 16, 1974. 
64. See Appendix B, pp. 354-357 for a wider treatment of this episode 
and the Hyundai Group as a whole. 
65. The Law for the Promotion of the Capital Market, Article 1. 
66. Hy6ng-yun Pyin, "Inp'tlle angjin kwa anj-nghwa kiban 'ii siryon" 
in tHan'guk kyngje chzngch'aek samsimny'un sa, edited by Chn'guk 
Kygngjein Yinhaphoe (Seoul, 1975). 
67. Soon Chough, "The Economics of Price Supervision," Seoul National 
University Economic Review, December 1968, pp. 51-70. 
68. Ibid., p. 59. 
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69. Chosen Ilbo, February 7, 1974. 
70. Kyu- k Yi, Sijang kujo wa tokkwajom kyuje (Seoul, 1977). 
71. Siul Sinmnun, July 1, 1977. 
72. Appendix B, pp. 361-365. 
73. Myrdal, p. 66. See also pp. 891-900. 
74. Myrdal uses the term "strong state" as the antonym to "soft state" 
(ibid., p. 898), but we prefer "hard state" as more direct and accurate. 
75. Ibid., p. 67. 
76. Ibid., p. 895 (emphasis added). 
77. See Appendix B, pp. 357-358, and Chapter 8, p. 284. 
78. See Chapter 4, pp. 82-83. 
79. The mean difference between the response on "Friendly persuasion" 
and "Incentives and privileges" is statistically significant at the 95% level, 
but narrower pairings (e.g., "Moral ex:l.crt.,rion" vcrsus s'Incentives and 
privileges") are not. Large firms, not surprisingly, report greater use of all 
mechanisms, but the differences (large versus small) are significant in only 
two cases. Similarly, export firms generally report a higher level of com­
pliance effort, but the differences (export versus domestic) :-re in no case 
significant. 
80. It is pedantic to report that these differences are statistically signifi­
cant, but it is worth noting that this is one of the few opinion questions on 
our survey in which "eyeballing" confirmed significance. Compare the 
responses to the questin on the helpfulness of various government poli­
cies (Chapter 3, pp. 74-77) where the present government is shown superior 
to the Rhee regime, but only by a statistical test. Responses to the imple­
mentation question are similar for large and small firms, exporters and 
domestic producers, and Seoul and provincial enterprises. 
81. See Table 22. 
82. Myrdal, p. 921. 
83. Montek Ahluwalia, "Income Inequality: Some Dimensions of the 
Problem," in Resdistributionwith Growth (pp. 3-37), ed. Hollis Chenery, 
(London, 1974), p. 14. 
FIVE PublicEnterprises 
1. This chapter is largely a summary of another book by one of the 
co-authors. Extracts are often taken verbatim without citation, and factual 
information not footnoted here is generally from this source. See Leroy 
P. Jones, Public Enterprise and Economic Development: The Korean Case 
(Seoul, 1976). 
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2. Indeed, in extreme cases, such as Indonesia's Pertamina, the size of 
the public enterprise and the political power of its chief executive may 
make it even less subject to government control. 
3. We exclude local government enterprises-largely water works­
which contribute only about three-tenths of one percent of GDP. We also 
omit defense industries run by the military, since no published informa­
tion is available. 
4. Residency General plus regular Korean government. From 1905­
1910, Korea was administered by the Residency General which, after 
1910, was called the Government General. 
5. Government General of Tyosen, Annual Report on Administration 
of Tyosen: 1936-37 (Keizyo (Keijo-), December 1937), pp. 56, 59. 
6. Ibid., p. 57. 
7. Ho Chin Choi, Economic History of Korea, p. 304. 
8. Ibid., pp. 301-304. 
9. Park Chung Hee, The Country, the Revolution, and 1, p. 47. 
10. Park Chung Hee, OurNation s Path, p. 218. 
11. See Indian Institute of Management at Bangalore, Overview of Pub­
lic EnterpriseSector in India (Bangalore, 1976), Appendix Table 4. 
12. Frederic Pryor, "Public Ownership: Some Quantitative Dimensions," 
in Public Enterprise (pp. 3-22) edited by William G. Shepherd (Lexington, 
1976). 
13. Direct plus indirect domestic linkages are theoretically superior 
measures, but at this level of generality yield similar results, and present 
purposes do not warrant the greater expository detail. 
14. As measured by the ratio of capital stock to wage bill at the 117 
sector level in 1977. 
SIX PrivateEntrepreneurship:Sources of Expansion 
1. Gross domestic product in constant 1970 prices less shares originat­
ing in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, government, ad public enterprise. 
Public enterprise data as in Chapter 5, extrapolated from 1974/1975 to 
1976 and from 1963/1964 to 1961. Other figures from: EPB, Macjor 
Statisticsof Korean Economy, 1977, pp. 26, 29. 
2. J. A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (Cani­
bridge, Mass., 1934), p. 74. 
3. Hirschman, Strategy ofEconomic Development, p. 27. 
4. For a more elaborate exposition of the supply versus demand formu­
lation, as well as an excellent survey of the literature, see Peter Kilby, 
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"Hunting the Heffalump," in Entrepreneurshipand Economic Develop­
ment, ed. Peter Kilby (New York, 1971), pp. 1-40. 
5. This is probably an overstatement, since there was a recession in 
1975. It was, however, a Korean recession, meaning a real growth rate 
of 8.3%. This is not a dramatic deviation from the long-run 10% mean 
growth rate, but the resulting profit squeeze would be much more drama­
tic. Note that the 13% exit rate for our sample in 1975 is much lower 
than the rates implicit in Table 28 of 30% in 1967 (a recession year) 
and 25% in 1968 and 1969. Part of the difference might be due to a time 
trend (with a higher exit rate expected in the more fragile economy of 
the 1960s), but we believe most of the gap is explained by differences in 
the size of sampled firms. Table 28 covers all corporations and joint­
stock companies, while Table includes only those with29 more than 50 
workers. As will be shown below (Table 30) smaller firms are much more 
vulnerable than larger firms and their exit rate is probably much much 
higher. 
6. See Kyo~ng-i Yi, "Chung so kio-p," in Han'guk kyongjeron, eds. 
HyZng-yun Py6n and Yun-hwan Kim (Seoul, 1977), p. 486. 
7. Note that this average conceals a much higher rate of increase in 
proprietorships through 1969 and an actual decline thereafter. 
8. There are, of cour e, many new young entrepreneurs replacing older 
ones. The point, howev .r, is that the net addition to the stock has been 
only a minor source of growth. 
9. Schumpeter, p. 34. 
10. Ibid., p. 66 (emphasis added). 
11. See Kilby, p. 3. 
12. The mean annual reported growth of productive capacity of our 196 
sample firms (less those 6 established in 1974) was 32%, while the median 
was 16%. 
13. Schumpeter, pp. 74-75. 
14. Kilby, p. 26. 
15. Harvey Leibenstein, "Entrepreneurship and Development," Ameri­
can Economic Review (May 1968), pp. 72-92. 
16. This is the major area in which the "no-response" problem is serious 
(see Appendix C). We have rc!atively few observations on early establish­
ments and very few on early expansions. Accordingly, we are unable to 
cross-correlate by size and date, and often unable to distinguish pre-1962 
from 1963-1968 events. 
17. This sample is even smaller than those reported elsewhere in this 
section, as this question was inadvertently left off the "reduced form" 
questionnaire. 
18. See Table 31 and pp. 177-178. 
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19. For additional discussion of size bias, see Chapter 3. pp. 75-77, and 
this chapter, pp. 190-192. 
20. In aggregate, for establishment only. Expansion data and breakdown 
by size, locus of sales, and time are discussed, but are not presented in 
tabular form for lack of space. 
21. Note that we have few observations in the Rhee period, so that what 
is being compared is early and late Park. Comparing Rhee and Park would 
presumably yield quite a different time trend. 
22. The larger role of private companies is not just a function of the 
advantage of size, but also reflects the greater likelihood of large com­
panies being members of chaeb~l groups and thus receiving cross-financing. 
23. Here again, it is unfortunate that we cannot distinguish between the 
pre- and post-1962 periods. 
24. It is regrettable that our sample was too small to test changes within 
the pre-1962 period. We had origir.ally broken our data down into pre­
1962, 1963-1969 and post-1969, to correspond to stagnation, growth­
initiation and sustained-growth periods. Too few pre-1962 observations 
forced us to merge the first two periods. 
25. For an early suggestion of this approach, see F. Harbison, "Entre­
preneurial Organization as a Factor in Economic Development," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, August 1956, pp. 364-379. For more recenta 
application, see John Harris, "Industrial Entrepreneurship in Nigeria" 
(PhD dissertation, Northwestern University, 1967). We also draw heavily 
on Kilby, "Hunting the Heffalump,"; Leibenstein "Enterpreneurship and 
Development"; and Leibenstein, Economic Backwardness and Economic 
Growth (New York, 1963), pp. 112-143. 
26. The specification of a "standard unit" of entrepreneurial time is 
cumbersome, but is identical with that necessary in any labor market 
where quality changes. For an alternative specification of quantity, sec 
Leibenstein, Economic Backwardness andEconomic Growth, pp. 122. 
27. These are further dampened by the definition of rent as the present 
value of a future stream, but these will be affected by expectations so the 
moving average concept is necessary. 
28. See Chapter 7. 
29. Hirshnan, Strategy of Economic Development, p. 7. 
30. Strictly, we should say changes in the entrepreneurial market rather 
than changes in prices in other markets. The perception gap (DPTD-DPR) 
is on the demand side, but is narrowed by events within the entrepre­
neurial market. We say "supply side" in the text for rhetorical convenience 
at the summary stage. 
31. Except in the formalistic sense of the price duel of the quantity of 
information. 
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SEVEN PrivateEntrepreneurship:Supply 
1. Jai Hi Choi, "Traditional Values of Korea and Problems of Moderni­
zation," in Report of InternationalConference on the Problems of Mod
ernization in Asia, (Seoul, 1966), p. 82. 
2. For a summary, see Everett Hagen, The Economics of Development 
(Homewood, Illinois, 1968), pp. 221-227. Schumpeter, n.1, p. 81. 
3. In an interview, response bias renders meaningless answers on 
parental class. Class can be obtained for a given individual by geneological 
investigation techniques, but this is well beyond the scope of our current 
effort. See Appendix C for elaboration. 
4. When Koreans speak of province of origin, they generally refer 
not to place of birth but to kohyang which can mean place of birth, 
ancestral orgin, or place where raised. This, however, is aone was vague 
and imprecise term, and for comparative purposes we follow other Korean 
sociological studies in using place of birth. 
5. See note h to Table 37. 
6. The distribution of each elite is significantly different from that of 
its cohort (5% level, X2 test). 
7. Note that, since we are dealing with stocks rather than flows, it is 
possible that the current regime has ippointed a disproportionate number 
of Ky~ngsang natives. A breakdown of our entrepreneurial sample by year 
of establishment provides little support for this view. Firms established 
prior to 1962 were 24% from Ky 6ngsang province; those from 1963­
1968, 31%; and from 1969-1975, 25%. Also note 
that 31% of the vested
 
properties from the Japanese period were in Ky'ngsang province (Chapter
 
2, Table 7). 
8. It would be desirable to push the analysis one step deeper by com­
paring the distribution of the elites to that of the college-educated popula­
tion. Unfortunately, we can find no data on the place of birth of college 
graduates. Given the results of our education section below, we would 
expect a high correlation between provincial representation in elites and the 
degree of educational attainment. 
9. We ignore the foreign-born group where the number of observations 
is too small for the distortion factors to be significant. 
10. There are also significant differences in age and family size. The 
former is small enough to be ignored (2.5 years), and we are at a loss to 
explain the latter. 
11. We say "appears," because we have had to rely on sequential partial 
correlation analysis rather than simultaneous multiple regression. A more 
rigorous test of the hypothesis would require a larger sample size as well 
as linked observations on the set of non-entrepreneurs. 
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12. Gustav F. Papanek, "The Development of Entrepreneurship," 
American Economic Review, Supplement, May 1962, pp. 45-58. 
13. Y.A. Sayigh, Entreprenevrsof Lebanon (Cambridge, Mass. 1962). 
14. Clifford Geertz, Peddlersand Princes (Chicago, 1965). 
15. Balwant Nevaskar, Capitaligts lt'ithout Capitalism (Westport, Conn., 
1971). 
16. There are, however, numerous minority sects founded by charismatic 
leaders whose followers operate sometimes substantial business ventures. 
The workers receiving little or no compensation, substantial profits accrue 
to the benefit of the faith or the leader, or both. Internationally, the best 
known of these groups is the Reverend Sun Myung Moon's Unification 
Church, whose substantial Korean holdings produce ginseng-based con­
sumer goods and textiles. Much l2rger is T'ae-sn Pak's Changno sect 
which operates 2 industrial parks producing textiles, candy, and other 
consumer goods. 
17. See top of Table 42. 
18. Note that males are much less likely to report religious influence 
than females (compare lines I-C and I-D of Table 42) so that the relevant 
base group is males rather than the population as a whole. 
19. By "medium" landowner we mean those respondents who classed 
their fathers as "owner-operators" holding an average of 3.3 chongbo (a 
ch4'ngbo is a little less than one hectare). 
20. Ban, Moon and Perkins, p. 294. 
21. Ki Hyuk Park et al, A Study of Land Tenure System in Korea 
(Seoul, 1966), p. 58. 
22. There are two sources of bias in this result. The first arises from use 
of the 1930 cohort as the basis of comparison. Given the rapid change 
during the 1930s, using 1940 data would have yielded a higher share of 
the cohort in these occupations. Since only a truncated version of the 
1910 census was printed (giving occupation by industry but not by func­
tion), no exact figures are available, but the distortion is undoubtedly 
small, particularly since tenancy increased during the period. It would be 
most surprising if the 15% figure in 1930 grew to 20% in 1940, and our 
basic story is not materially affected. A more serious source of bias is 
respondent exaggeration. This is likely primarily in the "owner-operator" 
class. No respondent claimed a parent in the mixed tenant/owner-operator 
group (which represented 8% of the population), and it is possible this is 
due to exaggeration. Taking outside estimates of both sources of bias, 
our statement could be modified to "98% came from groups representing 
up to 25% of society." The limited social mobility remains apparent. 
23. A number of other studies have inquired into parental backgrounds, 
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but most do not publish results with sufficient detail to be useful (e.g.,
listing simply "farming" as a category). 
24. It should be noted that this conclusion applies only to medium­
and large-scale industrial entrepreneurs. Hagen Koo's study of petty
traders, shopkeepers, and small manufacturers in Ch'nju led into the 
conclusion that "small business constitutes the most significant avenue of 
upward social mobility opening the greatest opportunities for manual 
workers to move into non-manual occupations." Hagen Koo, "Small 
Entrepreneurship in Developing Society,"a (Memphis State University, 
rnimeo, 1976), p. 15. 
25. Only 32% of public-enterprise managers were actually from SNU,
but 38% of the non-military academy managers came from there. 
26. Man-Gap Lee, "Sociological Implications of Modernization in 
Korea" (Seoul, undated mimeo). 
27. Hiroshi Mannari, The Japanese Business Leaders (Tokyo, 1974), 
pp. 85-86. 
28. Chong-gi Paek and Yong-jung Pak, Chaebolsamsimny 5n sa i ti-rama 
(Seoul, 1976), p. 30. 
29. This would be further supported if it could be shown that a dispro­
portionate number of the first sons were also first children. We failed to 
ask this question, as we initially accepted the prevailing stereotype that 
only male birth order mattered. 
30. John Harris has taken the first step in developing the framework for 
a maximization-based model of entrepreneurial supply. However, the 
model requires specification before testable hypotheses can be derived 
from it. Nonetheless, the present effort stimulated by Harris's workwas 

and follows him in 
 spirit. John Harris, "Entrepreneurship and Economic 
Development," (Cambridge, MIT. Economics Department Working Paper
69, April 1971). Reprinted in Essays in Honor of Harold F. Williamson, 
e lited by L. Cain and P. Uselding (Kent State University Pres-, 1973). 
31. Ibid., p. 23. 
32. Larger companies' chief executives reported working an average of
 
57 hours versus 55 
 for smaller firms, and the difference was significant at 
the 10% level. Other differences were not significant for export versus 
domestic, young versus old, etc. 
33. See Chapter 4, pp. 101-104 for a discussion of the capitai market 
and leveraging. 
34. Schumpeter, p. 93.
 
35.Geertz, 
 pp. 149-151. A fifth hypothesis deals with the nature of 
the entrepreneurial function. 
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EIGHT PrivateEconomic Power: 
Problems, Policies,and Prospects 
1. A second problem with business concentration is that technical and 
allocative efficiency may be reduced by intermarket exploitation (e.g., 
through transfer pricing, and extending the scope for oligopolistic col­
lusion). We leavt this aspect of the problem to others. For a path-breaking 
approach to this question, see Richard Caves and Masu Uekusa, Industrial 
Organization in Japan (WVashington, 1976), especially Chapter 4, "The 
Role of Intermarket Groups". 
2. Yanaga, p. 38. 
3. Johannes Hirschmeier and Tsunehiko Yui, iheDevelopment of 
Japanese Business: 1600-1973 (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), p. 187. 
4. Ibid., p. 187. 
5. The others coalesced around the large banks. For a survey of keiret­
su, see K. Bieda, The Structure and Operation of the Japanese Economy 
(Sydney, 1970), pp. 210-221. 
6. Hirschmeier and Yui, p. 264. 
7. Caves and Uekusa, p. 2. The only vaguely quantitative statement 
we could find on the contemporary scene is Bain's assertion that "Mit­
subishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo control about 40% of Japan's big business, 
even excluding loosely affidiat~d firms." With "control" and "big business" 
undefined, this is of no help. Joe Bain, InternationalDifferences in In­
dustrialStructure (New Haven, 1966), p. 88. 
8. 1960 GNP in constant 1975 dollars was about $10 billio, in Pakistan 
and $48 billion in India compared with $20 billion in Korea in 1975. 
(From IBRD, World Bank Atlas. Washington, 1977). Manufacturing was 
28% of GNP in Korea in 1975, and we assume a share of 10 or 15% in 
India and Pakistan. 
9. One conspicuous exception is the Sam Ho Group that was one of the 
three largest chaebol in the early 1960s but now does not even appear on 
our list of the top 45. 
10. For example: Yong-nok Kim, "Han'guk Ki'6pka ch'6ngsin Thipan­
song," Sasanggye (August 1964); S~ng-du Kim, Chaebll kwa pin'gon 
(Seoul, 1965); Wan-hy~k Pu, "Chaeb'ol kwa ogaeny~n kyehoek," Sa­
sanggye (August 1966); Chang-ny'61 Yi, "Chaeb~l iran mu'6t in'ga?" 
Sindo.nga, November 1966; Man-gi Yi, Han'guk kyngjeron ?leoul, 1973); 
and P,/bng-yun Pak, "Han'guk i chaeb'61," Sindonga, December 1975. 
11. Kyong-Dong Kim "Political Factors in the Formation of the Entre­
4 6 9 preneurial Elite in South Korea," Asian Survey (May 1976), p. . 
12. Leibenstein, Econonic Backwardness and Economic Growth, 
pp. 111-119. 
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13. Ibid., pp. 117-118. 
14. Yf'ng-nok Kim, pp. 37-38. Emphasis added. 
15. Kyong-Dong Kim, p. 468. 
16. S-ng-du Kim, pp. 23-24. 
17. Joungwon Kim, p. 152. 
18. Ibid., p. 157. 
19. Kyong-Dong Kim, p. 464. 
20. For a more detailed development of this process and its policy 
implications, see KDi, "Ki4"p clh'ngch'aek -ii kibon panghyang," (Seoul, 
March 1974). 
21. For example, see Kyong-Dong Kim, p. 473. 
22. The Special Law for Dealing with Illicit Wealth Accumulation of 
April 17, 1961. 
23. Issued o-i May 28, 1961. 
24. At the 1962 demand price from Table 12. 
25. Article 1 of the law. According to the bank's estimate, A and B 
groups together own 648 pieces of non-operating real estate amounting 
to 18,290,000 p'y 'ng (one p'y' ng is approximately equivalent to 4 
square yards). Its estimated value is 42 billion won or 87 million dollars. 
Reported in S~iul Ky5ngje Sinmun, December 28, 1975. 
26. Article 50 of the law. 
27. According to the Presidential Implementation Order for the law, 
the level was set as follows: in case of business firms, the amount is 1 
billion wo'n, and in case of individuals, it is 100 million won. (Article 
38 of the Implementation Order). 
28. See Chapter 4, pp. 130-132. 
NINE Summary 
1. First Economic White Book of 1884 as reported in Hirschmeier and 
Yui, p. 77. 
APPENDIX A Case Studies of Small and 
Mediu n Enterprises 
1. First Economic White Book of 1884 as reported in Hirschmeier and 
the additional cost (100,000 won/month) of a driver is part of the normal 
expense of operating a car. 
2. Ethnographic note: Although many Koreans, particularly successful 
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ones, are noisy, flamboyant, and inclined to arrogance, the Confucian 
ideal of restraint, dignity, and inner integrity is still widely respected. 
3. Although this case perhaps does not strictly qualify as small in­
dustry, it is included because I have a great deal of accurate information 
about Mr. Lee, and in a very general sense his path to success is not 
atypical of the whole period since the Korean War. 
4. In Korea such shops are heavily manned, with a couple of young 
apprentices for every mechanic. 
5. Most of this "sensitive" information was told to me by age mates of 
Mr. Lee from the same village who had also migrated to Inch'Zn or Seoul. 
6. His reputation at home was not high, because he had gotten into 
trouble for cutting firewood on other people's land and poaching fish 
from others' traps. 
7. This policy was changed in the late 1960s. 
8. Mr. Hwang was generally vague and evasive about money amounts. 
9. This phrase is heard fairly frequently as a description of ambition or 
the motivation to succeed. It contrasts with the resigned acceptance of 
one's assigned role in society or before the misfortunes dealt out by fate 
or circumstance. It is not entirely praiseworthy under traditional Confu­
cian canons of'behavior. 
APPENDIX B Chiaeb l Case Studies 
1. In terms of 1975 value added. See Table 55. 
2. References used for this company are as follows: 1) YW'ng-gu Cho, 
ed., Ky'ngs~ng Pangjik osimnyZ$n, 1919-1969 (Seoul, 1969); 2) Ki-jun 
Cho, Han'guk ki~pka sa; 3) Yn-su Kim, "Chaegyc hoego" reported in 
Sul Ky'dngje Sinmun during the period of January 8-July 31, 1975; 
4) Smmyang osimnyon (Seoul, 1974); 5) Ky5ng-nam YiHan .uk.ikipka, 
vol. 1 (Seoul, 1973); and 6) various newspaper articles. 
3. Ki-jun Cho, p. 257. 
4. Ibid., pp. 261-267. 
5. His family owned about 900 chZSngbo of rice paddy and 380 ch'6ng­
bo of dry land. 
6. Information included in this section comes from a variety of sources 
including: 1) interview with PyZng.ch' l Yi; 2) Yi's memoir reported in 
Sul Kyngje Sinmun during the period of April 7-July 26, 1976; 3) Kinji 
Yajima, Challenge of Korean Economy (Tokyo, 1977); 4) Ky'6ng-nam 
Yi, Han'guk U-i kiopka, Vol 1; 5) company-provided data; and 6) "Sam­
sdng Kujung," Hy ndae Ky6ngyt~ng, March 1977. 
7. Internationally, the group would rank 293rd in Fortune's list of 
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"the 500 Largest Industrial Corporations Outside the U.S." based on 
sales. Fortune,August 1976, p. 237. 
8. Yi's memoir reported in Saul Ky 6ngje Sinmnun, July 26, 1976. 
9. The domestic trading was carried by the Samsung Sanghoeout 

established in 1938. A part of the trading was 
sales of Korean products, 
e.g., fruits and dried fish to Manchuria. 
10. The wholesale price index increased 150% from 1951 to 1952 and 
217% from 1952 to 1953. 
11. In 1976, Cheil Wool Textile Co., Ltd. and Cheil Synthetic Textile 
Co., Ltd.-its sister company established in 1972-together exported U.S. 
$53 million worth of textile products. 
12. He purchased 85% of HiIng~p (today's Hanil), nearly 50% of Cho-
Hcung, and 30% of Commercial Bank of Korea. 
13. Chin-hy n Kim, p. 172. 
14. There was another person whose illicitly accumulated wealth was 
higher than Mr. Yi, but that was largely the result of illegal foreign 
exchange flight. 
15. The official reason was the difficulty of getting foreign loans. 
16. Various sources were used for this section. They include: 1) inter­
views with Chu-ybng Chang; 2) data provided by the group; 3) Kytng­
nam Yi, Han'guk "i kiopka, Vol. 2, (Seoul, 1976); and 4) various news­
paper reports. 
17. Table 55 gives Lucky as slightly larger than Hyundai, but, given the 
crudeness of our estimates, the difference is hardly significant. See Table 
B-3 for detailed quantitative estimates of Hyundai's activities. 
18. The brother remains the number-two man in the group as of this 
writing. 
19. Ninety-nine kilometers in length, including 39 bridges. 
20. Based on Hyundai projects reported in Application for Prequalifica­
tion (Seoul, Hyundai Construction, Co., Ltd.). 
21. See Chapter 4, pp. 119-120 for President Park's role. 
22. Sources of information for this section include: 1) interviews with 
Mr. Cho; 2) data provided by the group; 3) Kyong-nam Yi, Han'guk 
Ui ki3'pka, Vol. 1; ard 4) various newspaper articles. "
23. Data sources include: 1) company-provided data; 2) "Taeu kurup" 
in Hyondae Kyongy3'ng, May 1977; 3) interviews with Vok-chong Kim, 
Co-President of the 3roup; and 4) various newspaper articles. 
APPENDIX C EntrepreneurshipSurvey 
1. Appendixes A and B. 
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Notes to Appendix C, pp. 366-3 70 
2. Han'guk Saengsansong Ponbu (KPC), Han'guk kio'p ch'ongnam 
(Seoul, 1975). 
3. There is undoubtedly some under-enumeration in the KPC data, but 
we know of no reason to expect it to be substantial. The Economic Plan­
ning Board's Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, 1973 lists 
3,291 manufacturing establishments with more than 50 workers. If 1 in 7 
enterprises consists of an average of 3 establishments, then the results are 
consistent. 
4. Except Ch"lla provinces which were covered by two KDI research 
assistants. 
5. The questions included in this questionnaire are indicated in Appen­
dix D. 
6. Valu- added was calculated indirectly by using reported profits, 
non-profit value added, and sales coefficients from the 340-sector BOK 
10 table for 1973. 
7. The somewhat higher asset t value (0.77) is discounted because of 
vintage pricing distortions. 
8. By way of contrast, compare the "response" and "could not re­
spond" sets. Here we also cannot reject the null hypothesis, but the differ­
ences in the meanis are so palpable and the t value so high that neither do 
we accept it. 
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